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External agent harnesses
Status: Approved Scope: the harness model and, in "Session contract",
the duplex session that the setup terminal and the run-scoped live view both
use. Code cites this file for both (ui/src/harness/SetupTerminal.vue,
internal/infrastructure/postgres/queries/harness_secrets.sql).
Decision
A workflow stage can run on an external coding-agent CLI instead of the built-in agent loop: Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or any other CLI packaged as a Docker Sandbox Kit v3. Each authenticates with an API key or the operator's subscription login, and can carry the operator's own skills, plugins, subagents and instructions.
Two boundaries hold regardless of what the harness does:
- The real credential never enters the container. The container sees sentinel values; archie's egress proxy substitutes the real credential on outbound requests and performs OAuth refresh on the host.
- Archie's workflow guarantees are enforced outside the harness. Git, protected paths, read-only stages, gates and budgets are checked by archie around the process and against the worktree afterwards.
Kits
A harness is packaged as a Kit v3 image: an OCI image whose
vnd.docker.sandbox.kit.descriptor manifest annotation declares what the
harness needs. Archie reads descriptors with the published
github.com/docker/sandbox-kit-spec/v3/spec package and does not maintain its
own descriptor format. Published Kits run unmodified.
Archie is a partial Kit runtime. It implements these capability types:
| Type | Archie behaviour |
|---|---|
credential@1 |
Proxy-managed only, described below. |
network-policy@1 |
Enforced by the egress proxy. |
volume@1 |
A Docker volume keyed by WorkflowExecution, deleted with it. |
lifecycle@1 |
Install and startup hooks run on container create. |
agent-sessions@1 |
The headless prompt and resume invocations for the stage. |
agent-skills@1 |
Discovery paths for bundled skills and optional shared skills; host access is always read-only. |
agent-skill@1 |
Selected image-bundled skills copied into the declared discovery paths. |
agent-context@1 |
The resolved discovery directory, defaulting beside the workspace; preserve instructions outside Archie-managed sections. |
resources@1 |
Container CPU and memory limits. |
Every other type fails closed: a required entry refuses the launch, an optional
one is skipped and recorded on the step. credential@1 with passthrough: true
and any credential for a forge service are refused.
The operator's own setup (plugins, subagents, instructions, settings) is a mixin Kit, published with the harness Kit as a Kit set: the set merges their layers into one image. It is versioned image content, rewritten on every create, never state a run can modify.
Contract
A harness run is a second implementation of agentexec.Runner. It takes the
same Request and returns the same Result, so workflows, the daemon and the
State Store do not know which runner ran a stage.
agent-sessions@1 supplies the invocation. Archie supplies, per CLI, an output
adapter that translates the CLI's JSON output stream into ToolCallReporter
calls, Usage and a session ID. A CLI with no adapter can run stages with no
capture tools, reporting no usage; its token budget falls back to wall clock.
Workflow definition validation rejects, at load time, a stage whose needs the
selected harness cannot meet: capture tools without an adapter, or a gate retry
without a resume verb.
Selection
A harness is an agent profile. docs/prds/event-automation.md defines a profile
as the execution environment a workflow selects; a harness profile names one Kit
pinned by digest, a workload Kit or a published Kit set, in place of a container
image. Archie runs that Kit's image and composes no Kits itself; a bare mixin is
refused. Everything else about profiles holds: a workflow names its profile, a
stage may name a different one, and a profile holds no secrets.
archie-agent builds the stage's runner from the stage's profile: the ai-sdk
agent loop for an image profile, the harness runner for a Kit profile. Image
profiles, and every workflow already written against them, are unchanged. A Kit
profile named by no workflow is a validation error.
A stage naming a different profile than its workflow's is a separate run, not a
mid-container runner switch: a Kit task runs in one container provisioned for
one profile (Container layout), so a stage that needs a different one is its own
callee, started the way workflow.call already starts one
(docs/prds/event-automation.md "Workflows call workflows"), with its own agent
profile resolved off its own task row. This needs no mechanism beyond
workflow.call plus per-task profile resolution (daemon.pinTaskProfile), both
of which already treat every task's profile independently of any caller's -- see
TestWorkflowCallerConformance (staterpc) for the callee's independent
Workflow field and TestWorkflowCallGivesACalleeItsOwnProfile (daemon) for
the Kit-vs-image runner selection that independence produces.
Profiles are org resources in the State Store, so a Kit profile belongs to one org, is granted to its workspaces like any profile, and applies without a restart.
Organisations
docs/prds/orgs-and-access.md is the boundary; a harness adds nothing that
crosses it.
- A Kit profile, its credential bindings and its OAuth tokens belong to one org. No record is shared between orgs.
- A harness run is a run like any other: it acts as the workflow's identity, under the run credential issued at dispatch.
