docs(bindings): bindings apply per event type with a filter; mappings count matches

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sam committed 2026-09-24 14:46:44 +10:00
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@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ machine** governing whether it is live.
type Binding struct {
ID, Name // identity
Matcher // { Source string } -- the webhook path segment, e.g. "sentry"
MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields
MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields; its event type is the binding's
Filter // optional CEL over the mapping's parameters
Workflow // registered workflow name to dispatch to
Version // bumped on every edit
Status // pending_approval | armed
@@ -34,19 +35,23 @@ them from the dashboard while the daemon runs, without a restart.
### Matching
`Matcher.Source` is the only predicate today: the path segment a sender
POSTs to (e.g. a webhook hitting `.../sentry` matches bindings with
`Matcher.Source == "sentry"`). The storage column is plain `TEXT`, so adding
predicates later is non-breaking -- extend `Matcher`, don't invent a second
matcher shape.
A binding applies to a capture when the capture arrived on `Matcher.Source`,
was identified as the event type its mapping belongs to, and passes its
`Filter` (`binding.CompileFilter`, checked against the mapping's parameters on
save). Any number of bindings may share a source; each dispatches a capture at
most once, claimed in `binding_dispatches` keyed by (binding, capture) before
its task is enqueued. An event signed with any armed binding's secret on the
source is authenticated.
### Mapping
`mapping.Resolve(fields, payload)` walks a captured JSON payload against a
list of typed `Field`s (name, JSON path, expected type), returning resolved
values plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. This
is schema-by-example in practice: a mapping is authored by pointing at a
real captured payload in the dashboard, not by guessing a schema in advance.
values plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. A
mapping belongs to an event type, and `mapping.CheckSchema` refuses a field
whose path or type the type's inferred schema lacks. Each capture a mapping
resolves at dispatch is counted once in `mapping_matches`, read back as
`MatchCount` and `LastMatchedAt`.
### Versioning
+1 -1
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
"url": "/dev/architecture/bindings/",
"title": "Playbook bindings: model and threat model",
"section": "Architecture",
"body": "# Playbook bindings: model and threat model\n\n**Status:** Approved foundation (documents shipped code: `archie-core-t2db.1`\nthrough `.5`, `.7`, `.9`-`.15`)\n**Date:** 2026-09-03\n\nThis document covers the binding model and the intake threat model portion\nof `archie-core-t2db.6`. It does not cover the task-lifecycle provenance rule\n(`messaging-and-work-intake.md`'s \"Intake provenance\") or the operator\nwalkthrough -- that walkthrough remains an open piece of the same ticket.\n\n## What a binding is\n\nA `binding` (`internal/domain/binding.Binding`) ties four things together:\na **matcher** (which captured events it applies to), a **mapping**\n(`internal/domain/mapping.Mapping`, how fields are pulled out of a payload),\na **workflow** (which registered workflow runs on a match), and a **state\nmachine** governing whether it is live.\n\n```go\ntype Binding struct {\n ID, Name // identity\n Matcher // { Source string } -- the webhook path segment, e.g. \"sentry\"\n MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields\n Workflow // registered workflow name to dispatch to\n Version // bumped on every edit\n Status // pending_approval | armed\n Secret // HMAC-SHA256 shared secret, encrypted at rest, never returned by GET\n}\n```\n\nBindings live in the store (SQLite), not `config.toml` -- operators author\nthem from the dashboard while the daemon runs, without a restart.\n\n### Matching\n\n`Matcher.Source` is the only predicate today: the path segment a sender\nPOSTs to (e.g. a webhook hitting `.../sentry` matches bindings with\n`Matcher.Source == \"sentry\"`). The storage column is plain `TEXT`, so adding\npredicates later is non-breaking -- extend `Matcher`, don't invent a second\nmatcher shape.\n\n### Mapping\n\n`mapping.Resolve(fields, payload)` walks a captured JSON payload against a\nlist of typed `Field`s (name, JSON path, expected type), returning resolved\nvalues plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. This\nis schema-by-example in practice: a mapping is authored by pointing at a\nreal captured payload in the dashboard, not by guessing a schema in advance.\n\n### Versioning\n\n`Version` increments on every `UpdateBinding` call. This exists so an\neditor's later change can never silently rewrite the historical provenance\nof a task that already fired -- a dispatched task's binding reference is\npinned to the version that was armed when it fired, not \"whatever the\nbinding currently says.\"\n\n### State machine\n\n```\ncreate ---\u003e pending_approval ---\u003e armed\n ^ |\n +----------------+\n (any edit to an armed binding drops it back to pending_approval)\n```\n\nA binding is created `pending_approval`, so the operator who creates one can\napprove it immediately. Bindings stored as `draft` by an earlier version are\nmoved to `pending_approval` when the EDA store opens.\n\nModeled directly on Telegram's existing `dangerousAction`/`pendingApproval`\nflow (`internal/channels/telegram/dangerous.go`, `approval.go`) -- not a new\napproval mechanism invented for this feature. **Only `armed` evaluates\nagainst incoming events** (`binding.Matches`, `internal/domain/binding/\nbinding.go`); a `pending_approval` binding is inert. An edit to\nan already-armed binding cannot bypass approval by silent mutation -- it\ndrops back to `pending_approval` and requires an explicit `Approve` call to\nre-arm.\n\n## The threat model\n\nThis is a public, unauthenticated-by-default intake surface whose output is\nan agent with a repo, a worktree, and tool access. The design brief\n(`archie-core-t2db.5`, `docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md`) named five\nnon-negotiables; each is verified below against the actual shipped code,\nnot the design intent.