applyContainerDefaults no longer fills containers.image with a hard-coded
private-registry reference. An unset image now fails configuration
validation with 'containers.image is required for autonomous workflow
workers', so a fresh instance is told at startup (and via the readiness
probe at runtime) instead of at the first failed container pull.
Configs that relied on the default now set it explicitly: dev.toml (the
local task image:agent build, which e2e also overlays), plus commented
[containers] blocks in config.example.toml and standalone.toml. The
deploy docs no longer describe a code-level default.
Task containers log in with their run credential on an external broker and
reach only their own subjects, decided by the embedded broker's authenticator.
The broker token is never put in a container environment.
Every service connected to PostgreSQL as the database owner, which is a
superuser, so anything that compromised an app process owned the cluster, and
every connection reached the server with an empty application_name, so
pg_stat_activity could not say which service a session belonged to.
Split the DB credential into two login roles and name every pool:
- archie_migrator owns public and its objects and runs goose. Migrations run
on a short-lived pool opened from the new migration_database_url, before the
serving pool opens. It is not a superuser.
- archie_runtime serves requests with SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, sequence
USAGE/SELECT and function EXECUTE only. It has no CREATE privilege, so it
cannot change the schema.
- Every pool sets application_name: archie-state-store, archie-gateway, and a
-migrate / -recovery / -schema / -provision suffix on the transient
administrative connections. Existing one-URL installs keep working: an
absent migration_database_url falls back to database_url and the migration
runs on the serving pool exactly as before.
Provisioning is a new idempotent `archie-state-store provision` subcommand: it
needs an admin URL the services never hold (database owner or superuser),
creates or reconciles both roles, hands every public-schema object to the
migration role, revokes PUBLIC's CREATE on public, sets row-level grants, and
sets the migration role's default privileges so tables future migrations
create are usable without a hand-run grant. It stores SCRAM verifiers, refuses
superuser roles, and verifies the boundary before committing.
install.sh now provisions the bundled path and separates the credentials: the
superuser password the Compose database is created with lives only in a
compose-only postgres.env, while the env file the units load holds the
non-superuser PGPASSWORD. A bundled install that predates the split is
upgraded in place: the roles are created, the superuser password is rotated
out of the env file, and config.toml is moved to the runtime and migration
URLs. External databases keep their operator-managed credential; the
deployments README documents the one-shot provision command.
setup writes both bundled URLs, dev:postgres provisions the dev database, the
e2e stack provisions its throwaway server, and the deployment templates point
at the two roles.
Curators could only reach the workflow/integration tools; there was no way
to survey task runs. Adds run_list/run_events to the shared registry
(guarded as read on task kind), attaches the instance's acting principal
to curator model calls so guarded tools authorize, and records a pass's
final text as a pass.summary action so the report is inspectable. Ships a
dry-run self-intake definition in dev.toml/config.example.toml declaring
only those two tools, so it cannot file issues yet.
Add [access].denial_retention (default 90 days, matching the audit-retention
seed) wired through config defaults and validation; the State Store sweeps
denial records older than the configured age hourly via the new
access.DenialPruner / PruneDenials store query. The dashboard gains
GET /api/access/denials (read_audit-gated, so org admins/owners see their
org's records; the store scopes by the credential's org) and an
/org/denials page backed by a Pinia store.
Replace the service bearer tokens with [tls] ca_file and cert_dir. Caller
identity comes from the verified certificate, not metadata. Without TLS,
services listen and dial on loopback only. Task containers get only the CA
and keep their grant.
* feat(state): durable operator alerts owned by the State Store
Alerts dedup on org+kind+subject, resolve themselves when a condition
clears, and are raised, resolved, dismissed and listed through the state
contract. Task transitions raise needs-human and failed alerts in the same
transaction; the store checks service health and prunes closed alerts.
Each raise and resolve queues a webhook delivery whose attempts are kept.
* feat(notify): deliver operator alerts to the webhook; raise config and release alerts
notify.webhook now receives raised and resolved alerts above a severity
threshold with HMAC-signed payloads, bounded retry and every attempt recorded
on the alert. archied raises model alias, provider and credential-binding
alerts from the effective configuration, an update alert from the release
channel, and a credential-rejected alert from the egress resolver. The
dashboard API lists and dismisses the caller's org's alerts.
* feat(ui): alert bell in the top bar and webhook alert settings
The bell lists the org's open alerts by severity with dismiss and a link per
alert, and refreshes from the event stream. The task settings page gains the
webhook severity threshold and signing secret. ui/dist rebuilt.
The dashboard's setup terminal was a 503: it had a WebSocket route, an
authorizer and an xterm.js surface, but nothing owned a container. The
daemon owns containers, so the session contract lands there and the
dashboard consumes it over a new gRPC contract.
