* fix(webui): accept the merge task action
The action whitelist omitted merge, so the dashboard's Merge button on a
pr_open task was refused with 400 unknown action.
Closes: archie-core-slpoz
* fix(workflow): give each parallel branch its own outputs
Branches shared the task's Outputs map, so concurrent declared-output
writes raced (or were lost when the map started nil). Each branch now
writes a copy; join merges new outputs in branch-name order and refuses
one written by two branches as a second write.
Closes: archie-core-3a7w2
* fix(postgres): dispatch captures oldest first and keep pending ones
ListUndispatchedCaptures ordered newest first and listed captures no
binding can match (failed HMAC), so sustained intake starved older work
and bad signatures held the batch. It is now oldest first and lists only
dispatchable captures. Count retention no longer evicts a capture that
is still pending for an armed binding. The daemon lists only sources
with an enabled workflow, so captures waiting on a disabled one do not
hold the oldest-first batch.
Closes: archie-core-2et4b, archie-core-o0s0z
* fix(ui): refuse renaming a workflow onto an existing id
Saving upserts by id, so editing a workflow's id to another workflow's
id removed the open one and overwrote the other. The editor now refuses
that save and says why.
Closes: archie-core-wpoz8
* fix(workflow): reject unknown step settings at save
Step factories decoded settings with yaml.Node.Decode, which drops keys
it does not know, and settings-less steps ignored settings entirely, so a
misspelt key (readOnly for read_only) saved and silently did nothing.
Every factory now decodes strictly and settings-less steps refuse
settings; ParseDefinition runs the factories, so the save refuses them.
Closes: archie-core-8b5nk
* fix(postgres): keep a stored capture when its prune fails
InsertCapture committed the capture, then returned the prune's error, so
intake answered 500 and a sender without a delivery header retried into
a duplicate capture and a duplicate dispatch. A failed prune is now
logged and the stored capture's id returned.
Closes: archie-core-3miuh
* fix(crondelivery): fail and advance a job no runner can deliver
Router.Run returned nil for a kind with no runner, so the engine reported
a successful run while the schedule never advanced and the job fired on
every tick. The run now fails with the refusal, which the engine reports,
and the schedule advances (a one-shot is removed). The router's own
refusal event is gone with it.
Closes: archie-core-s6ahh
* fix(taskactions): stop the runs of cancelled callees
CancelExecution cancelled a caller's waited-on callees in the store, but
only the caller's run was stopped, so callee containers ran to the end.
CancelExecution now returns the callees it cancelled (nested included)
in place of the step ids nobody read, and every cancelling action stops
their runs too.
Closes: archie-core-9labz
* fix(workflow): treat a zero json.Number as false in when
Task inputs and step results decode numbers as json.Number, which truthy
did not unpack, so when: inputs.count held for a count of 0.
Closes: archie-core-uv270
* fix(webui): read a workflow's runs with a workflow-filtered page
The workflows page and the canvas run picker filtered the newest 100
tasks of every workflow client-side, so on a busy instance a workflow's
older runs were invisible. GET /api/tasks takes a workflow filter, carried
through the State Store's Tasks request to the query, and both views ask
for the selected workflow's runs.
Closes: archie-core-tpiw1
* fix(ui): load the restored workflow into the editor
Restore Defaults saved the shipped definition but left the open draft in
the editor, still marked unsaved, so a later save re-applied it. The
editor now reloads the restored definition.
Closes: archie-core-85e7w
A retry now carries the operator's worktree choice (refresh onto the base
branch or continue the work already pushed on the task branch) from the
dashboard through the task action to the daemon dispatch, and persists it
on the task row so it survives a reload. The daemon resolves the mode from
the task, never from the workflow; BeginRemediation records continue
explicitly so a remediation still resumes its pull request branch.
Decision 1 of docs/prds/pr-review-operator-response.md: the dashboard's
POST /api/tasks/{id}/action is the authoritative surface, chat's /approve
is a shortcut that posts every offered finding, and both reach the same
Service.Apply so one operator intent cannot be recorded as two decisions.