- The egress proxy injects a credential only when the run credential carries the secret the binding names. A Kit that declares a service the identity is not granted gets no credential: a required one refuses the launch, an optional one is skipped.
- A Kit's network policy is what the Kit asks for; the identity's network grants are what the org allows. The proxy enforces the intersection.
- Concurrency slots are counted per binding within its org.
Credentials
A credential binding maps a Kit's credential@1 service name to an org
secret, which the org grants to identities like any secret. The secret holds one
of:
- API key: a value in the org's secret store.
- OAuth: tokens captured by the setup terminal, stored in the State Store
under the at-rest envelope of
binding-secret-encryption.mdwith its own domain separator.
The egress proxy resolves the binding for each request against the run
credential. The container gets the Kit's sentinel in the named variable or
credential file. OAuth refresh happens at the proxy, which intercepts the Kit's
tokenEndpoint, so a refreshed token is written to the State Store and never
returned to the container.
Runs sharing an OAuth binding share its subscription's rate limit.
max_concurrent on the binding (default 1) caps its simultaneous runs. A stage
waiting for a slot is pending, not running.
Session contract
A session is a duplex PTY into a Kit container the daemon owns. One concept covers both targets; only the address, the lifetime and the established egress phase differ.
| Setup session | Run session (deferred) | |
|---|---|---|
| Address | {org, profile} |
{org, task, attempt} |
| Container | ephemeral, from the profile's Kit | the task's running container |
| Purpose | run the CLI's own login so the proxy captures the tokens | watch and optionally take over |
| Lifetime | bounded by the session TTL; the container is removed on close | bounded by the task |
- Transport. The daemon serves
harness.v1.HarnessService, a bidi gRPC stream, and the dashboard implements itsHarnessTerminalinterface (internal/webui) over that client; the browser's WebSocket route is unchanged. The contract lives on the daemon because the daemon owns containers: the dashboard process must not linkinternal/container,internal/app/archiedorinternal/agentexec. - Authorisation. Opening a session is the
updateaction on the secret, decided by the dashboard's authorizer before the route runs (internal/webui/authorize.go). The dashboard then dials the daemon with the harness service token. The daemon does not re-authorise an operator; it trusts the asserted{org, profile}exactly as the task-action RPC trusts an asserted actor. Because that authority is a shell in a container holding an org's credential, the harness listener requiresHARNESS_TOKENeven on loopback, unlike the State Store's loopback convention. - Egress phase. Token interception is filtered by phase (
oauth.go'srule.runtime == atRun), andEnterRuntimeis one-way. A setup session therefore follows a run's lifecycle exactly: install hooks at the install phase,EnterRuntimebefore the shell. A credential whose token endpoint must be captured declaresphase: runtime; a credential capturing at install phase is captured by the install hooks that run before the switch. - Credentials. Capture is gated: the proxy intercepts a token endpoint only
for a service the session is granted (
Proxy.granted). A setup session has no task, so the daemon registers a session grant: its proxy token resolves to{org, the Kit's declared credential services the org binds}. That is the intersection theupdate-on-secret authorisation covers. The real token never enters the container: the response is sentinelized and stored as the org's harness secret. - Container discipline. The setup container runs a keepalive entrypoint with
an empty
Config.Env; the PTY is an exec as the Kit's harness user with the harness env and nothing inherited from any worker. No worktree is mounted. It is acquired through the container pool, so it carries thearchie-daemonlabel, the concurrency cap and the max-uptime reaper; the session TTL is the smaller bound. Closing revokes the egress session, removes the sandbox network and the Kit volumes, then releases the container. - Kit unavailable. The daemon serves the contract only when it has a
container pool and a Kit launcher; otherwise there is no listener, and a
client's refused connection is gRPC's
Unavailable. The dashboard's existing failure surface is the honest degrade;/api/harness'sterminalfield means "a client is configured", not "the daemon can run a Kit". - Run target.
