The three recovery tools now carry a required `confirm: true`, rejected before
the API is touched when absent. It is a deliberate-action signal, not a
security control -- an agent can pass it trivially, and the module header says
so. Its value is making the model state intent rather than reaching for a
mutation mid-sentence.
The module headers also record two things this work learned the hard way: the
API's three string/object shape traps (inputSchema and executeTool's input and
result are JSON strings, not objects), and the advisory status of the
annotations -- Chrome 152's getTools() reports only readOnlyHint and
untrustedContentHint and drops consequentialHint, and a page-invoked
executeTool gates nothing. Nothing here is enforced by the browser. The tools
run in the signed-in operator's session and cannot exceed that operator's
rights; that is the security model.