Files
archie/internal/infrastructure/oidc/oidc_test.go
T
sam c53b2fee60 feat(webui): let a person sign in and act as themselves
The last gap in the identity boundary: enabling a provider used to lock browsers
out, because nothing could turn a sign-in into the credential the dashboard already
verifies. Now a browser completes the authorization code flow with PKCE and the
identity reaching the request context is the person who signed in.

The audience is requested AT THE AUTHORIZATION ENDPOINT, not only at the token
endpoint. Infra measured that a provider asked otherwise returns the audience empty,
and this dashboard then refuses a perfectly valid token -- a failure that reads as a
signing fault and is actually a missing query parameter. A test asserts the
parameter is present, so it cannot quietly go missing.

The flow is the libraries': discovery, the code exchange, PKCE generation and the
challenge transformation are go-oidc and x/oauth2, so archie writes no protocol. The
token returned by the exchange is verified through the SAME Verifier a presented
token goes through, and the identity is then resolved through the same rule -- one
Resolve now shared by Authenticate and the callback, so a browser sign-in cannot be
accepted on terms a presented token would be refused on.

Archie still issues no session. The callback stores the PROVIDER's token in an
HttpOnly cookie and every later request re-verifies it, so what archie holds cannot
outlive the provider's own decision. The callback checks the state it issued, and
expires the state and PKCE verifier cookies on use.

The sign-in routes mount on the bypass mux because they are how a caller becomes
authenticated; gating them behind the credential they obtain would make signing in
impossible. The client secret is never a flag: -oidc-client-secret-env names the
environment variable holding it, so it cannot reach a process listing or a log line.
No client id means no sign-in route and token verification is unaffected, which is
what an agent-only deployment wants.

Evidence, produced by driv·ng the flow rather than the seam:
internal/webui/api_tasks_actor_test.go's TestBrowserSignInRecordsTheSignedInPerson
walks sign-in -> callback -> cookie -> action and asserts the recorded actor is the
signed-in person with human_approved. TestCallbackRefusesAMismatchedState asserts a
replayed state is refused before any credential is verified.
internal/infrastructure/oidc/flow_test.go runs the real flow against a test
provider's own authorize and token endpoints, asserting the audience parameter, the
PKCE challenge, a successful exchange, and a refused wrong verifier.

