dev:daemon, dev:dashboard and dev:state-store all pass
`-config-overlay deployments/dev.toml`, which is what sets
[services.state].target = 127.0.0.1:9090. dev:gateway did not, so under
`task dev` the gateway dialled whatever the developer's installed
~/.config/archie/config.toml named, or failed to start in a fresh checkout,
while the other three processes used the dev store the task summary itself
describes.
No automated test accompanies this: asserting it would mean reading
Taskfile.yml's text, which is the source-coupling class the tracker already
files as test-coupling-6/-7. The change is a config value, verified by
inspection of the four dev processes.
WIRE: taskrun.Request.MCPServers is documented as the channel for MCP server
definitions the agent should construct, and the archie-agent worker consumes
it (task_execution.go startMCPProviders). The daemon's request constructor
dropped the field in a refactor, so configured MCP servers never reached a
task container. Restore it from d.configFor(task).Tools.MCPServers.
WIRE, not delete: per-repo max_retries is a configured field with a real
consumer (the retry gate), and it works for the legacy single-identity
[[repos]] list. In a multi-identity deployment repositories live under
[[identities.repos]] and there is no global [[repos]] at all, so the resolver
never saw the override and a parked task was killed at the global cap rather
than the configured one.
MaxRetries now consults the identity named on the task before the legacy list,
then falls back to the global cap. Identity name is the only thing that says
which repository list owns a persisted row.
Red-then-green: TestMaxRetriesResolvesFromTheOwningIdentity gained the
multi-identity cases; "identity repo override wins over the global cap" failed
with `MaxRetries = 3, want 7`. Two neighbouring cases keep the fix honest:
another identity's override must not leak, and the legacy path must still
resolve. Mutation-verified by deleting only the identity lookup, keeping the
extracted helper and the API intact.
DELETE: mcp.Client.RegisterTools and its handlerFor/writeMultimodalResult
chain, plus the WithMediaDir and WithParallelToolCalls options, had no
production caller -- the live adaptation path is provider/mcp.Provider,
which now owns binary media persistence itself. A repo-wide search finds
no remaining reference outside the composition contract test that asserts
RegisterTools must not appear, so the two paths can no longer diverge.
DELETE: NATS startup is mandatory (config.NATSConfig documents "there is no
broker-off execution mode"), so Daemon.Tasks is never nil in production and
pollSQLite/drainSQLite are unreachable. Remove them and their d.Tasks==nil
call sites, and correct the Tasks field comment.
Resolves infra-misc-3.
WIRE: webhookguard.SensitiveKeyMarkers is now the single exported marker
list, and gateway.sensitiveParameterKey consumes it instead of inlining an
identical copy. webhookguard/redact.go documented that the two lists must
match "exactly so the two redaction paths agree"; that agreement is now
structural (one slice, two consumers) rather than a comment nothing
enforces. A new test asserts both consumers observe the same set, so a
future edit cannot silently desynchronise chat-transcript redaction from
webhook-capture redaction.
WIRE: the live provider/mcp adaptation path is the only production MCP
consumer and its handlerFor detected image/audio/resource-blob blocks but
returned an empty MultimodalResult, so telegram_setup's multimodalMediaRefs
(which reads only result.URLs) had nothing to deliver. Decode each media
block into the provider's media root and populate Files, SubdirHint and
URLs with local-path refs the channel uploads.
Service.Check matched deferred[component.ID] == component.Available, and a
never-deferred recipient's absent entry is the empty string -- equal to an
empty Available emitted for a component with no update. Guard on a real
(non-empty) available version before applying the deferral, so an
up-to-date recipient is not told their update is deferred. No WIRE/DELETE
decision applies: this is a correctness fix on a live consumer, not
unreachable code.
WIRE, not delete: cronstore.Store.MarkRun is the documented run-completion
step ("once the ticker has dispatched a job, the runner ... calls MarkRun to
keep next_run fresh") and the scheduling engine is now started at boot, but
nothing in production called it. Due returns every job whose NextRun is at or
before now, so with NextRun frozen in the past a job with a 1h interval was
handed to the runner on every tick.
The delivery Router is the single Runner the engine is given and, per this
package's own doc, the only place that knows a job store exists, so it is the
producer-side site. RouterStore (SpecLookup + RunRecorder) widens only what
the Router takes; the per-kind runners keep the narrow SpecLookup, and
NewRouter's signature is unchanged, so no call site moved.
