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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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36981c2024 |
feat(statestore): CancelExecution, and one cancel path for daemon stop and operator actions
Plan item 5 of docs/prds/execution-tree-state-machine.md (archie-core-1217).
Until now a stop was a context cancel plus a caller-side transition, and the
step rows a worker still held running could never be told: the execution moved
while the work carried on, and the old interrupt-first ordering existed only
because the record could not defend itself. The step table can: the PRD's
ordering -- the store is the record, the context cancel is the delivery --
became safe the moment a worker's next step write fails ErrStaleTransition
against a cancelled step.
- storecontract.ExecutionCanceller and the CancelExecution RPC: one
transaction moves every non-terminal StepExecution of the execution's
current attempt to cancelled (one event row each, in the same
transaction), and the execution itself to the status the operator action
names, under the shared transition table with its audit row. Staleness is
decided before legality, the way guardTransition decides it. Earlier
attempts are never rewritten. Deliberately administrative: the
deny-by-default grant rule covers it, pinned by a test.
- taskactions.Service routes stop, cancel, abandon and reject through it and
the old Transition/CancelTask combinations are deleted; the daemon's
in-memory cancel is demoted to the delivery hook the PRD names, called
after the store record.
- The gateway's chat controller records first and delivers second, the same
order, and records even when no runtime is wired here (a standalone
gateway cannot reach the daemon's goroutines): the record is what unsticks
a lost-cancel task, and the delivery is best effort. StopRunning and
TaskRuntime.CancelRunningTasks are deleted outright -- no production
caller remained once the task_action tool owned stopping, and the daemon's
CancelRunningTasks/runningTasks.stopAll go with them.
- The gateway's chat adapter writes through CancelExecution instead of a
bare Transition, so chat /cancel and the dashboard's action service land
on the same path.
PRD decisions recorded here:
- Each cancelled step's event row is stage_finish with {cancelled: true} and
the reason as its detail -- the exact-one-event-per-step-transition rule
covers the pending -> cancelled transition too, even for a step that never
ran.
- A parked cancel carries the needs_human class, matching the Transition
path this replaces; the transient class stays with parkRunningTask's
unwind parks, which now meet ErrStaleTransition for cancelled runs and are
ignored there.
- Cancelling a wait:true callee is deferred to #1216's agent-call children:
the callee's own tree and the wait flag are what make
"cancelling a caller cancels each callee it waits on" decidable, and the
callee writes it cannot fake are this issue's half of the contract.
- RecoverStale's interrupted sweep is plan item 6, untouched here.
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81862273c0 | fix(taskactions): abandon leaves the forge issue open | ||
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2cc605ae09 |
feat(identity): verify provider tokens and attribute task actions to their actor
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action records which identity acted and whose authority it used. resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise. identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act. The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token. The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not need a new RPC to satisfy it. attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved, a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so "approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted. Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard. That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs (ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite: the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second implementation of it. Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256 on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer https://auth.catlow.cloud. |