Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam 36981c2024 feat(statestore): CancelExecution, and one cancel path for daemon stop and operator actions
Plan item 5 of docs/prds/execution-tree-state-machine.md (archie-core-1217).
Until now a stop was a context cancel plus a caller-side transition, and the
step rows a worker still held running could never be told: the execution moved
while the work carried on, and the old interrupt-first ordering existed only
because the record could not defend itself. The step table can: the PRD's
ordering -- the store is the record, the context cancel is the delivery --
became safe the moment a worker's next step write fails ErrStaleTransition
against a cancelled step.

- storecontract.ExecutionCanceller and the CancelExecution RPC: one
  transaction moves every non-terminal StepExecution of the execution's
  current attempt to cancelled (one event row each, in the same
  transaction), and the execution itself to the status the operator action
  names, under the shared transition table with its audit row. Staleness is
  decided before legality, the way guardTransition decides it. Earlier
  attempts are never rewritten. Deliberately administrative: the
  deny-by-default grant rule covers it, pinned by a test.
- taskactions.Service routes stop, cancel, abandon and reject through it and
  the old Transition/CancelTask combinations are deleted; the daemon's
  in-memory cancel is demoted to the delivery hook the PRD names, called
  after the store record.
- The gateway's chat controller records first and delivers second, the same
  order, and records even when no runtime is wired here (a standalone
  gateway cannot reach the daemon's goroutines): the record is what unsticks
  a lost-cancel task, and the delivery is best effort. StopRunning and
  TaskRuntime.CancelRunningTasks are deleted outright -- no production
  caller remained once the task_action tool owned stopping, and the daemon's
  CancelRunningTasks/runningTasks.stopAll go with them.
- The gateway's chat adapter writes through CancelExecution instead of a
  bare Transition, so chat /cancel and the dashboard's action service land
  on the same path.

PRD decisions recorded here:
- Each cancelled step's event row is stage_finish with {cancelled: true} and
  the reason as its detail -- the exact-one-event-per-step-transition rule
  covers the pending -> cancelled transition too, even for a step that never
  ran.
- A parked cancel carries the needs_human class, matching the Transition
  path this replaces; the transient class stays with parkRunningTask's
  unwind parks, which now meet ErrStaleTransition for cancelled runs and are
  ignored there.
- Cancelling a wait:true callee is deferred to #1216's agent-call children:
  the callee's own tree and the wait flag are what make
  "cancelling a caller cancels each callee it waits on" decidable, and the
  callee writes it cannot fake are this issue's half of the contract.
- RecoverStale's interrupted sweep is plan item 6, untouched here.
2026-09-27 06:34:01 +10:00
sam 81862273c0 fix(taskactions): abandon leaves the forge issue open 2026-09-25 08:59:54 +10:00
sam 2cc605ae09 feat(identity): verify provider tokens and attribute task actions to their actor
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action
records which identity acted and whose authority it used.

resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer
token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie
compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no
client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an
identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another
service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an
unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise.

identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it
refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that
did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a
verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act.
The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is
used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended
identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is
archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token.

The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects
keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a
different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim
one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower
than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole
identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not
need a new RPC to satisfy it.

attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting
identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added
through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced
by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an
agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved,
a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing
approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so
"approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted.
Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is
never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token
and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard.

That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is
not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals
are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording
nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard
to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs
(ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite:
the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second
implementation of it.

Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque
authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified
against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256
on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer
https://auth.catlow.cloud.
2026-09-22 14:34:16 +10:00