Compare commits
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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e801306c15
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4707427759
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faeaa0d7f0
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No files matched your search
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ components:
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type: string
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public_url:
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type: string
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trusted_proxies:
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items:
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type: string
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type:
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- array
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- "null"
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required:
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- public_url
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type: object
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@@ -1798,11 +1804,18 @@ components:
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type: string
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public_url:
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type: string
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trusted_proxies:
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items:
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type: string
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type:
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- array
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- "null"
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required:
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- public_url
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- oidc_issuer
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- oidc_audience
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- oidc_client_id
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- trusted_proxies
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type: object
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GovernanceBlackout:
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additionalProperties: false
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@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ func (o *operations) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
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o.settings.UseAuthorizer(checked)
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o.allow.UseAuthorizer(checked)
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o.tell.UseAccess(checked)
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o.hear.UseDeliveryPolicy(access)
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o.hear.UseDeliveryPolicy(governance.RecordingDelivery(access, o.settings, o.log.With("module", "governance")))
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o.hear.UseTrustedProxies(o.settings.TrustedProxies)
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o.talk.Use(chat.Deps{
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People: o.settings, Access: access, Settings: o.settings, Toolbox: o.conns, Judge: o.judge,
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Approver: o.allow, Memory: o.remember, Runs: o.engine, Notifier: o.tell,
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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
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-- +goose Up
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-- Reverse proxies whose X-Forwarded-For header webhook intake uses as the
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-- client address, stored as a JSON array of addresses and CIDR ranges.
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ALTER TABLE governance.authentication_settings
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ADD COLUMN trusted_proxies jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]';
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-- +goose Down
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ALTER TABLE governance.authentication_settings DROP COLUMN trusted_proxies;
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@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ func (c *channelLookups) Get(string) (*connectors.Connector, bool) {
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// TestDeliveryIsAuthorizedOnEveryAttempt guards that a queued message is sent
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// only while the workload principal may still deliver on its channel. Each
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// attempt, including a retry after a backoff or a restart, asks again: a
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// revoked grant ends the message as failed, and a chain that can't decide
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// leaves it queued for its next attempt instead of dropping it.
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// revoked grant marks the message failed, and a chain that can't decide leaves
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// it queued for its next attempt instead of dropping it.
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func TestDeliveryIsAuthorizedOnEveryAttempt(t *testing.T) {
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allowed, revoked, unavailable := governance.Allowed(), governance.DeniedAt(governance.LevelOrg, []string{"org-workload"}), governance.Unavailable()
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tests := []struct {
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@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func TestDeliveryIsAuthorizedOnEveryAttempt(t *testing.T) {
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wantOutcomes []string
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}{
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{name: "an allowed attempt is sent", decisions: []governance.Decision{allowed}, attempts: 1, wantSends: 1, wantOutcomes: []string{"failed: connector \"slack\" isn't running"}},
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{name: "a revoked grant ends the message", decisions: []governance.Decision{revoked}, attempts: 1, wantOutcomes: []string{"gave up: " + connectors.ErrRejected.Error() + ": " + governance.ErrDenied.Error() + ": deliver delivery slack"}},
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{name: "a revoked grant fails the message", decisions: []governance.Decision{revoked}, attempts: 1, wantOutcomes: []string{"gave up: " + connectors.ErrRejected.Error() + ": " + governance.ErrDenied.Error() + ": deliver delivery slack"}},
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{name: "a retry after revocation is refused", decisions: []governance.Decision{allowed, revoked}, attempts: 2, wantSends: 1, wantOutcomes: []string{"failed: connector \"slack\" isn't running", "gave up: " + connectors.ErrRejected.Error() + ": " + governance.ErrDenied.Error() + ": deliver delivery slack"}},
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{name: "an undecidable chain leaves the message queued", decisions: []governance.Decision{unavailable}, attempts: 3},
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{name: "no policy wired leaves the message queued", unwired: true, attempts: 1},
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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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// Package deliveries is the transport for what Archie tells people, on each
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// channel. It holds no approval state: approvals own the request and its
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// answer, and use deliveries to carry them. The composer, the chat box in the
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// dashboard, is the first channel: its messages are rows a client reads from a
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// cursor, with a live stream that only says when to read. Every accepted
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// connector that delivers messages is another: each gets its own row, retried
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// until the connector confirms it, rejects it permanently, or the retry limit
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// is reached.
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// Package deliveries carries what Archie tells people on each channel. It
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// holds no approval state: approvals own the request and its answer, and use
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// deliveries to carry them. The composer, the chat box in the dashboard, is
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// the first channel: its messages are rows a client reads from a cursor, with
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// a live stream that only says when to read. Every accepted connector that
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// delivers messages is another channel: each gets its own row, retried until
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// the connector confirms it, rejects it permanently, or the retry limit is
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// reached.
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package deliveries
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import (
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@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ type Notification struct {
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}
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// ApprovalRequest is one judged action waiting for a person's answer. It is
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// carried like a notification, with the request an answer names and the time
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// it runs out.
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// carried like a notification, and adds the approval request an answer refers
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// to and when the request expires.