Only a successful run records, matching the store's own contract that an
interval or cron schedule fires "after the last successful run". A one-shot
schedule reports ErrScheduleUnsupported -- it has no recurring next run by
definition -- which is swallowed rather than returned, because propagating it
would make the engine emit KindJobError for a job that actually succeeded.
Red-then-green: TestRouterAdvancesTheScheduleAfterASuccessfulRun asserts
LastRun is set and NextRun moved past now, and failed on both counts before
the change. TestRouterToleratesAOnceScheduleWithoutANextRun pins the
sentinel half. Mutation-verified by replacing only the record call with
`return nil`, keeping the API intact.
Resolves gate-subsystem-2 and gate-subsystem-1.
WIRE: gate.Finding.Level is now a typed gate.Level restricted to
LevelError/LevelWarn, and Finding.Validate rejects any other value so a
mis-typed or empty level fails the gate closed instead of silently
downgrading an intended blocker to a pass -- mirroring the fail-closed
standard ReviewFinding.Validate already sets in
internal/domain/workflow/review_findings.go.
WIRE: StageYaegiGate now delegates the blocking decision to
gate.Finding.Blocking instead of re-implementing the raw "error" literal,
so the script-facing gate.Blocking helper (exposed by gateextract to
interpreted .archie/gate.go scripts) and the rule the daemon actually
enforces share one source of truth and cannot drift.
Root-cause fix: Connect validated the raw config before withDefaults, so
the Heartbeat<TTL guard was skipped whenever Heartbeat was unset and a
custom TTL below DefaultHeartbeat passed as a silently expiring registry.
Apply defaults first so the documented invariant is enforced. No
WIRE/DELETE decision applies: this is a producer-ordering bug, not
unreachable code.
WIRE: docs/prds/state-store-contract.md §11 requires the remote wire and the
local adapter to behave identically. The local adapter (internal/store/events.go)
records a {"marshal_error":%q} marker when json.Marshal of event Data fails,
while eventDataJSON silently returned "" on the same failure, emptying the
event's Data on the wire. Carry the same marker so an unmarshalable Data
value survives the hop with the local adapter's fidelity.
WIRE, not delete: docs/architecture/configuration.md's behavioural-literals
inventory lists the "Memory safety scanner -- compiled prompt-injection and
sensitive-data patterns with fixed warn/block consequences" as current
behaviour, and internal/memory.Manager.HandleToolCall already refuses a write
whose content scans as ThreatBlock. The consumer existed; the producer never
called SetScanner, so Manager.ScanContent short-circuited to ThreatNone and
the gate was a permanent no-op.
setupMemory now installs memory.DefaultScanner. Consequences stay at the
documented defaults -- scanReject is false, so a prompt-injection match is
downgraded to a warn and logged rather than refusing the operator's write.
Red-then-green: TestSetupMemoryInstallsAThreatScanner asserts the composed
manager actually scans, not that a field was assigned; it failed with
"ScanContent = ThreatNone for a prompt-injection payload" before the change.
Mutation-verified by removing only the SetScanner call (API intact) and
watching the same assertion fail.
Choice: cross-package test (pin). Both ceiling pairs are live producers
and currently agree, so the WIRE/DELETE rule does not apply. Deriving one
shared definition would either require a new package outside this lane's
ownership or bind the channel-free sendfile tool to the telegram package;
the cross-package test pins the documented 'the two must agree' contract
at the duplicate itself.
WIRE: docs/prds/session-memory-curator.md specifies that each pass finds
"sessions with activity since the last pass", and its effectiveSince rule
treats a zero Since as "the runtime declining to name a horizon" (24h
fallback for the first pass). The runtime is the only production constructor
of PassInput and already carries lastPass, so it must name the horizon at the
producer by setting Since to the prior pass time. Previously Since was never
set, so the session curator fell back to now-24h on every pass and re-read
the same window each chat turn.
IncrementRetryCount had zero production callers -- only tests and the
staterpc plumbing referenced it. taskactions.Service.applyRetry already
uses the atomic RetryTask exclusively, which increments retry_count and
requeues in one transaction.
Unlike ListCaptures/ListUndispatchedCaptures (kept as declared-unconsumed
compatibility surfaces because a rolling deploy could have an old
client/server pairing mid-flight), this repo has one production consumer
(see AGENTS.md's solo-project note), so the breaking removal is accepted
outright rather than deprecated-and-kept. Deleted the Go method, the
storecontract interface entry, the staterpc server/client methods, and the
RPC/messages from state.proto, regenerating the .pb.go/_grpc.pb.go pair.
