Files
archie/internal/webhookguard/redact.go
T
sam 7c1d34ac85 feat(webhookguard): shared HMAC, rate-limit, and redaction mechanics
archie-core-7d5u.3 -- storage-agnostic building blocks for vetting inbound
webhook-shaped requests, extracted rather than duplicated:

- VerifyHMAC: behavior-preserving extraction of internal/channels/webhook's
  private validateHMAC. internal/channels/webhook now calls it instead of
  keeping its own copy; all 10 of that package's existing tests still pass
  unmodified, and the one now-redundant unit test was removed with a
  comment pointing to where its coverage relocated.
- RateLimiter: per-source token bucket. Source IDs come from a registered,
  operator-controlled set, not unbounded attacker input, so the bucket map
  is not itself bounded -- documented explicitly rather than left implicit.
- RedactPayload: key-name-based redaction, matching gateway/stream.go's
  sensitiveParameterKey marker list. Deliberately does NOT reuse that
  function's actual behavior: it replaces every string value regardless of
  key, correct for a bounded chat summary and wrong here -- a captured
  payload exists to be inspected for field mapping (t2db.3), so only values
  under a sensitive-looking key are touched.

Narrowed from 7d5u.3's original scope, which bundled capture storage and an
approval state machine into this package. Both moved to the beads that own
that state (t2db.1's capture store depends on 7d5u.2's still-open NATS
storage decision; t2db.4's binding is the only consumer of approval state
today) rather than building shared abstractions ahead of a second real
consumer.

Adversarially reviewed by a fresh subagent with zero surviving findings:
token-bucket math hand-traced on two scenarios and race-clean under -race,
the redaction/gateway-stream.go behavioral divergence verified by reading
both functions side by side, both the redaction and rate-limit guards
mutation-tested by disabling each and confirming the suite catches it.

task check exit 0, golangci-lint 0 issues, gofumpt clean.
2026-08-22 01:28:58 +10:00

80 lines
2.5 KiB
Go

package webhookguard
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// redactedValue replaces a value whose key looks sensitive.
const redactedValue = "[redacted]"
// sensitiveKeyMarkers is the key-name heuristic, matching
// internal/gateway/stream.go's sensitiveParameterKey exactly so the two
// redaction paths agree on what counts as sensitive.
var sensitiveKeyMarkers = []string{
"token", "secret", "password", "passwd", "api_key", "apikey",
"authorization", "credential", "cookie", "private_key",
}
// RedactPayload replaces values under sensitive-looking JSON keys with a
// redaction marker and returns the re-encoded payload, for capturing an
// inbound webhook body before persisting it.
//
// This intentionally does NOT reuse internal/gateway/stream.go's
// SummarizeToolParameters shape unchanged: that function replaces every
// string value regardless of key, which produces a bounded one-line summary
// for a chat transcript. A captured webhook payload exists to be inspected
// and mapped field-by-field (see docs/prds/event-sources-and-reactions.md
// and t2db.3's schema-by-example mapping) -- redacting every string would
// make that impossible. Only a value whose key matches the marker list is
// touched; everything else is returned exactly as decoded.
//
// A key match redacts its entire value, including a nested object or array
// -- "credentials": {"host": ..., "user": ...} is wholesale replaced, not
// recursed into, matching the intent of the key name.
func RedactPayload(payload []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var value any
decoder := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(string(payload)))
decoder.UseNumber()
if err := decoder.Decode(&value); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("redact payload: decode: %w", err)
}
redacted := redactValue(value)
encoded, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("redact payload: encode: %w", err)
}
return encoded, nil
}
func redactValue(value any) any {
m, ok := value.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
if arr, ok := value.([]any); ok {
for i, child := range arr {
arr[i] = redactValue(child)
}
}
return value
}
for key, child := range m {
if sensitiveKey(key) {
m[key] = redactedValue
continue
}
m[key] = redactValue(child)
}
return m
}
func sensitiveKey(key string) bool {
normalized := strings.NewReplacer("-", "_", " ", "_").Replace(strings.ToLower(key))
for _, marker := range sensitiveKeyMarkers {
if strings.Contains(normalized, marker) {
return true
}
}
return false
}