Commit Graph
195 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam 0346bfef77 fix(configuration): require containers.image instead of a private-registry default (#2054)
applyContainerDefaults no longer fills containers.image with a hard-coded
private-registry reference. An unset image now fails configuration
validation with 'containers.image is required for autonomous workflow
workers', so a fresh instance is told at startup (and via the readiness
probe at runtime) instead of at the first failed container pull.

Configs that relied on the default now set it explicitly: dev.toml (the
local task image:agent build, which e2e also overlays), plus commented
[containers] blocks in config.example.toml and standalone.toml. The
deploy docs no longer describe a code-level default.
2026-11-21 01:16:41 +11:00
sam 3a965e2a4f feat(nats): an external broker defers logins to archie through auth callout (#1866)
Task containers log in with their run credential on an external broker and
reach only their own subjects, decided by the embedded broker's authenticator.
The broker token is never put in a container environment.
2026-11-14 04:04:15 +11:00
sam da1795c597 feat(egress): Docker task containers reach allowed hosts through the egress proxy (#1967)
The task session carries containers.egress_hosts and the profile's remote MCP
hosts, and the container gets ProxyEnv with the relay exempt from the proxy so
the State Store and NATS dials bypass it. A host the session lists exactly may
resolve to a private address; wildcard and any-host matches may not.
egress_hosts moves from openshell to containers, as it applies to both runtimes.
2026-11-14 04:01:31 +11:00
sam 5c02207d48 feat(openshell): connect to a gateway that requires mutual TLS (#1864) 2026-11-14 03:41:24 +11:00
sam 2096ae8267 feat(openshell): each sandbox's network policy admits only what its task needs (#1864, #1967)
Runtimes now take a task launch: image, mounts, env, the daemon's NATS
and State Store with the task's credentials, its model providers and the
hosts its tools may reach. Docker addresses them through the egress relay
as before. An OpenShell sandbox reaches NATS and the State Store over
plain TCP, the model providers with their credential bound, and the
task's remote MCP hosts and the allowed package registries; services
addressed by IP or loopback are named by the configured services host,
since sandbox policy admits only DNS names.
2026-11-14 03:24:37 +11:00
sam a1ec538a87 feat(openshell): task agents can run as OpenShell sandboxes (#1864)
Container runtime policies gain a runtime (docker or openshell) and the
OpenShell gateway's address, workspace and token, set on the container
runtime page and applied on restart. The OpenShell backend creates a
sandbox per task with the worktree and volumes bound in, reports when
the agent exits or outlives its maximum uptime, deletes the sandbox on
release, and sweeps this instance's leftovers at boot. Storage volumes
are created attachable to OpenShell sandboxes.
2026-11-14 03:07:57 +11:00
sam 1c191b4ee0 refactor(config): service registry is a static map, not init() registration (#1926) 2026-11-13 03:47:34 +11:00
sam 892ed291b9 refactor(mcp): use the official MCP Go SDK for the client
Deletes the hand-written internal/tools/mcp client and transports. The
provider talks to an SDK ClientSession over CommandTransport,
StreamableClientTransport or SSEClientTransport, and reconnects when the
server exits. The http transport now keeps a real streamable session
instead of stateless POSTs. Sampling goes through one adapter, since the
SDK marks it deprecated (SEP-2577). message_endpoint is removed: the
SSE transport takes the POST URL from the server's endpoint event.
2026-11-13 03:44:55 +11:00
sam f92c5b4536 chore(runtime): delete Kit and external agent harness support (#1877)
ci/woodpecker/pr/quality Pipeline was successful
Quality / check (pull_request) Canceled after 7m39s
Archie runs its own agent loop only. Removes Kit resolution and launch,
the harness runner and adapters, the setup terminal and sandbox view,
harness secrets and OAuth capture (table dropped in migration 0075), the
task-tools contract that only Kit containers reached, and the
sandbox-kit-spec dependency. Agent profiles carry image and tools only.
The egress proxy keeps the model-session path; the sandbox relay code
stays for #1867.
2026-11-12 21:29:05 +11:00
sam c54d328f0d feat(store): run services as a non-superuser role and name every connection (#1857)
Every service connected to PostgreSQL as the database owner, which is a
superuser, so anything that compromised an app process owned the cluster, and
every connection reached the server with an empty application_name, so
pg_stat_activity could not say which service a session belonged to.