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type ApprovalRequest struct {
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RunID uuid.UUID
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RequestID uuid.UUID
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@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ type ApprovalRequest struct {
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}
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// Message is a composer message as the API shows it. Attempts are the delivery
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// attempts of the connector rows that carry the same message, one per channel.
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// attempts recorded on the connector rows that carry the same message, one per
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// channel.
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type Message struct {
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Seq int64 `json:"seq"`
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ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
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@@ -108,7 +109,8 @@ type Channels interface {
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Get(name string) (*connectors.Connector, bool)
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}
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// Module delivers one organisation's notifications.
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// Module delivers one organisation's notifications, approval requests and
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// answers.
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type Module struct {
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orgID string
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store *store.Store
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@@ -214,9 +216,10 @@ func (m *Module) send(ctx context.Context, msg store.Message) error {
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return nil
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}
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// SentBy reports whether channel confirmed a message under one of ids, the id
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// a source's event carries when it echoes what Archie sent, and the run that
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// sent it (nil when the message belonged to none).
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// SentBy reports whether the channel confirmed a message under any of ids, and
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// returns the run that sent it. An id is the identifier a source's event
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// carries when it echoes back what Archie sent. The run is empty when no
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// message matched.
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func (m *Module) SentBy(ctx context.Context, channel string, ids ...string) (uuid.UUID, bool, error) {
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ids = slices.DeleteFunc(slices.Clone(ids), func(id string) bool { return id == "" })
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if len(ids) == 0 {
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@@ -249,9 +252,9 @@ func (m *Module) Work(ctx context.Context) {
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// deliver sends a claimed message when the workload principal may still deliver
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// on its channel. Each attempt is decided afresh, so a retry after a backoff or
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// a restart honours a revocation made meanwhile. A refusal ends the message as
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// failed. When the policy chain can't decide, the message stays queued for its
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// next attempt.
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// a restart honours a revocation made in the meantime. A refusal marks the
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// message failed. When the policy chain can't decide, the message stays queued
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// for its next attempt.
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func (m *Module) deliver(ctx context.Context, msg store.Message) {
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err := governance.RequireWorkload(ctx, m.access, governance.ActionDeliver, governance.Resource{
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Kind: governance.KindDelivery, ID: msg.Channel,
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@@ -313,7 +316,8 @@ func (m *Module) sendTo(ctx context.Context, msg store.Message) (string, error)
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return c.Deliver(ctx, connectors.DeliveryMessage, raw, msg.Key)
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}
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// backoff is how long to wait after the attempts so far before the next.
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// backoff returns the wait before the next attempt, given the number of
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// attempts made so far.
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func backoff(attempts int) time.Duration {
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if attempts >= 10 {
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return maxBackoff
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@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ type Message struct {
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RequestID uuid.NullUUID `db:"request_id"`
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ExpiresAt sql.NullTime `db:"expires_at"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `db:"created_at"`
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// Sent is set on a message its channel has confirmed; the composer's are
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// sent when they are stored.
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// Sent is set on a message its channel has confirmed. Composer messages
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// count as sent as soon as they are stored.
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Sent bool `db:"-"`
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Attempts int `db:"attempts"`
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}
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@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ func (s *Store) Latest(ctx context.Context, orgID, channel string, limit int) ([
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return out, nil
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}
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// Claim takes the oldest message a channel hasn't confirmed whose next attempt
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// is due, and pushes that attempt out by backoff first: the push is the lease,
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// so a crash mid-delivery retries after it rather than never.
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// Claim takes the oldest message its channel hasn't confirmed whose next
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// attempt is due, and first pushes that attempt out by the backoff. The push
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// is the lease, so a crash mid-delivery retries after it rather than never.
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func (s *Store) Claim(ctx context.Context, backoff func(attempts int) time.Duration) (Message, bool, error) {
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tx, err := s.db.BeginTxx(ctx, nil)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ func (s *Store) Sent(ctx context.Context, seq int64, attempt int, externalID str
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`UPDATE deliveries.messages SET sent_at = now(), external_id = $2, last_error = NULL WHERE seq = $1`, externalID)
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}
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// SentBy finds a message its channel confirmed under one of ids. The run is
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// the one that sent it, nil when the message belonged to none.
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// SentBy finds a message its channel confirmed under any of ids, and returns
|
||||
// the run that sent it. The run is invalid when the message belonged to none.
|
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func (s *Store) SentBy(ctx context.Context, orgID, channel string, ids []string) (uuid.NullUUID, bool, error) {
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var run uuid.NullUUID
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err := s.db.GetContext(ctx, &run, `
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@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ func (s *Store) SentBy(ctx context.Context, orgID, channel string, ids []string)
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return run, true, nil
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}
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// Failed records why an attempt failed, with the attempt that failed; the
|
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// lease already set when it is tried again.
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// Failed records why an attempt failed, along with the attempt that failed.
|
||||
// The lease that Claim set still decides when the next attempt is due.
