docs: edit guides, PRDs and security notes, regenerate release news
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@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
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# Generating a GitHub Token for Archie Core
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This guide walks you through creating a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) for Archie Core.
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This guide walks you through creating a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) for
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Archie Core.
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> **Important**: Archie Core requires a **Classic Personal Access Token** (starts with `ghp_...`). Fine-grained PATs currently lack necessary scope permissions for Git HTTP push operations, repository invitation acceptance, and cross-repository operations needed by the orchestrator.
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> **Important**: Archie Core requires a **Classic Personal Access Token**
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> (starts with `ghp_...`). Fine-grained PATs currently lack necessary scope
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> permissions for Git HTTP push operations, repository invitation acceptance,
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> and cross-repository operations needed by the orchestrator.
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---
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@@ -11,23 +15,30 @@ This guide walks you through creating a GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) for A
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Archie Core uses the GitHub API to:
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1. Poll assigned or labelled issues (`archie:queued`).
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2. Update issue labels as tasks transition (`archie:working`, `archie:pr`, `archie:parked`).
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2. Update issue labels as tasks transition (`archie:working`, `archie:pr`,
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`archie:parked`).
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3. Post status comments and emoji reactions.
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4. Create branches, commit code changes, and open Pull Requests for human review.
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4. Create branches, commit code changes, and open Pull Requests for human
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review.
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---
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## Step-by-Step Instructions: Creating a Classic Token
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1. Navigate to [GitHub Settings → Developer Settings → Tokens (classic)](https://github.com/settings/tokens).
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1. Navigate to
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[GitHub Settings → Developer Settings → Tokens (classic)](https://github.com/settings/tokens).
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2. Click **Generate new token** → **Generate new token (classic)**.
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3. Set the **Note**: `Archie Core` (or your bot's name).
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4. Choose an **Expiration** (e.g. 90 days, 1 year, or No expiration for dedicated bot accounts).
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4. Choose an **Expiration** (e.g. 90 days, 1 year, or No expiration for
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dedicated bot accounts).
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5. Select the required scope:
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- **`repo`** (Full control of private repositories — required for polling, commenting, pushing branches, and opening PRs).
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- **`workflow`** (Optional — required if Archie needs to update GitHub Actions workflows).
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- **`repo`** (Full control of private repositories — required for polling,
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commenting, pushing branches, and opening PRs).
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- **`workflow`** (Optional — required if Archie needs to update GitHub
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Actions workflows).
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6. Scroll to the bottom and click **Generate token**.
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7. **Copy your token immediately** (starts with `ghp_...`). You won't be able to see it again!
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7. **Copy your token immediately** (starts with `ghp_...`). You won't be able to
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see it again!
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---
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@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
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# Building your first playbook binding
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This walks through the whole no-code path the event-capture epic promises:
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point an external app's webhook at archie, see the real payload it sends,
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map the fields you care about, bind them to a workflow, and watch the next
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matching event turn into a task -- no code, no redeploy, no restart.
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This walks through the whole no-code path the event-capture epic promises: point
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an external app's webhook at archie, see the real payload it sends, map the
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fields you care about, bind them to a workflow, and watch the next matching
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event turn into a task -- no code, no redeploy, no restart.
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## 1. Create a source and send a test event
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Open **Events → Inspector** and click **New source**. Archie shows the
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source's URL and signing secret once; copy both. Point the external app's
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webhook at that URL. Send one real
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event however is easiest for a first test, e.g.:
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Open **Events → Inspector** and click **New source**. Archie shows the source's
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URL and signing secret once; copy both. Point the external app's webhook at that
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URL. Send one real event however is easiest for a first test, e.g.:
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```bash
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curl -X POST http://localhost:8484/webhooks/capture/sentry \
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@@ -18,25 +17,25 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8484/webhooks/capture/sentry \
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-d '{"issue": {"title": "NullPointerException in checkout"}, "level": "error"}'
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```
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This event isn't signed yet, so it's captured but marked **unauthenticated**
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-- visible for you to design against, but incapable of triggering anything: an unauthenticated event can never match a binding.
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This event isn't signed yet, so it's captured but marked **unauthenticated** --
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visible for you to design against, but incapable of triggering anything: an
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unauthenticated event can never match a binding.
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## 2. Inspect the captured payload
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Open the dashboard's **Event inspector** (`/captures`). Your test event
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appears there with its real body -- this is schema-by-example: you're
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looking at an actual payload from the actual sender, not guessing at a
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schema in advance.
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Open the dashboard's **Event inspector** (`/captures`). Your test event appears
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there with its real body -- this is schema-by-example: you're looking at an
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actual payload from the actual sender, not guessing at a schema in advance.
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## 3. Map the fields you care about
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Open **Field mappings** (`/mappings`) → **New mapping**. Pick your captured
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event from the dropdown, then click through its payload tree on the right --
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every key and value is clickable. Clicking a value binds it as a field
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(name, JSON path, and an inferred type you can change). Add whichever fields
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your workflow needs (e.g. the issue title), mark the ones that must be
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present as **Required**, hit **Preview** to confirm they resolve correctly
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against the real payload, then **Save**.
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every key and value is clickable. Clicking a value binds it as a field (name,
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JSON path, and an inferred type you can change). Add whichever fields your
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workflow needs (e.g. the issue title), mark the ones that must be present as
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**Required**, hit **Preview** to confirm they resolve correctly against the real
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payload, then **Save**.
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## 4. Create the binding
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@@ -46,20 +45,20 @@ Open **Playbook bindings** (`/bindings`) → **New binding**:
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- **Source** -- the same `<source>` segment from step 1 (e.g. `sentry`).
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- **Field mapping** -- the one you just saved.
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- **Workflow** -- which registered workflow should run on a match.
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- **Repo pin** (optional) -- leave both blank to use the single configured
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repo; set owner/repo explicitly if you run a multi-repo deployment.
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- **Shared secret** -- a real secret (16+ bytes), never `test1234`. The
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sender signs every request body with this via HMAC-SHA256 so archie can
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tell a genuine event from anyone who finds the URL.
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- **Repo pin** (optional) -- leave both blank to use the single configured repo;
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set owner/repo explicitly if you run a multi-repo deployment.
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- **Shared secret** -- a real secret (16+ bytes), never `test1234`. The sender
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signs every request body with this via HMAC-SHA256 so archie can tell a
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genuine event from anyone who finds the URL.
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Save. The binding starts in **draft** -- nothing fires yet.
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## 5. Approve it
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A **draft** or freshly-**edited** binding needs an explicit human approval
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before it can ever match a live event -- this is deliberate, not a missing
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step: an operator authoring a binding is a considered act, an event arriving
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is not, and nothing should self-arm. Click **Approve**. Status becomes **armed**.
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before it can ever match a live event -- this is deliberate, not a missing step:
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an operator authoring a binding is a considered act, an event arriving is not,
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and nothing should self-arm. Click **Approve**. Status becomes **armed**.
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## 6. Fire it for real
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@@ -77,16 +76,14 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8484/webhooks/capture/sentry \
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-d "$BODY"
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```
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This event is captured as **authenticated**, matched against your armed
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binding, and dispatched into a new task through the exact same
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gate/worktree/sandbox pipeline every other task goes through. Check
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the **Tasks** page; a new task should appear, its body built from the fields
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your mapping resolved.
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This event is captured as **authenticated**, matched against your armed binding,
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and dispatched into a new task through the exact same gate/worktree/sandbox
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pipeline every other task goes through. Check the **Tasks** page; a new task
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should appear, its body built from the fields your mapping resolved.
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## Editing a live binding
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Any edit to an armed binding -- even a typo fix -- drops it back to
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**pending_approval** automatically. This can't be bypassed by editing; it
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has to be re-approved. When editing, leave the **Shared secret** field blank
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to keep the existing secret; only fill it in if you're deliberately
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rotating it.
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**pending_approval** automatically. This can't be bypassed by editing; it has to
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be re-approved. When editing, leave the **Shared secret** field blank to keep
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the existing secret; only fill it in if you're deliberately rotating it.
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@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
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task bench:prreview
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```
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Reviews the 38 runnable Martian pull requests once each at `deep` depth with
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the production pipeline, judges the posted comments against the golden
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comments in `internal/app/prbench/martian.json`, and writes
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Reviews the 38 runnable Martian pull requests once each at `deep` depth with the
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production pipeline, judges the posted comments against the golden comments in
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`internal/app/prbench/martian.json`, and writes
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`docs/benchmarks/pr-review-<timestamp>.md` (recall per PR, overall recall,
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precision, models, archie version). Commit that file with the run.
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@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ precision, models, archie version). Commit that file with the run.
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and judge both default to its `default` alias. Override with
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`task bench:prreview -- -model ALIAS_OR_PROVIDER/MODEL -judge-model ALIAS_OR_PROVIDER/MODEL`.
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Pick a judge other than the reviewer's model for an independent judgement.
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Aliases set only in the dashboard are not in the file; pass a
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`provider/model` ref instead.
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Aliases set only in the dashboard are not in the file; pass a `provider/model`
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ref instead.
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- Pull requests are public, so no credential is needed. `GH_TOKEN` or
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`GITHUB_TOKEN`, if set, only raises the GitHub API rate limit.