Split the DB credential into two login roles and name every pool:

- archie_migrator owns public and its objects and runs goose. Migrations run
  on a short-lived pool opened from the new migration_database_url, before the
  serving pool opens. It is not a superuser.
- archie_runtime serves requests with SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, sequence
  USAGE/SELECT and function EXECUTE only. It has no CREATE privilege, so it
  cannot change the schema.
- Every pool sets application_name: archie-state-store, archie-gateway, and a
  -migrate / -recovery / -schema / -provision suffix on the transient
  administrative connections. Existing one-URL installs keep working: an
  absent migration_database_url falls back to database_url and the migration
  runs on the serving pool exactly as before.

Provisioning is a new idempotent `archie-state-store provision` subcommand: it
needs an admin URL the services never hold (database owner or superuser),
creates or reconciles both roles, hands every public-schema object to the
migration role, revokes PUBLIC's CREATE on public, sets row-level grants, and
sets the migration role's default privileges so tables future migrations
create are usable without a hand-run grant. It stores SCRAM verifiers, refuses
superuser roles, and verifies the boundary before committing.

install.sh now provisions the bundled path and separates the credentials: the
superuser password the Compose database is created with lives only in a
compose-only postgres.env, while the env file the units load holds the
non-superuser PGPASSWORD. A bundled install that predates the split is
upgraded in place: the roles are created, the superuser password is rotated
out of the env file, and config.toml is moved to the runtime and migration
URLs. External databases keep their operator-managed credential; the
deployments README documents the one-shot provision command.

setup writes both bundled URLs, dev:postgres provisions the dev database, the
e2e stack provisions its throwaway server, and the deployment templates point
at the two roles.
2026-11-11 03:12:54 +11:00
sam e3ffefdc7d fix(identity): use System as the one root identity and record who created every task (#1851)
deploy / plan (push) Successful in 25s
deploy / gate (push) Successful in 7m57s
deploy / agent-image (push) Successful in 21s
deploy / dist-zip (push) Skipped
deploy / archied-image (push) Successful in 2m12s
Drop the bot_user-derived root identity and the empty-identity sentinel. System
polls forge connections and owns instance-level work; a polled task stores the
polling identity, task_queued and work_request_submitted carry task id, actor
and principal, and an empty task identity is refused. Migration 0072 moves
empty tasks.identity, the identity-grants root key and the old root's
connection permits to System so a re-poll dedups.
2026-11-10 20:01:16 +11:00
sam 17e6e66e72 refactor(archied): delete the file-configured forge webhook receiver; forge webhooks arrive through event capture (#1817)
deploy / plan (push) Failing after 2s
deploy / gate (push) Skipped
deploy / archied-image (push) Skipped
deploy / agent-image (push) Skipped
deploy / dist-zip (push) Skipped
2026-11-09 00:50:00 +11:00
sam ac98b68bda feat(archied): connection commit identity and SSH commit signing (#1816)
deploy / plan (push) Failing after 2s
deploy / gate (push) Skipped
deploy / archied-image (push) Skipped
deploy / agent-image (push) Skipped
deploy / dist-zip (push) Skipped
2026-11-09 00:05:32 +11:00
sam 52b5740c39 fix(daemon): cap tasks per issue poll and wait for disk before cloning (#1805)
deploy / plan (push) Successful in 1m6s
deploy / archied-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / agent-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / dist-zip (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / gate (push) Canceled after 11s
2026-11-08 17:26:00 +11:00
sam af7577625f refactor(messaging): store Telegram's connection in extension-settings (#1802)
deploy / plan (push) Successful in 11s
deploy / archied-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / agent-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / dist-zip (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / gate (push) Canceled after 7m26s
2026-11-08 17:12:59 +11:00
sam 9d8f364af1 feat(releaseupdate): signed OCI distribution sources for releases and the catalogue (#1715)
Quality / check (push) Successful in 5m53s
deploy / gate (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / archied-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / agent-image (push) Canceled after 0s
deploy / dist-zip (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-10-31 18:18:43 +11:00
sam c5802cf86d fix(releaseupdate): load the env file beside the config so update install gets the database password from a shell (#1431) 2026-10-31 14:40:41 +11:00
sam 003771ca48 feat(access): denial retention knob, State Store sweep and dashboard denials page (#1842)
Add [access].denial_retention (default 90 days, matching the audit-retention
seed) wired through config defaults and validation; the State Store sweeps
denial records older than the configured age hourly via the new
access.DenialPruner / PruneDenials store query. The dashboard gains
GET /api/access/denials (read_audit-gated, so org admins/owners see their
org's records; the store scopes by the credential's org) and an
/org/denials page backed by a Pinia store.
2026-10-31 14:23:31 +11:00
sam 3db2654188 feat(webui): derive the setup checklist from the caller's organisation and drop the optional chat channel step 2026-10-27 10:47:14 +11:00
sam c6187b7c23 feat(servicekit): OpenTelemetry tracer provider and RPC propagation 2026-10-25 23:11:03 +11:00
sam 3b7193c207 refactor!: remove the diff-size cap and its gate.diff-size step 2026-10-24 22:19:23 +11:00
sam 4e97975862 fix(archieui): reach the sandbox and setup terminal on the daemon's listener 2026-10-24 11:24:49 +11:00
sam 69b8c482c1 fix(config): read a model alias's provider the way the resolver does 2026-10-22 17:39:13 +11:00
sam 2e6c493487 fix(config): give a non-system org only the aliases its policy resolves 2026-10-22 17:36:24 +11:00
sam 8ed814cbf7 feat(workflow): install a repository's declared tooling before its gate 2026-10-21 23:11:16 +11:00
sam ae178f1be0 fix(egress): bind a task's model providers from their api_key_ref
A container task parked when a provider carried an api_key_env but no
credential binding named after it, even though the task's models never
reached that provider. Egress pre-bound every provider the instance
configures and ignored api_key_ref, so the credentials an operator stores in
provider-settings were never used.

