Security: an unauthenticated endpoint must not be able to run an agent #473
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Reference: sam/archie#473
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P0 within this epic because the feature's own pitch is the threat model: a public intake surface whose output is an agent with tool access and a repo. Get this wrong and a webhook URL is remote code execution with extra steps.
Non-negotiables to design:
Archie's own principle applies: environmental enforcement over prompt rules. 'The agent should ignore instructions in the payload' is not a control.
Acceptance criteria
An event from an unauthenticated source can be captured but cannot trigger a workflow; a new binding requires explicit human approval before it arms; per-source rate limits exist; the blast radius of a playbook-triggered workflow is bounded by code rather than by prompt text; retention and visibility of captured payloads is decided and documented.
Notes
2026-08-22: security design decided and documented in docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md, covering all five non-negotiables from this bead's description:
This bead's code-level acceptance criteria (capture-can't-trigger, rate limits exist, blast-radius bounded, approval gate) cannot be implemented yet: they constrain t2db.1 (capture), 7d5u.3 (intake family) and t2db.4 (binding), none of which have landed. This document is the contract those beads build against -- do not build any of them without satisfying it. Leaving this bead in_progress rather than closing it; it closes when t2db.1/7d5u.3/t2db.4 land and demonstrably satisfy points 1-5, not before.
Close reason
Closed
Imported from beads
archie-core-t2db.5· GitHub #536 · type feature · priority P0 · created 2026-08-21 · closed 2026-09-02