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- `-problems ID,ID` runs a partial smoke run; its report says it is not the
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@@ -199,4 +199,4 @@
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"/news/archied/1.9.7/": "/news/1.9.7/",
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"/news/archied/1.9.8/": "/news/1.9.8/",
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"/news/archied/1.9.9/": "/news/1.9.9/"
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}
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}
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@@ -499,4 +499,4 @@
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"date": "2026-07-22",
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"body": "### archied\n\n- feat: ship the resident forge-polling daemon, deterministic workflow engine, isolated worktrees, quality gates, Gitea integration, Docker/NATS worker split, plugin loading, and skills support\n- feat: publish `archied` and `archie-agent` container images to the Gitea registry\n\n### archie-agent\n\n- feat: ship the isolated agent runtime, NATS RPC boundary, workflow execution, skills, and plugin support\n- feat: publish the `archie-agent` container image to the Gitea registry"
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}
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]
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]
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+229
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@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
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# External agent harnesses
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**Status:** Approved
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**Scope:** the harness model and, in "Session contract", the duplex session
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that the setup terminal and the run-scoped live view both use. Code cites
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this file for both (`ui/src/harness/SetupTerminal.vue`,
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**Status:** Approved **Scope:** the harness model and, in "Session contract",
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the duplex session that the setup terminal and the run-scoped live view both
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use. Code cites this file for both (`ui/src/harness/SetupTerminal.vue`,
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`internal/infrastructure/postgres/queries/harness_secrets.sql`).
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## Decision
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A workflow stage can run on an external coding-agent CLI instead of the
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built-in agent loop: Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or any
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other CLI packaged as a Docker Sandbox Kit v3. Each authenticates with an API
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key or the operator's subscription login, and can carry the operator's own
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skills, plugins, subagents and instructions.
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A workflow stage can run on an external coding-agent CLI instead of the built-in
|
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agent loop: Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or any other CLI
|
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packaged as a Docker Sandbox Kit v3. Each authenticates with an API key or the
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operator's subscription login, and can carry the operator's own skills, plugins,
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subagents and instructions.
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Two boundaries hold regardless of what the harness does:
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@@ -28,102 +27,99 @@ Two boundaries hold regardless of what the harness does:
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A harness is packaged as a Kit v3 image: an OCI image whose
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`vnd.docker.sandbox.kit.descriptor` manifest annotation declares what the
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harness needs. Archie reads descriptors with the published
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`github.com/docker/sandbox-kit-spec/v3/spec` package and does not maintain
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its own descriptor format. Published Kits run unmodified.
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`github.com/docker/sandbox-kit-spec/v3/spec` package and does not maintain its
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own descriptor format. Published Kits run unmodified.
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Archie is a partial Kit runtime. It implements these capability types:
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| Type | Archie behaviour |
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| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `credential@1` | Proxy-managed only, described below. |
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| `network-policy@1` | Enforced by the egress proxy. |
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| `volume@1` | A Docker volume keyed by WorkflowExecution, deleted with it. |
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| `lifecycle@1` | Install and startup hooks run on container create. |
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| `agent-sessions@1` | The headless `prompt` and `resume` invocations for the stage. |
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| `agent-skills@1` | Discovery paths for bundled skills and optional shared skills; host access is always read-only. |
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| `agent-skill@1` | Selected image-bundled skills copied into the declared discovery paths. |
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| `agent-context@1` | The resolved discovery directory, defaulting beside the workspace; preserve instructions outside Archie-managed sections. |
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| `resources@1` | Container CPU and memory limits. |
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| Type | Archie behaviour |
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| ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `credential@1` | Proxy-managed only, described below. |
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| `network-policy@1` | Enforced by the egress proxy. |
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| `volume@1` | A Docker volume keyed by WorkflowExecution, deleted with it. |
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| `lifecycle@1` | Install and startup hooks run on container create. |
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| `agent-sessions@1` | The headless `prompt` and `resume` invocations for the stage. |
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| `agent-skills@1` | Discovery paths for bundled skills and optional shared skills; host access is always read-only. |
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| `agent-skill@1` | Selected image-bundled skills copied into the declared discovery paths. |
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| `agent-context@1` | The resolved discovery directory, defaulting beside the workspace; preserve instructions outside Archie-managed sections. |
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| `resources@1` | Container CPU and memory limits. |
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Every other type fails closed: a required entry refuses the launch, an
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optional one is skipped and recorded on the step. `credential@1` with
|
||||
`passthrough: true` and any credential for a forge service are refused.
|
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Every other type fails closed: a required entry refuses the launch, an optional
|
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one is skipped and recorded on the step. `credential@1` with `passthrough: true`
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||||
and any credential for a forge service are refused.
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||||
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The operator's own setup (plugins, subagents, instructions, settings) is a
|
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mixin Kit, published with the harness Kit as a Kit set: the set merges their
|
||||
layers into one image. It is versioned image content, rewritten on every
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create, never state a run can modify.
|
||||
The operator's own setup (plugins, subagents, instructions, settings) is a mixin
|
||||
Kit, published with the harness Kit as a Kit set: the set merges their layers
|
||||
into one image. It is versioned image content, rewritten on every create, never
|
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state a run can modify.
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||||
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||||
## Contract
|
||||
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||||
A harness run is a second implementation of `agentexec.Runner`. It takes the
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same `Request` and returns the same `Result`, so workflows, the daemon and
|
||||
the State Store do not know which runner ran a stage.
|
||||
same `Request` and returns the same `Result`, so workflows, the daemon and the
|
||||
State Store do not know which runner ran a stage.
|
||||
|
||||
`agent-sessions@1` supplies the invocation. Archie supplies, per CLI, an
|
||||
output adapter that translates the CLI's JSON output stream into
|
||||
`ToolCallReporter` calls, `Usage` and a session ID. A CLI with no adapter can
|
||||
run stages with no capture tools, reporting no usage; its token budget falls
|
||||
back to wall clock.
|
||||
`agent-sessions@1` supplies the invocation. Archie supplies, per CLI, an output
|
||||
adapter that translates the CLI's JSON output stream into `ToolCallReporter`
|
||||
calls, `Usage` and a session ID. A CLI with no adapter can run stages with no
|
||||
capture tools, reporting no usage; its token budget falls back to wall clock.
|
||||
|
||||
Workflow definition validation rejects, at load time, a stage whose needs the
|
||||
selected harness cannot meet: capture tools without an adapter, or a gate
|
||||
retry without a `resume` verb.
|
||||
selected harness cannot meet: capture tools without an adapter, or a gate retry
|
||||
without a `resume` verb.
|
||||
|
||||
## Selection
|
||||
|
||||
A harness is an agent profile. `docs/prds/event-automation.md` defines a
|
||||
profile as the execution environment a workflow selects; a harness profile
|
||||
names one Kit pinned by digest, a workload Kit or a published Kit set, in
|
||||
place of a container image. Archie runs that Kit's image and composes no Kits
|
||||
itself; a bare mixin is refused. Everything else about profiles
|
||||
holds: a workflow names its profile, a stage may name a different one, and a
|
||||
profile holds no secrets.
|
||||
A harness is an agent profile. `docs/prds/event-automation.md` defines a profile
|
||||
as the execution environment a workflow selects; a harness profile names one Kit
|
||||
pinned by digest, a workload Kit or a published Kit set, in place of a container
|
||||
image. Archie runs that Kit's image and composes no Kits itself; a bare mixin is
|
||||
refused. Everything else about profiles holds: a workflow names its profile, a
|
||||
stage may name a different one, and a profile holds no secrets.
|
||||
|
||||
`archie-agent` builds the stage's runner from the stage's profile: the
|
||||
ai-sdk agent loop for an image profile, the harness runner for a Kit
|
||||
profile. Image profiles, and every workflow already written against them,
|
||||
are unchanged. A Kit profile named by no workflow is a validation error.
|
||||
`archie-agent` builds the stage's runner from the stage's profile: the ai-sdk
|
||||
agent loop for an image profile, the harness runner for a Kit profile. Image
|
||||
profiles, and every workflow already written against them, are unchanged. A Kit
|
||||
profile named by no workflow is a validation error.
|
||||
|
||||
A stage naming a different profile than its workflow's is a separate run,
|
||||
not a mid-container runner switch: a Kit task runs in one container
|
||||
provisioned for one profile (Container layout), so a stage that needs a
|
||||
different one is its own callee, started the way `workflow.call` already
|
||||
starts one (`docs/prds/event-automation.md` "Workflows call workflows"),
|
||||
with its own agent profile resolved off its own task row. This needs no
|
||||
mechanism beyond `workflow.call` plus per-task profile resolution
|
||||
(`daemon.pinTaskProfile`), both of which already treat every task's
|
||||
profile independently of any caller's -- see
|
||||
A stage naming a different profile than its workflow's is a separate run, not a
|
||||
mid-container runner switch: a Kit task runs in one container provisioned for
|
||||
one profile (Container layout), so a stage that needs a different one is its own
|
||||
callee, started the way `workflow.call` already starts one
|
||||
(`docs/prds/event-automation.md` "Workflows call workflows"), with its own agent
|
||||
profile resolved off its own task row. This needs no mechanism beyond
|
||||
`workflow.call` plus per-task profile resolution (`daemon.pinTaskProfile`), both
|
||||
of which already treat every task's profile independently of any caller's -- see
|
||||
`TestWorkflowCallerConformance` (staterpc) for the callee's independent
|
||||
`Workflow` field and `TestWorkflowCallGivesACalleeItsOwnProfile` (daemon)
|
||||
for the Kit-vs-image runner selection that independence produces.
