Files
archie/internal/infrastructure/agentgit/safety.go
T
sam 5d00ec7b0c refactor(agentexec): remove legacy execution paths
Autonomous workflows now have exactly one production boundary: a task-scoped archie-agent receives a full-task core-NATS request and runs the worker-local stage loop. The legacy [agent] section remains decode-only for migration; it no longer selects runtime behavior.
2026-08-24 14:56:57 +10:00

69 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package agentgit
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"os"
"os/exec"
"strings"
)
// gitRunner runs a git invocation and returns its combined output. Injected so
// the safe.directory configuration can be tested without a git binary.
type gitRunner func(ctx context.Context, args ...string) ([]byte, error)
// runGit is the production gitRunner.
func runGit(ctx context.Context, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", args...).CombinedOutput()
}
// MarkSafe adds mountDir to git's global safe.directory list on a best-effort basis.
func MarkSafe(ctx context.Context, mountDir string, log *slog.Logger) bool {
return markSafe(ctx, mountDir, runGit, log)
}
// markSafe adds mountDir to git's global safe.directory list.
//
// The daemon bind-mounts the task worktree into the container from the host,
// so the directory is owned by a UID the container user is not. Git refuses to
// operate in a repository it does not own ("detected dubious ownership"), and
// the Go toolchain shells out to git for VCS stamping during build/test/vet --
// so without this every gate fails before the agent does any real work.
//
// Best-effort by design: git may be absent from a minimal image, and an agent
// working a repo with no gate commands never needs it. A failure is logged and
// the agent continues. Returns true only when git accepted the configuration.
//
// The guard is existence, not mount-ness: os.Stat confirms mountDir exists and
// is a directory, which prevents a misconfigured archie-agent from writing to
// the operator's own ~/.gitconfig for a workspace path that was never mounted.
// Mandatory task boot metadata independently rejects non-task workers before
// they subscribe. This check does not detect a
// stale directory that happens to exist at the same path without actually
// being a bind mount -- a real mount check would need platform-specific
// parsing (e.g. /proc/self/mountinfo on Linux) that this deliberately does
// without. The failure mode is inert: git only rejects operations in a
// directory that both exists at this path and is a real repository, and
// safe.directory entries for a stale non-repo path do nothing.
func markSafe(ctx context.Context, mountDir string, run gitRunner, log *slog.Logger) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(mountDir)
if err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
log.Debug("git safe.directory skipped: mountDir does not exist", "dir", mountDir)
return false
}
out, err := run(ctx, "config", "--global", "--add", "safe.directory", mountDir)
if err != nil {
log.Warn(
"git safe.directory config failed -- gates that shell out to git may fail",
"dir", mountDir,
"err", err,
"output", strings.TrimSpace(string(out)),
)
return false
}
log.Info("git safe.directory configured", "dir", mountDir)
return true
}