RedactPayload only redacted values under a fixed set of sensitive key
names, so a sender that names a secret field something else leaked it into
captured_events.body. Harden the heuristic:
- broaden the key-name markers (compound names like access_token,
client_secret, signing_key, x_api_key, webhook_secret, refresh_token)
and keep gateway.sensitiveParameterKey identical to preserve the
documented agreement between the two redaction paths.
- add value-shape detection: a compact JWT or a PEM private-key block is
redacted under any key, catching the 'sender named the field something
the heuristic misses' gap.
- keep it conservative so schema-by-example field mapping still works:
only unambiguous shapes (eyJ-prefixed JWTs, PEM key blocks) are
redacted by value, never ordinary content.
Best-effort per docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md point 5.
Refs archie-core-t2db (captured_events.body redaction)