|
||||
`Workflow` field and `TestWorkflowCallGivesACalleeItsOwnProfile` (daemon) for
|
||||
the Kit-vs-image runner selection that independence produces.
|
||||
|
||||
Profiles are org resources in the State Store, so a Kit profile belongs to
|
||||
one org, is granted to its workspaces like any profile, and applies without
|
||||
a restart.
|
||||
Profiles are org resources in the State Store, so a Kit profile belongs to one
|
||||
org, is granted to its workspaces like any profile, and applies without a
|
||||
restart.
|
||||
|
||||
## Organisations
|
||||
|
||||
`docs/prds/orgs-and-access.md` is the boundary; a harness adds nothing that
|
||||
crosses it.
|
||||
|
||||
- A Kit profile, its credential bindings and its OAuth tokens belong to one
|
||||
org. No record is shared between orgs.
|
||||
- A Kit profile, its credential bindings and its OAuth tokens belong to one org.
|
||||
No record is shared between orgs.
|
||||
- A harness run is a run like any other: it acts as the workflow's identity,
|
||||
under the run credential issued at dispatch.
|
||||
- The egress proxy injects a credential only when the run credential carries
|
||||
the secret the binding names. A Kit that declares a service the identity is
|
||||
not granted gets no credential: a required one refuses the launch, an
|
||||
optional one is skipped.
|
||||
- A Kit's network policy is what the Kit asks for; the identity's network
|
||||
grants are what the org allows. The proxy enforces the intersection.
|
||||
- The egress proxy injects a credential only when the run credential carries the
|
||||
secret the binding names. A Kit that declares a service the identity is not
|
||||
granted gets no credential: a required one refuses the launch, an optional one
|
||||
is skipped.
|
||||
- A Kit's network policy is what the Kit asks for; the identity's network grants
|
||||
are what the org allows. The proxy enforces the intersection.
|
||||
- Concurrency slots are counted per binding within its org.
|
||||
|
||||
## Credentials
|
||||
|
||||
A credential binding maps a Kit's `credential@1` `service` name to an org
|
||||
secret, which the org grants to identities like any secret. The secret holds
|
||||
one of:
|
||||
secret, which the org grants to identities like any secret. The secret holds one
|
||||
of:
|
||||
|
||||
- **API key:** a value in the org's secret store.
|
||||
- **OAuth:** tokens captured by the setup terminal, stored in the State Store
|
||||
@@ -132,26 +128,26 @@ one of:
|
||||
|
||||
The egress proxy resolves the binding for each request against the run
|
||||
credential. The container gets the Kit's sentinel in the named variable or
|
||||
credential file. OAuth refresh happens at the proxy, which intercepts the
|
||||
Kit's `tokenEndpoint`, so a refreshed token is written to the State Store and
|
||||
never returned to the container.
|
||||
credential file. OAuth refresh happens at the proxy, which intercepts the Kit's
|
||||
`tokenEndpoint`, so a refreshed token is written to the State Store and never
|
||||
returned to the container.
|
||||
|
||||
Runs sharing an OAuth binding share its subscription's rate limit.
|
||||
`max_concurrent` on the binding (default 1) caps its simultaneous runs. A
|
||||
stage waiting for a slot is `pending`, not `running`.
|
||||
`max_concurrent` on the binding (default 1) caps its simultaneous runs. A stage
|
||||
waiting for a slot is `pending`, not `running`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Session contract
|
||||
|
||||
A **session** is a duplex PTY into a Kit container the daemon owns. One
|
||||
concept covers both targets; only the address, the lifetime and the
|
||||
established egress phase differ.
|
||||
A **session** is a duplex PTY into a Kit container the daemon owns. One concept
|
||||
covers both targets; only the address, the lifetime and the established egress
|
||||
phase differ.
|
||||
|
||||
| | Setup session | Run session (deferred) |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Address | `{org, profile}` | `{org, task, attempt}` |
|
||||
| Container | ephemeral, from the profile's Kit | the task's running container |
|
||||
| Purpose | run the CLI's own login so the proxy captures the tokens | watch and optionally take over |
|
||||
| Lifetime | bounded by the session TTL; the container is removed on close | bounded by the task |
|
||||
| | Setup session | Run session (deferred) |
|
||||
| --------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
|
||||
| Address | `{org, profile}` | `{org, task, attempt}` |
|
||||
| Container | ephemeral, from the profile's Kit | the task's running container |
|
||||
| Purpose | run the CLI's own login so the proxy captures the tokens | watch and optionally take over |
|
||||
| Lifetime | bounded by the session TTL; the container is removed on close | bounded by the task |
|
||||
|
||||
- **Transport.** The daemon serves `harness.v1.HarnessService`, a bidi gRPC
|
||||
stream, and the dashboard implements its `HarnessTerminal` interface
|
||||
@@ -161,39 +157,37 @@ established egress phase differ.
|
||||
`internal/app/archied` or `internal/agentexec`.
|
||||
- **Authorisation.** Opening a session is the `update` action on the secret,
|
||||
decided by the dashboard's authorizer before the route runs
|
||||
(`internal/webui/authorize.go`). The dashboard then dials the daemon with
|
||||
the harness service token. The daemon does not re-authorise a human; it
|
||||
trusts the asserted `{org, profile}` exactly as the task-action RPC trusts
|
||||
an asserted actor. Because that authority is a shell in a container holding
|
||||
an org's credential, the harness listener requires `HARNESS_TOKEN` even on
|
||||
loopback, unlike the State Store's loopback convention.
|
||||
- **Egress phase.** Token interception is filtered by phase
|
||||
(`oauth.go`'s `rule.runtime == atRun`), and `EnterRuntime` is one-way. A
|
||||
setup session therefore follows a run's lifecycle exactly: install hooks at
|
||||
the install phase, `EnterRuntime` before the shell. A credential whose
|
||||
token endpoint must be captured declares `phase: runtime`; a credential
|
||||
capturing at install phase is captured by the install hooks that run before
|
||||
the switch.
|
||||
- **Credentials.** Capture is gated: the proxy intercepts a token endpoint
|
||||
only for a service the session is granted (`Proxy.granted`). A setup session
|
||||
has no task, so the daemon registers a session grant: its proxy token
|
||||
resolves to `{org, the Kit's declared credential services the org binds}`.
|
||||
That is the intersection the `update`-on-secret authorisation covers. The
|
||||
real token never enters the container: the response is sentinelized and
|
||||
stored as the org's harness secret.
|
||||
- **Container discipline.** The setup container runs a keepalive entrypoint
|
||||
with an empty `Config.Env`; the PTY is an exec as the Kit's harness user
|
||||
with the harness env and nothing inherited from any worker. No worktree is
|
||||
mounted. It is acquired through the container pool, so it carries the
|
||||
`archie-daemon` label, the concurrency cap and the max-uptime reaper; the
|
||||
session TTL is the smaller bound. Closing revokes the egress session,
|
||||
removes the sandbox network and the Kit volumes, then releases the
|
||||
container.
|
||||
(`internal/webui/authorize.go`). The dashboard then dials the daemon with the
|
||||
harness service token. The daemon does not re-authorise a human; it trusts the
|
||||
asserted `{org, profile}` exactly as the task-action RPC trusts an asserted
|
||||
actor. Because that authority is a shell in a container holding an org's
|
||||
credential, the harness listener requires `HARNESS_TOKEN` even on loopback,
|
||||
unlike the State Store's loopback convention.
|
||||
- **Egress phase.** Token interception is filtered by phase (`oauth.go`'s
|
||||
`rule.runtime == atRun`), and `EnterRuntime` is one-way. A setup session
|
||||
therefore follows a run's lifecycle exactly: install hooks at the install
|
||||
phase, `EnterRuntime` before the shell. A credential whose token endpoint must
|
||||
be captured declares `phase: runtime`; a credential capturing at install phase
|
||||
is captured by the install hooks that run before the switch.
|
||||
- **Credentials.** Capture is gated: the proxy intercepts a token endpoint only
|
||||
for a service the session is granted (`Proxy.granted`). A setup session has no
|
||||
task, so the daemon registers a session grant: its proxy token resolves to
|
||||
`{org, the Kit's declared credential services the org binds}`. That is the
|
||||
intersection the `update`-on-secret authorisation covers. The real token never
|
||||
enters the container: the response is sentinelized and stored as the org's
|
||||
harness secret.
|
||||
- **Container discipline.** The setup container runs a keepalive entrypoint with
|
||||
an empty `Config.Env`; the PTY is an exec as the Kit's harness user with the
|
||||
harness env and nothing inherited from any worker. No worktree is mounted. It
|
||||
is acquired through the container pool, so it carries the `archie-daemon`
|
||||
label, the concurrency cap and the max-uptime reaper; the session TTL is the
|
||||
smaller bound. Closing revokes the egress session, removes the sandbox network
|
||||
and the Kit volumes, then releases the container.
