internal/tools/minimax wraps MiniMax's v2/video_generation (submit)
and v2/query/video_generation/{id} (poll) endpoints. Generation is
asynchronous on MiniMax's side but archie's tool subsystem has no
async-tool flow control (ToolEntry.IsAsync carries no flow control
today), so GenerateAndWait blocks the calling goroutine -- a tool
call, not the model's own generating goroutine -- submitting and
polling until the job reaches a terminal status or MaxWait elapses.
The poll loop tracks elapsed time purely from its injected Sleep
calls rather than a real time.Now() deadline, so a test that fakes
Sleep as an instant counter also makes the loop terminate instantly
instead of spinning in real wall-clock time.
Text-to-video only for now; image-to-video (image_url content items)
is a schema-and-routing change this can grow into. The tool returns a
tools.MultimodalResult carrying the video as a URLs entry -- the
shared envelope the gateway wiring downstream turns into a delivered
attachment.
MultimodalResult only modeled local bytes written under SubdirHint
(Files). A tool whose media lives at a remote, already-hosted URL --
a generation API's result, for example -- had nowhere to put it.
MediaRef{Type, URL} and the new URLs field give it one, reusing the
existing envelope rather than forking a second convention for the
same concept.
The dashboard has no inline media rendering path yet
(archie-core-1786748942243-6-f109697e). chatStreamSink.Media degrades
a MediaEvent to a link appended to the delta stream -- the same
fallback Telegram's liveReply uses when its own SendMedia call fails
-- rather than the event reaching nowhere.
telegramMediaSender routes a MediaAttachment to the matching Bot API
method (sendVideo/sendPhoto/sendAudio/sendDocument) rather than
sendMessage, which cannot carry a file. It is constructed per-launch
from the same *bot.Bot the update handler already has, matching
telegramApprover's lifetime rule: a /restart abandons an in-flight
send against the outgoing bot instance rather than silently
redirecting it through the new one.
liveReply.Media wires TurnStream into this: it checks
gateway.CapabilitiesOf before attempting delivery -- not just on
failure -- so a sender that already knows it cannot deliver a given
media kind never costs a doomed network round trip. Either path
(capability-limited or a failed send) falls back to rendering the
attachment's URL as a visible link, so a generated asset is never
silently dropped.
newMediaSender is an injectable field so tests can prove the
capability check actually short-circuits, since the real Telegram
sender always reports Media: true and can't exercise that path
itself.
Channels had no shared contract for delivering non-text tool output --
MessageEvent/MediaAttachment/MsgVideo existed but nothing produced or
consumed them. MediaSender and CapabilityReporter give a channel an
optional, capability-queryable way to deliver an attachment; TurnStream
gains Media(event) alongside Delta/ToolCall so a tool's media reaches
the channel in the same ordered pass as its text.
CapabilitiesOf takes any deliberately: it must not depend on the
soon-to-be-removed BasePlatformAdapter (archie-core-azbo), since the
live channels implement channels.Channel, not that interface.
Retry used to retain ignored and untracked output from an interrupted attempt, which CommitAll could publish later. Refresh now derives the tracked HEAD shape, removes every other worktree entry outside .git, and fails closed when the configured base cannot resolve.
Worktree RPC used to accept repository coordinates from the sandbox. It now accepts only an opaque per-dispatch grant, and the daemon derives the repository path and branch from grant-owned state.
Repository worktree paths also move from an ambiguous flattened key to encoded owner/repo components. Origin-matched legacy clones migrate safely; mismatched legacy paths are preserved.
Ephemeral task containers re-resolve and re-download npx-launched MCP
server packages from the npm registry on every task, since each task
gets a fresh container with no persistent cache -- a worse amplifier
of a registry outage than the daemon-restart case d4bb914b already
fixed.
Extract the daemon's npm-cache env logic into mcp.NpmCacheEnv, shared
by both the daemon's own long-lived npx MCP servers and archie-agent's
per-task ones. Mount a new archie-cache-mcp-npm Docker volume at
/data/cache/mcp-npm on every task container regardless of ecosystem
(MCP servers are daemon-wide config, not tied to the task repo's
language), and point npx-launched per-task stdio transports at it.