Test fixtures that used IncrementRetryCount as a setup helper now drive
retry_count through the real path instead: queries_test.go bumps it via
direct SQL (same package, no contract to route through), and
api_tasks_actions_test.go now loops RetryTask+Transition, which exercises
production code instead of a deleted one.
Every chat gateway (Telegram, email, webhook) implemented channels.Channel's
ConfigSchema/ValidateConfig contract but nothing ever called it, so a
misconfigured gateway would only fail once it tried to start rather than at
boot. setupEmailGateway/setupWebhookGateway now call ValidateConfig before
registering a start function and return false (fatal boot error, matching
setupTelegramGateway's existing convention) on failure; telegram_setup.go
does the same for the already-constructed *telegram.Gateway.
Fixed telegram.Gateway.ValidateConfig/ConfigSchema along the way: it only
recognised token_env, but chat.telegram.token (a secret reference) is an
equally valid, already-precedent-ordered credential source per
resolveTelegramToken. Wiring the old validator unmodified would have
rejected every Token-only deployment. Also corrected ConfigSchema's stale
allowed_chat_ids property name to the real allowed_user_ids toml key.
RegisterPluginTool/SetPluginToolExecutor/UnregisterPluginTools and the
PluginToolDef/PluginToolExecutor types have no production caller.
Plugin/MCP tool registration flows through agentexec.pluginToolSet and
internal/tools.Registry, not this staging registry (tools-builtin-2,
duplicate of tools-core-8).
Registry.Discover, DefaultRegistry and the go/ast extraction helpers
have no production caller; static source discovery has no PRD and no
consumer. Production registration goes through bootstrap.go's
toolReg.Register and the provider Registry's RegisterBatch (tools-core-3).
internal/channels/webhook's RouteConfig implements and tests HMAC
signature validation, payload template extraction, and reply delivery,
but setupWebhookGateway built []webhook.RouteConfig{{Path: "/webhook"}}
literally -- no config field could reach Secret/Template/DeliverTo, so
the gateway accepted any unsigned POST despite its package doc claiming
signature validation.
Adds config.ChatConfig.Webhook (WebhookRoute: path, secret as the
existing SecretRef pattern, template, deliver_to) and webhookRoutes(),
the pure translation into []webhook.RouteConfig that
setupWebhookGateway now calls. A secret ref that fails to resolve logs
and falls back to no validation rather than refusing to start, since
signature validation stays opt-in (an empty secret is documented,
valid config) unlike the mandatory forge webhook secret.
DispatchSequential, DispatchConcurrent, ClassifyEntry and their
supporting types (dispatch.go) have zero non-test callers; the live
tool path is agentexec/toolset.go's BuildToolSetFrom. Removes the
dead engine and its tests, and updates the PRD status table that
referenced it (tools-core-1).
b.web and its three adapters (skillCatalogAdapter, memoryUIAdapter,
curatorsUIAdapter) were constructed at boot but the daemon never calls
Handler() on the server and no route reads any of these fields -- the
dashboard is served by the separate archie-ui process (compose.go),
which deliberately leaves the same surfaces nil, and the daemon's
config snapshot goes through the standalone webui.BuildConfigView, not
a Server method. Removed the field, its four assignment sites, and the
three adapter files; test boot literals that carried a leftover
`web: &webui.Server{}` for no assertion-relevant reason had it
dropped, and the one test that specifically pinned b.web's store
surfaces staying nil is now moot with the field gone.
No /goal, /steer, or /queue command exists in messaging.localCommands, no
Router handler dispatches them, and BuildGoalPrompt was never merged into
the turn's system prompt. NewSessionState had no caller outside its own
test. Delete the entire mechanism rather than let a fully-built but
unreachable feature be mistaken for a live one.
All four production Router constructions left Dangerous nil; the only
Decide implementation was webui.DangerousService, used directly by the
webui HTTP handler, not through the Router. handleDeny and the typed
/approve branches always returned "not configured" in production. Delete
DangerousApprover, the Dangerous field, /deny, and the dead branches so
the router surface matches what is actually wired; the dashboard's
dangerous-action path is unaffected since it never routed through here.
telegram.New only ever constructed with empty webhookURL/webhookSecret
(telegram_setup.go) and config.TelegramConfig has no field to set them, so
the SetWebhook/StartWebhook branch, WebhookHandler, and webhook teardown in
Stop were dead code exercised only by tests. Long-polling is the only
reachable mode; delete the webhook path and its ConfigSchema properties so
the schema no longer advertises unsupported config.
internal/memory/scrubber had no importer anywhere in the repo; the
only emitter of <memory> fences (builtin.Provider.SystemPromptBlock)
also has no caller in the streaming output path, so the whole package
was dead code. Deleted it and the doc comment claiming a scrubber
consumes SystemPromptBlock's output.