RunTarget{task_id, attempt}opens a read-only view of a running task's sandbox; it ships as the peek. The daemon resolves the pair itself, so the dashboard never learns a container name: the task store says whether the task isrunningand which attempt is current, and the Kit launcher names the containerkitrun.TaskContainer(task_id, attempt)(one container per attempt, removed when the run ends; volumes remain task-scoped for retries). A finished or unknown task, a task that is not running, an attempt other than the running one, or a container that is gone isNotFoundwith the reason in the message; an unreachable task store or container engine isUnavailable. The view follows the container's stdout and stderr, including the harness output forwarded by the worker, carries no stdin and no exec, and ends when the task's container ends or the client leaves, so it confers no authority over the container. A read-only tail of the existing per-attempt logs was rejected: those refresh only on task state changes and are the daemon's account, not the sandbox's. Mid-stream failures are shown as a reason in the terminal before it closes.- Authorisation. The dashboard route
GET /api/tasks/{id}/sandboxis decided asread-logson the task before the handler runs, so a caller sees a sandbox exactly when they may read that task's log. The daemon checks that the task belongs to the asserted org before following output. - Grants. The view takes no grant of its own. The run's egress session
(its proxy token, install then
EnterRuntime) already belongs to the run and is revoked byLauncher.Releasewhen the task ends; the view reads after that phase switch and dies with the container. - Credentials. The sandbox holds sentinels, never real credentials: API
keys are
egress.Sentinel(credentials.go), and an OAuth token set is sentinelised in the response and swapped back by the proxy only on a granted service's resource host in the matching phase (oauth.go,injectOAuth). The proxy runs in the daemon outside the container, so a shell in the container sees only sentinels. - Takeover (interactive PTY into a running task) is out of scope for this
issue. It needs the dangerous-command authority (#1574) to
gate it, and that authority is not wired for it: the harness listener has no
approval step;
ToolSetOptions.Approvalininternal/agentexec/modelloopis never set by a caller, so task runs never build approval-required tools; approvals reach an operator only on the chat paths (dashboard ask, Telegram, Gateway). Takeover would also need an audit record naming the actor, task, attempt and open/close times, and revocation tied to task end (the exec is closed with the container). Those follow the setup session's shape (harnesssession.Session,container.ExecPTY) once the authority exists.
- Authorisation. The dashboard route
- Audit. Opening and closing a session and a successful capture are recorded with the asserted org and profile. A run view's open and close are logged with the task and attempt; it reads output only, so it has no takeover record.
Each session is the only interactive path into a harness container.
Egress
Only Kit profiles run on the egress path. An image profile keeps the network access its identity is granted, because workflows such as a network investigator need raw DNS, ICMP and arbitrary TCP that no HTTP proxy carries.
- Sandbox network. Each Kit run gets its own internal Docker bridge on which the host holds no address. Host services, including those listening on every interface, are unreachable from it by any address.
- Relay. One relay container,
archie-agent relay, sits on the sandbox networks under a fixed alias and on the host-reachable network. It forwards three fixed ports, to the proxy, NATS and the State Store, and can reach nothing else. It holds no secrets. - Proxy. The proxy runs inside
archied, listening on the host gateway of the host-reachable network. It terminates TLS with a per-daemon CA installed into the container at create, identifies the container by a per-run proxy password distinct from the worker's run grant, and applies that run's network policy and credential inject rules. Upstream dials refuse loopback, and refuse internal addresses unless the policy names the exact IP, so an allowed name cannot resolve back into the host.
Container layout
A Kit task runs in one container, from the Kit composition's image, on the task's sandbox network. The worker and every harness invocation share it; they are separated by user, not by container, so a run's cost scales with the run and not with how many agents it fans out to.
- Worker. Archie mounts its own
archie-agentbinary read-only and runs it as the container's entrypoint, as root. It holds the task's NATS and State Store credentials in its own environment and in root-only files, runs the workflow, and servesarchie-agent mcp. The Kit image's entrypoint is not PID 1. - Harness. Every invocation runs as the Kit's user (the image's
User, default uid 1000) with an explicit environment: the Kit's variables, the proxy environment and the credential sentinels, and nothing inherited from the worker. That user cannot read the worker's environment or files, or trace it. Sibling invocations in one run share the user and the worktree. - Hooks.
lifecycle@1install and startup hooks run as the user each declares, before the worker accepts work. - Mounts. The task worktree at the Kit's workspace directory, owned by the Kit's user, and the read-only skills store. Nothing else from the host.
- Network. The relay forwards three fixed ports on the sandbox network: the egress proxy, NATS and the State Store. The worker reaches NATS and the State Store with its credentials; a harness can open those ports but holds no credential either accepts.
- Volumes.
volume@1paths persist for the life of the WorkflowExecution, which covers session resume across gate iterations and retries. They are not shared between executions.
Archie tools inside the harness
Capture tools return a stage's structured results through archie-agent mcp, a
stdio MCP server. The same command forwards central-tool discovery and calls
over Streamable HTTP to http://archie.tools/mcp through the egress proxy.
Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI register it using their
native MCP configuration. Registration files are per-stage and outside the
worktree; the Kit's bundled settings remain intact. A CLI that exits without
initializing the required MCP server fails the stage.
archied handles that exact endpoint inside the authenticated task proxy; it is
not a listener or an upstream network destination. It is available only during
task runtime, never during install or a setup session. The harness supplies a
sentinel, and the proxy injects a separate random gateway token held only on the
host. Ending the proxy session revokes that token and cancels active calls.