Closes archie-core-qk8m.
A NATS redelivery or restart RecoverTurns redelivery hit the
TurnClaimCompleted branch in TurnRunner.Run and replayed only
turn.ResponseText, never the tool calls that produced it -- neither the
ledger nor the session store persisted them. The transcript showed the
original answer beside a tool-less duplicate, disagreeing about what ran.
TurnRecord now carries ToolCalls, saved in the same call as ResponseText via
a toolCallRecorder that tees Generate's TurnStream. The completed-duplicate
replay walks turn.ToolCalls into stream.ToolCall before replaying the text,
so a redelivered turn narrates the same activity as the original.
The other replay path (prior-reply, matched by conversation history rather
than turn ID) stays deliberately text-only: it exists for the crash race
where the assistant message was saved but the turn record was never
completed, so there is no persisted tool record for it to replay either.
Documented on Run's doc comment rather than left implicit.
Closes archie-core-ippu.
Oversized replies used to split at any newline, which could leave a Telegram message with an open Markdown fence. Fence-aware splitting now moves complete blocks intact or closes and reopens long blocks while keeping every part bounded.
archie-core-7d5u.5 (idempotency and poll/webhook parity): the dedup
mechanism (TaskEnvelope.IdempotencyKey + PublishUnique + JetStream
Nats-Msg-Id dedup) and the shared dispatch predicate were already fully
wired by 7d5u.4. What was missing: proof the dedup actually holds, and
observability for a wedged receiver.
- internal/infrastructure/eventbus/nats/dedup_test.go: regression test
proving PublishUnique suppresses a duplicate publish on the same
WorkQueuePolicy stream ARCHIE_TASKS uses in production.
- internal/forge/webhook/receiver.go: Receiver.Status() tracks
authenticated deliveries separately from successful publishes; a GET
to the receiver's listen address (GitHub only ever POSTs) now returns
it as JSON, so a wedged/non-delivering receiver is observable instead
of indistinguishable from an idle repo.
Poll/webhook parity (disabling webhook still polls) needed no code
change: Cycle()/Run() never reference cfg.Forge.Intake anywhere in
internal/daemon, only setupForgeWebhook gates the webhook HTTP server.
archie-core-h019.1 (design: adversarial self-review stage): one-page
decision at docs/prds/adversarial-self-review.md. Reviewer runs in a
second workspace pointed at a .git-stripped snapshot of the reviewed
commit, never the implementer's worktree, so isolation is a property of
what's mounted rather than a prompt instruction. Findings contract is
workflow.ReviewFinding, owned by internal/domain/workflow. A surviving
error-level finding sets StatusParked, not WaitingHuman -- the epic's
informal wording named two different states in the actual machine; this
resolves which.
Both changes reviewed by a fresh subagent with no memory of the
implementation, per CLAUDE.md's adversarial-verification requirement;
zero blocking findings, two minor coverage gaps closed.
Add [forge] intake = "poll" (default) | "webhook" | "both", and a forge
webhook receiver (internal/forge/webhook) that verifies a GitHub webhook's
HMAC signature, decodes the "issues" event, and publishes a matched issue
through the same path the poller uses -- so a labelled or assigned issue
starts a task the moment it happens instead of waiting up to poll_interval
(bead archie-core-7d5u.4).
The dispatch predicate (workintake.MatchesDispatch/RequiresLabel) is now a
single shared definition consumed by both the poller and the webhook
receiver, so the two cannot drift -- including the empty-label guard from
63d0446 (an empty label must never match every open issue). Assignee
matching is case-insensitive to agree with AssignedIssues' server-side
GitHub filter; label matching stays case-sensitive, since GitHub labels
are case-distinct.
daemon.publishTask is exported as PublishTask, the single enqueue path
now shared by the poller and the webhook intake.