One session concept, two targets. A setup session is addressed by Kit
profile and is ephemeral; a run session (archie-core-qi91) is addressed by
task and attempt and is bounded by the task. This slice serves setup and
answers Unimplemented for run.
The contract, the authorisation, the lifetime and the egress phase are
settled in docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md, "Session contract". The
short version: the daemon serves harness.v1.HarnessService; the dashboard
authorizes the operator as an update on the secret and then dials the
daemon with the harness service token, required even on loopback because a
session is a shell holding an org's credential; the setup container runs
no worker, mounts no worktree, holds a keepalive, and carries an empty
container environment. Install hooks run at the install phase and the
session enters runtime before the shell, so a runtime-phase credential's
token endpoint is the one the proxy intercepts.
Capture is gated by the egress proxy on a granted service, and a setup
session has no task, so the daemon registers a session grant: the
session's proxy token resolves to the org's bindings for the Kit's
declared services. The real token never enters the container: the token
endpoint response is sentinelized and stored as the org's harness secret.
Every teardown path releases the pool slot, revokes the egress session and
the grant, removes the sandbox network, and removes the session's volumes.
The listener requires HARNESS_TOKEN and stops with a 10s grace before
Stop, so an open session cannot hold shutdown to the watchdog leash.
The artifactsync client had no importer and [artifacts] parsed but was never
read, so the capability was dead. Remove the package, the config field and
type, the token defaulting, and the example section. A leftover [artifacts]
key now reports as unrecognised, like any other removed key.
The daemon stopped setting forge state labels when label-driven retry was removed; the config field, helpers and defaults had no consumer. Remove them and the Scheduling policy page's State labels section.
module_dir, logextract and examples/modules go with the Yaegi loader. The plugin
reconciler had only the module directory left to watch, so it goes too.
Nothing consumed plugin.Plugin. The daemon's capability host held only those
plugins, so it goes too. The lint fix to the extensions access test rides along.
A secret engine is now a subprocess serving secretengine.v1, installed through
the package store's new extensions family and enabled by extension-settings.
bws leaves the binary, as do the Yaegi engine loader and its examples.
A Telegram voice note was stored as the placeholder "[voice message]" and
nothing turned its audio into text, so the agent could not read it. Add a
channel-neutral Transcriber capability to the messaging media layer
(internal/domain/messaging), an ai-sdk Whisper implementation behind it
(internal/infrastructure/transcription), and wire it for Telegram.
The capability is config-driven like the other model roles:
models.transcription names a provider/model, the matching [providers.*]
entry carries the credential (api_key_env or an api_key secret ref), and
a missing role, provider, class or credential degrades to today's
behaviour with a log -- never an error that fails the turn.
A transcribed note replaces its placeholder with "[voice transcription]"
followed by the transcript, preserving any caption, so stored history
shows the agent it is reading a machine transcript.
ImagePull was called with empty options, so a private registry answered 401
on every pull regardless of containers.pull_policy. docker login did not help
either: it writes ~/.docker/config.json, which only the CLI reads.
Add containers.registry_auth, a SecretRef reusing the credential shape the
rest of the file uses, whose resolved value is a Docker registry.AuthConfig
JSON document. archied resolves it at boot and the pool base64url-encodes it
into the X-Registry-Auth header ImagePullOptions carries.
A missing or unresolvable credential degrades to the anonymous pull that
existed before the field (with a warning), so a deployment with no private
registry is unaffected; a half-named reference is refused by
configuration.Validate. The field is file-owned and json:"-", so the
container-runtime-policies layering has to preserve it explicitly, the way it
preserves Profiles.
docs/prds/pr-review-agent.md's own header already declared this
superseded (docs/architecture/adversarial-review.md, docs/prds/
operator-pr-review.md, docs/prds/review-calibration.md); this executes
that removal per the maintainer's explicit decision, so no reference
to the old path remains:
- internal/domain/workflow/review.go, review_findings.go,
review_report_md.go and their tests: Reviewer, ReviewRequest,
StageReview, StagePostReviewComments, ReviewReport/ReviewFinding and
friends. ReviewComment relocated into workflow.go (still used by
Forger.CreateReviewComments and the new pr-review pipeline).
- internal/app/agentworker/review.go: the ai-sdk-backed subagentReviewer.
- internal/app/archied/pr_review.go: the synchronous operator-review
path (prReviewer, gateway.ChatPRReviewer wiring). The review_pr chat
tool now self-omits (nil reviewer) until the operator trigger is
rebuilt to enqueue an async pr-review task instead of reviewing
synchronously in the chat turn.
- config.Repo.ReviewEnabled and its dashboard exposure.
- Two composition-order tests and one dashboard test that existed only
to pin the deleted path.