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func (s *Store) Failed(ctx context.Context, seq int64, attempt int, reason string, took time.Duration) error {
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return s.attempt(ctx, seq, attempt, attemptOutcome{failure: reason, took: took},
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`UPDATE deliveries.messages SET last_error = $2 WHERE seq = $1`, reason)
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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package events
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import (
|
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"context"
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"errors"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
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"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/platform/httpjson"
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/connectors"
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/events/internal/store"
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/governance"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestIntakeEvaluatesThePolicyAgainstTheClientBehindTrustedProxies guards the
|
||||
// address passed to the delivery policy: X-Forwarded-For is used only when the
|
||||
// peer is a configured proxy, and is read from right to left past trusted
|
||||
// hops, so a client can neither hide behind the proxy's address nor spoof one.
|
||||
func TestIntakeEvaluatesThePolicyAgainstTheClientBehindTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
|
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proxies := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"), netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32")}
|
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tests := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
peer string
|
||||
headers []string
|
||||
trusted []netip.Prefix
|
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readErr error
|
||||
want string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{name: "no proxies configured uses the peer", peer: "203.0.113.9:4711", want: "203.0.113.9"},
|
||||
{name: "a direct client can't forge a forwarded address", peer: "203.0.113.9:4711", headers: []string{"198.51.100.7"}, trusted: proxies, want: "203.0.113.9"},
|
||||
{name: "a trusted proxy reports the client", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"198.51.100.7"}, trusted: proxies, want: "198.51.100.7"},
|
||||
{name: "a forged entry left of the real client is ignored", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"1.2.3.4, 198.51.100.7"}, trusted: proxies, want: "198.51.100.7"},
|
||||
{name: "a chain of trusted proxies is skipped", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.9, 192.0.2.1"}, trusted: proxies, want: "198.51.100.7"},
|
||||
{name: "multiple header lines are joined into one list", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"1.2.3.4", "198.51.100.7"}, trusted: proxies, want: "198.51.100.7"},
|
||||
{name: "a trusted proxy with no header uses the peer", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", trusted: proxies, want: "10.0.0.5"},
|
||||
{name: "an unreadable entry uses the peer", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"198.51.100.7, unknown"}, trusted: proxies, want: "10.0.0.5"},
|
||||
{name: "an unreadable proxy list uses the peer", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"198.51.100.7"}, readErr: errors.New("store down"), want: "10.0.0.5"},
|
||||
{name: "an IPv6 client address has no brackets", peer: "10.0.0.5:4711", headers: []string{"2001:db8::7"}, trusted: proxies, want: "2001:db8::7"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
const token = "not-a-real-token" //nolint:gosec // fixture bearer token the verifier must accept
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
policy := &deliveryPolicy{decision: governance.Allowed()}
|
||||
m := &Module{
|
||||
orgID: "default", log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler), inserter: &onceInserter{stored: map[string]bool{}}, deliveries: noEcho{},
|
||||
reader: fakeSources{store.Source{OrgID: "default", Name: "hook", Connector: "c", Verification: store.Token, TokenSHA256: httpjson.TokenHash(token)}},
|
||||
parse: func(context.Context, string, []byte, map[string]string) ([]connectors.Event, error) {
|
||||
return []connectors.Event{{Type: "alert", SourceEventID: "evt-1"}}, nil
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.UseDeliveryPolicy(policy)
|
||||
m.UseTrustedProxies(func(context.Context) ([]netip.Prefix, error) { return tt.trusted, tt.readErr })
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/hooks/hook", strings.NewReader(`{}`))
|
||||
req.SetPathValue("source", "hook")
|
||||
req.RemoteAddr = tt.peer
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
|
||||
for _, h := range tt.headers {
|
||||
req.Header.Add("X-Forwarded-For", h)
|
||||
}
|
||||
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
m.intake(rec, req)
|
||||
if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusAccepted)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if want := "org-sys hook " + tt.want; len(policy.asked) != 1 || policy.asked[0] != want {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("delivery policy asked %v, want %q", policy.asked, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+121
-28
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ type Module struct {
|
||||
inserter eventInserter
|
||||
types typeReader
|
||||
delivery governance.DeliveryAuthorizer
|
||||
proxies func(context.Context) ([]netip.Prefix, error)
|
||||
sealer Sealer
|
||||
parse func(ctx context.Context, connector string, body []byte, headers map[string]string) ([]connectors.Event, error)
|
||||
connectors Connectors
|
||||
@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ func (m *Module) intake(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
httpjson.Error(w, status, err.Error())
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
stored, duplicates, err := m.save(r.Context(), d.src, d.events, d.body, d.arrival)
|
||||
stored, duplicates, err := m.save(r.Context(), d.admission, d.events, d.body, d.arrival)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
httpjson.Error(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, err.Error())
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -154,10 +157,12 @@ func (m *Module) intake(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
|
||||
// delivery is a webhook delivery that passed verification and was parsed.
|
||||
type delivery struct {
|
||||
src store.Source
|
||||
events []connectors.Event
|
||||
body []byte
|
||||
arrival arrival
|
||||
src store.Source
|
||||
// admission is set after the source's delivery policy allows the sender.
