Three defects the first sweep left behind, each caught by a rule the guard did not yet have. Statuses. RULES.md gives three; the tree had 25 values, and the free-text ones were carrying progress. "Implemented (wiring landed)" and "Ratified (rev. 2e). Rev. 2e adds the OpenTaskByPR lookup. Rev. 2d revised section 10..." were both changelogs living in the one field the other rules exempt. Every PRD now declares Draft, Approved or Finalised and nothing else; five that declared nothing now declare one. A revision number moves to **Revision:**, a pointer to the authoritative document to **Authority:**, and what a past revision changed to git. CLAUDE.md's citation of state-store-contract rev. 2e still resolves. Stale cross-references. "Supersedes the 2026-09-03 open question", "this bullet previously said", "an earlier draft of this document claimed" all point at text the reader cannot see, because it was replaced. A supersede marker survives only when it names a file, a section or a symbol that can be found. Temporal hedges. 100 uses of today, currently and right now across 31 files. Each dates its sentence to the day it was written: "[notify] today is one webhook URL, read in one place" stops being true the moment this design lands, while still reading as the premise it rests on. The header-field exemption was also too wide. "**Date:** 2026-09-03, Channel resolved 2026-09-22" smuggled a dated status into the one line the rules did not read; the exemption is now a Date holding only a date and a Status holding only one of the three.
102 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
102 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# Webhook intake security -- decision
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**Status:** Approved
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**Date:** 2026-08-22
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**Beads issue:** `archie-core-t2db.5`, blocks `archie-core-t2db.4`
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## Why this is decided ahead of the code it constrains
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`archie-core-t2db` (no-code playbooks) and `archie-core-7d5u` (typed event
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sources) both land a public intake surface whose eventual output is an agent
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with tool access and a repo. Neither capture (`t2db.1`) nor the intake family
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(`7d5u.3`) has shipped yet, so this decision exists to be a contract the two
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epics build against, not a retrofit once the surface exists. A webhook URL
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that can start an agent is remote code execution with extra steps if any of
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the five points below is missing on day one.
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## 1. Per-source authentication
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Reuse the per-route HMAC-SHA256 scheme already in
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`internal/channels/webhook/webhook.go` (`validateHMAC`), unchanged: a source
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registers with a shared secret; the signature is checked against the raw
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body. Do not invent a second scheme for intake.
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**Capture and triggering split at the signature, not at a separate flag.** An
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event with a missing or invalid signature is still captured (visible in the
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inspector, marked unauthenticated) so an operator can diagnose a
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misconfigured sender -- but an unauthenticated event can never be matched
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against a binding. Authentication is what promotes an event from "something
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arrived" to "something that can run a workflow."
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## 2. Human approval before a binding arms
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A binding has three states: `draft -> pending_approval -> armed`. Only
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`armed` bindings are evaluated against incoming events. Creating or editing a
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binding's matcher, mapping, or target workflow always sets it to
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`pending_approval`, including edits to an already-armed binding -- an edit is
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not silently re-armed, or the approval gate is decorative. Approval requires
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an authenticated dashboard session; there is no unattended approval path.
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Model: `internal/channels/telegram`'s dangerous-command approval flow
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(`dangerousAction` / `pendingApproval` in `dangerous.go` / `approval.go`) is
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the existing precedent for "a human decision gates code from running" in this
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codebase -- follow its shape rather than designing a new approval primitive.
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## 3. Rate and volume limits, per source
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A token-bucket limiter keyed by source ID, not global -- one noisy or hostile
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sender must not exhaust another source's capture budget. Precedent for
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per-key volume capping: `internal/pairing/store.go`'s `MaxPendingPerPlatform`.
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On limit exceeded, the request is rejected (HTTP 429), not silently dropped.
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A silently dropped event is indistinguishable from a sender that never fired
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-- the same invisible-failure shape the update-verification work
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(`archie-core-522`) exists to prevent. The rejection itself is observable in
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the inspector as a distinct outcome from "not received."
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## 4. Blast radius bounded by code, not by prompt wording
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A playbook-triggered task runs through exactly the same enforcement as every
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other task: the `[[repos.gate]]` quality gate, `diff_cap_lines`, the
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sandboxed per-task container (`internal/container`), worktree isolation, and
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"the model never runs git." No new relaxation is introduced for
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playbook-triggered work, and none is needed -- the existing constraints are
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the control.
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Mapped payload fields are treated as ordinary user-controlled text inside an
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agent prompt, exactly like an inbound chat message never as trusted
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instructions. "The agent should ignore instructions in the payload" is not a
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control and must not appear as one anywhere in this feature -- per
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`ARCHITECTURE.md`'s environmental-enforcement-over-prompt-rules principle,
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the boundary is the gate and the sandbox, not a sentence in the system
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prompt.
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## 5. Retention and redaction of captured payloads
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**Retention:** captured events (bound or not) are purged after 7 days,
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configurable per deployment. Unbound events exist to be mapped against; nothing
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justifies keeping them indefinitely once that window has passed, and an
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unbounded capture store is the same disk-exhaustion risk item 3 addresses at
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the request-rate level.
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**Redaction:** before a captured payload is persisted, apply the same
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key-name heuristic `internal/gateway/stream.go`'s `sensitiveParameterKey`
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already uses for tool-call parameters (matches `token`, `secret`, `password`,
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`passwd`, `api_key`, `apikey`, `authorization`, `credential`, `cookie`,
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`private_key` against normalized JSON keys) and replace matching values with
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the same `[redacted]` marker. This is best-effort, not a guarantee -- a
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sender that names a secret field something the heuristic misses will still
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have it captured. Document that limitation where captured payloads are
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displayed, rather than implying the redaction is complete.
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**Visibility:** captured payloads, redacted or not, are visible only to an
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authenticated dashboard operator -- the same authorization boundary as every
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other webui surface, not a separate or lower bar.
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## What this does not decide
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The intake family's registration interface (`7d5u.3`), the capture storage
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mechanism (`7d5u.2`, embedded NATS), and the binding data model's persistence
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and versioning (`t2db.4`) are separate decisions. This document constrains
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all three: whatever they build must satisfy points 1-5 above.
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