b2652fc643704ad34dca0bf1a010efd2510933cc
One identity record covers users, agents, external agents, service accounts and the system. Authentication is delegated to the estate's OIDC provider and attribution stays archie's. Nothing that verifies a credential, issues a session, stores a password or checks a permission is built here, per Sam's hard requirement that authentication and authorisation are OSS archie integrates. Authelia is the only provider, because the estate already runs it in front of the dashboard and it issues credentials for both kinds of caller: authorization code for humans and client_credentials for machines, whose subject is the client's own identifier. Each agent is its own client, so two agents are distinguishable in the audit trail and revocable separately. SPIFFE/SPIRE is rejected on operational fit rather than quality: it is adopted and its attestation is strictly stronger, but it adds a control plane archie does not have and answers a threat archie does not face while its agents run in containers the operator launches. internal/domain/identity survives and is not replaced by the provider's directory, because it carries what the directory does not: lifecycle, bindings and attribution. archie owns the subject binding that ties an identity to the provider subject asserting it -- the same bridge identity_aliases already provides from a legacy name -- plus the lifecycle, the attribution and the identity audit trail. It owns no credential, password, session, token, signing key or permission rule. How an agent proves who it is: it presents a token the provider issued to its own client, archie validates it against the provider's published keys and takes the subject as the acting identity, so an agent holds the secret and archie holds only public keys. A WebMCP tool call cannot be a proof of agent identity and cannot be made one -- a page can invoke its own tools, so an agent's call and a page script's call arrive identically and the difference does not exist on the wire. It is attributed to the identity the request presented with its source as a hint, and it never records that an agent acted or that a human approved. Agent-initiated action therefore arrives on a surface that carries a credential. Task actions gain both attributions: the acting identity, derived from the credential and never from a supplied string, and the authorising principal whose authority the action used. The event kind describes the actor, so KindHumanApproved is recorded only when a human acted; an agent acting under a standing approval records itself as actor and the human as authorising principal. An action with no authorising principal is unattributed rather than attributed to the actor's own authority, and the review gate's approver is the approval's authorising principal, not the surface they used. External agents are first-class: the same record, kind service_account, bound to its own provider client, at the cost of a client registration and a secret to rotate per peer. Authorisation is deferred: no engine, no policy language, no decision point, with the credential's scopes as the only input; the decision point goes behind a single archie interface when per-skill limits are needed. The PRD is a development-audience page, so it regenerates dev-docs.json to 69 pages. Verified: task check exit 0, including docs:prds.
Description
Archie connects events from your systems to agents that can investigate, reason, and act.
Define what an event means, map its data into a workflow, and give that workflow an agent equipped for the job: its own execution environment, tools, and identity.
https://archie.catlow.cloud
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Archie v1.62.0
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