Two failure modes fixed during adversarial self-review before this landed:
a webhook secret that fails to resolve at runtime now degrades (logs and
skips the receiver) instead of aborting the whole daemon -- under
intake="both" the poll exists specifically as a backstop for this exact
misconfiguration, so crashing boot over it defeated its own purpose;
multi-identity deployments ([[identities]]) are explicitly unsupported for
now (webhook intake refuses to start, logs why, and leaves each identity's
own poll loop unaffected) rather than silently matching issues against the
wrong identity's dispatch rules.
Adds t2db.3: schema-by-example field mapping for the no-code playbook epic.
An operator picks a captured event, clicks through its payload to bind named
fields to JSON paths, and previews the resolution against a real event
before saving -- a missing, null, or type-changed path fails loudly (named
by field and event) rather than handing an agent a blank value.
- internal/domain/mapping: Mapping/Field types, path parsing/walking,
Resolve (per-field failure reporting), Validate (incl. duplicate names)
- internal/store/mappings.go: SQLite persistence, mirrors captures.go
- internal/webui/api_mapping.go: CRUD + preview HTTP API
- ui/src/mappings/: dashboard editor (clickable payload tree, live preview)
Design decisions recorded in docs/prds/payload-field-mapping.md. t2db.4
(binding a mapping + matcher to a workflow) is out of scope here.
Wire github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 into production startup so a
single-process deployment gets reaction delivery and task distribution
over an in-process server rather than a separate one
(docs/prds/embedded-nats.md).
Meaning change: [nats].url empty used to mean "no NATS, use the SQLite
ClaimNext flow"; it now means "start an embedded NATS server". The old
behaviour is the explicit opt-out [nats].mode = "off". mode resolves from
url when unset (url set -> external, url empty -> embedded), and
agent.mode="nats" / [containers] now require mode="external" (an embedded
loopback server cannot be reached by agent workers or containers).
The daemon owns the embedded server's lifecycle: StartEmbedded before
dialing the client, Shutdown after the client closes (LIFO cleanups). The
embedded server binds loopback on a random port, enables JetStream in a
store dir under the data directory, and leaves its logger nil so a startup
failure surfaces as a Connect error rather than an os.Exit.
Retention becomes a nats.Config field (default WorkQueuePolicy) so a future
reaction stream can fan out under LimitsPolicy instead of the hardcoded
competing-consumer policy that starves a second consumer on overlapping
subjects.
Adversarial review of the just-shipped event inspector (a8f9f1b) found that
handleCapture's s.emit() call embedded the full (up to CaptureMaxBodyBytes,
default 256KiB) redacted body and headers into the events table's Data
column on every capture. That table has no retention or row-count prune
anywhere in the codebase -- unlike captured_events, whose three disk-bound
mechanics (size cap, rate limit, prune-on-write) this feature exists to
provide. An unauthenticated, rate-limited-only sender could grow the events
table without bound even though captured_events itself stayed correctly
capped, silently defeating docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md's stated
"max_events * max_body_bytes" worst-case guarantee.
Fix: the live "capture" SSE event now carries only {id, source} -- enough
for the dashboard to know something arrived -- and the event inspector
treats it purely as an invalidation signal, refetching GET /api/captures
for the authoritative row data instead of merging partial event fields into
its local list. This also fixes two smaller issues the same review found:
the previous approach's frontend dedup-by-id logic depended on a field
(Data["id"]) no test actually asserted, and received_at differed in
precision between the live-pushed and REST-listed copies of the same row --
both are moot now that the frontend has one source of truth for row data.
Adds GET /api/captures (token-gated, matching the memory/skills
enabled-false-not-an-error convention when Server.Captures is nil) and a
new dashboard page at /captures listing recent inbound captures, newest
first, with per-row expand to explore the redacted payload and headers
pretty-printed.
Live updates reuse the existing operator-activity event pipeline
(Server.emit -> Events.Publish -> the /events SSE stream every other page
already subscribes to) rather than polling or inventing new push
plumbing: handleCapture now emits a Kind "capture" event with the same
field shape the list endpoint returns, so a captured event appears in the
inspector without a manual refresh.