Also splits PRReview()'s Stage list into prReviewDecisionStages()
(phases 1-8) and stagePROutput() (phase 9), so a future caller can
splice the decision phases before a PR exists and defer posting until
after -- needed for the "archie's own PRs" trigger, not wired here: it
needs the same stage-loop-around-StageOpenPR semantics this pass
couldn't fully verify in the time available (does an Outcome-setting
stage like StageOpenPR end the compiled-workflow-definition engine the
same way it ends workflow.Run's literal loop?). Carries ScoredFinding.
Adversary through synthesis so that trigger's blocking-finding check
doesn't need to cross-reference back into the pre-synthesis slice.
Not built in this pass, left as a precise continuation (see the bead
comment): the watched-repositories and operator triggers, both blocked
on the same real question -- how a forge-reading credential reaches
PRSource's real implementation when the pr-review pipeline's Stage.Run
bodies execute inside the sandboxed archie-agent process, which holds
none today.
kitrun ran the first Kit of a profile's list as the container image, so
every mixin's layers (its tools, skills and staged context) were dropped
without a refusal. A profile's `kit` is now one digest-pinned reference:
a workload Kit, or a published Kit set, which the Kit spec's frontend
merges from a workload and its mixins into one image. archie composes no
Kits itself, and a bare mixin is refused with a pointer to publishing a
set. kit.Compose had no production caller left and is removed.
BREAKING CHANGE: `[containers.profiles.X] kit` and the agent-profiles
document's `kit` are a string, not a list. A stored list fails to decode
and must be rewritten as the one workload or set reference.
Part of archie-core-egkf.6.
docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md (Credentials) and orgs-and-access.md:
egress.Resolver had no production implementation, and no run carried a
credential naming the org secrets its identity is granted, so a Kit's
required credential@1 was refused at the proxy and no harness run
authenticated (archie-core-egkf.11).
Two things, as scoped (this does not attempt #1026's full run-credential
consolidation replacing WorktreeGrantIssuer/StateStoreGrantIssuer -- that
PRD item is real, separate, and still open; this is deliberately narrower):
1. A run credential naming granted secrets: config.CredentialBinding maps a
Kit credential@1 service to a secret; config.Config/IdentityConfig gain
Org and GrantedCredentials (a per-identity allowlist of service names,
reusing the existing per-identity config-override pattern DiffCapLines
already uses, not a new Cedar/Authorizer integration -- KindSecret policy
objects exist in internal/domain/access but assembling a full Principal
is #1026's job, not a two-line addition here). config.ContainerConfig.
BoundCredentials computes the declared (Kit) ∩ granted (identity) ∩
org-matched intersection Sam's own rule requires: neither side widens
the other, proven by a mutation-checked test flipping each of the three
independently.
2. egress.GrantResolver: the production Resolver, holding only what a
caller explicitly Grant-ed one run, replaced wholesale (not merged) on
a repeated Grant, gone entirely on RevokeGrant. kitrun.Launcher.Launch
computes the intersection per launch and resolves real values through
the existing secret registry (SecretResolver), Grants it before the
proxy session opens, and Release/error-path rollback (a new shared
Launcher.release) always revokes it.
Course-corrected mid-implementation (flagged by Sam): credential bindings
first landed as a boot-time config.ContainerConfig.Credentials field
captured once into Launcher.Bindings -- exactly the "parses but is not a
resource" trap CLAUDE.md warns about, and inconsistent with agent-profiles
(#1207) making a Kit profile apply without a restart. Rebuilt as its own
live control-plane resource, CredentialBindingsKind ("credential-bindings"),
following the agent-profiles/container-runtime-policies split precisely:
config.ContainerConfig.Credentials is json:"-", [containers].credentials
is only its seed, and kitrun.Launcher now holds *config.Holder (not a
captured slice) and reads Containers.Credentials fresh on every Launch.
Org/GrantedCredentials were already read fresh per dispatch (d.configFor
inside runKitTask, never cached), so no equivalent fix was needed there.
Deliberately not built: identities and grants as their own State Store
resource (orgs-and-access.md's "Org owns ... identities and their grants").
Identities are entirely config.toml-defined today with no control-plane
resource at all; moving GrantedCredentials alone into one would put half
an identity in two places. That migration is identities' own scope, not
credential bindings'.
Every install serves from Postgres, so the legacyread/legacyimport packages,
the archie-state-store import command, the boot gate that refused to serve
over unimported SQLite files, and db_path (which only located those files)
go. Migration 0010 drops the import_completion table.
Each credential is now only a {engine, key} secret reference. A stale
token_env in a file is reported at startup as an unrecognised key.
nats.token_env stays (no secret-ref form), and providers.api_key_env stays:
it is the carrier the resolver writes each resolved key's env name into.