A task's config now carries only the providers its model aliases resolve to,
each with the variable its credential is read from: the operator's
api_key_env, or a name derived from the provider when its credential is a
secret reference. modelEgress resolves that reference once for the session
and the proxy substitutes the session's key for the sentinel, so the
container still holds no key. A provider that only declares an env var keeps
resolving through its org credential binding.
2026-10-20 06:56:38 +11:00
sam bf4fde5f7d fix(config): keep the resolved aliases when an org supplies none 2026-10-20 03:44:21 +11:00
sam 76c0e4dd1b fix(container): scope agent containers, volumes and the egress relay to the instance 2026-10-19 10:15:47 +11:00
sam b8b223c87c feat(configuration): name the instance with ARCHIE_INSTANCE and scope default paths by it 2026-10-19 10:12:48 +11:00
sam eb6aaca1f5 feat(credentials): grant credential services to dashboard identities, chosen from pickers 2026-10-18 00:43:31 +11:00
sam 33f5290015 feat(instructions): layer instance, organisation, workflow and repository instructions into every agent stage 2026-10-17 23:42:39 +11:00
sam a2ade2ee42 fix(config): treat a [[curators]] entry without enabled as on 2026-10-17 17:15:34 +11:00
sam f45ea9e0aa feat(workflow): configure review precision and approval on the review.pr step 2026-10-17 17:00:55 +11:00
sam 7b504f9ed6 refactor(archied): discover issues through organisation connections 2026-10-17 13:38:46 +11:00
sam 01acb97f96 chore: delete code no binary or test reaches 2026-10-17 10:14:26 +11:00
sam 05987f04e2 feat(daemon): execute and verify organisation repository connections 2026-10-17 09:32:39 +11:00
sam cb48a27d16 feat(controlplane): organisation forge connections
A connection is an organisation's own resource: the forge host, the
credential reference and the external account it belongs to. It records a
reference, never a token value, and names per execution identity the
operations that identity may perform through it.

The file's [forge] sections seed it: the root's becomes the root connection
and each identity's own forge becomes a connection only that identity may
use, so the migration keeps exactly the grants the file expressed.
2026-10-17 03:05:01 +11:00
sam 9cdae5642e feat(rpc): mTLS between services from operator-issued certificates
Replace the service bearer tokens with [tls] ca_file and cert_dir. Caller
identity comes from the verified certificate, not metadata. Without TLS,
services listen and dial on loopback only. Task containers get only the CA
and keep their grant.
2026-10-16 02:37:51 +11:00
sam 9eabc624ee fix(config): a task snapshot carries only the model limits its aliases resolve to 2026-10-13 17:07:40 +11:00
sam 8a3ba32c5a Feat/operator alerts (#1635)
* feat(state): durable operator alerts owned by the State Store

Alerts dedup on org+kind+subject, resolve themselves when a condition
clears, and are raised, resolved, dismissed and listed through the state
contract. Task transitions raise needs-human and failed alerts in the same
transaction; the store checks service health and prunes closed alerts.
Each raise and resolve queues a webhook delivery whose attempts are kept.

* feat(notify): deliver operator alerts to the webhook; raise config and release alerts

notify.webhook now receives raised and resolved alerts above a severity
threshold with HMAC-signed payloads, bounded retry and every attempt recorded
on the alert. archied raises model alias, provider and credential-binding
alerts from the effective configuration, an update alert from the release
channel, and a credential-rejected alert from the egress resolver. The
dashboard API lists and dismisses the caller's org's alerts.

