Three defects the first sweep left behind, each caught by a rule the guard did not yet have. Statuses. RULES.md gives three; the tree had 25 values, and the free-text ones were carrying progress. "Implemented (wiring landed)" and "Ratified (rev. 2e). Rev. 2e adds the OpenTaskByPR lookup. Rev. 2d revised section 10..." were both changelogs living in the one field the other rules exempt. Every PRD now declares Draft, Approved or Finalised and nothing else; five that declared nothing now declare one. A revision number moves to **Revision:**, a pointer to the authoritative document to **Authority:**, and what a past revision changed to git. CLAUDE.md's citation of state-store-contract rev. 2e still resolves. Stale cross-references. "Supersedes the 2026-09-03 open question", "this bullet previously said", "an earlier draft of this document claimed" all point at text the reader cannot see, because it was replaced. A supersede marker survives only when it names a file, a section or a symbol that can be found. Temporal hedges. 100 uses of today, currently and right now across 31 files. Each dates its sentence to the day it was written: "[notify] today is one webhook URL, read in one place" stops being true the moment this design lands, while still reading as the premise it rests on. The header-field exemption was also too wide. "**Date:** 2026-09-03, Channel resolved 2026-09-22" smuggled a dated status into the one line the rules did not read; the exemption is now a Date holding only a date and a Status holding only one of the three.
111 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
111 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# Binding secret at-rest encryption -- decision
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**Status:** Approved
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**Date:** 2026-09-02
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**Beads issue:** `archie-core-t2db.7` (P2), parent `archie-core-t2db`
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## Problem
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`binding.Binding.Secret` (the per-source HMAC shared secret) is persisted as
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plaintext in the `bindings.secret TEXT` column. Anyone with read access to the
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SQLite file -- the same access level as `captured_events.body` and `tasks.body`
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-- sees sender-side shared secrets. A leaked database file leaks secrets even
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when the filesystem ACLs were correct at rest.
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## Decision
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Encrypt the `secret` column at rest with **AES-256-GCM** (stdlib
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`crypto/aes` + `crypto/cipher`, no new dependency), transparently inside the
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store: encrypt on write, decrypt on read. The store is the data boundary; its
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consumers (dispatch loop, HMAC verification) receive the plaintext secret
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exactly as and the webui already blanks `Secret` on every response.
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### Cipher parameters
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- **AEAD:** AES-256-GCM, 12-byte random nonce (`crypto/rand`), tag appended.
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- **Key length:** 32 bytes, derived as `SHA-256(resolved_material)`. Kept as
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SHA-256 (no Argon2id) because the source is a **32-byte high-entropy** value
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resolved through the secret registry, so re-deriving to 32 bytes merely
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re-shapes entropy rather than defending a weak passphrase.
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- **AAD:** a static domain separator, `[]byte("arcie-binding-secret")`, so a
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ciphertext cannot be relocated to a different field/column and still
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authenticate. AAD is intentionally **not** row-bound: binding secrets are
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random HMAC keys and are never used as lookup keys, so cross-row swap is not
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a meaningful attack here.
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### Envelope format
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```
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arcie-binding:v1:<keyFingerprint>:<base64url(nonce || ciphertext || tag)>
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```
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- `arcie-binding` -- domain marker
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- `v1` -- format version (future cipher/KDF change is a new version, old rows
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stay readable)
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- `<keyFingerprint>` -- `hex(SHA-256(material))[:16]`, the identity of the key
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that sealed the row, enabling rotation without a one-shot rewrite
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- payload -- `base64url` of `nonce ‖ GCM.Seal(plaintext, aad)`
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### Key source (confirmed with maintainer)
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Resolved through the existing secret registry (`internal/secret`), the
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established `SecretRef` pattern already used for `forge.webhook_secret`:
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```toml
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[bindings]
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encryption_key = { engine = "env", key = "ARCHIE_BINDING_KEY" }
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# Rotation: after swapping encryption_key to a new value, retain the previous
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# material so rows sealed under the old key still decrypt.
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previous_encryption_keys = [ { engine = "env", key = "ARCHIE_BINDING_KEY_OLD" } ]
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```
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The active key encrypts new writes; `previous_encryption_keys` are retained for
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decrypt-only. Key identity is intrinsic to the material (the fingerprint), so
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no manual key IDs are configured.
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### Rotation story
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Rotate by changing `encryption_key`, moving the old material into
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`previous_encryption_keys`. Rows sealed under the old key still decrypt via
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their embedded fingerprint; new writes use the new active key. Once no
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remaining row references an old fingerprint, remove it from the config. Losing
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a fingerprint's material before all its rows are rewritten makes those rows
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unreadable -- the same operational rule as any key rotation, and the reason the
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old material must be retained.
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## Non-goals / deferred
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- **`captured_events.body` redaction hardening** was completed alongside this
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work (not deferred): `webhookguard.RedactPayload` now redacts an expanded set
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of secret key markers (compound names like `access_token`, `client_secret`,
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`signing_key`, `x_api_key`, …) as well as unambiguous value shapes (compact
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JWTs, PEM private-key blocks) under any key. `gateway.sensitiveParameterKey`
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was broadened identically to preserve the documented agreement. It remains
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best-effort per `docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md` point 5 -- a sender
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that picks a name the heuristic misses is still captured.
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- **Key re-derivation on config reload** is a startup concern: the store holds
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the cipher for its lifetime, so a reload that changes `[bindings]` keys
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requires a daemon restart to take effect. Documented, accepted.
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## Wiring
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- `internal/config`: add `BindingsConfig` (`encryption_key SecretRef`,
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`previous_encryption_keys []SecretRef`) on `Config.Bindings`.
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- `internal/app/archied/bootstrap.go` `openStores`: resolve both refs through
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the already-built `secrets` registry, pass the material to `store.Open` via a
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new option `store.WithBindingCipher(cipher)`.
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- `internal/store`: add a `BindingCipher` interface (concrete AES-GCM impl in
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`binding_cipher.go`), a `bindingCipher` field on `Store`, and the `Open`
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option. **Nil cipher = plaintext**, so existing call sites and tests change
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nothing and legacy deployments keep current behaviour until they set a key.
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## Back-compat & tests
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- `store.Open` gains the option variadically; all current call sites compile
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unchanged.
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- Existing plaintext rows are unaffected until a cipher is configured; rows
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written before a cipher is installed remain plaintext and read as plaintext.
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- Tests: cipher round-trip (Encrypt/Decrypt), wrong-key and tampered-ciphertext
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integrity failure, envelope parse errors, and a store round-trip that asserts
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the persisted column is NOT the plaintext while `GetBinding` returns it.
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