Verified: task check exit 0 on this tree.
2026-09-22 14:59:03 +10:00

290 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package oidc
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
)
const testAudience = "archie-dashboard"
// provider is a minimal identity provider: a discovery document and a JWKS.
// It signs with a real RSA key so every refusal below is the library's own
// signature and claim checking, not a stub's behaviour.
type provider struct {
server *httptest.Server
key *rsa.PrivateKey
keyID string
// other is a second, unrelated key used to sign a token the provider
// never published, which is what a forged or foreign token looks like.
other *rsa.PrivateKey
// pending holds the PKCE challenge each issued code must be redeemed with.
pending sync.Map
}
func newProvider(t *testing.T) *provider {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
}
other, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate second key: %v", err)
}
p := &provider{key: key, other: other, keyID: "test-key"}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"issuer": p.server.URL,
"jwks_uri": p.server.URL + "/keys",
"authorization_endpoint": p.server.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": p.server.URL + "/token",
"response_types_supported": []string{"code"},
"subject_types_supported": []string{"public"},
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/authorize", p.authorizeEndpoint(t))
mux.HandleFunc("/token", p.tokenEndpoint(t))
mux.HandleFunc("/keys", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(jose.JSONWebKeySet{Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{{
Key: key.Public(), KeyID: p.keyID, Algorithm: "RS256", Use: "sig",
}}})
})
p.server = httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(p.server.Close)
return p
}
// testClaims is the claim set this provider emits. A machine token carries
// client_id and no sub; a person's token carries sub.
type testClaims struct {
jwt.Claims
ClientID string `json:"client_id,omitempty"`
Scopes []string `json:"scp,omitempty"`
}
// token signs a token with the given key for the given claims.
func (p *provider) token(t *testing.T, signer *rsa.PrivateKey, mutate func(*testClaims)) string {
t.Helper()
claims := testClaims{
Issuer: p.server.URL,
Subject: "sam",
Audience: jwt.Audience{testAudience},
Expiry: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)),
}
if mutate != nil {
mutate(&claims)
}
sig, err := jose.NewSigner(jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: signer},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT").WithHeader("kid", p.keyID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new signer: %v", err)
}
raw, err := jwt.Signed(sig).Claims(claims).Serialize()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("serialize token: %v", err)
}
return raw
}
// personToken is what the token endpoint issues for a signed-in person: a
// subject, and the audience this dashboard checks.
func (p *provider) personToken(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
return p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"
c.ClientID = ""
c.Scopes = []string{"openid", "profile", "email"}
})
}
func (p *provider) verifier(t *testing.T) *Verifier {
t.Helper()
v, err := New(context.Background(), Config{Issuer: p.server.URL, Audience: testAudience})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
}
return v
}
func TestVerifyAcceptsAProviderIssuedToken(t *testing.T) {
p := newProvider(t)
credential, err := p.verifier(t).Verify(context.Background(), p.token(t, p.key, nil))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Verify() error = %v", err)
}
if credential.Subject.Subject != "sam" {
t.Fatalf("subject = %q, want %q", credential.Subject.Subject, "sam")
}
if credential.Subject.Issuer != p.server.URL {
t.Fatalf("issuer = %q, want %q", credential.Subject.Issuer, p.server.URL)
}
}
// TestVerifyDerivesTheSubjectTheWayTheProviderIssuesIt: a person is named by sub
// and a machine by client_id, because a machine token carries no sub at all.
// Getting this wrong does not fail loudly -- it binds every machine caller to one
// identity, or to none.
func TestVerifyDerivesTheSubjectTheWayTheProviderIssuesIt(t *testing.T) {
p := newProvider(t)
verifier := p.verifier(t)
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*testClaims)
wantSubject string
wantScopes []string
}{
{
name: "a person's token carries sub",
mutate: func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"
c.Scopes = []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"}
},
wantSubject: "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
wantScopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"},
},
{
name: "a machine token carries client_id and no sub",
mutate: func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = ""
c.ClientID = "archie"
c.Scopes = []string{"authelia.bearer.authz"}
},
wantSubject: "archie",
wantScopes: []string{"authelia.bearer.authz"},
},
{
name: "sub wins when a token carries both",
mutate: func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000002"
c.ClientID = "archie-web"
},
wantSubject: "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000002",
},
{
name: "a space-delimited scope claim is read too",
mutate: func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000003"
c.ClientID = ""
c.Scopes = nil
},
wantSubject: "a150ab4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000003",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
credential, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), p.token(t, p.key, tc.mutate))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Verify() error = %v", err)
}
if credential.Subject.Subject != tc.wantSubject {
t.Fatalf("subject = %q, want %q", credential.Subject.Subject, tc.wantSubject)
}
if tc.wantScopes != nil && !slices.Equal(credential.Scopes, tc.wantScopes) {
t.Fatalf("scopes = %v, want %v", credential.Scopes, tc.wantScopes)
}
})
}
}
// TestVerifyRefusesATokenThatNamesNobody: a verified token asserting neither sub
// nor client_id is an anonymous caller, and accepting it would let any token the
// provider ever signed act as whoever the binding happened to hold.
func TestVerifyRefusesATokenThatNamesNobody(t *testing.T) {
p := newProvider(t)
token := p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) {
c.Subject = ""
c.ClientID = ""
})
if _, err := p.verifier(t).Verify(context.Background(), token); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Verify() accepted a token that asserts no caller")
}
}
func TestVerifyRefusesEveryUnacceptableToken(t *testing.T) {
p := newProvider(t)
verifier := p.verifier(t)
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
}{
{
name: "no token",
token: "",
},
{
name: "expired",
token: p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) { c.Expiry = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)) }),
},
{
name: "signed by a key the provider never published",
token: p.token(t, p.other, nil),
},
{
name: "issued for another audience",
token: p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) { c.Audience = jwt.Audience{"another-service"} }),
},
{
name: "issued by another provider",
token: p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) { c.Issuer = "https://someone-else.example" }),
},
{
// The human path's failure mode: a token minted without the requested
// audience arrives with an empty audience, and the check here refuses
// it. The fix is requesting the audience at the authorisation
// endpoint, not weakening this check.
name: "issued with no audience at all",
token: p.token(t, p.key, func(c *testClaims) { c.Audience = nil }),
},
{
name: "not a token at all",
token: "not-a-jwt",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), tc.token); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Verify() accepted a token it must refuse")
}
})
}
}
func TestNewRefusesAnIncompleteConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
p := newProvider(t)
tests := []struct {
name string
cfg Config
}{
{"no issuer", Config{Audience: testAudience}},
{"no audience", Config{Issuer: p.server.URL}},
{"unreachable issuer", Config{Issuer: "http://127.0.0.1:1", Audience: testAudience}},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := New(context.Background(), tc.cfg); err == nil {
t.Fatal("New() accepted a configuration it must refuse")
}
})
}
}