Frontend follows the tasks/task-row.js precedent: row rendering is split
into ui/src/captures/capture-row.js so it can be unit tested without the
page's fetch/SSE wiring.
"Unbound" is shown for every row today since no binding data model exists
yet (t2db.4) -- the column is wired now so that bead only needs to change
what it renders, not add it.
Adds POST /webhooks/capture/{source}: an unauthenticated endpoint (mounted
alongside /healthz, bypassing dashboard token auth by design) that persists
any inbound webhook archie has no binding for yet, so it can be inspected
and mapped later (t2db.2/t2db.3).
docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md decides SQLite over NATS JetStream for
storage: NATS is not unconditionally available until 7d5u.2 ships embedded
support, and capture's single-writer/single-reader access pattern doesn't
need JetStream's fan-out/replay machinery anyway.
internal/store/captures.go adds a captured_events table with prune-on-write
(retention age + row-count cap, both configurable). The HTTP handler applies
webhookguard redaction before persisting, and enforces two more independent
disk-bound mechanics before that: a per-request body-size cap and a
per-remote-address rate limit. New [capture] config section with documented
defaults; all fields optional, capture is on by default.
Adversarial review (manual, after the usual fresh-subagent pass hit a
session API limit mid-run) caught and fixed three real defects before this
landed, each with a regression test confirmed to fail against the pre-fix
code:
- the body-size cap silently no-op'd when CaptureMaxBodyBytes was left
unset, the one bound that limits a single payload's size rather than row
count or write rate
- the rate limiter was keyed by the request's own source path segment --
unregistered and attacker-chosen by design for this endpoint, violating
webhookguard.RateLimiter's documented bounded-key-space assumption and
letting a sender bypass the limit by rotating the segment; rekeyed to
remote address
- the retention prune compared time.RFC3339Nano strings, whose trimmed
variable-width fractional seconds break lexicographic ordering within the
same second; switched to fixed-width RFC3339
Closes archie-core-t2db.1.
Found while investigating an `ineffassign` finding, not a stylistic report:
the branch handling "another connection inserted the same turn between our
read and insert" was discarding its own result.
`result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, ...)` for the INSERT sits inside
`if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { ... }`, a new block scope, with `result`
new to that scope -- so Go's `:=` declares a fresh, block-scoped `err`
shadowing the function's own `err` for the rest of the block, including the
retry read a few lines later (`err = tx.QueryRowContext(...).Scan(...)`).
That assignment landed in the shadow, which goes out of scope at the block's
closing brace. The `if err != nil` check afterward was therefore still
looking at the *original* err -- sql.ErrNoRows from the very first read --
regardless of whether the retry read succeeded. The loser of a genuine
insert race would always return `sessionstore: read turn: %w` wrapping
`sql.ErrNoRows`, contradicting the branch's own comment: "apply the normal
claim state machine instead of surfacing a uniqueness error."
Fix: the insert-path errors are now insertErr, not err, so the retry read's
plain assignment reaches the outer err the later check actually inspects.
Confirmed via careful trace of Go's block-scoping rules that this closes the
gap for the affected!=1 (loser) path without touching the affected==1
(winner) path, which returns from its own separately-scoped err before ever
reaching this one.
Commit the honest limitation along with the fix: a genuine two-connection
concurrent regression test could not be made to hit the exact branch. A
temporary, reverted-before-commit diagnostic (real concurrent race,
artificially widened with a sleep) showed the losing connection instead
fails its own INSERT outright with SQLITE_BUSY_SNAPSHOT under WAL mode with
this driver, before ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING can ever report 0 rows affected
-- meaning the specific branch this bug lived in may be effectively
unreachable via this driver/journal-mode combination today. The shipped
test verifies the weaker, still real property that matters operationally:
many genuinely concurrent same-turn-ID claims across separate connections
never produce the bug's error signature ("sessionstore: read turn:"),
distinct from unrelated SQLITE_BUSY/SQLITE_BUSY_SNAPSHOT lock contention,
which is retried rather than treated as a failure. The fix stands
regardless of provable live reachability -- the shadowing was unambiguous
and wrong on its own terms.