|
||||
admission admission
|
||||
events []connectors.Event
|
||||
body []byte
|
||||
arrival arrival
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// accept verifies a delivery against its source's scheme, then passes it to
|
||||
@@ -203,7 +208,9 @@ func (m *Module) accept(r *http.Request) (d delivery, status int, err error) {
|
||||
return m.refuse(ctx, d, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status, err := m.deliveryAllowed(ctx, src, r); err != nil {
|
||||
addr := m.clientAddr(ctx, r)
|
||||
d.admission, status, err = m.admit(ctx, src, addr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return d, status, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
d.events, err = m.parse(ctx, src.Connector, d.body, map[string]string{"Content-Type": r.Header.Get("Content-Type")})
|
||||
@@ -213,7 +220,7 @@ func (m *Module) accept(r *http.Request) (d delivery, status int, err error) {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return d, http.StatusBadRequest, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
d.arrival.addr = senderAddr(r)
|
||||
d.arrival.addr = addr
|
||||
d.arrival.headers = r.Header
|
||||
return d, 0, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -238,35 +245,97 @@ var (
|
||||
errDeliveryUnavailable = errors.New("delivery policy unavailable")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// deliveryAllowed applies the source's delivery policy to the sender's address.
|
||||
// A verified delivery still needs it. When the policy chain can't decide the
|
||||
// delivery is refused with 503, so the sender retries and nothing is stored.
|
||||
func (m *Module) deliveryAllowed(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, r *http.Request) (int, error) {
|
||||
// admission records that the source's delivery policy allowed a sender. Only
|
||||
// admit creates one and save requires one, so no intake path can store events
|
||||
// without evaluating the policy.
|
||||
type admission struct {
|
||||
src store.Source
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// admit evaluates the source's delivery policy against the sender's address.
|
||||
// The address is empty for a source without a remote sender, such as a
|
||||
// connector's listener stream. Verified deliveries are evaluated too. If the
|
||||
// policy chain returns no decision, admit returns 503 so that a webhook sender
|
||||
// retries, and nothing is stored.
|
||||
func (m *Module) admit(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, addr string) (admission, int, error) {
|
||||
if m.delivery == nil {
|
||||
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, errDeliveryUnavailable
|
||||
return admission{}, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, errDeliveryUnavailable
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr := senderAddr(r)
|
||||
// Delivery policies belong to the operating organisation, whatever the
|
||||
// source's own org id says.
|
||||
d := m.delivery.AuthorizeDelivery(ctx, governance.DefaultOrgID, src.Name, addr)
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case d.Allowed:
|
||||
return 0, nil
|
||||
return admission{src: src}, 0, nil
|
||||
case errors.Is(d.Err, governance.ErrChainUnavailable):
|
||||
m.log.WarnContext(ctx, "delivery policy unavailable", "source", src.Name)
|
||||
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, errDeliveryUnavailable
|
||||
return admission{}, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, errDeliveryUnavailable
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.log.WarnContext(ctx, "refused webhook delivery", "source", src.Name, "reason", "delivery policy", "level", d.Level, "policies", d.Policies)
|
||||
return http.StatusForbidden, errDeliveryDenied
|
||||
m.log.WarnContext(ctx, "refused delivery", "source", src.Name, "reason", "delivery policy", "level", d.Level, "policies", d.Policies)
|
||||
return admission{}, http.StatusForbidden, errDeliveryDenied
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// senderAddr is the address a request came from, without its port.
|
||||
func senderAddr(r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
addr, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return r.RemoteAddr
|
||||
// clientAddr returns the request's client address: the connection's peer
|
||||
// address, or the forwarded client address when the peer is a trusted proxy.
|
||||
func (m *Module) clientAddr(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) string {
|
||||
peer := r.RemoteAddr
|
||||
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(peer); err == nil {
|
||||
peer = host
|
||||
}
|
||||
return addr
|
||||
return forwardedClient(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), m.trustedProxies(ctx))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// forwardedClient returns the client address from X-Forwarded-For. The header
|
||||
// lists the client first, followed by each proxy that relayed the request.
|
||||
// Only entries appended by trusted proxies are reliable, because a client can
|
||||
// set any value at the left end, so the list is read from right to left and
|
||||
// the first address that is not a trusted proxy is returned. The peer address
|
||||
// is returned when the peer is not trusted or the header can't be parsed.
|
||||
func forwardedClient(peer string, forwarded []string, trusted []netip.Prefix) string {
|
||||
if len(trusted) == 0 || !isTrusted(peer, trusted) {
|
||||
return peer
|
||||
}
|
||||
hops := strings.Split(strings.Join(forwarded, ","), ",")
|
||||
for i, hop := range slices.Backward(hops) {
|
||||
hop := strings.TrimSpace(hop)
|
||||
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hop)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return peer
|
||||
}
|
||||
if i == 0 || !isTrusted(hop, trusted) {
|
||||
return addr.Unmap().String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return peer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isTrusted reports whether addr is inside any of the trusted prefixes.
