merge: proxy-aware Origin validation for dashboard mutations (crew/proxyfix)
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commit
45fbed4228
9 files changed
+406
-12
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@@ -179,6 +179,19 @@ class = "ollama"
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# Set to "off" (or leave empty) to disable.
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[web]
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listen = "127.0.0.1:8484"
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# Trust X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host headers when validating Origin
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# on mutating requests (CSRF protection).
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#
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# Off by default. When false, the expected Origin scheme is derived directly
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# from the daemon's own network connection (http unless TLS is terminated by
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# archied directly). Setting this to true causes archied to respect the
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# X-Forwarded-Proto header sent by a reverse proxy (e.g. Traefik, Caddy, Nginx).
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#
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# SECURITY WARNING: Enable ONLY when archied is deployed behind a trusted
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# reverse proxy that strips or overwrites any client-supplied X-Forwarded-*
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# headers. Enabling this on a directly exposed daemon allows untrusted
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# clients to spoof the Origin scheme and bypass CSRF protection.
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# trust_forwarded_headers = false
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# Where archied writes its logs. Without file set, output goes only to
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# stderr -- which under systemd means journald holds the sole copy, and
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@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ pull_policy = "missing"
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[web]
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listen = "127.0.0.1:8484"
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# Trust X-Forwarded-Proto when fronted by a reverse proxy (e.g. Traefik)
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# terminating TLS so dashboard mutations succeed with external HTTPS Origin.
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trust_forwarded_headers = true
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[models]
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triage = "deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro"
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@@ -825,4 +825,11 @@ type Web struct {
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// Listen is the dashboard address; "off" disables the web UI.
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// Bind localhost (or a LAN/tailnet address) -- there is no auth.
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Listen string `toml:"listen" yaml:"listen"`
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// TrustForwardedHeaders enables deriving the effective request scheme and
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// host from X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host headers during mutation
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// Origin validation. Off by default: trusting forwarded headers
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// unconditionally allows untrusted clients to spoof Origin scheme checks
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// and bypass CSRF protection. Enable ONLY when archied is deployed behind
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// a trusted reverse proxy that overwrites/strips untrusted forwarded headers.
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TrustForwardedHeaders bool `toml:"trust_forwarded_headers" yaml:"trust_forwarded_headers"`
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}
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@@ -418,3 +418,46 @@ func TestEcosystemCustom(t *testing.T) {
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t.Errorf("ResolvedPreflight custom: got %v, want nil", got)
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}
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}
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func TestWebConfigTOML(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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input string
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wantListen string
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wantTrustForwarded bool
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}{
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{
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name: "default trust_forwarded_headers is false when absent",
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input: `[web]` + "\n" + `listen = "127.0.0.1:8484"`,
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wantListen: "127.0.0.1:8484",
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wantTrustForwarded: false,
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},
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{
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name: "explicit trust_forwarded_headers true",
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input: `[web]` + "\n" + `listen = "127.0.0.1:8484"` + "\n" + `trust_forwarded_headers = true`,
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wantListen: "127.0.0.1:8484",
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wantTrustForwarded: true,
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},
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{
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name: "explicit trust_forwarded_headers false",
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input: `[web]` + "\n" + `listen = "127.0.0.1:8484"` + "\n" + `trust_forwarded_headers = false`,
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wantListen: "127.0.0.1:8484",
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wantTrustForwarded: false,
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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var cfg Config
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if _, err := toml.Decode(tc.input, &cfg); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
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}
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if cfg.Web.Listen != tc.wantListen {
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t.Errorf("Web.Listen = %q, want %q", cfg.Web.Listen, tc.wantListen)
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}
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if cfg.Web.TrustForwardedHeaders != tc.wantTrustForwarded {
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t.Errorf("Web.TrustForwardedHeaders = %v, want %v", cfg.Web.TrustForwardedHeaders, tc.wantTrustForwarded)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (s *Server) handleChannels(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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}
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func (s *Server) handleChannelReload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
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if !s.authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
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return
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}
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id := r.PathValue("id")
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@@ -290,9 +290,10 @@ type ContainersView struct {
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Network string `json:"network,omitempty"`
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}
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// WebView is the dashboard's own listen address.
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// WebView is the dashboard's own listen address and proxy header trust settings.