Adversarially reviewed by a fresh subagent, which independently reverted
just the fix (keeping the test) and confirmed empirically -- 20 runs, plus
1000 trials with a debug probe on the affected!=1 branch -- that the branch
is never reached under this driver, corroborating the test's own stated
limitation rather than contradicting it. gocognit/nestif findings on
ClaimTurn are pre-existing on the prior committed baseline, unchanged by
this fix (only variable names moved).
Six mechanical fixes from `golangci-lint run ./...` (30 findings total, 23
deliberately left -- see the next commit's message for the one that grew
into something bigger, and the following note for the rest):
- apply.go: %v -> %w for the wrapped yaml error, matching the identical
double-%w pattern already used in decode.go/discovery.go/loader.go in the
same package (errorlint).
- contract_test.go: filepath.Join("provider.go") with a single argument is a
no-op join; replaced with the literal (gocritic).
- inprocess_test.go, yaegi_test.go: two goroutines whose whole purpose is
timing (does Execute return promptly on cancellation / does Run block
forever), where the call's result is irrelevant -- explicitly discarded
with `_, _ =` and a comment saying why, rather than silently ignored
(errcheck).
- find_test.go: an unchecked os.MkdirAll now matches the file's own
createTestFile helper, which already checks and t.Fatals on the same
operation (errcheck).
Not touched, and why: 18 cyclop/gocognit/gocyclo/funlen/nestif findings
require extracting helpers to reduce complexity -- the exact shape of two
regressions already recorded in CLAUDE.md's Lint-driven changes section
(one from --fix silently dropping a predicate, one from a nestif extraction
that doubled data), so a blind sweep across 9 unfamiliar files was declined
rather than risk a third. 2 godox findings (storage.go, worktree.go) mark
real missing work; deleting the comment would hide debt, not fix it. 3
recvcheck findings (Duration, TaskEnvelope, Provenance) each mix a
mandatory-pointer-receiver method (UnmarshalText/UnmarshalJSON's interface
contract, or genuine mutation) with correctly-value-receiver read-only
methods -- forcing consistency would either break interface conformance or
force pointer receivers onto call sites where the value isn't addressable.
Adversarially reviewed by a fresh subagent: all six confirmed
behavior-neutral or behavior-improving, all touched packages pass -race,
golangci-lint confirms exactly 23 issues remain (not more, not fewer), and
none are new.
archie-core-7d5u.3 -- storage-agnostic building blocks for vetting inbound
webhook-shaped requests, extracted rather than duplicated:
- VerifyHMAC: behavior-preserving extraction of internal/channels/webhook's
private validateHMAC. internal/channels/webhook now calls it instead of
keeping its own copy; all 10 of that package's existing tests still pass
unmodified, and the one now-redundant unit test was removed with a
comment pointing to where its coverage relocated.
- RateLimiter: per-source token bucket. Source IDs come from a registered,
operator-controlled set, not unbounded attacker input, so the bucket map
is not itself bounded -- documented explicitly rather than left implicit.
- RedactPayload: key-name-based redaction, matching gateway/stream.go's
sensitiveParameterKey marker list. Deliberately does NOT reuse that
function's actual behavior: it replaces every string value regardless of
key, correct for a bounded chat summary and wrong here -- a captured
payload exists to be inspected for field mapping (t2db.3), so only values
under a sensitive-looking key are touched.
Narrowed from 7d5u.3's original scope, which bundled capture storage and an
approval state machine into this package. Both moved to the beads that own
that state (t2db.1's capture store depends on 7d5u.2's still-open NATS
storage decision; t2db.4's binding is the only consumer of approval state
today) rather than building shared abstractions ahead of a second real
consumer.
Adversarially reviewed by a fresh subagent with zero surviving findings:
token-bucket math hand-traced on two scenarios and race-clean under -race,
the redaction/gateway-stream.go behavioral divergence verified by reading
both functions side by side, both the redaction and rate-limit guards
mutation-tested by disabling each and confirming the suite catches it.
task check exit 0, golangci-lint 0 issues, gofumpt clean.