|
||||
- **Kit unavailable.** The daemon serves the contract only when it has a
|
||||
container pool and a Kit launcher; otherwise there is no listener, and a
|
||||
client's refused connection is gRPC's `Unavailable`. The dashboard's
|
||||
existing failure surface is the honest degrade; `/api/harness`'s `terminal`
|
||||
field means "a client is configured", not "the daemon can run a Kit".
|
||||
client's refused connection is gRPC's `Unavailable`. The dashboard's existing
|
||||
failure surface is the honest degrade; `/api/harness`'s `terminal` field means
|
||||
"a client is configured", not "the daemon can run a Kit".
|
||||
- **Run target.** `RunTarget{task_id, attempt}` opens a read-only view of a
|
||||
running task's sandbox; it ships as the peek. The daemon resolves the pair
|
||||
itself, so the dashboard never learns a container name: the task store says
|
||||
@@ -201,140 +195,136 @@ established egress phase differ.
|
||||
launcher names the container `kitrun.TaskContainer(task_id, attempt)` (one
|
||||
container per attempt, removed when the run ends; volumes remain task-scoped
|
||||
for retries). A finished or unknown task, a task that is not running, an
|
||||
attempt other than the running one, or a container that is gone is
|
||||
`NotFound` with the reason in the message; an unreachable task store or
|
||||
container engine is `Unavailable`. The view follows the container's stdout
|
||||
and stderr, including the harness output forwarded by the worker, carries
|
||||
no stdin and no exec, and
|
||||
ends when the task's container ends or the client leaves, so it confers no
|
||||
authority over the container. A read-only tail of the existing per-attempt
|
||||
logs was rejected: those refresh only on task state changes and are the
|
||||
daemon's account, not the sandbox's.
|
||||
Mid-stream failures are shown as a reason in the terminal before it closes.
|
||||
attempt other than the running one, or a container that is gone is `NotFound`
|
||||
with the reason in the message; an unreachable task store or container engine
|
||||
is `Unavailable`. The view follows the container's stdout and stderr,
|
||||
including the harness output forwarded by the worker, carries no stdin and no
|
||||
exec, and ends when the task's container ends or the client leaves, so it
|
||||
confers no authority over the container. A read-only tail of the existing
|
||||
per-attempt logs was rejected: those refresh only on task state changes and
|
||||
are the daemon's account, not the sandbox's. Mid-stream failures are shown as
|
||||
a reason in the terminal before it closes.
|
||||
- **Authorisation.** The dashboard route `GET /api/tasks/{id}/sandbox` is
|
||||
decided as `read-logs` on the task before the handler runs, so a caller
|
||||
sees a sandbox exactly when they may read that task's log. The daemon
|
||||
checks that the task belongs to the asserted org before following output.
|
||||
decided as `read-logs` on the task before the handler runs, so a caller sees
|
||||
a sandbox exactly when they may read that task's log. The daemon checks that
|
||||
the task belongs to the asserted org before following output.
|
||||
- **Grants.** The view takes no grant of its own. The run's egress session
|
||||
(its proxy token, install then `EnterRuntime`) already belongs to the run
|
||||
and is revoked by `Launcher.Release` when the task ends; the view reads
|
||||
after that phase switch and dies with the container.
|
||||
- **Credentials.** The sandbox holds sentinels, never real credentials:
|
||||
API keys are `egress.Sentinel` (`credentials.go`), and an OAuth token set
|
||||
is sentinelised in the response and swapped back by the proxy only on a
|
||||
granted service's resource host in the matching phase (`oauth.go`,
|
||||
`injectOAuth`). The proxy runs in the daemon outside the container, so a
|
||||
shell in the container sees only sentinels.
|
||||
- **Credentials.** The sandbox holds sentinels, never real credentials: API
|
||||
keys are `egress.Sentinel` (`credentials.go`), and an OAuth token set is
|
||||
sentinelised in the response and swapped back by the proxy only on a granted
|
||||
service's resource host in the matching phase (`oauth.go`, `injectOAuth`).
|
||||
The proxy runs in the daemon outside the container, so a shell in the
|
||||
container sees only sentinels.
|
||||
- **Takeover (interactive PTY into a running task) is out of scope for this
|
||||
bead.** It needs the dangerous-command authority (`archie-core-sod1`) to
|
||||
gate it, and that authority is not wired for it: the harness listener has
|
||||
no approval step; `ToolSetOptions.Approval` in `internal/agentexec/modelloop`
|
||||
gate it, and that authority is not wired for it: the harness listener has no
|
||||
approval step; `ToolSetOptions.Approval` in `internal/agentexec/modelloop`
|
||||
is never set by a caller, so task runs never build approval-required tools;
|
||||
approvals reach a human only on the chat paths (dashboard ask, Telegram,
|
||||
Gateway). Takeover would also need an audit record naming the actor, task,
|
||||
attempt and open/close times, and revocation tied to task end (the exec is
|
||||
closed with the container). Those follow the setup session's shape
|
||||
(`harnesssession.Session`, `container.ExecPTY`) once the authority exists.
|
||||
- **Audit.** Opening and closing a session and a successful capture are
|
||||
recorded with the asserted org and profile. A run view's open and close are
|
||||
logged with the task and attempt; it reads output only, so it has no
|
||||
takeover record.
|
||||
- **Audit.** Opening and closing a session and a successful capture are recorded
|
||||
with the asserted org and profile. A run view's open and close are logged with
|
||||
the task and attempt; it reads output only, so it has no takeover record.
|
||||
|
||||
Each session is the only interactive path into a harness container.
|
||||
|
||||
## Egress
|
||||
|
||||
Only Kit profiles run on the egress path. An image profile keeps the network
|
||||
access its identity is granted, because workflows such as a network
|
||||
investigator need raw DNS, ICMP and arbitrary TCP that no HTTP proxy
|
||||
carries.
|
||||
access its identity is granted, because workflows such as a network investigator
|
||||
need raw DNS, ICMP and arbitrary TCP that no HTTP proxy carries.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Sandbox network.** Each Kit run gets its own internal Docker bridge on
|
||||
which the host holds no address. Host services, including those listening
|
||||
on every interface, are unreachable from it by any address.
|
||||
- **Sandbox network.** Each Kit run gets its own internal Docker bridge on which
|
||||
the host holds no address. Host services, including those listening on every
|
||||
interface, are unreachable from it by any address.
|
||||
- **Relay.** One relay container, `archie-agent relay`, sits on the sandbox
|
||||
networks under a fixed alias and on the host-reachable network. It
|
||||
forwards three fixed ports, to the proxy, NATS and the State Store, and can
|
||||
reach nothing else. It holds no secrets.
|
||||
- **Proxy.** The proxy runs inside `archied`, listening on the host gateway
|
||||
of the host-reachable network. It terminates TLS with a per-daemon CA
|
||||
installed into the container at create, identifies the container by a
|
||||
per-run proxy password distinct from the worker's run grant, and applies
|
||||
that run's network policy and credential inject rules. Upstream dials refuse loopback, and refuse internal addresses
|
||||
unless the policy names the exact IP, so an allowed name cannot resolve
|
||||
back into the host.
|
||||
networks under a fixed alias and on the host-reachable network. It forwards
|
||||
three fixed ports, to the proxy, NATS and the State Store, and can reach
|
||||
nothing else. It holds no secrets.
|
||||
- **Proxy.** The proxy runs inside `archied`, listening on the host gateway of
|
||||
the host-reachable network. It terminates TLS with a per-daemon CA installed
|
||||
into the container at create, identifies the container by a per-run proxy
|
||||
password distinct from the worker's run grant, and applies that run's network
|
||||
policy and credential inject rules. Upstream dials refuse loopback, and refuse
|
||||
internal addresses unless the policy names the exact IP, so an allowed name
|
||||
cannot resolve back into the host.
|
||||
|
||||
## Container layout
|
||||
|
||||
A Kit task runs in one container, from the Kit composition's image, on the
|
||||
task's sandbox network. The worker and every harness invocation share it;
|
||||
they are separated by user, not by container, so a run's cost scales with
|
||||
the run and not with how many agents it fans out to.
|
||||
task's sandbox network. The worker and every harness invocation share it; they
|
||||
are separated by user, not by container, so a run's cost scales with the run and
|
||||
not with how many agents it fans out to.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Worker.** Archie mounts its own `archie-agent` binary read-only and runs
|
||||
it as the container's entrypoint, as root. It holds the task's NATS and
|
||||
State Store credentials in its own environment and in root-only files,
|
||||
runs the workflow, and serves `archie-agent mcp`. The Kit image's
|
||||
entrypoint is not PID 1.
|
||||
- **Worker.** Archie mounts its own `archie-agent` binary read-only and runs it
|
||||
as the container's entrypoint, as root. It holds the task's NATS and State
|
||||
Store credentials in its own environment and in root-only files, runs the
|
||||
workflow, and serves `archie-agent mcp`. The Kit image's entrypoint is not
|
||||
PID 1.
