fix(builtin): send_file resolves symlinks before the confinement check

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sam committed 2026-10-25 16:45:34 +11:00
1 parent cf2942c97a
commit db560fdb8b
3 files changed
+80 -5

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+21 -4
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@@ -12,16 +12,33 @@ import (
// ErrPathNotAllowed reports a path refused by the workspace confinement.
var ErrPathNotAllowed = errors.New("path is outside the configured workspace")
// ResolveReadable resolves path as the read tool does and returns it when
// the read tool would allow it.
// ResolveReadable resolves path as the read tool does, then follows
// symlinks and re-checks where they lead, so a link inside the workspace
// cannot hand out a file outside it. The returned path has no symlinks.
func ResolveReadable(cwd, path string) (string, error) {
resolved := resolvePath(cwd, path)
if !isReadConfined(cwd, resolved) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrPathNotAllowed, resolved)
}
abs, err := filepath.Abs(resolved)
target, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(resolved)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve %s: %w", resolved, err)
}
return abs, nil
target, err = filepath.Abs(target)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve %s: %w", resolved, err)
}
cache := goModCacheDir()
if !isConfined(realDir(cwd), target) && (cache == "" || !isConfined(realDir(cache), target)) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s links to %s", ErrPathNotAllowed, resolved, target)
}
return target, nil
}
// realDir returns dir with symlinks resolved, or dir when it cannot be.
func realDir(dir string) string {
if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir); err == nil {
return r
}
return dir
}
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
package builtin
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestResolveReadableFollowsSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
ws := filepath.Join(root, "ws")
outside := filepath.Join(root, "secret")
for _, d := range []string{ws, filepath.Join(ws, "sub")} {
if err := os.Mkdir(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for _, f := range []string{outside, filepath.Join(ws, "sub", "ok.txt")} {
if err := os.WriteFile(f, []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
links := map[string]string{"out": outside, "in": filepath.Join(ws, "sub", "ok.txt"), "outdir": root}
for name, target := range links {
if err := os.Symlink(target, filepath.Join(ws, name)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
linkedWS := filepath.Join(root, "linkedws")
if err := os.Symlink(ws, linkedWS); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tests := []struct {
name, cwd, path string
allowed bool
}{
{"plain file", ws, "sub/ok.txt", true},
{"link inside workspace", ws, "in", true},
{"link to file outside", ws, "out", false},
{"link to dir outside", ws, "outdir/secret", false},
{"symlinked workspace", linkedWS, "sub/ok.txt", true},
{"lexical escape", ws, "../secret", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := ResolveReadable(tt.cwd, tt.path)
if tt.allowed && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("want allowed, got %v", err)
}
if !tt.allowed && !errors.Is(err, ErrPathNotAllowed) {
t.Fatalf("want ErrPathNotAllowed, got %v", err)
}
})
}
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// Package sendfile provides send_file: it validates a host file under the
// read tool's path policy and returns it for the turn's channel to upload.
// read tool's path policy, symlinks resolved, and returns it for the turn's
// channel to upload.
package sendfile
import (