The action body now carries instructions (required by rereview) and the
finding keys an approve posts. taskactions.Service answers an offer
through the guarded RespondReviewGate write: approve records the
selection on the offer, rereview records the instructions, increments the
round and clears the offer, and a rereview with no instructions, with no
offer, or at the cap is refused as a conflict with nothing written. Chat
reaches the same service: chatTaskControllerAdapter.ApproveChatTask
delegates to b.taskActions() instead of its own requeue, which is what
removed the handler's hardcoded implement handoff -- feasibility's deliver
stage now names implement on the task before it waits, the invariant the
handler needs.
The payload crosses every hop it must: the NATS action request, the
gateway.v1 gRPC contract (regenerated), the LocalChatAdapter, and the
webui handler, which answers 400 for a rereview without instructions and
409 for the cap. A rereview event kind names its actor the way the
approval and rejection trios do.
taskactions.Task gains review_gate and rereview_rounds, and the two
surfaces' tests assert they agree.
Plan item 5 of docs/prds/execution-tree-state-machine.md (archie-core-1217).
Until now a stop was a context cancel plus a caller-side transition, and the
step rows a worker still held running could never be told: the execution moved
while the work carried on, and the old interrupt-first ordering existed only
because the record could not defend itself. The step table can: the PRD's
ordering -- the store is the record, the context cancel is the delivery --
became safe the moment a worker's next step write fails ErrStaleTransition
against a cancelled step.
- storecontract.ExecutionCanceller and the CancelExecution RPC: one
transaction moves every non-terminal StepExecution of the execution's
current attempt to cancelled (one event row each, in the same
transaction), and the execution itself to the status the operator action
names, under the shared transition table with its audit row. Staleness is
decided before legality, the way guardTransition decides it. Earlier
attempts are never rewritten. Deliberately administrative: the
deny-by-default grant rule covers it, pinned by a test.
- taskactions.Service routes stop, cancel, abandon and reject through it and
the old Transition/CancelTask combinations are deleted; the daemon's
in-memory cancel is demoted to the delivery hook the PRD names, called
after the store record.
- The gateway's chat controller records first and delivers second, the same
order, and records even when no runtime is wired here (a standalone
gateway cannot reach the daemon's goroutines): the record is what unsticks
a lost-cancel task, and the delivery is best effort. StopRunning and
TaskRuntime.CancelRunningTasks are deleted outright -- no production
caller remained once the task_action tool owned stopping, and the daemon's
CancelRunningTasks/runningTasks.stopAll go with them.
- The gateway's chat adapter writes through CancelExecution instead of a
bare Transition, so chat /cancel and the dashboard's action service land
on the same path.
PRD decisions recorded here:
- Each cancelled step's event row is stage_finish with {cancelled: true} and
the reason as its detail -- the exact-one-event-per-step-transition rule
covers the pending -> cancelled transition too, even for a step that never
ran.
- A parked cancel carries the needs_human class, matching the Transition
path this replaces; the transient class stays with parkRunningTask's
unwind parks, which now meet ErrStaleTransition for cancelled runs and are
ignored there.
- Cancelling a wait:true callee is deferred to #1216's agent-call children:
the callee's own tree and the wait flag are what make
"cancelling a caller cancels each callee it waits on" decidable, and the
callee writes it cannot fake are this issue's half of the contract.
- RecoverStale's interrupted sweep is plan item 6, untouched here.
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action
records which identity acted and whose authority it used.
resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer
token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie
compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no
client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an
identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another
service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an
unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise.
identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it
refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that
did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a
verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act.
The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is
used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended
identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is
archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token.
The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects
keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a
different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim
one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower
than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole
identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not
need a new RPC to satisfy it.
attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting
identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added
through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced
by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an
agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved,
a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing
approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so
"approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted.
Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is
never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token
and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard.
That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is
not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals
are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording
nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard
to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs
(ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite:
the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second
implementation of it.
Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque
authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified
against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256
on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer
https://auth.catlow.cloud.