|
||||
func isTrusted(addr string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
|
||||
a, err := netip.ParseAddr(addr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
a = a.Unmap()
|
||||
return slices.ContainsFunc(trusted, func(p netip.Prefix) bool { return p.Contains(a) })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// trustedProxies returns the configured trusted proxy prefixes.
|
||||
func (m *Module) trustedProxies(ctx context.Context) []netip.Prefix {
|
||||
if m.proxies == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
prefixes, err := m.proxies(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
m.log.WarnContext(ctx, "read trusted proxies", "error", err)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return prefixes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UseTrustedProxies sets the function that reads the trusted reverse proxies.
|
||||
// If it is not set, X-Forwarded-For is ignored.
|
||||
func (m *Module) UseTrustedProxies(read func(context.Context) ([]netip.Prefix, error)) {
|
||||
m.proxies = read
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseWith has a running connector parse a delivery.
|
||||
@@ -280,7 +349,8 @@ func (m *Module) parseWith(ctx context.Context, connector string, body []byte, h
|
||||
|
||||
// save stores each event with the payload it arrived in, recording at arrival
|
||||
// whether it echoes a delivery Archie sent, so those never reach grouping.
|
||||
func (m *Module) save(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, parsed []connectors.Event, body []byte, a arrival) (stored, duplicates int, err error) {
|
||||
func (m *Module) save(ctx context.Context, adm admission, parsed []connectors.Event, body []byte, a arrival) (stored, duplicates int, err error) {
|
||||
src := adm.src
|
||||
for i, e := range parsed {
|
||||
run, own, err := m.deliveries.SentBy(ctx, src.Connector, e.SourceEventID, e.LinkKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -365,10 +435,7 @@ func (m *Module) listen(ctx context.Context, src store.Source) {
|
||||
err = fmt.Errorf("connector %q isn't running", src.Connector)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err = conn.Listen(ctx, cursor, func(events []connectors.Event, next string) error {
|
||||
if _, _, err := m.save(ctx, src, events, received(events), arrival{}); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := m.store.SetCursor(ctx, m.orgID, src.Name, next); err != nil {
|
||||
if err := m.listenBatch(ctx, src, events, next); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
cursor = next
|
||||
@@ -386,6 +453,32 @@ func (m *Module) listen(ctx context.Context, src store.Source) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// listenBatch stores one streamed batch, then moves the source's cursor past it.
|
||||
func (m *Module) listenBatch(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, events []connectors.Event, next string) error {
|
||||
if err := m.storeListened(ctx, src, events); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return m.store.SetCursor(ctx, m.orgID, src.Name, next)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// storeListened stores a batch streamed by a connector listener if the source's
|
||||
// delivery policy allows it. A listener has no remote sender, so the policy is
|
||||
// evaluated with an empty address: rules on the source apply, and a rule that
|
||||
// allows only specific addresses denies every listener. A denied batch is
|
||||
// dropped without an error, because evaluating it again would return the same
|
||||
// decision.
|
||||
func (m *Module) storeListened(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, events []connectors.Event) error {
|
||||
adm, _, err := m.admit(ctx, src, "")
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, errDeliveryDenied) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, _, err = m.save(ctx, adm, events, received(events), arrival{})
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// answer settles the approval request an answer event names. An answer that
|
||||
// can't settle it is logged and done with: the request's own record already
|
||||
// says why. A channel account no account has linked is told how to link it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
package events
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/connectors"
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/events/internal/store"
|
||||
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/modules/governance"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestListenedEventsPassTheDeliveryPolicyBeforeStoring guards connector
|
||||
// listener intake: a streamed batch is evaluated against its source's delivery
|
||||
// policy, as a webhook delivery is. A denial stores nothing and does not fail
|
||||
// the stream, so the cursor advances. An unavailable decision fails the stream
|
||||
// so that the batch is fetched again.
|
||||
func TestListenedEventsPassTheDeliveryPolicyBeforeStoring(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
policy governance.Decision
|
||||
unwired bool
|
||||
wantErr bool
|
||||
wantStored int
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{name: "an allowed batch is stored", policy: governance.Allowed(), wantStored: 1},
|
||||
{name: "a denied batch is dropped without failing the stream", policy: governance.DeniedAt(governance.LevelObject, []string{"tg-deny"})},
|
||||
{name: "an unavailable decision fails the stream so the batch is fetched again", policy: governance.Unavailable(), wantErr: true},
|
||||
{name: "no policy wired fails the stream", unwired: true, wantErr: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
policy := &deliveryPolicy{decision: tt.policy}
|
||||
inserter := &onceInserter{stored: map[string]bool{}}
|
||||
m := &Module{orgID: "default", log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler), inserter: inserter, deliveries: noEcho{}}
|
||||
if !tt.unwired {
|
||||
m.UseDeliveryPolicy(policy)
|
||||
}
|
||||
src := store.Source{OrgID: "default", Name: "tg", Connector: "telegram"}
|
||||
err := m.storeListened(t.Context(), src, []connectors.Event{{Type: "message", SourceEventID: "evt-1"}})
|
||||
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want error %v", err, tt.wantErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(inserter.stored) != tt.wantStored {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("events stored = %d, want %d", len(inserter.stored), tt.wantStored)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -500,9 +500,9 @@ func TestSeedShippedPolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestAuthorizeWithoutOrgPolicies guards the deny-by-default rule: an org
|
||||
// with no stored org policies, or only narrowing ones, must refuse every
|
||||
// request instead of falling through to allow.
