A source is the capture endpoint: a UUIDv7 path by default or a unique URL-safe custom path, signed by default with an Archie-generated secret (encrypted via the bindings cipher), or unsigned after an approval. Intake verifies X-Hub-Signature-256/X-Signature-256 against the source secret before redaction; an unauthenticated event on a signed source is captured but never dispatched, an event on an approved unsigned source dispatches and is marked unsigned. The binding secret is retired; migration 0006 derives sources from existing binding and capture source strings, moving each binding's secret onto its source. SourceStore crosses the State Store gRPC contract. The dashboard gains a sources panel and flags unsigned in the capture inspector, binding list and task timeline.
232 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
232 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
// Package captureintake is the HTTP receiver for inbound webhooks archie has
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// no binding for yet: it persists what arrives so an operator can inspect it
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// and build one (docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md).
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//
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// It belongs to the process that owns work intake, not to the dashboard that
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// displays captures. It served from the dashboard's listener while the two
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// shared a process; the split gives the read to the dashboard, over the State
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// Store, and keeps the write here (archie-core-8cda.5.4). From the cutover
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// change in the same bead it is a persistence shim over the State Store
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// contract mounted by the UI process -- the only dashboard listener left --
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// while the daemon's binding-dispatch loop consumes captures from the same
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// store: the HTTP front door moved without moving work intake.
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package captureintake
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/source"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/storecontract"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/events"
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"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/webhookguard"
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)
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// Path is the route this receiver serves. It is unauthenticated by design:
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// the senders it exists to capture have no credential here yet.
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const Path = "POST /webhooks/capture/{source}"
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// Receiver persists inbound webhook captures.
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type Receiver struct {
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// Captures persists what arrives. Nil answers 503 rather than failing
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// the process it is mounted in: capture is a precondition for the
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// no-code playbook epic, not a hard dependency of the daemon.
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Captures storecontract.CaptureStore
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// Limiter is the per-remote-address token bucket applied before a body
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// is read. Nil disables rate limiting, which composition never does in
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// production.
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Limiter *webhookguard.RateLimiter
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// Sources resolves the source a path names and its signing setting.
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// Nil disables verification: every event records as neither
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// authenticated nor unsigned, so none dispatches.
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Sources SourceResolver
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// Retention and MaxEvents are passed straight to InsertCapture's
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// prune-on-write bounds. See config.CaptureConfig.
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Retention time.Duration
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MaxEvents int
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// MaxBodyBytes rejects (413) a body larger than this before redaction
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// or storage sees it.
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MaxBodyBytes int64
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// Publish puts the capture's arrival on the activity stream, with the
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// request's context: the announce happens synchronously inside the
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// handler, before the 202 is written, so the request's lifetime bounds
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// it. Nil records the capture without announcing it.
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Publish func(ctx context.Context, e events.Event)
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Log *slog.Logger
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}
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// SourceResolver is the one SourceStore read intake needs.
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type SourceResolver interface {
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GetSource(ctx context.Context, path string) (*source.Source, error)
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}
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// Register mounts the receiver on mux.
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func (rc *Receiver) Register(mux *http.ServeMux) {
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mux.HandleFunc(Path, rc.ServeHTTP)
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}
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// ServeHTTP accepts an inbound webhook POST and persists it. On a signed
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// source only a valid HMAC under the source's secret marks the event
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// authenticated; on an approved unsigned source every event is marked
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// unsigned. Anything else is still captured and visible in the inspector,
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// but is neither, so the dispatch loop's check (binding.Matcher.Matches over
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// CapturedEvent.Dispatchable) never starts a task from it.
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func (rc *Receiver) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if rc.Captures == nil {
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http.Error(w, "capture not configured", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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path := r.PathValue("source")
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// webhookguard.RateLimiter's bucket map assumes a bounded, operator-
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// registered key space (see its doc comment) -- it is never evicted, and
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// a fresh key starts with a full burst allowance. source is an
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// unregistered, attacker-chosen URL segment by design (this endpoint
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// exists to capture senders archie has no registration for yet), so
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// keying on it would let a single attacker rotate a new "source" on
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// every request to bypass the limit entirely and grow the bucket map
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// without bound. Remote address is the bounded identity available here.
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if rc.Limiter != nil && !rc.Limiter.Allow(remoteAddrHost(r)) {
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http.Error(w, "rate limit exceeded", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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src := rc.resolveSource(r, path)
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBodyBytesOrFallback(rc.MaxBodyBytes))
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body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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// The only realistic cause here is MaxBytesReader tripping; any other
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// read failure also means there is no usable body to capture.