|
||||
- **Harness.** Every invocation runs as the Kit's user (the image's `User`,
|
||||
default uid 1000) with an explicit environment: the Kit's variables, the
|
||||
proxy environment and the credential sentinels, and nothing inherited from
|
||||
the worker. That user cannot read the worker's environment or files, or
|
||||
trace it. Sibling invocations in one run share the user and the worktree.
|
||||
default uid 1000) with an explicit environment: the Kit's variables, the proxy
|
||||
environment and the credential sentinels, and nothing inherited from the
|
||||
worker. That user cannot read the worker's environment or files, or trace it.
|
||||
Sibling invocations in one run share the user and the worktree.
|
||||
- **Hooks.** `lifecycle@1` install and startup hooks run as the user each
|
||||
declares, before the worker accepts work.
|
||||
- **Mounts.** The task worktree at the Kit's workspace directory, owned by the
|
||||
Kit's user, and the read-only skills store. Nothing else from the host.
|
||||
- **Network.** The relay forwards three fixed ports on the sandbox network:
|
||||
the egress proxy, NATS and the State Store. The worker reaches NATS and the
|
||||
State Store with its credentials; a harness can open those ports but holds
|
||||
no credential either accepts.
|
||||
- **Volumes.** `volume@1` paths persist for the life of the
|
||||
WorkflowExecution, which covers session resume across gate iterations and
|
||||
retries. They are not shared between executions.
|
||||
- **Network.** The relay forwards three fixed ports on the sandbox network: the
|
||||
egress proxy, NATS and the State Store. The worker reaches NATS and the State
|
||||
Store with its credentials; a harness can open those ports but holds no
|
||||
credential either accepts.
|
||||
- **Volumes.** `volume@1` paths persist for the life of the WorkflowExecution,
|
||||
which covers session resume across gate iterations and retries. They are not
|
||||
shared between executions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Archie tools inside the harness
|
||||
|
||||
Capture tools return a stage's structured results through `archie-agent mcp`,
|
||||
a stdio MCP server. The same command forwards central-tool discovery and
|
||||
calls over Streamable HTTP to `http://archie.tools/mcp` through the egress
|
||||
proxy. Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI register it using
|
||||
their native MCP configuration. Registration files are per-stage and outside
|
||||
the worktree; the Kit's bundled settings remain intact. A CLI that exits
|
||||
without initializing the required MCP server fails the stage.
|
||||
Capture tools return a stage's structured results through `archie-agent mcp`, a
|
||||
stdio MCP server. The same command forwards central-tool discovery and calls
|
||||
over Streamable HTTP to `http://archie.tools/mcp` through the egress proxy.
|
||||
Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI register it using their
|
||||
native MCP configuration. Registration files are per-stage and outside the
|
||||
worktree; the Kit's bundled settings remain intact. A CLI that exits without
|
||||
initializing the required MCP server fails the stage.
|
||||
|
||||
`archied` handles that exact endpoint inside the authenticated task proxy;
|
||||
it is not a listener or an upstream network destination. It is available
|
||||
only during task runtime, never during install or a setup session. The
|
||||
harness supplies a sentinel, and the proxy injects a separate random gateway
|
||||
token held only on the host. Ending the proxy session revokes that token and
|
||||
cancels active calls.
|
||||
`archied` handles that exact endpoint inside the authenticated task proxy; it is
|
||||
not a listener or an upstream network destination. It is available only during
|
||||
task runtime, never during install or a setup session. The harness supplies a
|
||||
sentinel, and the proxy injects a separate random gateway token held only on the
|
||||
host. Ending the proxy session revokes that token and cancels active calls.
|
||||
|
||||
The proxy reaches `archie-gateway` through its authenticated gRPC contract.
|
||||
The Gateway derives the task, execution principal and org from a live run
|
||||
grant on every request. Its tool list is bounded by the profile in that org
|
||||
and the package's accepted tool authority, checked again at invocation.
|
||||
Workspace tools, chat file delivery, conversation-only tools and tools that
|
||||
require an unavailable approver are not served. Tool result limits apply
|
||||
without exposing host spill paths; media is returned as MCP content.
|
||||
The proxy reaches `archie-gateway` through its authenticated gRPC contract. The
|
||||
Gateway derives the task, execution principal and org from a live run grant on
|
||||
every request. Its tool list is bounded by the profile in that org and the
|
||||
package's accepted tool authority, checked again at invocation. Workspace tools,
|
||||
chat file delivery, conversation-only tools and tools that require an
|
||||
unavailable approver are not served. Tool result limits apply without exposing
|
||||
host spill paths; media is returned as MCP content.
|
||||
|
||||
Task MCP providers run in the Gateway with task-bound sessions and sampling.
|
||||
Sampling uses the task's model and credentials, records task usage and refuses
|
||||
revoked grants. It does not use the chat identity or chat model. The worker
|
||||
does not start another copy of those providers for Kit tasks. The harness's
|
||||
own built-in tools remain outside Archie's tool-result limits.
|
||||
revoked grants. It does not use the chat identity or chat model. The worker does
|
||||
not start another copy of those providers for Kit tasks. The harness's own
|
||||
built-in tools remain outside Archie's tool-result limits.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enforcement around the harness
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | Enforcement |
|
||||
| -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Property | Enforcement |
|
||||
| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Model never runs git | No forge credential can be bound. Archie records `HEAD` and every ref before the run; any change fails the step (`failed`, policy class). The workflow commits the stage's changes. |
|
||||
| Protected paths | A diff touching a `Protection` path fails the step. |
|
||||
| Read-only stage | Any worktree diff fails the step. |
|
||||
| Gate | Archie runs the stage's gate after the harness exits. On failure it resumes the session with the gate output, up to the stage's iteration budget. |
|
||||
| Budget | Archie kills the process on wall-clock timeout, or when streamed usage passes the token budget. |
|
||||
| Cancellation | Cancelling the step kills the process group, then the container. |
|
||||
| Egress | Only the proxy is reachable; the Kit's network policy decides the rest. |
|
||||
| Protected paths | A diff touching a `Protection` path fails the step. |
|
||||
| Read-only stage | Any worktree diff fails the step. |
|
||||
| Gate | Archie runs the stage's gate after the harness exits. On failure it resumes the session with the gate output, up to the stage's iteration budget. |
|
||||
| Budget | Archie kills the process on wall-clock timeout, or when streamed usage passes the token budget. |
|
||||
| Cancellation | Cancelling the step kills the process group, then the container. |
|
||||
| Egress | Only the proxy is reachable; the Kit's network policy decides the rest. |
|
||||
|
||||
Harness settings that deny git or protected paths are added where the CLI
|
||||
supports them, to save wasted turns. They are never the enforcement.
|
||||
@@ -342,38 +332,34 @@ supports them, to save wasted turns. They are never the enforcement.
|
||||
## Execution tree
|
||||
|
||||
A harness run is one `agent` StepExecution. Subagents the harness spawns
|
||||
internally are not recorded as children. Their usage is included in the
|
||||
step's `tokens_used` when the adapter reports it.
|
||||
internally are not recorded as children. Their usage is included in the step's
|
||||
`tokens_used` when the adapter reports it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Agents never hold a harness
|
||||
|
||||
An Agent reaches a harness only by invoking a Workflow whose stage names it.
|
||||
No Agent tool, chat tool or capability exposes a harness, its setup terminal
|
||||
or its credential. The stage boundary is what carries the container, the git
|
||||
and path checks, the gate and the budget; a harness outside a stage has none
|
||||
of them.
|
||||
An Agent reaches a harness only by invoking a Workflow whose stage names it. No
|
||||
Agent tool, chat tool or capability exposes a harness, its setup terminal or its
|
||||
credential. The stage boundary is what carries the container, the git and path
|
||||
checks, the gate and the budget; a harness outside a stage has none of them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of scope
|
||||
|
||||
- Chat through a harness. The gateway chat loop stays on the built-in
|
||||
runtime.
|
||||
- `network-policy@2` HTTP method and path rules; a Kit requiring it is
|
||||
refused.
|
||||
- Chat through a harness. The gateway chat loop stays on the built-in runtime.
|
||||
- `network-policy@2` HTTP method and path rules; a Kit requiring it is refused.
|
||||
- Recording the harness's internal subagents as StepExecutions.
|
||||
- Cost in currency.
|
||||
- Choosing a harness automatically per task.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Descriptor resolution with the Kit spec package; capability support
|
||||
table and fail-closed refusal.
|
||||
1. Descriptor resolution with the Kit spec package; capability support table and
|
||||
fail-closed refusal.
|
||||
2. Egress proxy: internal network, per-daemon CA, per-container token,
|
||||
`network-policy@1`.
|
||||
3. `credential@1`: API-key bindings, sentinel rendering, inject rules.
|
||||
4. Harness `Runner`: container create with worktree, volumes, lifecycle
|
||||
hooks and the mounted `archie-agent`; `agent-sessions@1` invocation;
|
||||
worktree checks for git, protected paths and read-only; budget and
|
||||
cancellation.
|
||||
4. Harness `Runner`: container create with worktree, volumes, lifecycle hooks
|
||||
and the mounted `archie-agent`; `agent-sessions@1` invocation; worktree
|
||||
checks for git, protected paths and read-only; budget and cancellation.