* feat(ui): alert bell in the top bar and webhook alert settings

The bell lists the org's open alerts by severity with dismiss and a link per
alert, and refreshes from the event stream. The task settings page gains the
webhook severity threshold and signing secret. ui/dist rebuilt.
2026-10-12 03:30:46 +11:00
sam 8540c9f7c8 feat(releaseupdate): transactional self-update through archied (#1633)
archied update install verifies the release zip, checks every binary
reports the release, pulls the agent image by digest, backs up the
database in-process and stages the binaries before handing off to
archied update watchdog in its own process. The watchdog restarts units
in release order, requires archied healthy for 120s and otherwise rolls
back binaries and image policy, restoring the database only when a
migration ran. Boot recovery resumes the frozen watchdog.

Deletes scripts/archie-update-install, scripts/archie-update-watchdog,
the updater's --from-source and --auto, CommandInstaller,
ScriptInstaller and the update-image and update-topology subcommands.
2026-10-12 03:21:02 +11:00
sam 5290dab199 feat(controlplane): per-org model access, org aliases and org providers
The system org sets each org's allowed models and whether it may add its
own providers (org-model-policy); an org with no entry may use nothing.
An org's aliases and providers are checked against that policy on save
and filtered by it at resolution. Tasks get their org's providers, keyed
by the org's credential binding through the egress proxy. Org Settings
gains a Models tab; instance Models gains Org access.
2026-10-10 18:48:40 +11:00
sam 12b9a57404 feat(config): model aliases replace model roles, resolved by one resolver
Agent steps, implement, pr-review, MCP sampling, chat, embedding and
transcription resolve a model alias (empty means the purpose's default)
and fail on an unknown alias instead of falling back. The step editor and
chat pick aliases; workflow definitions naming an unknown alias are
refused on save.
2026-10-10 17:29:52 +11:00
sam badbbf84bd fix(config): normalize default org for harness credentials 2026-10-09 10:01:35 +11:00
sam d98352d003 feat(settings): classify startup and live runtime settings 2026-10-09 09:57:57 +11:00
sam 02ab747ca9 fix(configuration): reject unknown conf.d files 2026-10-09 09:57:56 +11:00
sam d0370ed9f7 fix(daemon): inherit live settings for identity tasks 2026-10-09 09:57:56 +11:00
sam 7ef58293be feat(harness): serve a daemon-side setup session to the dashboard
The dashboard's setup terminal was a 503: it had a WebSocket route, an
authorizer and an xterm.js surface, but nothing owned a container. The
daemon owns containers, so the session contract lands there and the
dashboard consumes it over a new gRPC contract.

One session concept, two targets. A setup session is addressed by Kit
profile and is ephemeral; a run session (archie-core-qi91) is addressed by
task and attempt and is bounded by the task. This slice serves setup and
answers Unimplemented for run.

The contract, the authorisation, the lifetime and the egress phase are
settled in docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md, "Session contract". The
short version: the daemon serves harness.v1.HarnessService; the dashboard
authorizes the operator as an update on the secret and then dials the
daemon with the harness service token, required even on loopback because a
session is a shell holding an org's credential; the setup container runs
no worker, mounts no worktree, holds a keepalive, and carries an empty
container environment. Install hooks run at the install phase and the
session enters runtime before the shell, so a runtime-phase credential's
token endpoint is the one the proxy intercepts.

Capture is gated by the egress proxy on a granted service, and a setup
session has no task, so the daemon registers a session grant: the
session's proxy token resolves to the org's bindings for the Kit's
declared services. The real token never enters the container: the token
endpoint response is sentinelized and stored as the org's harness secret.

Every teardown path releases the pool slot, revokes the egress session and
the grant, removes the sandbox network, and removes the session's volumes.
The listener requires HARNESS_TOKEN and stops with a 10s grace before
Stop, so an open session cannot hold shutdown to the watchdog leash.
2026-10-09 01:38:41 +11:00
sam 3a3a714cc4 fix(modelcatalog): never serve a disabled provider from the ambient key
disableProvider already cleared a failed provider's credential, but that
made it indistinguishable from a provider nobody configured, so
usableProvider fell back to the catalog's ambient env var (e.g.
OPENAI_API_KEY) and sent turns with a key the operator did not choose.
Mark the provider Disabled when its key fails to resolve, refuse it in
usableProvider, and carry the flag through mergeProviders so a catalog
refresh cannot resurrect it.
2026-10-08 22:59:23 +11:00
sam a8dbab0cff feat(controlplane): update commands are an update-settings kind edited on Status, defaulting to the installed scripts 2026-10-07 00:57:01 +11:00