Event types, field mappings and the stored-delivery inspector move into
modules/events: copied from internal/domain/eventtype and
internal/domain/mapping, which the old services still import. Each stored
event records how its delivery was verified; a source that checks nothing
refuses deliveries until approved; triggers gain approve, pause, resume,
event-type and mapping binding, dispatch history and delete. The captures,
mappings and bindings sections are reported as served.
A disabled workflow is never started by a trigger, another workflow or a
person. Delete is refused while a trigger, another workflow or a run in
progress names it. A parked or ended run restarts from a step.
Trigger dispatch, run start, every run claim, every delivery attempt and
webhook intake now ask the policy chain. Background work acts as the
workload principal; a refusal is final and recorded on the run or the
delivery, and an undecidable chain leaves the work queued for another
attempt. Intake applies the per-source delivery policy after source
verification.
Operations register through httpapi.Register with Public, Authorized or
AdminAuthorized, and the guard asks the policy chain for the declared
action and resource kind before the handler runs. An undeclared operation
and an undecidable chain are refused. The workload principal, its shipped
policy, a self-service policy and Recording for denials are added in
governance.
A PUT that names no verification keeps the stored scheme, token hash and
sealed secret, and an hmac save with a blank secret keeps the sealed one.
The sources page gains an Edit action that reuses the add dialog.
A source now declares how its deliveries prove themselves: token (the
default, unchanged), hmac (HMAC-SHA256 over the raw body, per-source header
and prefix, secret sealed at rest and write-only) or none. The events module
verifies before the connector parses, answers 401 and logs the refusal.
The digest comparison is ported from internal/webhookguard/hmac.go and the
header-borne signature from internal/infrastructure/captureintake/receiver.go;
the old copies stay until their service goes. The seal package moves to
internal/platform/seal so events can seal the secret.
A step is id/type/settings with when and on_failure; the five kinds become
the types agent.run (inline mission), connector.action, approval.wait,
run.notify and workflow.sleep. Documents declare inputs, repository,
instructions, identity and profile; references are {{ task|inputs|steps }}
checked at save. Any number of approval steps, each asking only about what
was held since; actions still held at the end are put to people before the
run finishes. Triggers are refused for a workflow they can't start, and the
workflows API lists, reads and saves documents beside a step-type catalog.
Copied from internal/domain/workflow: definition.go, step_refs.go,
step_flow.go's checks, control_steps.go's when parser, vocabulary.go and
task/interface.go. stableid moves to internal/platform.
Every /api operation is registered with Huma behind one admin-token
middleware, served at /api/openapi.json with a docs page at /api/docs,
and committed as api/openapi.yaml, which task check keeps current.
GET /api/runs/{id} assembles a run's trail from rows already kept: the event
and trigger that started it, each workflow step, and each model and tool call
from the agent's journal. Investigations end by notifying their findings on
the composer, whose messages are read from a cursor with a live stream that
only says when to read. The binary serves its own SPA entry, archie.html,
calling only the new API. The investigate prompt now treats the event as a
claim to check against what it measures.