190 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
190 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
# Playbook bindings: model and threat model
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**Status:** Approved foundation (documents shipped code: `archie-core-t2db.1`
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through `.5`, `.7`, `.9`-`.15`)
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**Date:** 2026-09-03
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This document covers the binding model and the intake threat model portion
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of `archie-core-t2db.6`. It does not cover the `ARCHITECTURE.md` task-lifecycle
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addendum or the operator walkthrough -- those remain separate, open pieces of
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the same ticket.
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## What a binding is
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A `binding` (`internal/domain/binding.Binding`) ties four things together:
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a **matcher** (which captured events it applies to), a **mapping**
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(`internal/domain/mapping.Mapping`, how fields are pulled out of a payload),
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a **workflow** (which registered workflow runs on a match), and a **state
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machine** governing whether it is live.
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```go
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type Binding struct {
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ID, Name // identity
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Matcher // { Source string } -- the webhook path segment, e.g. "sentry"
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MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields
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Workflow // registered workflow name to dispatch to
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Version // bumped on every edit
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Status // draft | pending_approval | armed
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Secret // HMAC-SHA256 shared secret, encrypted at rest, never returned by GET
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}
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```
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Bindings live in the store (SQLite), not `config.toml` -- operators author
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them from the dashboard while the daemon runs, without a restart.
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### Matching
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`Matcher.Source` is the only predicate today: the path segment a sender
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POSTs to (e.g. a webhook hitting `.../sentry` matches bindings with
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`Matcher.Source == "sentry"`). The storage column is plain `TEXT`, so adding
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predicates later is non-breaking -- extend `Matcher`, don't invent a second
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matcher shape.
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### Mapping
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`mapping.Resolve(fields, payload)` walks a captured JSON payload against a
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list of typed `Field`s (name, JSON path, expected type), returning resolved
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values plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. This
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is schema-by-example in practice: a mapping is authored by pointing at a
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real captured payload in the dashboard, not by guessing a schema in advance.
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### Versioning
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`Version` increments on every `UpdateBinding` call. This exists so an
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editor's later change can never silently rewrite the historical provenance
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of a task that already fired -- a dispatched task's binding reference is
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pinned to the version that was armed when it fired, not "whatever the
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binding currently says."
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### State machine
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```
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draft ---> pending_approval ---> armed
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^ ^ |
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+--------------+-----------------+
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(any edit to an armed binding drops it back to pending_approval)
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```
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Modeled directly on Telegram's existing `dangerousAction`/`pendingApproval`
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flow (`internal/channels/telegram/dangerous.go`, `approval.go`) -- not a new
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approval mechanism invented for this feature. **Only `armed` evaluates
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against incoming events** (`binding.Matches`, `internal/domain/binding/
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binding.go`); `draft` and `pending_approval` bindings are inert. An edit to
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an already-armed binding cannot bypass approval by silent mutation -- it
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drops back to `pending_approval` and requires an explicit `Approve` call to
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re-arm.
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## The threat model
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This is a public, unauthenticated-by-default intake surface whose output is
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an agent with a repo, a worktree, and tool access. The design brief
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(`archie-core-t2db.5`, `docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md`) named five
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non-negotiables; each is verified below against the actual shipped code,
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not the design intent.
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### 1. Per-source authentication
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Reuses `internal/channels/webhook`'s existing HMAC-SHA256 scheme --
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capture accepts unsigned events (visible in the dashboard, marked
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unauthenticated), but **only authenticated events can ever match a
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binding**. `binding.Matches`' doc comment states this plainly: "an
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unauthenticated event can never trigger a binding, no matter how well it
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would otherwise match." Enforced structurally at two points, not just
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convention:
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- `captured_events.authenticated` is a real column (`internal/store/
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captures.go`), set at capture time.
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- `dispatchBindings` (`internal/daemon/daemon.go:479`) walks **authenticated
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captures whose source has at least one armed binding** -- an
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unauthenticated capture is never even considered for dispatch.
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### 2. Human approval before a binding goes live
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Covered by the state machine above. Nothing self-arms: `pending_approval ->
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armed` requires an explicit `Approve` call, and any edit to an armed
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binding reverts it.