A pending update report used to be relayed verbatim. It is entirely
self-reported: scripts/archie-update-watchdog decides "passed" from
`curl -sf $HEALTH_URL/healthz`, which only proves that *a* daemon is
answering, then copies the version the installer *intended*
(ARCHIE_UPDATE_INSTALLED_GATEWAY) into the report. If the new binary
never made it into service, the previous daemon answers the probe just
as happily, so the message read "Update complete: daemon 1.9.8 -> 1.9.0.
Health check passed - archie-core is healthy on the new version" about a
version that was not running. That shipped: /update reported success and
the next task hit the exact bug the update was meant to fix (#468).
Report.Verify now checks the claims against the versions components
report for *themselves* -- archied's compiled-in gatewayVersion, which no
installer can talk it out of -- and partitions every claimed component
into Confirmed, Drift or Unverified.
What changed in MEANING:
- A passed health check used to mean "the new version is running". It
now means only "something answered"; the version claim is a separate,
separately-checked assertion.
- "Update complete ... healthy on the new version" used to be the only
success wording. There are now three outcomes, because collapsing them
is how the false success happened: confirmed, unconfirmed ("I could
not confirm which version is actually running"), and contradicted
("Update did NOT take effect").
- An unverifiable component is NOT a failing one. Absent, empty,
"unknown" (the watchdog's own default) and "dev" (an unstamped build)
all mean "we could not check", never "it is wrong" -- treating them as
drift would turn healthy updates whose bookkeeping went missing into
reported failures.
Verification covers the daemon only, deliberately. archied's compiled-in
runtimeVersion records what its own pipeline stamped, not what the agent
container runs, so vouching for the agent would be the same kind of
guess this change exists to remove. The agent is therefore Unverified on
every successful update, and the success message names it as unchecked
rather than letting the confirmed daemon silently vouch for it.
Drift detail is attached per component: one component can sit on the
version the update meant to replace while another is on some third
version, and a single explanatory sentence would state a falsehood about
one of them.
Regression tests were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix code,
reproducing the exact false-success string, and each new guard was
mutation-tested. The drift-ordering test's component count is
load-bearing and documented: Go rotates small maps rather than permuting
them, so 8 components let an unsorted implementation pass ~12% of the
time while 9 fails it outright.
Refs #522, #468
GitHub's issues-list API treats an empty label filter as no filter at
all, so dispatch.trigger = "label"/"either" with cfg.Label unset
silently returned every open issue in the repo. A live incident
(GH#445) queued 124 unrelated issues in one poll cycle after
[dispatch.labels] -- a different field mapping task states to their
own labels -- was configured while the actual trigger-match label was
left blank.
pollIssuesWithConfig's "label" branch now refuses to poll and logs an
error when cfg.Label is empty; pollEitherWithConfig skips only the
label-side poll in that case, still returning assignee matches.
validateDispatch rejects the same misconfiguration at config-load
time. A per-identity gap remains: identities have no Label field of
their own and share the root's, so an identity overriding
dispatch.trigger to "label" isn't caught by validation -- only by
the runtime guard, which is why the runtime guard matters even with
validation in place.
Fixes archie-core-1786637501009-424-5b8332dd / GH#445.
The chat agent labelled unchecked figures "Verified details" and
fabricated an entire "Hermes gateway" subsystem with invented file
paths, stating both as confirmed fact until directly challenged.
Reword core rule 1 to separate static tool-capability claims (fixed
by the tool list) from dynamic file/memory/action/result claims,
which now must be verified this turn rather than merely "in this
conversation" -- the looser wording let a stale claim be treated as
still verified. Add rules 8 and 9: never label something
verified/confirmed without a this-turn tool check, and never state a
specific system detail (path, subsystem, count, config value) with
confidence unless just retrieved.
Fixes archie-core-3jag / GH#524.
The /update command went silent between "starting" and one final message,
gave no version summary, and required manual intervention on failure.
