Follow-up to archie-core-xec, which only migrated Forge.TokenEnv (self-contained call site). Provider.APIKeyEnv is forwarded THREE different ways that all assume the secret is reachable by name in the daemon's own env, not resolved centrally:
agentexec.NewRuntime -> passes the env-var NAME into ai-sdk/runtime's AuthConfig.APIKeyEnv, which lazily os.Getenv's it later (external module, cannot change its contract).
agentexec.WorkerEnvironment / subprocess.go WorkerEnvironment() -> allowlist-forwards the NAME into a subprocess's environment for archie-agent to read itself.
daemon.containerEnv() -> already eagerly resolves via os.Getenv and injects NAME=value into a container env (this one generalizes cleanly).
Migrating Provider.APIKeyEnv to SecretRef requires switching cases 1 and 2 from name-forwarding to eager-resolve-via-secret.Registry-then-inject-value (ai-sdk/runtime.AuthConfig.APIKey literal field already supports this per its ResolveAPIKey fallback chain -- no ai-sdk/runtime changes needed, just stop relying on its lazy os.Getenv path for non-env engines). Also migrate NATSConfig.TokenEnv and TelegramConfig.TokenEnv (each has a single simple os.Getenv call site, lower risk than Provider).
Design
secret.Registry must be threaded into agentexec.NewRuntime, WorkerEnvironment, and daemon.containerEnv (or a shared secret-resolution helper) so eager-resolve-then-inject replaces name-forwarding for engines other than the built-in env engine.
Acceptance Criteria
Provider.APIKeyEnv, NATSConfig.TokenEnv, TelegramConfig.TokenEnv replaced with SecretRef; all three consumption paths (in-process runtime, subprocess worker env, container env) resolve via secret.Registry; task check passes; adversarial review finds zero surviving findings; explicit test proving a non-env engine (e.g. a fake test engine) correctly delivers a provider API key to agentexec.NewRuntime via the AuthConfig.APIKey literal field, not APIKeyEnv.
Close reason
Closed
Imported from beads archie-core-1786637500667-412-04faa3e7 · GitHub #433 · type task · priority P2 · created 2026-08-08 · closed 2026-10-01
Follow-up to archie-core-xec, which only migrated Forge.TokenEnv (self-contained call site). Provider.APIKeyEnv is forwarded THREE different ways that all assume the secret is reachable by name in the daemon's own env, not resolved centrally:
1. agentexec.NewRuntime -> passes the env-var NAME into ai-sdk/runtime's AuthConfig.APIKeyEnv, which lazily os.Getenv's it later (external module, cannot change its contract).
2. agentexec.WorkerEnvironment / subprocess.go WorkerEnvironment() -> allowlist-forwards the NAME into a subprocess's environment for archie-agent to read itself.
3. daemon.containerEnv() -> already eagerly resolves via os.Getenv and injects NAME=value into a container env (this one generalizes cleanly).
Migrating Provider.APIKeyEnv to SecretRef requires switching cases 1 and 2 from name-forwarding to eager-resolve-via-secret.Registry-then-inject-value (ai-sdk/runtime.AuthConfig.APIKey literal field already supports this per its ResolveAPIKey fallback chain -- no ai-sdk/runtime changes needed, just stop relying on its lazy os.Getenv path for non-env engines). Also migrate NATSConfig.TokenEnv and TelegramConfig.TokenEnv (each has a single simple os.Getenv call site, lower risk than Provider).
### Design
secret.Registry must be threaded into agentexec.NewRuntime, WorkerEnvironment, and daemon.containerEnv (or a shared secret-resolution helper) so eager-resolve-then-inject replaces name-forwarding for engines other than the built-in env engine.
### Acceptance Criteria
Provider.APIKeyEnv, NATSConfig.TokenEnv, TelegramConfig.TokenEnv replaced with SecretRef; all three consumption paths (in-process runtime, subprocess worker env, container env) resolve via secret.Registry; task check passes; adversarial review finds zero surviving findings; explicit test proving a non-env engine (e.g. a fake test engine) correctly delivers a provider API key to agentexec.NewRuntime via the AuthConfig.APIKey literal field, not APIKeyEnv.
### Close reason
Closed
---
_Imported from beads `archie-core-1786637500667-412-04faa3e7` · GitHub #433 · type task · priority P2 · created 2026-08-08 · closed 2026-10-01_
sam
added the mediumtask labels 2026-10-27 13:38:23 +00:00
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Follow-up to archie-core-xec, which only migrated Forge.TokenEnv (self-contained call site). Provider.APIKeyEnv is forwarded THREE different ways that all assume the secret is reachable by name in the daemon's own env, not resolved centrally:
Migrating Provider.APIKeyEnv to SecretRef requires switching cases 1 and 2 from name-forwarding to eager-resolve-via-secret.Registry-then-inject-value (ai-sdk/runtime.AuthConfig.APIKey literal field already supports this per its ResolveAPIKey fallback chain -- no ai-sdk/runtime changes needed, just stop relying on its lazy os.Getenv path for non-env engines). Also migrate NATSConfig.TokenEnv and TelegramConfig.TokenEnv (each has a single simple os.Getenv call site, lower risk than Provider).
Design
secret.Registry must be threaded into agentexec.NewRuntime, WorkerEnvironment, and daemon.containerEnv (or a shared secret-resolution helper) so eager-resolve-then-inject replaces name-forwarding for engines other than the built-in env engine.
Acceptance Criteria
Provider.APIKeyEnv, NATSConfig.TokenEnv, TelegramConfig.TokenEnv replaced with SecretRef; all three consumption paths (in-process runtime, subprocess worker env, container env) resolve via secret.Registry; task check passes; adversarial review finds zero surviving findings; explicit test proving a non-env engine (e.g. a fake test engine) correctly delivers a provider API key to agentexec.NewRuntime via the AuthConfig.APIKey literal field, not APIKeyEnv.
Close reason
Closed
Imported from beads
archie-core-1786637500667-412-04faa3e7· GitHub #433 · type task · priority P2 · created 2026-08-08 · closed 2026-10-01