The proxy reaches archie-gateway through its authenticated gRPC contract. The
Gateway derives the task, execution principal and org from a live run grant on
every request. Its tool list is bounded by the profile in that org and the
package's accepted tool authority, checked again at invocation. Workspace tools,
chat file delivery, conversation-only tools and tools that require an
unavailable approver are not served. Tool result limits apply without exposing
host spill paths; media is returned as MCP content.
Task MCP providers run in the Gateway with task-bound sessions and sampling. Sampling uses the task's model and credentials, records task usage and refuses revoked grants. It does not use the chat identity or chat model. The worker does not start another copy of those providers for Kit tasks. The harness's own built-in tools remain outside Archie's tool-result limits.
Enforcement around the harness
| Property | Enforcement |
|---|---|
| Model never runs git | No forge credential can be bound. Archie records HEAD and every ref before the run; any change fails the step (failed, policy class). The workflow commits the stage's changes. |
| Protected paths | A diff touching a Protection path fails the step. |
| Read-only stage | Any worktree diff fails the step. |
| Gate | Archie runs the stage's gate after the harness exits. On failure it resumes the session with the gate output, up to the stage's iteration budget. |
| Budget | Archie kills the process on wall-clock timeout, or when streamed usage passes the token budget. |
| Cancellation | Cancelling the step kills the process group, then the container. |
| Egress | Only the proxy is reachable; the Kit's network policy decides the rest. |
Harness settings that deny git or protected paths are added where the CLI supports them, to save wasted turns. They are never the enforcement.
Execution tree
A harness run is one agent StepExecution. Subagents the harness spawns
internally are not recorded as children. Their usage is included in the step's
tokens_used when the adapter reports it.
Agents never hold a harness
An Agent reaches a harness only by invoking a Workflow whose stage names it. No Agent tool, chat tool or capability exposes a harness, its setup terminal or its credential. The stage boundary is what carries the container, the git and path checks, the gate and the budget; a harness outside a stage has none of them.
Out of scope
- Chat through a harness. The gateway chat loop stays on the built-in runtime.
network-policy@2HTTP method and path rules; a Kit requiring it is refused.- Recording the harness's internal subagents as StepExecutions.
- Cost in currency.
- Choosing a harness automatically per task.
Plan
- Descriptor resolution with the Kit spec package; capability support table and fail-closed refusal.
- Egress proxy: internal network, per-daemon CA, per-container token,
network-policy@1. credential@1: API-key bindings, sentinel rendering, inject rules.- Harness
Runner: container create with worktree, volumes, lifecycle hooks and the mountedarchie-agent;agent-sessions@1invocation; worktree checks for git, protected paths and read-only; budget and cancellation. - Claude Code output adapter;
archie-agent mcp; gate-and-resume loop. - Kit profiles, runner selection from the stage's profile, and definition validation.
- OAuth bindings as org secrets: token-endpoint interception, encrypted storage, per-binding concurrency; dashboard setup terminal.
- Output adapters for Codex, Pi, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI.
Verification
- Every named adapter discovers and calls a permitted central tool through the proxy and records a local capture. A guessed tool outside the profile or accepted package authority is refused.
- The gateway token never appears in the container, generated MCP files, worktree, logs or events. It is not the container's proxy password.
- A permission change after discovery takes effect at the next call; ending the proxy session cancels active calls, and a revoked grant cannot execute tools or sample a model.
- Bundled skills remain visible with shared skills missing or disabled; shared mounts are per-skill and read-only. Explicit context directories preserve non-managed instructions and refuse symlinked staging paths.
- The same workflow definition completes on
builtinand on the Claude Code Kit with the sameResultshape and captures. - After
/loginin the setup terminal, the container's credential file holds only sentinels, the State Store holds the encrypted token, and a task run authenticates. - A real API key or OAuth token never appears in the container environment, filesystem, worktree, task log or event stream.
- A request to a host outside the Kit's runtime allow list fails, including a direct connection that bypasses the proxy settings.
- A harness instructed to
git commitfails its step, and the task branch is unchanged. - A harness edit to a protected test file fails the step in a TDD fix stage.
- A read-only feasibility stage that writes a file fails.
- A file a run writes into a Kit-managed path such as the CLI's settings file is gone on the next execution.
- A Kit requiring an unsupported capability is refused at launch with the capability named.
- A stage with a failing gate resumes the same session with the gate output, then succeeds or exhausts its iterations.
- Two tasks sharing an OAuth binding with
max_concurrent = 1run one at a time; the second waits aspending. - Stopping a run kills the harness process and removes the container.
- A harness invocation cannot read the worker's NATS or State Store credential
from its environment, its files or
/proc. - A run fanning out to many agent invocations uses one container.
- A Kit profile in org A cannot be selected, and its binding cannot be resolved, by a workflow in org B.
- A harness run whose identity is not granted a Kit's required credential is refused at launch; the proxy never injects a secret outside the run credential.
- The firewall investigation example runs unchanged on an image profile with direct network access.