|
||||
// TestAuthorizeWithoutOrgPolicies guards deny by default: an org with no
|
||||
// org-level policies, even with instance or workspace policies present, must
|
||||
// deny every request instead of falling through to allow.
|
||||
func TestAuthorizeWithoutOrgPolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
const org = OrgID("acme")
|
||||
owner := Principal{IdentityID: "o", Org: org, Memberships: []Membership{{IdentityID: "o", OrgID: org, Role: RoleOwner}}}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,10 +333,11 @@ func (m *Module) getAuthentication(ctx context.Context, _ *struct{}) (*httpapi.R
|
||||
type authenticationInput struct {
|
||||
Session string `cookie:"archie_session"`
|
||||
Body struct {
|
||||
PublicURL string `json:"public_url"`
|
||||
OIDCIssuer string `json:"oidc_issuer,omitempty"`
|
||||
OIDCAudience string `json:"oidc_audience,omitempty"`
|
||||
OIDCClientID string `json:"oidc_client_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
PublicURL string `json:"public_url"`
|
||||
OIDCIssuer string `json:"oidc_issuer,omitempty"`
|
||||
OIDCAudience string `json:"oidc_audience,omitempty"`
|
||||
OIDCClientID string `json:"oidc_client_id,omitempty"`
|
||||
TrustedProxies []string `json:"trusted_proxies,omitempty"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ func (m *Module) putAuthentication(ctx context.Context, in *authenticationInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := m.SaveAuthenticationSettings(ctx, AuthenticationSettings(in.Body))
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidIdentity) {
|
||||
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Use a valid instance origin and complete OIDC settings. Remove enrolled passkeys before changing the instance URL.")
|
||||
return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("Use a valid instance origin, trusted proxies that are addresses or CIDR ranges, and complete OIDC settings. Remove enrolled passkeys before changing the instance URL.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, m.accountError(ctx, err)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,3 +111,31 @@ func (m *Module) mayUse(ctx context.Context, p Principal, action Action, kind Re
|
||||
}
|
||||
return chain.Authorize(ctx, p, action, Resource{Kind: kind, Org: p.Org}, AccessContext{Time: time.Now()}).Allowed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type recordingDelivery struct {
|
||||
DeliveryAuthorizer
|
||||
denials DenialRecorder
|
||||
log *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RecordingDelivery wraps a so that every denied delivery is stored as a
|
||||
// denial, for webhook and listener intake alike. An unavailable decision is
|
||||
// not a denial and is not stored.
|
||||
func RecordingDelivery(a DeliveryAuthorizer, denials DenialRecorder, log *slog.Logger) DeliveryAuthorizer {
|
||||
return recordingDelivery{DeliveryAuthorizer: a, denials: denials, log: log}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r recordingDelivery) AuthorizeDelivery(ctx context.Context, orgID OrgID, sourcePath, addr string) Decision {
|
||||
d := r.DeliveryAuthorizer.AuthorizeDelivery(ctx, orgID, sourcePath, addr)
|
||||
if d.Allowed || errors.Is(d.Err, ErrChainUnavailable) {
|
||||
return d
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := r.denials.RecordDenial(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), Denial{
|
||||
Principal: SenderID, Org: orgID, Action: ActionDeliver, Kind: KindSource, ResourceID: sourcePath,
|
||||
Level: d.Level, Policies: d.Policies, At: time.Now(), Count: 1,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
r.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "record delivery denial", "source", sourcePath, "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return d
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -180,9 +180,9 @@ func (e *Engine) Authorize(_ context.Context, p Principal, a Action, r Resource,
|
||||
if p.Org == "" || resOrg != p.Org {
|
||||
return DeniedAt(LevelInstance, []string{CrossOrgForbidID})
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Lower levels only narrow, so an org with no policies of its own has
|
||||
// nothing that grants access. Evaluating the chain alone would skip every
|
||||
// empty level and allow the request.
|
||||
// Only org-level policies grant access within an org. evaluate skips empty
|
||||
// levels, so without this check an org with no org-level policies would be
|
||||
// allowed.
|
||||
if !e.orgs[resOrg].active() {
|
||||
return DeniedAt(LevelOrg, nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -433,19 +433,27 @@ type AccountSecurity interface {
|
||||
RecoverAccount(ctx context.Context, email, code, password string) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuthenticationSettings stores instance public origin and OIDC parameters.
|
||||
// AuthenticationSettings stores the instance's public origin, its trusted
|
||||
// reverse proxies and the OIDC parameters.