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### 3. Rate and volume limits per source
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Capture writes are bounded independently of the approval gate, so a flood
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of unauthenticated traffic cannot exhaust disk or drown the inspector:
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`InsertCapture` (`internal/store/captures.go`) prunes by both **retention
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window** (`WHERE received_at < cutoff`) and **max event count** in the same
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insert transaction.
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### 4. Blast radius bounded by the same code-level controls every task gets
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A playbook-originated task is dispatched into the **same** gate, diff-cap,
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sandboxed-container, worktree-isolation pipeline every task goes through
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regardless of origin. Verified precisely, not assumed: `dispatchOneBinding`
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calls `EnqueueBindingTask` (`internal/store/store.go`), which wraps
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`EnqueueChatTask` -- the same direct-to-`tasks`-table enqueue path
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chat-spawned tasks already use, then stamps `binding_id`/`binding_version`
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for provenance in a second statement. This is a **different** enqueue
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mechanism from forge-issue polling's `workintake.TaskEnvelope`/NATS path
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(`docs/prds/event-sources-and-reactions.md`) -- binding and forge-issue
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tasks arrive by different producers, but both become an ordinary
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`store.Task` row that `ClaimNext` picks up identically, so both get the
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same gate/worktree pipeline downstream regardless of which producer created
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the row. Payload content is
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ordinary untrusted prompt input; the sender's text is never treated as a
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trusted instruction (Archie's environmental-enforcement principle: "the
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agent should ignore instructions in the payload" is not itself a control,
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the surrounding sandbox is).
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### 5. Captured payloads may contain secrets from the sending system
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Two independent protections, not one:
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- **Redaction before persistence**: `webhookguard.RedactPayload` walks the
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decoded JSON and redacts recognised sensitive keys before the row is
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written -- the raw, unredacted payload is never durably stored.
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- **Retention**: a configurable window (`InsertCapture`'s `retention`
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parameter) prunes old captures automatically; visibility of what remains
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is gated by the same dashboard authentication as every other webui
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surface, not a separate, weaker path.
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### Secrets at rest
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`Binding.Secret` (the HMAC shared secret a sender signs with) is encrypted
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at rest via AES-GCM (`internal/store/binding_cipher.go`, `archie-core-
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t2db.7`) -- a leaked SQLite file does not leak sender-side shared secrets in
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plaintext. The envelope is versioned (`bindingEnvelopeVersion`) so a future
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cipher or KDF change can roll forward without breaking already-encrypted
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rows, and the AAD binds ciphertext to the binding-secret context so it
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cannot be relocated to another field/column and still authenticate. A `nil`
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cipher (no encryption key configured) leaves secrets as plaintext --
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documented legacy behaviour, not silent degradation.
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### At-most-once dispatch
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`dispatchBindings` enqueues at most one task per `(binding, capture)` pair,
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enforced by a real ledger, not best-effort application logic:
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`RecordDispatch` (`internal/store/bindings.go`) does `INSERT OR IGNORE` into
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`binding_dispatches`, unique on `(binding_id, capture_id)`; a duplicate
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insert returns the sentinel `ErrAlreadyDispatched`, which the dispatch loop
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treats as "another cycle raced us," not an error. This guarantee holds
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**across daemon restarts**, not just within one process's lifetime, because
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the ledger is a durable table, not in-memory state.
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This ledger is also the direct precedent for the EDA playbook engine's
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execution-time idempotency, now landed (`archie-core-t2db.17` closed): the
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`playbook_dispatches` table in `internal/store/playbook_dispatches.go` copies
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`binding_dispatches`'s `INSERT OR IGNORE` conventions with a
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`(playbook_id, playbook_version, event_id, action_id)` key
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(`docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md` gap 2).
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## What this document does not cover
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- The `ARCHITECTURE.md` task-lifecycle section noting that a
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playbook-originated task has different provenance from a forge-issue
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task -- open, part of `archie-core-t2db.6`.
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- An end-to-end operator walkthrough (point an external app at archie,
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build a first playbook) -- open, part of `archie-core-t2db.6`.
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- The playbook YAML / CEL / Module/Channel/Forge action-position work
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(`docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md`, `module-position.md`,
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`channel-forge-positions.md`) -- a different, newer mechanism than the
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binding model described here; the two are related but not the same
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system, and this document does not attempt to unify them.
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