Files
archie/proto
sam 369ae695d4 feat(webui): verify a provider credential on a request path
The verifier was a library nothing called. A request now carries a credential or
is refused: webui.Server.Authenticate resolves a presented bearer token to the
identity that may act, and requireIdentity attaches it to the request context.
With a provider configured that check replaces the shared token, so every request
resolves to a named identity or is refused; with none, the shared-token gate stays
for a loopback instance.

Nothing about the caller is read from the request. The subject comes from the
credential the provider signed and the identity is the record that subject is bound
to, which is what makes attribution possible at all: a caller cannot assert who it
is, it can only present what the provider gave it. A test sends an
X-Archie-Identity header and an actor field in the body alongside a valid token and
asserts the resolved identity is still the credential's.

Refusals follow HTTP's own distinction: absent or unverifiable credentials are 401
and name the scheme, while a credential that verified for an identity that may not
act is 403. Each is covered, because a refusal path with no test is a path nobody
has watched refuse.

The two state-store RPCs the dashboard needs to resolve a subject exist:
ResolveIdentitySubject and BindIdentitySubject, with the client implementing
identity.SubjectBinding (a narrower contract than Repository, so the administrative
facade keeps its shape) and the server answering Unavailable rather than pretending
when a process has no binding store.

chat.proto carries the actor for the next step: actor_id, actor_kind and
principal_id on ApplyOperatorTaskActionRequest, regenerated here. The transport can
now carry an attribution and nothing fills it yet, which is why the dashboard still
records task_approved rather than a human attribution.

Not wired in production yet, and worth stating plainly: dep.Authenticate is a seam
nothing sets, because the dashboard is served only by the UI process and that
process is documented to take endpoint references only -- there is deliberately no
config.Config in it. OIDC settings must therefore arrive as flags there, which is an
existing design boundary I did not want to cross unilaterally. config.Oidc exists
so the daemon-side wiring has somewhere to read from.

Verified: task check exit 0 after this commit; focused webui run records the
resolution and all four refusals.
2026-09-22 14:43:20 +10:00
..

Service wire contracts

Each canonical service owns proto/<service>/v1/*.proto in this single Buf module. The service directory matches its registry, DNS and chart name. Breaking changes require a new v2, v3, etc. directory; retain published versions for existing consumers. Buf's FILE rules compare against local main. The first introduction skips that comparison only when main has no Buf config.

Run task proto:install once to install the pinned Buf and Go plugins, with $(go env GOPATH)/bin on PATH. Run task proto:generate after editing a schema. Managed mode sets Go package paths; do not set go_package in the source. Generated grpc-go and protobuf files belong in internal/contracts/<service>/v1/ and must be committed, including formatter output. This directory is generated in full; handwritten adapters belong outside it.

task proto:lint checks lint and compatibility; task proto:check regenerates and rejects differences or untracked generated files. Both run in task check and the deployment quality gate. Normal build and test commands use committed Go files and do not require Buf.

Compatibility smoke verification (2026-09-05): copied the gateway schema and gate script into a temporary Git repository, committed it on main, and ran the lint gate from a linked worktree. The unchanged schema passed. Deleting ChatService.Cancel then failed with Previously present RPC "Cancel" on service "ChatService" was deleted. This exercises the same Git-baseline comparison as the gate without modifying the working schema or real main.