The Gateway had no transport boundary: RunGateway refused any non-loopback listen address and serveGateway registered no interceptor, so archie-ui was colocation-only while the State Store already had a token-authenticated equivalent. gatewayrpc gains a gateway-token metadata credential with constant-time comparison and both unary and stream interceptors on each side. Stream coverage is required here and not in staterpc: the Gateway's Stream RPC is server-streaming. Dial fails closed on a non-loopback target with no token, mirroring staterpc.Dial. gatewayServerOpts applies the same rule server-side: loopback stays insecure, non-loopback requires a token, malformed errors. The daemon resolves [services.gateway].target_token then GATEWAY_TOKEN; archie-ui passes the token its config projection already carried, so a distributed dashboard is now possible. Closes: archie-core-juqx
68 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
68 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
package gatewayrpc
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import "testing"
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func TestTargetIsLoopback(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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addr string
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want bool
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}{
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{"loopback ipv4", "127.0.0.1:8585", true},
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{"loopback ipv6", "[::1]:8585", true},
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{"localhost hostname", "localhost:8585", true},
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{"localhost uppercase", "LOCALHOST:8585", true},
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{"wildcard", "0.0.0.0:8585", false},
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{"private ip", "192.168.1.10:8585", false},
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{"dns name", "gateway.example.com:8585", false},
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{"empty host", ":8585", false},
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{"malformed", "127.0.0.1", false},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got, err := TargetIsLoopback(tt.addr)
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if tt.name == "malformed" {
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("TargetIsLoopback(%q) = (%v, nil), want error", tt.addr, got)
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}
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return
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}
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("TargetIsLoopback(%q): %v", tt.addr, err)
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}
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if got != tt.want {
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t.Fatalf("TargetIsLoopback(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.addr, got, tt.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestDialFailsClosedOffLoopbackWithoutToken is the transport half of the
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// Gateway security rule: a target reachable from the network must present a
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// Bearer [REDACTED], so a missing credential stops the dial rather than opening
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// an unauthenticated connection. It mirrors staterpc's §9 dial rule.
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func TestDialFailsClosedOffLoopbackWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
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if _, _, err := Dial("", ""); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Dial with an empty target should fail")
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}
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if _, _, err := Dial("0.0.0.0:8585", ""); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("Dial to a non-loopback target without a token should fail closed")
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}
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client, cleanup, err := Dial("0.0.0.0:8585", "secret")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Dial to a non-loopback target with a token: %v", err)
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}
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defer cleanup()
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if client == nil {
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t.Fatal("Dial returned no client")
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}
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loopback, cleanupLoopback, err := Dial("127.0.0.1:8585", "")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Dial to a loopback target without a token: %v", err)
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}
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defer cleanupLoopback()
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if loopback == nil {
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t.Fatal("Dial returned no client for a loopback target")
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}
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}
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