None had a production consumer: [agent] and containers.enabled were decoded
only so old files kept loading, [oidc] was never read (archie-ui takes OIDC
from flags), and [image] was validated but no provider exists.
A stored container-runtime-policies document that carries Profiles now
replaces the file's profiles instead of merging into them, so a profile
deleted in the dashboard stays deleted; one stored before profiles existed
still inherits the file's. Profiles drop their json tags so the stored
document keys them like its other fields.
Adds examples/profiles/Dockerfile.agent-net (agent image plus network
lookup tools) with a build-only agent-net compose service,
examples/workflows/firewall-investigate.yaml with a test that parses every
example against the registered step vocabulary, and names the postgres
service in the compose header.
Workflow definitions declare inputs, repository (none, optional or
required; default required) and profile. A binding assigns each input
from a mapped parameter or a constant and may take its repository from a
parameter, which must name a configured repo; both are checked when the
binding is saved and again at dispatch. Inputs travel as structured task
data (tasks.inputs, the task brief, and a JSON block in the agent's
mission), never as body text.
A task with no repository runs in a per-task scratch workspace with no
clone and no publication grant. The agent.run step runs one mission
without a repository and finishes the task in the new completed status.
Agent profiles live under [containers.profiles.<name>]: an image and an
allowlist over the tools archie adds (MCP, scripts, plugins).
[containers].image is the default profile; an unconfigured profile parks
the task. The workflow is now pinned before the container starts so the
profile can choose its image.
Also stop two archied tests writing embedded NATS state into the package
directory, refuse an empty state_dir for embedded NATS, and drop the NATS
store files an earlier lane commit tracked.
Architecture, deployment, installer, skill and PRD text now name the Postgres
State Store, the offline recovery commands on database_url, state_dir for host
state, and db_path as the legacy-file locator for archie-state-store import.
Finalised PRDs, CHANGELOG, docs/news and docs/archive are unchanged records.
The State Store's task and event-capture stores and the conversation store
read by archied and served by archie-gateway now open on database_url.
Every serving process refuses to start when legacy SQLite data exists and no
import completion is recorded, naming archie-state-store import; a fresh
install records completion itself. The Gateway holds its Postgres serve
claim for its lifetime and releases it before the pool closes.
Wave 1 of the Postgres migration (archie-core-7r0x.9). This is the shared shape
every port lane builds on; nothing here switches a live path to Postgres yet.
- config: add `database_url` beside `db_path` (config.go), mark it bootstrap-only
in denied_keys, expose it in the webui StorageView/config schema, and add it to
config.example.toml plus all deployments/*.toml.
- docker-compose: add a postgres:18 service; `task dev` (dev:postgres) brings it
up and waits for it before the State Store boots.
- archied: `openStateStore` now opens and migrates the process-scoped Postgres
pool via `openStateStorePool`. The State Store fails closed (D1.2) when
database_url is absent or invalid rather than fall back to SQLite; serving
against Postgres later requires an import-completion record (D1.3), which is a
later lane's gate, not this one.
- composition seam: task-store construction (state_store_task.go) and EDA-store
construction (state_store_eda.go) are extracted from openStateStore, with the
pool open in state_store_pool.go. This is a behaviour-preserving refactor only
— no store, interface, error, ordering or logging change — so L1 and L2 build
against separate files instead of sharing state_store.go.
Tests: fail-closed pool behaviour is pinned (absent/invalid URL); the State Store
boot/restart tests now run against a throwaway Postgres 18 container (pgtest
TestMain). Scoped test command and module-wide build pass; see lane report.
Implements docs/prds/artifact-sender.md (Approved). archie-core now sends
generated artifacts to the offloaded.dev collaborative editor, whose
POST /api/artifacts route, bearer service token, PocketBase-backed
versions and idempotency semantics are the receiving contract.
- [artifacts] config section: base_url + token SecretRef with a
token_env fallback naming WORKSPACE_INGEST_TOKEN. An empty base_url
disables the sender entirely; a base_url with an unresolvable token
disables it with a warning, because a missing credential disables a
capability rather than stopping the daemon.
- internal/infrastructure/artifactsync: one-method Publish seam in the
Courier posture, full source per publish (versions of record are
snapshots), 503 retried three times with backoff, 401/400 surfaced
immediately with the field reason, deterministic request ids
(artifact:pr-review:<owner>/<repo>#<n>).
- ReviewReport gains a pure markdown renderer in internal/domain/workflow:
summary, one subsection per finding with the failure scenario and
disposition when present, verified properties as a checked-clean list.
- The daemon's PR reviewer publishes after a completed review when the
sender is configured, records the editor deep link on the result, and
degrades a failed publish to a log line -- publishing never fails the
producing work.