settings_get now reads three more kinds:
- soul, the instruction text layered into a workflow run;
- task-policy, the diff cap and alert delivery settings;
- org-model-policy, which models an org may use.
None of them holds a secret value: task-policy's notify_secret and the
secrets elsewhere in the readable kinds are SecretRef references (engine and
key), never the resolved value.
access_policies_list is new: the caller org's Cedar policies (id, level,
scope, text), and the instance policies when the caller owns the instance,
which is what the dashboard lists for the same read. It is guarded as
access.ActionRead on access.KindPolicy, the check the dashboard makes.
IntegrationSource gained Policies, implemented over the State Store's
ListPolicies.
workflow_get now says how its instructions field layers: after the
instance's and the organisation's, before the repository's.
The Access area mixed organisation, instance and personal settings under
one name. Split them: /org is the organisation's own area (members,
identities, connections, models, schedules, playbooks), /settings is
instance administration only, and personal security stays in the account
menu. Setup checklist steps now link to the page that fixes them.
The seeded root connection was called "Instance forge", which names two
archie concepts an operator never chose. Name it for the host it points at
instead.
A Connections page under Settings lists the organisation's forge connections:
host, forge type, the reference to the credential (never its value), the
external account it belongs to, and the operations each execution identity may
perform through it. The chat agent's page registry names the page too.
The connections kind joins the live resource watches. On a new revision
archied re-resolves the instance forge from the settings it just published and
replaces every holder of the client: the boot forge, the worktree token, the
daemon's root forge and the root task RPC servers, which are now returned from
registration so a task that is already connected asks the new credential
rather than the one the process booted with.
This commit also carries the execution-identity agent's concurrent edits to
these three files, which the shared working tree had not committed yet.
Layering reads forge-connections and takes the root connection for the
instance's own forge, keeping the file's webhook intake and secret, which are
instance infrastructure rather than an account. A document with no root
connection disables the forge instead of falling back to a credential the
operator may have withdrawn.
A connection is an organisation's own resource: the forge host, the
credential reference and the external account it belongs to. It records a
reference, never a token value, and names per execution identity the
operations that identity may perform through it.
The file's [forge] sections seed it: the root's becomes the root connection
and each identity's own forge becomes a connection only that identity may
use, so the migration keeps exactly the grants the file expressed.
Personal API tokens are the signed-in operator's, and the instance URL and
OIDC providers are the instance's, so neither belongs under the organisation
Access area. Tokens render in the account page and Authentication moves to
Settings; the old paths redirect.
Personas were a misread requirement: SOUL is the chat identity and
identities are per action. The selected persona's prompt never reached the
model. Drops the resource, /personality, the chat selector, the settings
page and ChatService.SetPersona, and deletes stored persona documents.