fix(state): correct audit backfill scoping and policy write races
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6 files changed
+120
-45
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@@ -120,12 +120,26 @@ type Policy struct {
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// (the Validator contract); this check is structural, so the store and the
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// reset path can reject a malformed document without an engine.
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func (p Policy) Validate() error {
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if err := p.validateScope(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(p.Text) == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: no text", ErrInvalidPolicy)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (p Policy) validateScope() error {
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if strings.TrimSpace(p.ID) == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: no ID", ErrInvalidPolicy)
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}
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if err := p.Level.Validate(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(p.OrgID), "/") || strings.Contains(string(p.WorkspaceID), "/") {
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// auditKey encodes the scope as path segments.
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: org and workspace IDs must not contain a slash", ErrInvalidPolicy)
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}
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switch p.Level {
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case LevelInstance:
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case LevelOrg:
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@@ -141,9 +155,6 @@ func (p Policy) Validate() error {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: object policy carries no org, kind or ID", ErrInvalidPolicy)
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}
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(p.Text) == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: no text", ErrInvalidPolicy)
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}
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return nil
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}
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@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ package postgres
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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@@ -54,12 +53,6 @@ func auditKey(p access.Policy) string {
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return strings.Trim(joined, "/")
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}
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// textJSON wraps a policy text as the JSON string sys_audit stores.
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func textJSON(text string) []byte {
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out, _ := json.Marshal(text)
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return out
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}
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// ListPolicies returns the stored policies the request's scope may see:
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// every policy across levels for an unscoped service.
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func (s *Store) ListPolicies(ctx context.Context) ([]access.Policy, error) {
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@@ -126,6 +119,9 @@ func (s *Store) PutPolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) (int64, error) {
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level, orgID, wsID, kind, id, policyID := accessScopeOf(p)
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var version int64
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_, err := s.writePolicy(ctx, func(q *postgresdb.Queries) error {
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if err := q.LockPolicyWrite(ctx, auditKey(p)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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previous, err := q.AccessPolicyText(ctx, postgresdb.AccessPolicyTextParams{
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Level: level, OrgID: orgID, WorkspaceID: wsID,
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ObjectKind: kind, ObjectID: id, PolicyID: policyID,
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@@ -133,10 +129,17 @@ func (s *Store) PutPolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) (int64, error) {
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var oldValue []byte
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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oldValue = textJSON(previous)
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oldValue, err = auditJSON(previous)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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case !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows):
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return err
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}
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newValue, err := auditJSON(p.Text)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := q.UpsertAccessPolicy(ctx, postgresdb.UpsertAccessPolicyParams{
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Level: level, OrgID: orgID, WorkspaceID: wsID,
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ObjectKind: kind, ObjectID: id,
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@@ -154,7 +157,7 @@ func (s *Store) PutPolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) (int64, error) {
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return q.InsertAccessPolicyAudit(ctx, postgresdb.InsertAccessPolicyAuditParams{
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RecordKey: auditKey(p),
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OldValue: oldValue,
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NewValue: textJSON(p.Text),
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NewValue: newValue,
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RecordVersion: version,
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Actor: access.ActorFromContext(ctx),
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Source: access.SourceFromContext(ctx),
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@@ -169,9 +172,10 @@ func (s *Store) PutPolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) (int64, error) {
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}
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// auditOrg is the org a policy change belongs to. Instance-level policies
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// govern the whole deployment, so they belong to the system org.
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// govern the whole deployment, whatever org their scope field carries, so they
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// belong to the system org.
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func auditOrg(p access.Policy) string {
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if p.OrgID == "" {
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if p.Level == access.LevelInstance || p.OrgID == "" {
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return storecontract.DefaultOrgID
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}
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return string(p.OrgID)
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@@ -185,6 +189,9 @@ func (s *Store) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) error {
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}
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level, orgID, wsID, kind, id, policyID := accessScopeOf(p)
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_, err := s.writePolicy(ctx, func(q *postgresdb.Queries) error {
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if err := q.LockPolicyWrite(ctx, auditKey(p)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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oldText, err := q.DeleteAccessPolicy(ctx, postgresdb.DeleteAccessPolicyParams{
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Level: level, OrgID: orgID, WorkspaceID: wsID,
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ObjectKind: kind, ObjectID: id, PolicyID: policyID,
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@@ -195,20 +202,17 @@ func (s *Store) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, p access.Policy) error {
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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oldValue, err := auditJSON(oldText)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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version, err := q.UpsertAccessPolicyVersion(ctx, postgresdb.UpsertAccessPolicyVersionParams{
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Level: level, OrgID: orgID, WorkspaceID: wsID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := q.InsertAccessPolicyAudit(ctx, postgresdb.InsertAccessPolicyAuditParams{
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RecordKey: auditKey(p),
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OldValue: textJSON(oldText),
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RecordVersion: version,
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Actor: access.ActorFromContext(ctx),
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Source: access.SourceFromContext(ctx),
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OrgID: auditOrg(p),
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}); err != nil {
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if err := insertAudit(ctx, q, "access_policies", auditKey(p), "text", oldValue, nil, version, auditOrg(p)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// A level-scope with no policies left keeps no version row.
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/access"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/infrastructure/postgres/postgresdb"
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@@ -29,15 +30,32 @@ func insertAudit(ctx context.Context, q *postgresdb.Queries, table, recordKey, f
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return nil
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}
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// auditJSON encodes one side of an audit change. A nil value stays nil, which
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// the column stores as NULL: absent is not the same fact as JSON null.