|
||||
5. Claude Code output adapter; `archie-agent mcp`; gate-and-resume loop.
|
||||
6. Kit profiles, runner selection from the stage's profile, and definition
|
||||
validation.
|
||||
@@ -383,19 +369,19 @@ of them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- Every named adapter discovers and calls a permitted central tool through
|
||||
the proxy and records a local capture. A guessed tool outside the profile
|
||||
or accepted package authority is refused.
|
||||
- Every named adapter discovers and calls a permitted central tool through the
|
||||
proxy and records a local capture. A guessed tool outside the profile or
|
||||
accepted package authority is refused.
|
||||
- The gateway token never appears in the container, generated MCP files,
|
||||
worktree, logs or events. It is not the container's proxy password.
|
||||
- A permission change after discovery takes effect at the next call; ending
|
||||
the proxy session cancels active calls, and a revoked grant cannot execute
|
||||
tools or sample a model.
|
||||
- Bundled skills remain visible with shared skills missing or disabled;
|
||||
shared mounts are per-skill and read-only. Explicit context directories
|
||||
preserve non-managed instructions and refuse symlinked staging paths.
|
||||
- The same workflow definition completes on `builtin` and on the Claude Code
|
||||
Kit with the same `Result` shape and captures.
|
||||
- A permission change after discovery takes effect at the next call; ending the
|
||||
proxy session cancels active calls, and a revoked grant cannot execute tools
|
||||
or sample a model.
|
||||
- Bundled skills remain visible with shared skills missing or disabled; shared
|
||||
mounts are per-skill and read-only. Explicit context directories preserve
|
||||
non-managed instructions and refuse symlinked staging paths.
|
||||
- The same workflow definition completes on `builtin` and on the Claude Code Kit
|
||||
with the same `Result` shape and captures.
|
||||
- After `/login` in the setup terminal, the container's credential file holds
|
||||
only sentinels, the State Store holds the encrypted token, and a task run
|
||||
authenticates.
|
||||
@@ -407,8 +393,8 @@ of them.
|
||||
unchanged.
|
||||
- A harness edit to a protected test file fails the step in a TDD fix stage.
|
||||
- A read-only feasibility stage that writes a file fails.
|
||||
- A file a run writes into a Kit-managed path such as the CLI's settings file
|
||||
is gone on the next execution.
|
||||
- A file a run writes into a Kit-managed path such as the CLI's settings file is
|
||||
gone on the next execution.
|
||||
- A Kit requiring an unsupported capability is refused at launch with the
|
||||
capability named.
|
||||
- A stage with a failing gate resumes the same session with the gate output,
|
||||
@@ -416,11 +402,11 @@ of them.
|
||||
- Two tasks sharing an OAuth binding with `max_concurrent = 1` run one at a
|
||||
time; the second waits as `pending`.
|
||||
- Stopping a run kills the harness process and removes the container.
|
||||
- A harness invocation cannot read the worker's NATS or State Store
|
||||
credential from its environment, its files or `/proc`.
|
||||
- A harness invocation cannot read the worker's NATS or State Store credential
|
||||
from its environment, its files or `/proc`.
|
||||
- A run fanning out to many agent invocations uses one container.
|
||||
- A Kit profile in org A cannot be selected, and its binding cannot be
|
||||
resolved, by a workflow in org B.
|
||||
- A Kit profile in org A cannot be selected, and its binding cannot be resolved,
|
||||
by a workflow in org B.
|
||||
- A harness run whose identity is not granted a Kit's required credential is
|
||||
refused at launch; the proxy never injects a secret outside the run
|
||||
credential.
|
||||
|
||||
+169
-162
@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
|
||||
# User authorization boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
Archie separates authentication (which person or service is calling) from
|
||||
permission to act on a resource. This inventory follows the [OWASP
|
||||
Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html)
|
||||
and [Authorization Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html),
|
||||
permission to act on a resource. This inventory follows the
|
||||
[OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html)
|
||||
and
|
||||
[Authorization Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html),
|
||||
including its guidance on attributes and relationships. It describes concrete
|
||||
enforcement points and their regression tests; it is not a compliance certification.
|
||||
enforcement points and their regression tests; it is not a compliance
|
||||
certification.
|
||||
|
||||
## Transport and authority
|
||||
|
||||
The browser uses HTTP/JSON and SSE to the UI service. The UI service calls
|
||||
State Store, Gateway, Messaging and Harness through their gRPC contracts.
|
||||
Only the State Store opens the task/control-plane/account database; Gateway
|
||||
owns conversation storage. Browser HTTP handlers never open either database.
|
||||
The browser uses HTTP/JSON and SSE to the UI service. The UI service calls State
|
||||
Store, Gateway, Messaging and Harness through their gRPC contracts. Only the
|
||||
State Store opens the task/control-plane/account database; Gateway owns
|
||||
conversation storage. Browser HTTP handlers never open either database.
|
||||
|
||||
Instance service credentials are administrative authority. They are not user
|
||||
sessions and must never reach a browser, model, or agent container. A service
|
||||
@@ -23,21 +25,25 @@ boundary evaluates Cedar before invoking them. Task credentials have a separate,
|
||||
explicit RPC allowlist and cannot call account or identity administration.
|
||||
|
||||
Local service listeners are trusted process boundaries. Loopback is not a
|
||||
substitute for authentication on a remotely reachable listener. OIDC credentials,
|
||||
local browser sessions, personal API tokens, service credentials, and task grants
|
||||
must remain distinct.
|
||||
substitute for authentication on a remotely reachable listener. OIDC
|
||||
credentials, local browser sessions, personal API tokens, service credentials,
|
||||
and task grants must remain distinct.
|
||||
|
||||
## Policy and relationship model
|
||||
|
||||
`internal/domain/access` defines actions, resources, principals and memberships.
|
||||
`internal/infrastructure/access` assembles Cedar entities and evaluates the
|
||||
instance → organization → workspace → object chain. A forbid wins; each applicable
|
||||
level must permit the operation. Missing or invalid policy chains fail closed.
|
||||
instance → organization → workspace → object chain. A forbid wins; each
|
||||
applicable level must permit the operation. Missing or invalid policy chains
|
||||
fail closed.
|
||||
|
||||
The default policies grant actions through scoped roles. Policies can also
|
||||
restrict a named identity, workspace environment, owner, state, source address,
|
||||
signature, run or step. HTTP task decisions now include the stored initiating identity and task state; binding decisions include the stored binding state. The HTTP source address is the actual connection peer, not an unverified forwarded header. Membership and resource attributes must come from stored
|
||||
records or authenticated context, never a request's assertion about itself.
|
||||
signature, run or step. HTTP task decisions now include the stored initiating
|
||||
identity and task state; binding decisions include the stored binding state. The
|
||||
HTTP source address is the actual connection peer, not an unverified forwarded
|
||||
header. Membership and resource attributes must come from stored records or
|
||||
authenticated context, never a request's assertion about itself.
|
||||
|
||||
Cedar permission is not ownership of another person's private data. Conversation
|
||||
history, passkeys, recovery codes and personal tokens are bound to the person.
