Revert "fix(messaging): mask secrets embedded in chat tool arguments"
This reverts commit 9c9aefd296.
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9c9aefd296
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@@ -9,10 +9,6 @@ func TestSummarizeToolParameters(t *testing.T) {
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{"plain values are shown", `{"command":"git diff --stat"}`, `{"command":"git diff --stat"}`},
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{"sensitive keys are redacted", `{"api_key":"sk-1","path":"a.go"}`, `{"api_key":"[redacted]","path":"a.go"}`},
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{"nested sensitive keys are redacted", `{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer x"}}`, `{"headers":{"Authorization":"[redacted]"}}`},
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{"a bearer token inside a command is masked", `{"command":"curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer abc123' https://x"}`, `{"command":"curl -H '[redacted]' https://x"}`},
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{"a token-shaped value is masked in place", `{"command":"git push https://ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123@github.com/a/b"}`, `{"command":"git push https://[redacted]@github.com/a/b"}`},
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{"a prefixed key in prose is masked", `{"text":"use sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx now"}`, `{"text":"use [redacted] now"}`},
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{"a token flag is masked", `{"command":"tool --token=s3cr3tvalue run"}`, `{"command":"tool [redacted] run"}`},
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{"unparseable input is withheld", `not json`, `[unavailable]`},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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@@ -284,8 +284,6 @@ func redactToolParameters(value any, sensitive bool) any {
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typed[i] = redactToolParameters(child, sensitive)
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}
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return typed
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case string:
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return webhookguard.ScrubSecrets(typed)
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default:
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return value
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}
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@@ -90,18 +90,3 @@ func sensitiveKey(key string) bool {
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}
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return false
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}
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// embeddedSecretRe matches secrets written inside a longer value, such as a
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// token in a shell command: credential-carrying headers and flags, JWTs, PEM
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// private keys, and token formats whose prefix marks them as credentials.
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var embeddedSecretRe = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:(?:authorization|x-api-key|x-auth-token|private-token)\s*:\s*(?:bearer\s+|basic\s+|token\s+)?|bearer\s+|--?(?:token|password|api-key)[=\s]+)['"]?[^\s'"]+` +
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`|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+` +
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`|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)` +
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`|\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})` +
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`|://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s@]+@`)
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// ScrubSecrets masks every secret-shaped run inside s and leaves the rest,
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// so a command stays readable without the credential it carried.
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func ScrubSecrets(s string) string {
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return embeddedSecretRe.ReplaceAllString(s, redactedValue)
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}
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