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func auditJSON(value any) []byte {
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if value == nil {
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return nil
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// auditJSON encodes one side of an audit change. An absent value stays nil,
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// which the column stores as NULL: absent is not the same fact as JSON null.
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// A value that cannot be encoded is an error, never a silent NULL that would
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// read as a create or delete.
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func auditJSON(value any) ([]byte, error) {
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if isNil(value) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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out, err := json.Marshal(value)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit value: %w", err)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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// isNil covers the typed nils interface comparison misses, so a nil pointer or
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// map is recorded as absent rather than the JSON literal null.
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func isNil(value any) bool {
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if value == nil {
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return true
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}
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v := reflect.ValueOf(value)
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switch v.Kind() {
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case reflect.Chan, reflect.Func, reflect.Interface, reflect.Map, reflect.Pointer, reflect.Slice:
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return v.IsNil()
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default:
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return false
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}
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return out
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}
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@@ -13,22 +13,46 @@ ALTER TABLE sys_audit ADD CONSTRAINT sys_audit_org_nonempty CHECK (org_id <> '')
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-- access_policies: <level>/<org>/<workspace>/<objectKind>/<objectID>/<policyID>;
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-- instance-level policies carry no org; reset rows are reset/instance or
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-- reset/org/<org>.
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UPDATE sys_audit SET org_id =
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CASE table_name
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WHEN 'resources' THEN
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CASE
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WHEN position('/' IN record_key) > 0 THEN split_part(record_key, '/', 1)
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ELSE 'org-sys'
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END
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WHEN 'access_policies' THEN
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CASE
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WHEN record_key LIKE 'reset/org/%' THEN split_part(record_key, '/', 3)
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WHEN record_key LIKE 'reset/%' THEN 'org-sys'
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WHEN split_part(record_key, '/', 1) = 'instance' THEN 'org-sys'
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ELSE COALESCE(NULLIF(split_part(record_key, '/', 2), ''), 'org-sys')
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END
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ELSE 'org-sys'
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END;
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--
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-- record_key was never rewritten by the org rename, so rows written while the
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-- default org was still called "default" carry that dead id. They belong to
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-- org-sys, which is what the rename made the same org.
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UPDATE sys_audit SET org_id = 'org-sys'
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WHERE table_name = 'access_policies'
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AND (split_part(record_key, '/', 2) = 'default' OR record_key = 'reset/org/default');
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-- Org ids may themselves contain '/', which the old validation allowed. Match
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-- the longest existing org prefix rather than the first path segment, so
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-- acme/dev never resolves to acme.
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UPDATE sys_audit a SET org_id = (
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SELECT o.id FROM orgs o
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WHERE a.record_key LIKE o.id || '/%'
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ORDER BY length(o.id) DESC
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LIMIT 1
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)
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WHERE a.table_name = 'resources'
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AND a.org_id = 'org-sys'
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AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM orgs o WHERE a.record_key LIKE o.id || '/%');
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UPDATE sys_audit a SET org_id = (
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SELECT o.id FROM orgs o
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WHERE a.record_key LIKE split_part(a.record_key, '/', 1) || '/' || o.id || '/%'
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ORDER BY length(o.id) DESC
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LIMIT 1
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)
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WHERE a.table_name = 'access_policies'
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AND a.org_id = 'org-sys'
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AND split_part(a.record_key, '/', 1) IN ('org', 'workspace', 'object')
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AND EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM orgs o
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WHERE a.record_key LIKE split_part(a.record_key, '/', 1) || '/' || o.id || '/%'
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);
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UPDATE sys_audit a SET org_id = o.id
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FROM orgs o
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WHERE a.table_name = 'access_policies'
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AND a.org_id = 'org-sys'
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AND a.record_key = 'reset/org/' || o.id;
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CREATE INDEX idx_sys_audit_org_at ON sys_audit (org_id, at DESC, id DESC);
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CREATE INDEX idx_sys_audit_org_record ON sys_audit (org_id, table_name, record_key, at DESC, id DESC);
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@@ -283,6 +283,18 @@ func (q *Queries) ListDenials(ctx context.Context, arg ListDenialsParams) ([]Acc
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return items, nil
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}
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const lockPolicyWrite = `-- name: LockPolicyWrite :exec
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SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended($1::text, 0))
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`
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// Serialises concurrent writes to one policy key. SELECT FOR UPDATE cannot
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// lock a row that does not exist yet, so without this two concurrent creates
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// both read no previous row and the second is audited as a create.
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func (q *Queries) LockPolicyWrite(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
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_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, lockPolicyWrite, key)
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return err
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}
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const recordDenial = `-- name: RecordDenial :exec
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INSERT INTO access_denials (org_id, principal, action, resource_kind, resource_id, level, policies)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
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@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ WHERE level = $1 AND org_id = $2 AND workspace_id = $3 AND object_kind = $4
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AND object_id = $5 AND policy_id = $6
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RETURNING text;
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-- name: LockPolicyWrite :exec
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-- Serialises concurrent writes to one policy key. SELECT FOR UPDATE cannot
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-- lock a row that does not exist yet, so without this two concurrent creates
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-- both read no previous row and the second is audited as a create.
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SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended(sqlc.arg(key)::text, 0));
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-- name: AccessPolicyText :one
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SELECT text FROM access_policies
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WHERE level = $1 AND org_id = $2 AND workspace_id = $3 AND object_kind = $4
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