|
||||
type AuthenticationSettings struct {
|
||||
PublicURL string `json:"public_url"`
|
||||
OIDCIssuer string `json:"oidc_issuer"`
|
||||
OIDCAudience string `json:"oidc_audience"`
|
||||
OIDCClientID string `json:"oidc_client_id"`
|
||||
// TrustedProxies are the addresses and CIDR ranges of reverse proxies whose
|
||||
// X-Forwarded-For header webhook intake uses as the client address.
|
||||
TrustedProxies []string `json:"trusted_proxies"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks that PublicURL is a valid origin and OIDC fields are paired.
|
||||
// Validate checks that PublicURL is a valid origin, the trusted proxies are
|
||||
// addresses or ranges, and OIDC fields are paired.
|
||||
func (s AuthenticationSettings) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !validInstanceOrigin(s.PublicURL) {
|
||||
return ErrInvalidIdentity
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := normalizeProxies(s.TrustedProxies); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.OIDCIssuer == "" {
|
||||
if s.OIDCClientID != "" || s.OIDCAudience != "" {
|
||||
return ErrInvalidIdentity
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ type AuthSettingsRow struct {
|
||||
OIDCIssuer string `db:"oidc_issuer"`
|
||||
OIDCAudience string `db:"oidc_audience"`
|
||||
OIDCClientID string `db:"oidc_client_id"`
|
||||
// TrustedProxies is a JSON array of addresses and CIDR ranges.
|
||||
TrustedProxies []byte `db:"trusted_proxies"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RegisterAccountParams carries the validated inputs to create a user account.
|
||||
@@ -342,7 +344,7 @@ func (s *Store) RecoverAccount(ctx context.Context, email, recoveryHash, newPass
|
||||
func (s *Store) AuthenticationSettings(ctx context.Context) (AuthSettingsRow, error) {
|
||||
var out AuthSettingsRow
|
||||
err := s.db.GetContext(ctx, &out, `
|
||||
SELECT public_url, oidc_issuer, oidc_audience, oidc_client_id
|
||||
SELECT public_url, oidc_issuer, oidc_audience, oidc_client_id, trusted_proxies
|
||||
FROM governance.authentication_settings WHERE singleton`)
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
||||
return AuthSettingsRow{}, nil
|
||||
@@ -357,9 +359,9 @@ func (s *Store) AuthenticationSettings(ctx context.Context) (AuthSettingsRow, er
|
||||
func (s *Store) SaveAuthenticationSettings(ctx context.Context, row AuthSettingsRow) (updated bool, err error) {
|
||||
res, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
||||
UPDATE governance.authentication_settings
|
||||
SET public_url = $1, oidc_issuer = $2, oidc_audience = $3, oidc_client_id = $4
|
||||
SET public_url = $1, oidc_issuer = $2, oidc_audience = $3, oidc_client_id = $4, trusted_proxies = $5
|
||||
WHERE singleton AND (public_url = $1 OR NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM governance.passkeys))`,
|
||||
row.PublicURL, row.OIDCIssuer, row.OIDCAudience, row.OIDCClientID)
|
||||
row.PublicURL, row.OIDCIssuer, row.OIDCAudience, row.OIDCClientID, string(row.TrustedProxies))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false, fmt.Errorf("save authentication settings: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (o *oidcLogin) flow(ctx context.Context, settings AuthenticationSettingsSto
|
||||
}
|
||||
o.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer o.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if o.provider == nil || o.current != value {
|
||||
if o.provider == nil || o.current.OIDCIssuer != value.OIDCIssuer || o.current.OIDCAudience != value.OIDCAudience {
|
||||
provider, err := newOIDCProvider(value.OIDCIssuer, value.OIDCAudience)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
package governance
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
json "encoding/json/v2"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// maxTrustedProxies limits the size of the proxy list, which is read on every
|
||||
// webhook delivery.
|
||||
const maxTrustedProxies = 64
|
||||
|
||||
// normalizeProxies trims each entry and checks that it is an address or a CIDR
|
||||
// range. A bare address means that one host.
|
||||
func normalizeProxies(entries []string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
if len(entries) > maxTrustedProxies {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidIdentity
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]string, 0, len(entries))
|
||||
for _, entry := range entries {
|
||||
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
|
||||
if entry == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
prefix, err := parseProxy(entry)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrInvalidIdentity
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, prefix.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func parseProxy(entry string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
|
||||
if strings.Contains(entry, "/") {
|
||||
return netip.ParsePrefix(entry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return netip.Prefix{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TrustedProxies returns the reverse proxies whose X-Forwarded-For header
|
||||
// webhook intake uses as the client address.