|
||||
@@ -48,34 +54,34 @@ accounts by unverified email, or create an administrator.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enforcement inventory
|
||||
|
||||
| Location | Enforcement | Regression evidence |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Browser credential gate: `webui/auth.go`, `accounts.go` | Account session or verified provider identity; shared dashboard token is not a person when accounts are enabled. No API data before authentication. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAccountSessionFailureIsClosed` |
|
||||
| Browser policy gate: `webui/authorize.go` | Resolve principal from stored identity; evaluate action against stored org/workspace and resource kind before handler. Missing chain refuses. | `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed`, `TestAuthorizeRefusesWithoutAChain`, `TestAuthorizeRecord`, `TestTaskAuthorizationUsesStoredAttributes`, `TestAuthorizeCreateIn` |
|
||||
| Instance-only HTTP surfaces: `webui/instance_only.go`, server route registration | Hide instance-owned configuration and diagnostics from another org; policy still applies first. | `TestInstanceOnlyHidesTheInstanceFromOtherOrgs`, `TestInstanceAdminOrgs` |
|
||||
| First setup: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Initial organization, workspace, instance URL, admin identity and password commit together. Transaction lock closes bootstrap after first account; later requests require `manage_members`. | Disposable PostgreSQL smoke verification for bootstrap race and rollback; account policy tests below |
|
||||
| Account creation: `webui/accounts.go`, `staterpc/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Cedar `manage_members` at HTTP and RPC; target org is authenticated context. New local accounts cannot request owner role. | `TestAccountManagementUsesPolicy`, `TestAccountBoundary` |
|
||||
| Local passwords and sessions: `identity/password.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Argon2id, independent salts, length/common-password checks, generic login refusal, account throttling, session hashes and expiry, revocation on logout/password change/suspension. | `TestPasswordVerification`, `TestAccountBoundary`; disposable PostgreSQL session verification |
|
||||
| Transport and CSRF: `webui/accounts.go`, `api_tasks.go` | Password/account mutations require HTTPS or localhost development, JSON, custom CSRF header and same-origin requests. Forwarded headers require explicit trusted-proxy configuration. | `TestAuthenticationTransport`, existing mutation security tests |
|
||||
| Personal account routes: `webui/accounts.go` | Active signed-in person; principal supplied by server. Password change verifies current password. Sensitive authenticator changes require recent sign-in. No caller-supplied target identity. | `TestAccountBoundary` |
|
||||
| Recovery: `postgres/account_security.go`, `webui/accounts.go` | Fresh authenticated owner generates a hashed, one-use recovery secret. Redemption replaces password and revokes all sessions atomically. No email-existence disclosure. | Disposable PostgreSQL recovery verification |
|
||||
| Passkeys: `postgres/passkeys.go`, `webui/passkeys.go` | Configured RP origin, browser-bound one-use expiring challenge, verified credential signature and user verification. Enrollment/management belong to caller. Credential counters persist under a row lock. | Disposable browser virtual-authenticator verification; task-grant denial tests |
|
||||
| OIDC: `infrastructure/oidc`, `archieui/account_oidc.go`, `webui/auth.go` | Discovery and signed ID token with issuer/client audience/expiry, PKCE, state and nonce. Verified subject resolves to active identity. Browser-local session cannot outlive provider token, and provider credential remains checked. | `TestBrowserFlowVerifiesIDToken`, `TestProviderOutageIsUnavailableThenRecovers`, subject-claim tests; no external provider acceptance implied |
|
||||
| OIDC settings: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/authentication.go` | Instance ownership plus policy; recent sign-in for changes. Public URL cannot change while enrolled passkeys would be orphaned. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAuthenticationSettingsRejectUntrustedOrigins` |
|
||||
| Org membership/workspaces/agent assignment: `webui/api_orgs.go`, `staterpc/orgs.go`, `postgres/orgs.go` | Own org or instance-owner relationship, allowed role vocabulary, membership escalation/last-owner guards, tenant-scoped SQL. | `TestOrgRPCsActInTheCallersOrg`, `TestSetMembershipRefusesUnknownRole`, org HTTP tests |
|
||||
| Personal API tokens: `webui/api_personal_tokens.go`, `staterpc/personal_tokens.go`, `postgres/personal_tokens.go` | Token owner comes from principal; store only token hash; revoke only caller's binding. | `TestPersonalTokensWithoutPerson`, `TestPersonalTokenOwner` |
|
||||
| gRPC caller attribution: `rpcidentity/identity.go` | Authenticated service may forward a principal; State Store resolves memberships/org itself. Task grant metadata is stripped. | `TestCallerAttribution` |
|
||||
| Agent/task gRPC: `staterpc/task_grants.go` | Durable task-scoped grant, explicit allowed RPC and target task, no definition-pin replacement, no account RPCs. | `TestTaskCredentialsCannotManageAccounts`, `TestTaskCredentialCannotReplaceItsPin`, `TestRecordUsageAuthority`, `TestWorkerPresenceAuthority` |
|
||||
| Chat HTTP: `webui/api_chat.go` | Server stamps sender and person thread; lists/read/turns/cancel/persona verify session ownership. Browser cannot submit another sender identity. | `TestWebChatOwnership`, `TestWebChatSenderCannotBeSuppliedByBrowser`; HTTP deny matrix |
|
||||
| Chat history, slash commands and model session tools: `gateway/session_store_postgres.go` | Store filters `Get`, `List`, `GetByChannel`; shared read/write guards check person ownership as well as org. A saved session cannot change its conversation source to claim another person's history. Service curation runs without a person principal. | `TestSessionVisibility`; PostgreSQL smoke for history isolation |
|
||||
| Chat questions/approvals: `webui/api_chat_ask.go` | Waiting question is bound to the initiating person, in addition to its unguessable ID. | `TestChatQuestionBelongsToInitiatingPerson` |
|
||||
| Chat downloads: `webui/api_chat_files.go` | Offered file token expires and is bound to the initiating person; requests cannot supply a filesystem path. | `TestChatFileDownload` |
|
||||
| Per-person memory: `archiegateway/chat_identity.go`, gateway memory tools, `sessioncurator` | Verified web sender identity scopes reads/writes. Curator refuses unidentified or mixed participants instead of guessing a person. | Gateway memory and session-curator tests |
|
||||
| Workflow/task actions: `webui/api_tasks.go`, `domain/taskactions`, `staterpc` | Policy and stored workspace before action; domain transition, authority and durable dispatch guards remain in force. | HTTP deny matrix, task action/domain tests, task grant tests |
|
||||
| Incoming webhooks: `forge/webhook`, `captureintake`, access delivery engine | Verify HMAC before parsing; derive source/org from stored source; evaluate source delivery policies and egress rules. No browser-user credential is inferred. | Webhook/capture tests, `TestAuthorizeDelivery` |
|
||||
| Control-plane configuration, secrets, harness and extensions | Browser policy and instance-only restrictions where registered; service contracts carry principal/org; task grants cannot invoke administrative RPCs. | HTTP deny matrix, `TestAdministrationRoutes`, `TestChannelReloadRoute`, `TestConfineHarnessOrg` |
|
||||
| Live HTTP/SSE and diagnostics | Authenticated policy gate applies before stream creation; org-scoped event reads; instance logs require administrative visibility. | HTTP deny matrix, instance-only tests, `TestServiceLogsRequireInstanceCredential` |
|
||||
| Background schedules, dispatch, curation | Service/agent authority, not an implicit browser user. Task-scoped grants and org scopes remain distinct from initiating human attribution. | Existing dispatch, grant, memory and org-scope tests |
|
||||
| Location | Enforcement | Regression evidence |
|
||||
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| Browser credential gate: `webui/auth.go`, `accounts.go` | Account session or verified provider identity; shared dashboard token is not a person when accounts are enabled. No API data before authentication. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAccountSessionFailureIsClosed` |
|
||||
| Browser policy gate: `webui/authorize.go` | Resolve principal from stored identity; evaluate action against stored org/workspace and resource kind before handler. Missing chain refuses. | `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed`, `TestAuthorizeRefusesWithoutAChain`, `TestAuthorizeRecord`, `TestTaskAuthorizationUsesStoredAttributes`, `TestAuthorizeCreateIn` |
|
||||
| Instance-only HTTP surfaces: `webui/instance_only.go`, server route registration | Hide instance-owned configuration and diagnostics from another org; policy still applies first. | `TestInstanceOnlyHidesTheInstanceFromOtherOrgs`, `TestInstanceAdminOrgs` |
|
||||
| First setup: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Initial organization, workspace, instance URL, admin identity and password commit together. Transaction lock closes bootstrap after first account; later requests require `manage_members`. | Disposable PostgreSQL smoke verification for bootstrap race and rollback; account policy tests below |
|
||||
| Account creation: `webui/accounts.go`, `staterpc/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Cedar `manage_members` at HTTP and RPC; target org is authenticated context. New local accounts cannot request owner role. | `TestAccountManagementUsesPolicy`, `TestAccountBoundary` |
|
||||
| Local passwords and sessions: `identity/password.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Argon2id, independent salts, length/common-password checks, generic login refusal, account throttling, session hashes and expiry, revocation on logout/password change/suspension. | `TestPasswordVerification`, `TestAccountBoundary`; disposable PostgreSQL session verification |
|
||||
| Transport and CSRF: `webui/accounts.go`, `api_tasks.go` | Password/account mutations require HTTPS or localhost development, JSON, custom CSRF header and same-origin requests. Forwarded headers require explicit trusted-proxy configuration. | `TestAuthenticationTransport`, existing mutation security tests |
|
||||
| Personal account routes: `webui/accounts.go` | Active signed-in person; principal supplied by server. Password change verifies current password. Sensitive authenticator changes require recent sign-in. No caller-supplied target identity. | `TestAccountBoundary` |
|
||||
| Recovery: `postgres/account_security.go`, `webui/accounts.go` | Fresh authenticated owner generates a hashed, one-use recovery secret. Redemption replaces password and revokes all sessions atomically. No email-existence disclosure. | Disposable PostgreSQL recovery verification |
|
||||
| Passkeys: `postgres/passkeys.go`, `webui/passkeys.go` | Configured RP origin, browser-bound one-use expiring challenge, verified credential signature and user verification. Enrollment/management belong to caller. Credential counters persist under a row lock. | Disposable browser virtual-authenticator verification; task-grant denial tests |
|
||||
| OIDC: `infrastructure/oidc`, `archieui/account_oidc.go`, `webui/auth.go` | Discovery and signed ID token with issuer/client audience/expiry, PKCE, state and nonce. Verified subject resolves to active identity. Browser-local session cannot outlive provider token, and provider credential remains checked. | `TestBrowserFlowVerifiesIDToken`, `TestProviderOutageIsUnavailableThenRecovers`, subject-claim tests; no external provider acceptance implied |
|
||||
| OIDC settings: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/authentication.go` | Instance ownership plus policy; recent sign-in for changes. Public URL cannot change while enrolled passkeys would be orphaned. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAuthenticationSettingsRejectUntrustedOrigins` |
|
||||
| Org membership/workspaces/agent assignment: `webui/api_orgs.go`, `staterpc/orgs.go`, `postgres/orgs.go` | Own org or instance-owner relationship, allowed role vocabulary, membership escalation/last-owner guards, tenant-scoped SQL. | `TestOrgRPCsActInTheCallersOrg`, `TestSetMembershipRefusesUnknownRole`, org HTTP tests |
|
||||
| Personal API tokens: `webui/api_personal_tokens.go`, `staterpc/personal_tokens.go`, `postgres/personal_tokens.go` | Token owner comes from principal; store only token hash; revoke only caller's binding. | `TestPersonalTokensWithoutPerson`, `TestPersonalTokenOwner` |
|
||||
| gRPC caller attribution: `rpcidentity/identity.go` | Authenticated service may forward a principal; State Store resolves memberships/org itself. Task grant metadata is stripped. | `TestCallerAttribution` |
|
||||
| Agent/task gRPC: `staterpc/task_grants.go` | Durable task-scoped grant, explicit allowed RPC and target task, no definition-pin replacement, no account RPCs. | `TestTaskCredentialsCannotManageAccounts`, `TestTaskCredentialCannotReplaceItsPin`, `TestRecordUsageAuthority`, `TestWorkerPresenceAuthority` |
|
||||
| Chat HTTP: `webui/api_chat.go` | Server stamps sender and person thread; lists/read/turns/cancel/persona verify session ownership. Browser cannot submit another sender identity. | `TestWebChatOwnership`, `TestWebChatSenderCannotBeSuppliedByBrowser`; HTTP deny matrix |
|
||||
| Chat history, slash commands and model session tools: `gateway/session_store_postgres.go` | Store filters `Get`, `List`, `GetByChannel`; shared read/write guards check person ownership as well as org. A saved session cannot change its conversation source to claim another person's history. Service curation runs without a person principal. | `TestSessionVisibility`; PostgreSQL smoke for history isolation |
|
||||
| Chat questions/approvals: `webui/api_chat_ask.go` | Waiting question is bound to the initiating person, in addition to its unguessable ID. | `TestChatQuestionBelongsToInitiatingPerson` |
|
||||
| Chat downloads: `webui/api_chat_files.go` | Offered file token expires and is bound to the initiating person; requests cannot supply a filesystem path. | `TestChatFileDownload` |
|
||||
| Per-person memory: `archiegateway/chat_identity.go`, gateway memory tools, `sessioncurator` | Verified web sender identity scopes reads/writes. Curator refuses unidentified or mixed participants instead of guessing a person. | Gateway memory and session-curator tests |
|
||||
| Workflow/task actions: `webui/api_tasks.go`, `domain/taskactions`, `staterpc` | Policy and stored workspace before action; domain transition, authority and durable dispatch guards remain in force. | HTTP deny matrix, task action/domain tests, task grant tests |
|
||||
| Incoming webhooks: `forge/webhook`, `captureintake`, access delivery engine | Verify HMAC before parsing; derive source/org from stored source; evaluate source delivery policies and egress rules. No browser-user credential is inferred. | Webhook/capture tests, `TestAuthorizeDelivery` |
|
||||
