Allow an authenticated user to provide secret values remotely to an Archie secret engine, with a mobile-first interaction model. The primary use case is an operator using Telegram or another supported mobile channel to complete setup or repair a secret without SSH, editing TOML, or exposing the value in ordinary chat history.
The feature must extend the existing secret-engine architecture rather than bypass it. Secret values are submitted to a named engine/secret reference, validated by the engine, and then stored or forwarded according to that engine's contract.
Scope
A provider-neutral remote secret-input capability and lifecycle.
Mobile-first UX, initially through the existing Telegram channel abstraction.
Secure challenge/session handling, authorization, expiry, cancellation, and one-time submission semantics.
Engine-side write/update support for engines that can accept remote values.
Safe setup/status feedback without echoing secret material into messages, logs, telemetry, prompts, or persistent transcripts.
Documentation and tests for operator workflows and threat boundaries.
Non-goals
Making secret values readable through chat after submission.
Storing raw secrets in Archie state, issue bodies, ordinary chat history, or generated configuration logs.
Bypassing an external engine's own policy, ACLs, or encryption.
Supporting every channel or secret backend in the first implementation; capability discovery must make support explicit.
Definition of done
A user can initiate a remote secret-input flow from a mobile channel, select the target engine/reference, submit the value, and receive only a redacted success/failure result.
The flow is explicitly authorized, bound to the initiating user/session, expires, can be cancelled, and cannot be replayed.
Secret input is never passed through the normal model prompt/tool transcript path and is not logged or persisted in plaintext.
Engines advertise whether remote writes are supported; unsupported engines fail clearly without weakening resolution behaviour.
At least the intended initial engine(s) have an end-to-end tested write path, with external engine credentials handled through existing secret configuration.
Tests cover abuse and failure paths, and the mobile operator documentation is complete.
Related existing work: secret-engine registry #429, provider/consumer SecretRef migration #433, and engine plugins #430-#432.
Close reason
Pivoted after design review: value-entry web form duplicates the Bitwarden app for bws and adds a secret-accepting web surface for no gain. The real gap was engine refresh (bws caches once per process). Replaced by fresh-resolving sops/vault/age engines (beads #409/#411/age). Remote secret-input contract kept as design doc in #505; value-entry UX deferred until a writable engine without a mobile path exists.
Imported from beads archie-core-1786748942324-9-509793a0 · GitHub #504 · type epic · priority P1 · created 2026-08-14 · closed 2026-08-17
## Goal
Allow an authenticated user to provide secret values remotely to an Archie secret engine, with a mobile-first interaction model. The primary use case is an operator using Telegram or another supported mobile channel to complete setup or repair a secret without SSH, editing TOML, or exposing the value in ordinary chat history.
The feature must extend the existing secret-engine architecture rather than bypass it. Secret values are submitted to a named engine/secret reference, validated by the engine, and then stored or forwarded according to that engine's contract.
## Scope
- A provider-neutral remote secret-input capability and lifecycle.
- Mobile-first UX, initially through the existing Telegram channel abstraction.
- Secure challenge/session handling, authorization, expiry, cancellation, and one-time submission semantics.
- Engine-side write/update support for engines that can accept remote values.
- Safe setup/status feedback without echoing secret material into messages, logs, telemetry, prompts, or persistent transcripts.
- Documentation and tests for operator workflows and threat boundaries.
## Non-goals
- Making secret values readable through chat after submission.
- Storing raw secrets in Archie state, issue bodies, ordinary chat history, or generated configuration logs.
- Bypassing an external engine's own policy, ACLs, or encryption.
- Supporting every channel or secret backend in the first implementation; capability discovery must make support explicit.
## Definition of done
- A user can initiate a remote secret-input flow from a mobile channel, select the target engine/reference, submit the value, and receive only a redacted success/failure result.
- The flow is explicitly authorized, bound to the initiating user/session, expires, can be cancelled, and cannot be replayed.
- Secret input is never passed through the normal model prompt/tool transcript path and is not logged or persisted in plaintext.
- Engines advertise whether remote writes are supported; unsupported engines fail clearly without weakening resolution behaviour.
- At least the intended initial engine(s) have an end-to-end tested write path, with external engine credentials handled through existing secret configuration.
- Tests cover abuse and failure paths, and the mobile operator documentation is complete.
Related existing work: secret-engine registry #429, provider/consumer SecretRef migration #433, and engine plugins #430-#432.
### Close reason
Pivoted after design review: value-entry web form duplicates the Bitwarden app for bws and adds a secret-accepting web surface for no gain. The real gap was engine refresh (bws caches once per process). Replaced by fresh-resolving sops/vault/age engines (beads #409/#411/age). Remote secret-input contract kept as design doc in #505; value-entry UX deferred until a writable engine without a mobile path exists.
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_Imported from beads `archie-core-1786748942324-9-509793a0` · GitHub #504 · type epic · priority P1 · created 2026-08-14 · closed 2026-08-17_
sam
added the highepic labels 2026-10-27 13:38:29 +00:00
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Goal
Allow an authenticated user to provide secret values remotely to an Archie secret engine, with a mobile-first interaction model. The primary use case is an operator using Telegram or another supported mobile channel to complete setup or repair a secret without SSH, editing TOML, or exposing the value in ordinary chat history.
The feature must extend the existing secret-engine architecture rather than bypass it. Secret values are submitted to a named engine/secret reference, validated by the engine, and then stored or forwarded according to that engine's contract.
Scope
Non-goals
Definition of done
Related existing work: secret-engine registry #429, provider/consumer SecretRef migration #433, and engine plugins #430-#432.
Close reason
Pivoted after design review: value-entry web form duplicates the Bitwarden app for bws and adds a secret-accepting web surface for no gain. The real gap was engine refresh (bws caches once per process). Replaced by fresh-resolving sops/vault/age engines (beads #409/#411/age). Remote secret-input contract kept as design doc in #505; value-entry UX deferred until a writable engine without a mobile path exists.
Imported from beads
archie-core-1786748942324-9-509793a0· GitHub #504 · type epic · priority P1 · created 2026-08-14 · closed 2026-08-17