|
||||
func (m *Module) TrustedProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
|
||||
settings, err := m.AuthenticationSettings(ctx)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(settings.TrustedProxies))
|
||||
for _, entry := range settings.TrustedProxies {
|
||||
prefix, err := parseProxy(entry)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stored trusted proxy %q: %w", entry, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, prefix)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func encodeProxies(entries []string) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if entries == nil {
|
||||
entries = []string{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return json.Marshal(entries)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func decodeProxies(raw []byte) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
entries := []string{}
|
||||
if len(raw) == 0 {
|
||||
return entries, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &entries); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read trusted proxies: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return entries, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -534,11 +534,16 @@ func (m *Module) AuthenticationSettings(ctx context.Context) (AuthenticationSett
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return AuthenticationSettings{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
proxies, err := decodeProxies(row.TrustedProxies)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return AuthenticationSettings{}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return AuthenticationSettings{
|
||||
PublicURL: row.PublicURL,
|
||||
OIDCIssuer: row.OIDCIssuer,
|
||||
OIDCAudience: row.OIDCAudience,
|
||||
OIDCClientID: row.OIDCClientID,
|
||||
PublicURL: row.PublicURL,
|
||||
TrustedProxies: proxies,
|
||||
OIDCIssuer: row.OIDCIssuer,
|
||||
OIDCAudience: row.OIDCAudience,
|
||||
OIDCClientID: row.OIDCClientID,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -552,11 +557,20 @@ func (m *Module) SaveAuthenticationSettings(ctx context.Context, value Authentic
|
||||
if err := value.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
proxies, err := normalizeProxies(value.TrustedProxies)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
encoded, err := encodeProxies(proxies)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
updated, err := m.store.SaveAuthenticationSettings(ctx, store.AuthSettingsRow{
|
||||
PublicURL: value.PublicURL,
|
||||
OIDCIssuer: value.OIDCIssuer,
|
||||
OIDCAudience: value.OIDCAudience,
|
||||
OIDCClientID: value.OIDCClientID,
|
||||
PublicURL: value.PublicURL,
|
||||
TrustedProxies: encoded,
|
||||
OIDCIssuer: value.OIDCIssuer,
|
||||
OIDCAudience: value.OIDCAudience,
|
||||
OIDCClientID: value.OIDCClientID,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@ import PageHeader from "@/base/PageHeader.vue";
|
||||
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
|
||||
import CodeView from "@/base/CodeView.vue";
|
||||
import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
|
||||
import { Textarea } from "@/components/ui/textarea";
|
||||
import { api, classifyActionError, describeError } from "@/lib/api";
|
||||
import { errors } from "@/copy/errors";
|
||||
import { SettingRow } from "@/components/ui/setting-row";
|
||||
import { Section } from "@/components/ui/section";
|
||||
interface Settings {public_url:string;oidc_issuer:string;oidc_audience:string;oidc_client_id:string}
|
||||
const value=ref<Settings>({public_url:"",oidc_issuer:"",oidc_audience:"",oidc_client_id:""});const loaded=ref(false);const error=ref("");const sessionExpired=ref(false);const busy=ref(false);const saved=ref(false);
|
||||
interface Settings {public_url:string;oidc_issuer:string;oidc_audience:string;oidc_client_id:string;trusted_proxies:string[]}
|
||||
const value=ref<Settings>({public_url:"",oidc_issuer:"",oidc_audience:"",oidc_client_id:"",trusted_proxies:[]});const loaded=ref(false);const error=ref("");const sessionExpired=ref(false);const busy=ref(false);const saved=ref(false);
|
||||
async function load(){try{value.value=await api.authentication<Settings>();loaded.value=true;error.value=""}catch(cause){error.value=describeError(cause, errors.common.unknown)}finally{loaded.value=true}}
|
||||
onMounted(load);
|
||||
const proxyText=computed({get:()=>value.value.trusted_proxies.join("\n"),set:(text:string|number)=>{value.value.trusted_proxies=String(text).split("\n")}});
|
||||
const redirectURI=computed(()=>`${value.value.public_url.replace(/\/$/,"")}/oauth2/callback`);
|
||||
async function save(){busy.value=true;error.value="";saved.value=false;try{await api.saveAuthentication(value.value);saved.value=true}catch(cause){error.value=describeError(cause, errors.common.unknown);sessionExpired.value=classifyActionError(cause).kind==="session-expired"}finally{busy.value=false}}
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +28,9 @@ async function save(){busy.value=true;error.value="";saved.value=false;try{await
|
||||
<Section title="Instance URL">
|
||||
<SettingRow label="Public address" for="instance-url" hint="Passkeys require HTTPS and a domain name, or localhost. Once passkeys are enrolled, their domain is fixed."><Input id="instance-url" v-model="value.public_url" type="url" required /></SettingRow>
|
||||
</Section>
|
||||
<Section title="Reverse proxies">
|
||||
<SettingRow label="Trusted proxies" for="trusted-proxies" hint="One address or CIDR range per line. Webhook deliveries from these proxies are checked against the client address in X-Forwarded-For."><Textarea id="trusted-proxies" v-model="proxyText" rows="3" class="max-w-xl font-mono" placeholder="10.0.0.0/8" /></SettingRow>
|
||||
</Section>
|
||||
<Section title="OpenID Connect">
|
||||
<SettingRow label="Issuer URL" for="oidc-issuer"><Input id="oidc-issuer" v-model="value.oidc_issuer" type="url" placeholder="https://identity.example.com" /></SettingRow>
|
||||
<SettingRow label="Client ID" for="oidc-client"><Input id="oidc-client" v-model="value.oidc_client_id" /></SettingRow>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user