UnaryTokenInterceptor/TokenValidator/checkToken (auth.go) and
constantTimeTokenValidator (state_store.go) had no production caller:
server auth on the bridge-address listener is wired through
TaskGrants.UnaryInterceptor/StreamInterceptor, which replaced this
all-or-nothing token check with per-task scoped grants. Removed the
dead cluster and its now-pointless tests; TaskGrants' own auth
rejection paths are already covered in task_grants_test.go.
TaskConfig now carries the daemon's ToolPolicy (MaxResultChars/SpillDir)
via ForTask/ToConfig, and runTask applies it to the constructed
LoopRunner. Previously the worker always built the agent loop with a
zero-value ToolLimits, so tool results in every task's agent stage were
never capped or spilled despite the configured 50k default (agentexec-1,
tools-core-11).
schedulingConfig translated [scheduling] config into a domain
EngineConfig but nothing ever called it in production: the whole
scheduling/cron family (ticker engine, cronstore, crondelivery) was
built and tested but reachable from no binary, so an operator setting
scheduling.interval etc got a silently inert section.
setupScheduling opens a cronstore.Store as the engine's JobSource,
builds a crondelivery.Router with a workflow-kind runner backed by the
same non-forge gateway.TaskCreator chat's /spawn already uses, and
constructs the scheduling.Engine from schedulingConfig. startServices
starts it alongside every other subsystem; Stop is registered via
addCleanup on the same Background-timeout pattern as the curator
runtime. No chat task creator configured leaves the engine unstarted
rather than running with no reachable job kind -- the "chat" delivery
kind stays unmapped for the same reason (no unified cross-channel
outbound sender exists at this composition root yet).
Reachability (tools/reachaudit, epic archie-core-06ag) answers "is this code
in a shipped binary?". It cannot answer the complementary question: "does
every declared contract surface have a consumer, or a declaration that it
has none?". ratelimit was in the binary closure and called by nothing, which
reachability could not see.
tools/contractaudit classifies each subject of each declared surface as
CONSUMED, DECLARED-UNCONSUMED, UNDECLARED-UNCONSUMED, or STALE-DECLARATION,
and only the last two are findings. The declaration allowlist must match
reality exactly: a missing entry fails and so does an entry that outlived
its subject, because a stale allowlist is how a gate quietly stops checking
anything.
Surfaces: the two gRPC services, whose consumption is derived by scanning
adapter bodies for calls through the generated client, and the dashboard
HTTP API, matched between the registerXRoutes call sites and the path
literals the bundled client calls.
Findings on the current tree, all deliberate and now declared:
ListCaptures and ListUndispatchedCaptures are superseded by their streaming
variants -- staterpc's client calls StreamCaptures -- so no production
client reaches the unary RPCs.
Three bugs this tool found in itself, each recorded because each is the
class of error that makes a conformance check worse than none:
- Joining RPCs to adapter methods by name silently reported live RPCs as
unconsumed, because adapters do not map one-to-one: StoreClient.Get calls
GetSession, List calls ListSessions.
- Reflecting over the client value rather than the pointer reported zero
methods, hence the whole surface unconsumed.
- Treating the asset mount and the health probes as dashboard API routes
reported four healthy routes as undeclared; they have different consumers
and are out of scope for this surface.
The consumer extractor fails loudly on a call shape it cannot parse rather
than under-reporting, and every check is negative-tested: a route, an RPC,
and a removed consumer are each injected, confirmed to fail for the right
reason, and reverted. The declaration staleness rule is tested too.
Advisory when run directly; task check runs it -strict. See
docs/prds/contract-conformance-audit.md.
TestResolveProviderSecretsDegradesInsteadOfFailing matched a substring of the
warning's prose. Assert the structured provider attribute instead so a
rewording can't break the suite while a missing warning still fails it.
ServiceConnection only has target/target_token; poll_interval was never a
real field there and never did anything. Caught by the new unknown-key
check in the configuration loader (TestDeploymentOverlaysHaveNoUnknownKeys).
Surfaces configuration.Document.UnknownKeys as a warning naming the
offending keys. Stays a warning, not a boot failure, per
docs/architecture/configuration.md's startup policy: only an invalid
config is fatal, and a stray key is far more likely an operator typo in an
otherwise-working file.
decodeTOML discarded toml.DecodeFile's metadata, so a misspelled or
renamed key parsed, validated and silently did nothing. Document.UnknownKeys
now carries the dotted key paths a loaded file's decode targets left
undecoded.