| Control-plane configuration, secrets, harness and extensions | Browser policy and instance-only restrictions where registered; service contracts carry principal/org; task grants cannot invoke administrative RPCs. | HTTP deny matrix, `TestAdministrationRoutes`, `TestChannelReloadRoute`, `TestConfineHarnessOrg` |
|
||||
| Live HTTP/SSE and diagnostics | Authenticated policy gate applies before stream creation; org-scoped event reads; instance logs require administrative visibility. | HTTP deny matrix, instance-only tests, `TestServiceLogsRequireInstanceCredential` |
|
||||
| Background schedules, dispatch, curation | Service/agent authority, not an implicit browser user. Task-scoped grants and org scopes remain distinct from initiating human attribution. | Existing dispatch, grant, memory and org-scope tests |
|
||||
|
||||
The policy HTTP matrix enumerates each registered protected route. It checks
|
||||
both anonymous refusal and refusal by an explicit Cedar forbid, using the real
|
||||
@@ -93,8 +99,9 @@ they do not contain user data. `/health/detailed` remains protected.
|
||||
|
||||
Personal routes under `/api/account/` require an active signed-in person and
|
||||
server-derived ownership: password change, recovery-secret generation, passkey
|
||||
begin/finish/list/delete. They do not require an organization administrator role.
|
||||
`POST /api/accounts` and `/api/authentication` are administrative policy routes.
|
||||
begin/finish/list/delete. They do not require an organization administrator
|
||||
role. `POST /api/accounts` and `/api/authentication` are administrative policy
|
||||
routes.
|
||||
|
||||
## HTTP route inventory
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,120 +109,120 @@ The following routes are covered by `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed` in
|
||||
`internal/webui/authorization_surfaces_test.go`. `authorize.go` maps each to its
|
||||
action/resource; the handler may impose a stricter record or instance boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
| Method | Route example |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/event-types/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/extensions/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/orgs/7/members/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/sources/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/tokens/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/alerts` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/authentication` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/capabilities` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/captures` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/captures/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/channels` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/file/sample` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions/7/messages` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions/7/turns` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/update` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/config` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/apply-status` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/audit` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/catalog` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample/history` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/curators` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/event-types` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/extensions` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/extensions/catalogue` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/harness/bindings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/harness/terminal` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/identities` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/logs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/mappings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7/members` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7/workspaces` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/secret-engines` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/services` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/setup` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/skills` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/sources` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/stream` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/summary` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/task-meta` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/attempts` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/changes` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/debug` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/logs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/logs/download` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/sandbox` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tokens` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/version` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/workflows` |
|
||||
| PATCH | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| PATCH | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/accounts` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/alerts/7/dismiss` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/approve` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/pause` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/resume` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/channels/7/reload` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/answer` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/cancel` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/message` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/persona` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/stream` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/update/defer` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/update/install` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample/commands/sample` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/event-types` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/catalogue/sample/install` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/accept` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/approve-update` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/rollback` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/update` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/identities` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/identities/7/sample` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/mappings` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/mappings/preview` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs/7/members` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs/7/workspaces` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/secret-references/check` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/approve-unsigned` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/secret` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/signing` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/tasks/7/action` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/tokens` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/work-requests` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/authentication` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/event-types/7` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/extensions/sample/enabled` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/extensions/sample/update-policy` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/orgs/7/agents/sample` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/orgs/7/members/sample` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/sources/sample/delivery-header` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/sources/sample/name` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/workflows/7/enabled` |
|
||||
| Method | Route example |
|
||||
| ------ | ----------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/event-types/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/extensions/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/orgs/7/members/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/sources/sample` |
|
||||
| DELETE | `/api/tokens/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/alerts` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/authentication` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/bindings/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/capabilities` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/captures` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/captures/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/channels` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/file/sample` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions/7/messages` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/sessions/7/turns` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/chat/update` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/config` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/apply-status` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/audit` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/catalog` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample/history` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/curators` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/event-types` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/extensions` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/extensions/catalogue` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/harness/bindings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/harness/terminal` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/identities` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/logs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/mappings` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7/members` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/orgs/7/workspaces` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/secret-engines` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/services` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/setup` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/skills` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/sources` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/stream` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/summary` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/task-meta` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/attempts` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/changes` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/debug` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/dispatches` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/logs` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/logs/download` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tasks/7/sandbox` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/tokens` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/version` |
|
||||
| GET | `/api/workflows` |
|
||||
| PATCH | `/api/bindings/7` |
|
||||
| PATCH | `/api/mappings/7` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/accounts` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/alerts/7/dismiss` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/approve` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/pause` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/bindings/7/resume` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/channels/7/reload` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/answer` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/cancel` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/message` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/persona` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/stream` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/update/defer` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/chat/update/install` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/control-plane/resources/sample/commands/sample` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/event-types` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/catalogue/sample/install` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/accept` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/approve-update` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/rollback` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/extensions/sample/update` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/identities` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/identities/7/sample` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/mappings` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/mappings/preview` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs/7/members` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/orgs/7/workspaces` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/secret-references/check` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/approve-unsigned` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/secret` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/sources/sample/signing` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/tasks/7/action` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/tokens` |
|
||||
| POST | `/api/work-requests` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/access/policies` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/authentication` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/event-types/7` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/extensions/sample/enabled` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/extensions/sample/update-policy` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/orgs/7/agents/sample` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/orgs/7/members/sample` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/sources/sample/delivery-header` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/sources/sample/name` |
|
||||
| PUT | `/api/workflows/7/enabled` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification limits
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -224,9 +231,9 @@ security key or every operating system. An OIDC unit test is not acceptance
|
||||
against a deployed provider. Disposable PostgreSQL smoke checks verify real SQL
|
||||
without putting database-dependent tests in the fast unit suite.
|
||||
|
||||
Existing anonymous conversations are retained but are not silently assigned to
|
||||
a new person. Existing service credentials remain privileged; this inventory
|
||||
does not claim that all internal gRPC methods have independent Cedar gates.
|
||||
Existing anonymous conversations are retained but are not silently assigned to a
|
||||
new person. Existing service credentials remain privileged; this inventory does
|
||||
not claim that all internal gRPC methods have independent Cedar gates.
|
||||
|
||||
When changing a user-facing operation, update its inventory entry and its
|
||||
allow/deny behavior cases. Include another user in the same organization, a
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user