Files
archie/internal/webhookguard/redact.go
T

126 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package webhookguard
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// redactedValue replaces a value whose key (or shape) looks sensitive.
const redactedValue = "[redacted]"
// SensitiveKeyMarkers are key substrings whose values are redacted.
var SensitiveKeyMarkers = []string{
"token", "secret", "password", "passwd", "pwd", "passphrase",
"api_key", "apikey", "api_secret", "client_secret", "private_key", "secret_key",
"signing_key", "authorization", "bearer", "credential", "cookie", "session",
"access_token", "refresh_token", "id_token", "bot_token", "webhook_secret",
"x_api_key", "x_auth_token", "jwt", "oauth", "csrf", "otp", "signature",
}
// jwtTokenRe matches a compact JWT (header.payload.signature) -- the header's
// base64url always begins "eyJ" -- anywhere in a string. It is unanchored so
// a token embedded in prose is still caught, both in JSON string values and
// in free text.
var jwtTokenRe = regexp.MustCompile(`eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`)
// RedactPayload replaces values under sensitive keys, or with secret-shaped
// values, with a marker and returns the re-encoded JSON. Best-effort.
func RedactPayload(payload []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var value any
decoder := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(string(payload)))
decoder.UseNumber()
if err := decoder.Decode(&value); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("redact payload: decode: %w", err)
}
redacted := redactValue(value)
encoded, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("redact payload: encode: %w", err)
}
return encoded, nil
}
// RedactString replaces a free-text value that has an unambiguous secret's
// shape, for fields that carry prose rather than a JSON document. Key-based
// redaction does not apply: there is no key.
func RedactString(value string) string {
if sensitiveValueShape(value) {
return redactedValue
}
return value
}
// pemPrivateKeyRe matches a PEM private-key block, header to footer.
var pemPrivateKeyRe = regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----`)
// RedactText replaces each secret-shaped span inside free text, keeping the
// rest, for long text such as tool output where blanking the whole value would
// hide everything around the secret.
func RedactText(value string) string {
if len(value) < 20 {
return value
}
value = jwtTokenRe.ReplaceAllString(value, redactedValue)
return pemPrivateKeyRe.ReplaceAllString(value, redactedValue)
}
func redactValue(value any) any {
switch typed := value.(type) {
case map[string]any:
for key, child := range typed {
if sensitiveKey(key) && !tokenCount(key, child) {
typed[key] = redactedValue
continue
}
typed[key] = redactValue(child)
}
return typed
case []any:
for i, child := range typed {
typed[i] = redactValue(child)
}
return typed
case string:
if sensitiveValueShape(typed) {
return redactedValue
}
return typed
default:
return value
}
}
// sensitiveValueShape reports whether a string contains an unambiguous secret
// even under a non-sensitive key: a compact JWT anywhere in the string, or a
// PEM private-key block. These shapes are never a meaningful field-mapping
// value, so redacting them does not hurt the schema-by-example use case.
func sensitiveValueShape(s string) bool {
if len(s) < 20 {
return false
}
if jwtTokenRe.MatchString(s) {
return true
}
return strings.Contains(s, "-----BEGIN") && strings.Contains(s, "PRIVATE KEY-----")
}
// tokenCount reports a model usage count such as total_tokens: a number under
// a "tokens" key is a count, while a numeric value under other sensitive keys
// (an OTP, a PIN) is still a secret.
func tokenCount(key string, value any) bool {
_, number := value.(json.Number)
return number && strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(key), "tokens")
}
func sensitiveKey(key string) bool {
normalized := strings.NewReplacer("-", "_", " ", "_").Replace(strings.ToLower(key))
for _, marker := range SensitiveKeyMarkers {
if strings.Contains(normalized, marker) {
return true
}
}
return false
}