One file feeds two decode targets (&doc.Config and &doc.Scheduling), so a
key legitimately owned by one shows up as undecoded in the other -- a key
is only reported when both leave it undecoded (unknownKeys intersects the
two sets), which is what keeps a valid [scheduling] block from being
misreported as unknown on every config that uses it.
YAML config sources are unchanged for now (no equivalent metadata hook in
the yaml decoder); this covers the TOML path, which is what
config.example.toml, every shipped deployments/*.toml profile, and
install.sh's generated config.toml all use.
TestSubscribeAgentEventsFlushesBeforeReturning only checked that main.go's
source text contained the string "flush task event subscription", so it
passed whether or not subscribeAgentEvents actually flushed and failed if
the message were merely reworded. Replace it with a real embedded-NATS
test: subscribe, then publish on a separate connection with no delay, and
assert the event arrives -- repeated to make the SUB/PUB ordering race
observable. Mutation-verified: removing the flush call makes this fail
reliably (multiple iterations lose the race) while the text-grep version
would have kept passing.
rotate() closed the current file before attempting the rename+reopen, so
when the reopen failed (a full disk, a permission change) every write
afterward went to a closed *os.File and was silently dropped -- the sink
stayed permanently broken rather than recovering once the transient
condition cleared. Keep the old descriptor open across the rename/reopen
and only close it once the new one is confirmed, so a write during (or
after) a failed rotation always lands somewhere.
extractBody re-split the already-isolated body on the first blank line it
found, intending to strip a stray content-header block some MTAs emit.
That heuristic can't distinguish a header block from an ordinary blank
line between paragraphs, so any multi-paragraph plain-text email silently
lost everything before the first paragraph break.
Clone's own doc comment promises mutating the clone cannot touch memory
shared with the original, but Image.Hosted/Image.Local were left as a
shallow map copy -- a runtime overlay or dashboard PATCH decoding into the
clone could mutate the published config's image provider maps.
Registry.Resolve and Getenv called engine.Resolve directly with no panic
recovery, so a defective interpreted engine (sops/Vault plugin) took the
whole daemon down at boot when resolving a provider credential
(provider_secrets.go's only caller has no recovery of its own). Wrap both
call sites in yaegiutil.Safe, the same recovery every other Yaegi
extension surface in this repo already uses.
handleTaskAction, the config and workflow write handlers all call
authorizeTaskMutation before mutating, but the binding and mapping
create/update/delete/approve handlers never did, leaving those dashboard
endpoints reachable by a cross-origin request with no CSRF header -
contradicting dynamic-curators.md's documented mutation contract.
BindingDispatcher and BindingTaskCreator are documented "optional: nil
disables the dispatch loop", same as Bindings, but dispatchBindings only
checked Bindings before dereferencing the other two. Any composition that
wires Bindings without also wiring both handles panicked on the first
dispatch cycle.
Two things fall out of one principle: a test that asserts against a
hand-written file is testing an artifact a human or an agent may legitimately
rewrite at any moment, so only generated output is a valid target.
install.sh generated config.toml two ways -- a full heredoc for the self-host
path and an awk splice of the [forge] block into config.example.toml -- with a
forge_block shell helper feeding both. That is the arrangement
docs/architecture/configuration.md decided against: it "must stop generating
config.toml; archied setup owns it", because the installer hand-rolling TOML
already drifted once (choosing Gitea produced a config naming a token the
installer never wrote). Both generators and forge_block are gone; install.sh
collects its answers as before and passes them to archied setup as parameters,
with secrets passed as REFERENCES to the env keys it just wrote rather than as
values, which would put them on a command line. The installer also now asks for
a cloud model, which archied setup requires and the old path never emitted.
deployment_contract_test.go tested the removed generators by parsing install.sh's
shell text, reconstructing the heredoc and asserting on its content. It broke the
instant install.sh stopped generating config -- "install.sh has no heredoc
declaring the daemon config's [nats] table" -- which is the failure mode in
miniature: the test was coupled to an artifact, not to behaviour. Deleted.
What it actually protected is kept, asserted on the GENERATED config instead:
TestRunSetup_GeneratedConfigSatisfiesDaemonRequirements runs archied setup and
loads what it wrote, requiring services.state.target and bot_user. A test against
generated output fails when generation breaks and passes when a human merely
tidies the template.
Found by an adversarial package sweep (temp tracker: config-1,
repo-root-deployment-1, repo-root-deployment-2).