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type WebView struct {
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Listen string `json:"listen"`
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Listen string `json:"listen"`
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TrustForwardedHeaders bool `json:"trust_forwarded_headers"`
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}
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// handleConfig returns a read-only, secret-free view of the running
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@@ -353,7 +354,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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PullPolicy: cfg.Containers.PullPolicy,
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Network: cfg.Containers.Network,
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},
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Web: WebView{Listen: cfg.Web.Listen},
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Web: WebView{
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Listen: cfg.Web.Listen,
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TrustForwardedHeaders: cfg.Web.TrustForwardedHeaders,
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},
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Provenance: provenance,
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Locked: lockedConfigKeys(),
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}
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ type taskActionRequest struct {
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}
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func (s *Server) handleTaskAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
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if !s.authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
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return
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}
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id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
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@@ -194,7 +194,14 @@ func taskMutation(action taskstate.Action) bool {
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// boundary: JSON only, a non-simple custom header, and a matching Origin when
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// the browser supplies one. The custom header forces cross-origin callers
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// through a CORS preflight, which this server never permits.
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func authorizeTaskMutation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
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//
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// Origin comparison previously validated against the daemon's own direct network
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// connection (r.TLS). It now validates against the effective external scheme
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// and host, deriving them from X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host only when
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// explicit proxy header trust is enabled (Web.TrustForwardedHeaders). When trust
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// is disabled (the default), forwarded headers are ignored to prevent untrusted
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// clients from forging Origin scheme checks on exposed daemons.
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func (s *Server) authorizeTaskMutation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
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if r.Header.Get("X-Archie-CSRF") != "1" {
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http.Error(w, "missing CSRF header", http.StatusForbidden)
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return false
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@@ -209,18 +216,54 @@ func authorizeTaskMutation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
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return true
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(origin)
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wantScheme := "http"
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if r.TLS != nil {
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wantScheme = "https"
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "cross-origin mutation refused", http.StatusForbidden)
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return false
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}
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if err != nil || u.User != nil || u.Path != "" || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" ||
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!strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, wantScheme) || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, r.Host) {
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wantScheme, wantHost := s.expectedOrigin(r)
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if !validOrigin(u, wantScheme, wantHost) {
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http.Error(w, "cross-origin mutation refused", http.StatusForbidden)
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (s *Server) expectedOrigin(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {
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scheme = "http"
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if r.TLS != nil {
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scheme = "https"
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}
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host = r.Host
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if s == nil || !s.trustForwardedHeaders() {
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return scheme, host
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}
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if proto := firstForwardedValue(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")); proto != "" {
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scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
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}
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if fHost := firstForwardedValue(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host")); fHost != "" {
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host = fHost
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}
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return scheme, host
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}
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func firstForwardedValue(raw string) string {
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raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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if raw == "" {
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return ""
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}
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if first, _, ok := strings.Cut(raw, ","); ok {
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raw = first
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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}
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func validOrigin(u *url.URL, wantScheme, wantHost string) bool {
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if u == nil || u.User != nil || u.Path != "" || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" {
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return false
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}
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return strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, wantScheme) && strings.EqualFold(u.Host, wantHost)
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}
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// actionOutcome is what a completed operator action should record.
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type actionOutcome struct {
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kind string
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@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
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package webui
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/config"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/workflow"
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)
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func TestAuthorizeTaskMutationOrigin(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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trustForwardedDirect bool
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trustForwardedCfg *bool
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forwardedProto string
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forwardedHost string
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requestHost string
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tls bool
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origin string
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csrfHeader string
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contentType string
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wantStatus int
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wantBodyContains string
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}{
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{
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name: "1. proxied https: trust enabled directly, X-Forwarded-Proto https, plain HTTP, Origin https",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "1b. proxied https: trust enabled via Cfg holder, X-Forwarded-Proto https, plain HTTP, Origin https",
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trustForwardedCfg: boolPtr(true),
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "1c. proxied https: comma-separated X-Forwarded-Proto list",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https, http",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "1d. proxied https: X-Forwarded-Host trusted and matched",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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forwardedHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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requestHost: "10.36.25.188:8484",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "2. direct http: trust disabled, no forwarded header, Origin http",