CommandInstaller now streams the installer script's stdout live instead of
buffering it, and parses a structured result (previous/installed versions,
per-component status) from a sentinel line. Because the reference install
script hands the daemon restart off to a detached systemd unit specifically
so restarting archied.service doesn't kill the process that requested the
update, the outcome is reported in two phases: the synchronous build/install
result comes back through Install() itself, and the post-restart health
check/rollback outcome is written by a new watchdog script and relayed by
whichever archied process boots next, via a small JSON handoff file cleared
once relayed.
Also fixes three defects an adversarial review pass found in the first
draft: the caller's request/handler context was passed straight into the
install child process, so a concurrent /restart or a browser disconnect
could SIGKILL it mid binary-copy; Telegram and the web dashboard each
tracked "install in progress" with their own private flag despite sharing
one Service, allowing two installs to race the same .prev backups; and the
watchdog reported rolled_back:true even when no backup existed to restore,
which would have told an operator to stand down while the daemon was still
broken.
internal/webui gains an unauthenticated /healthz the watchdog polls after
restarting archied.
Agent containers run as root (no USER in the Dockerfile, no
userns-remap), so a commit the agent writes to the bind-mounted
worktree lands owned by UID 0 on the host. The daemon then reads
those same loose objects to push, running as its own non-root host
user, and fails with "openat objects/../..: permission denied".
containerEnv() now passes the daemon's own UID/GID as
WORKTREE_UID/WORKTREE_GID. hybridTrees.Push -- the single point
where a commit's objects are handed back for the actual push --
chowns the worktree to that owner first, via os.Lchown so a
legitimately-tracked-but-dangling symlink doesn't abort a push that
would otherwise have succeeded.
Closes archie-core-1786749700606-6-bf6aa32d.
Release() always slept the configured GracePeriod and always used
Docker's default ~10s graceful SIGTERM-then-SIGKILL timeout, even
when the release was happening because /stop had just cancelled the
task's context. A cancelled task's container -- and the in-flight
generation/tool calls inside it -- could sit doing nothing for up to
GracePeriod+~10s before actually dying, so /stop reported success
while work visibly continued for tens of seconds to a couple minutes.
releaseDecision(ctx, grace) now skips the grace sleep and requests an
immediate SIGKILL (Timeout: 0) when ctx is already cancelled; a live
ctx (normal completion) keeps the original behaviour byte for byte.
Closes archie-core-1786749700580-5-e3878224.
CLI-based, env-configured, cache-less engines resolving SecretRef values
through the existing Yaegi plugin surface. Fresh resolve per call, so
values updated in the backend are picked up without daemon restart —
closing the gap that motivated the remote secret-input epic (#504),
whose value-entry web form duplicated the Bitwarden app for bws.
- examples/secret-engines/: sops (SOPS_FILE), vault (VAULT_ADDR/TOKEN,
key "path/field" or VAULT_SECRET_PATH prefix), age (AGE_FILE/
AGE_IDENTITY, key=value lines). //go:build ignore keeps them out of
the Go toolchain; yaegi treats the tag as a comment and loads them.
- enginehost: host-side Run helper registered as a Yaegi symbol. yaegi's
interpreted os/exec cannot pass env to child processes, so plugins
shell out through host code; bounded by a 30s timeout like the bws
engine.
- secret.LoadDir seeds the interpreter with the host environment: yaegi's
interpreted os package keeps a private env otherwise, and plugin
os.Getenv would silently see nothing.
- cmd/archied wires enginehost + unrestricted symbols into the engine
plugin loader, matching skillscript's interpretation posture.
- tests load the real shipped plugin files with fake CLIs on PATH;
added CONTEXT.md glossary for the remote secret-input vocabulary.
Keep bare GitHub issue and pull-request links separate from following prose across one-shot sends, live edits, and long-message splitting. Preserve Markdown delimiters and newline boundaries while retaining plain-text fallbacks.
Format /status response with clear heading, visual task status icons, canonical lifecycle ordering, and separated runtime details with graceful fallbacks.