\n\n### 1. Per-source authentication\n\nReuses `internal/channels/webhook`'s existing HMAC-SHA256 scheme --\ncapture accepts unsigned events (visible in the dashboard, marked\nunauthenticated), but **only authenticated events can ever match a\nbinding**. `binding.Matches`' doc comment states this plainly: \"an\nunauthenticated event can never trigger a binding, no matter how well it\nwould otherwise match.\" Enforced structurally at two points, not just\nconvention:\n\n- `captured_events.authenticated` is a real column (`internal/store/\n captures.go`), set at capture time.\n- `dispatchBindings` (`internal/daemon/daemon.go:479`) walks **authenticated\n captures whose source has at least one armed binding** -- an\n unauthenticated capture is never even considered for dispatch.\n\n### 2. Human approval before a binding goes live\n\nCovered by the state machine above. Nothing self-arms: `pending_approval -\u003e\narmed` requires an explicit `Approve` call, and any edit to an armed\nbinding reverts it.\n\n### 3. Rate and volume limits per source\n\nCapture writes are bounded independentlyLine truncated
"body": "# Playbook bindings: model and threat model\n\n**Status:** Approved foundation (documents shipped code: `archie-core-t2db.1`\nthrough `.5`, `.7`, `.9`-`.15`)\n**Date:** 2026-09-03\n\nThis document covers the binding model and the intake threat model portion\nof `archie-core-t2db.6`. It does not cover the task-lifecycle provenance rule\n(`messaging-and-work-intake.md`'s \"Intake provenance\") or the operator\nwalkthrough -- that walkthrough remains an open piece of the same ticket.\n\n## What a binding is\n\nA `binding` (`internal/domain/binding.Binding`) ties four things together:\na **matcher** (which captured events it applies to), a **mapping**\n(`internal/domain/mapping.Mapping`, how fields are pulled out of a payload),\na **workflow** (which registered workflow runs on a match), and a **state\nmachine** governing whether it is live.\n\n```go\ntype Binding struct {\n ID, Name // identity\n Matcher // { Source string } -- the webhook path segment, e.g. \"sentry\"\n MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields; its event type is the binding's\n Filter // optional CEL over the mapping's parameters\n Workflow // registered workflow name to dispatch to\n Version // bumped on every edit\n Status // pending_approval | armed\n Secret // HMAC-SHA256 shared secret, encrypted at rest, never returned by GET\n}\n```\n\nBindings live in the store (SQLite), not `config.toml` -- operators author\nthem from the dashboard while the daemon runs, without a restart.\n\n### Matching\n\nA binding applies to a capture when the capture arrived on `Matcher.Source`,\nwas identified as the event type its mapping belongs to, and passes its\n`Filter` (`binding.CompileFilter`, checked against the mapping's parameters on\nsave). Any number of bindings may share a source; each dispatches a capture at\nmost once, claimed in `binding_dispatches` keyed by (binding, capture) before\nits task is enqueued. An event signed with any armed binding's secret on the\nsource is authenticated.\n\n### Mapping\n\n`mapping.Resolve(fields, payload)` walks a captured JSON payload against a\nlist of typed `Field`s (name, JSON path, expected type), returning resolved\nvalues plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. A\nmapping belongs to an event type, and `mapping.CheckSchema` refuses a field\nwhose path or type the type's inferred schema lacks. Each capture a mapping\nresolves at dispatch is counted once in `mapping_matches`, read back as\n`MatchCount` and `LastMatchedAt`.\n\n### Versioning\n\n`Version` increments on every `UpdateBinding` call. This exists so an\neditor's later change can never silently rewrite the historical provenance\nof a task that already fired -- a dispatched task's binding reference is\npinned to the version that was armed when it fired, not \"whatever the\nbinding currently says.\"\n\n### State machine\n\n```\ncreate ---\u003e pending_approval ---\u003e armed\n ^ |\n +----------------+\n (any edit to an armed binding drops it back to pending_approval)\n```\n\nA binding is created `pending_approval`, so the operator who creates one can\napprove it immediately. Bindings stored as `draft` by an earlier version are\nmoved to `pending_approval` when the EDA store opens.\n\nModeled directly on Telegram's existing `dangerousAction`/`pendingApproval`\nflow (`internal/channels/telegram/dangerous.go`, `approval.go`) -- not a new\napproval mechanism invented for this feature. **Only `armed` evaluates\nagainst incoming events** (`binding.Matches`, `internal/domain/binding/\nbinding.go`); a `pending_approval` binding is inert. An edit to\nan already-armed binding cannot bypass approval by silent mutation -- it\ndrops back to `pending_approval` and requires an explicit `Approve` call to\nre-arm.\n\n## The threat model\n\nThis is a public, unauthenticated-by-default intake surface whose output is\nan agent with a repo, a worktree, and tool access. The design brief\n(`archie-core-t2db.5`, `docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md`) named five\nnon-negotiables; each is verified below against the actual shipped code,\nnot the design intent.\n\n### 1. Per-source authentication\n\nReuses `internal/channels/webhook`'s existing HMAC-SHA256 scheme --\ncapture accepts unsigned events (visible in the dashboard, marked\nunauthenticated), but **only authenticated events can ever match a\nbinding**. `binding.Matches`' doc comment states this plainly: \"an\nunauthenticated event can never trigger a binding, no matter how well it\nwould otherwise match.\" Enforced structurally at two points, not just\nconvention:\n\n- `captured_events.authenticated` is a real column (`internal/store/\n captures.go`), set at capture time.\n- `dispatchBindings` (`internal/daemon/daemon.go:479`) walks **authenticated\n captures whose source has at least one armed bindingLine truncated
},
{
"url": "/dev/architecture/configuration/",