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http.Error(w, "request body too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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// Verified on the raw bytes, before redaction parses them.
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authenticated, unsigned := verify(src, r.Header, body)
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headers, _ := json.Marshal(r.Header)
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redactedHeaders, err := webhookguard.RedactPayload(headers)
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if err != nil {
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redactedHeaders = headers
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}
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// A body that isn't JSON has no key-value structure for the heuristic to
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// match against, so there is nothing to redact -- store it as received
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// rather than dropping or mangling it. Best-effort, per
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// docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md point 5.
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redactedBody, err := webhookguard.RedactPayload(body)
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if err != nil {
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redactedBody = body
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}
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c := storecontract.CapturedEvent{
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ReceivedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
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Source: path,
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RemoteAddr: r.RemoteAddr,
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ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
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Headers: string(redactedHeaders),
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Body: string(redactedBody),
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Authenticated: authenticated,
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Unsigned: unsigned,
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}
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id, err := rc.Captures.InsertCapture(r.Context(), c, rc.Retention, rc.MaxEvents)
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if err != nil {
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rc.logger().Error("capture insert", "err", err, "source", path)
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http.Error(w, "capture failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// Reuses the existing activity-event pipeline rather than inventing
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// separate push plumbing -- see docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md.
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// Deliberately LIGHTWEIGHT: the events table this feeds has no retention
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// or row-count prune, unlike captured_events, so embedding the full (up
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// to MaxBodyBytes) body/headers here would duplicate the payload into an
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// unbounded table and defeat InsertCapture's own disk-bound guarantee.
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// The captures view treats this purely as an invalidation signal and
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// refetches the list for the actual row data.
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if rc.Publish != nil {
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rc.Publish(r.Context(), events.Event{
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Kind: "capture",
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Detail: "capture from " + path,
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Data: map[string]any{"id": id, "source": path, "unsigned": unsigned},
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})
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
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}
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// resolveSource looks up the source a path names. A lookup error is logged
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// and treated as an unknown source: the event is still captured but cannot
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// dispatch, so failing open here costs no safety, while failing closed would
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// turn a transient store hiccup into a capture outage.
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func (rc *Receiver) resolveSource(r *http.Request, path string) *source.Source {
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if rc.Sources == nil {
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return nil
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}
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src, err := rc.Sources.GetSource(r.Context(), path)
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if err != nil {
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rc.logger().Warn("source lookup", "source", path, "err", err)
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return nil
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}
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return src
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}
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// verify decides how an event on src may dispatch. An approved unsigned
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// source marks it unsigned. Otherwise a valid HMAC under the source's secret
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// authenticates it: X-Hub-Signature-256 first, X-Signature-256 as fallback.
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// A source with no secret yet authenticates nothing, since an empty key is
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// one anybody can sign with.
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func verify(src *source.Source, h http.Header, body []byte) (authenticated, unsigned bool) {
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switch {
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case src == nil:
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return false, false
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case src.Unsigned():
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return false, true
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case src.Secret == "":
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return false, false
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}
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sig := h.Get("X-Hub-Signature-256")
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if sig == "" {
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sig = h.Get("X-Signature-256")
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}
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return webhookguard.VerifyHMAC(body, sig, src.Secret), false
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}
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func (rc *Receiver) logger() *slog.Logger {
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if rc.Log == nil {
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return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
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}
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return rc.Log
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}
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// fallbackMaxBodyBytes bounds a capture body when MaxBodyBytes is left unset
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// (zero). The size cap is the only one of the three disk-bound mechanics in
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// docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md that limits a SINGLE payload rather than
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// total row count or write rate -- a table pruned to maxEvents rows still
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// holds one arbitrarily large row if nothing ever bounded that row's size, so
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// this must never be skippable by a missing wiring value the way the rate
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// limiter (best-effort, not disk-bound-load-bearing on its own) is allowed to
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// be.
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const fallbackMaxBodyBytes = 256 * 1024
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func maxBodyBytesOrFallback(configured int64) int64 {
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if configured > 0 {
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return configured
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}
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return fallbackMaxBodyBytes
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}
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// remoteAddrHost strips the port from r.RemoteAddr for use as a rate-limit
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// key, falling back to the raw value if it isn't a host:port pair.
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func remoteAddrHost(r *http.Request) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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return host
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}
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