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trustForwardedDirect: false,
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requestHost: "localhost:8484",
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tls: false,
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origin: "http://localhost:8484",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "3. direct https: trust disabled, r.TLS set, Origin https",
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trustForwardedDirect: false,
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requestHost: "localhost:8484",
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tls: true,
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origin: "https://localhost:8484",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "4. SPOOFED: trust disabled, attacker sends X-Forwarded-Proto https, plain HTTP, Origin https",
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trustForwardedDirect: false,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "localhost:8484",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://localhost:8484",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "cross-origin mutation refused",
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},
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{
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name: "4b. SPOOFED HOST: trust disabled, attacker sends X-Forwarded-Host, plain HTTP",
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trustForwardedDirect: false,
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forwardedHost: "target.example.com",
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requestHost: "localhost:8484",
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tls: false,
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origin: "http://target.example.com",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "cross-origin mutation refused",
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},
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{
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name: "5. missing CSRF header: returns 403 with distinct message",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "missing CSRF header",
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},
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{
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name: "6. genuinely cross-origin request: returns 403 cross-origin mutation refused",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://evil.example.com",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "cross-origin mutation refused",
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},
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{
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name: "7. invalid Origin URI: containing userinfo",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://user:pass@archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "cross-origin mutation refused",
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},
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{
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name: "8. invalid Origin URI: containing path",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud/path",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "application/json",
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wantStatus: http.StatusForbidden,
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wantBodyContains: "cross-origin mutation refused",
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},
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{
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name: "9. unsupported media type: non-JSON body",
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trustForwardedDirect: true,
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forwardedProto: "https",
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requestHost: "archie.catlow.cloud",
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tls: false,
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origin: "https://archie.catlow.cloud",
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csrfHeader: "1",
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contentType: "text/plain",
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wantStatus: http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType,
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wantBodyContains: "Content-Type must be application/json",
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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ctx := t.Context()
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if _, err := srv.Store.EnqueueIssue(ctx, "acme", "widget", 1, "queued", "", "", ""); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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task, err := srv.Store.TaskByIssue(ctx, "acme", "widget", 1)
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if err != nil || task == nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to fetch enqueued task: %v", err)
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}
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srv.TrustForwardedHeaders = tc.trustForwardedDirect
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if tc.trustForwardedCfg != nil {
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srv.Cfg = config.NewHolder(config.Config{
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Web: config.Web{
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TrustForwardedHeaders: *tc.trustForwardedCfg,
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},
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})
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}
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path := "/api/tasks/" + strconv.FormatInt(task.ID, 10) + "/action"
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req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader(`{"action":"cancel"}`))
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if tc.requestHost != "" {
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req.Host = tc.requestHost
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}
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if tc.tls {
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req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
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}
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if tc.forwardedProto != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", tc.forwardedProto)
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}
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if tc.forwardedHost != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", tc.forwardedHost)
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}
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if tc.origin != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Origin", tc.origin)
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}
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if tc.csrfHeader != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Archie-CSRF", tc.csrfHeader)
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}
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if tc.contentType != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
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}
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != tc.wantStatus {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d (body %q)", w.Code, tc.wantStatus, w.Body.String())
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}
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if tc.wantBodyContains != "" && !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), tc.wantBodyContains) {
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t.Fatalf("body %q does not contain %q", w.Body.String(), tc.wantBodyContains)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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|
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func boolPtr(b bool) *bool {
|
||||
return &b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWorkRequestOriginProxy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
srv := newTestServer(t)
|
||||
creator := &recordingWorkRequestCreator{}
|
||||
srv.WorkRequests = creator
|
||||
srv.Workflows = []workflow.Definition{{ID: "implement", Name: "Implement", Enabled: true}}
|
||||
srv.TrustForwardedHeaders = true
|
||||
|
||||
body := `{"identity":"archie","repository":"acme/widget","workflow":"implement","title":"Fix login","instructions":"Reproduce and fix it."}`
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/api/work-requests", strings.NewReader(body))
|
||||
req.Host = "archie.catlow.cloud"
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Archie-CSRF", "1")
|
||||
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
|
||||
req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://archie.catlow.cloud")
|
||||
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 201 (body %q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ type workRequest struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) handleWorkRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
if !authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
|
||||
if !s.authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.WorkRequests == nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,10 +169,26 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
// than Confirmed.
|
||||
RunningVersions func() map[string]string
|
||||
|
||||
// TrustForwardedHeaders controls whether X-Forwarded-Proto and
|
||||
// X-Forwarded-Host are trusted when validating Origin on mutating
|
||||
// requests. When false, Origin scheme must match the direct connection (r.TLS).
|
||||
// When Cfg is present, Cfg.Get().Web.TrustForwardedHeaders is also checked.
|
||||
TrustForwardedHeaders bool
|
||||
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
conns map[chan events.Event]struct{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Server) trustForwardedHeaders() bool {
|
||||
if s.TrustForwardedHeaders {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.Cfg == nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s.Cfg.Get().Web.TrustForwardedHeaders
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ConfigOrigin explains one source file contributing to the effective
|
||||
// configuration. Sources are ordered from lowest to highest precedence.
|
||||
type ConfigOrigin struct {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user