Files
archie/tools
sam 2f8076d7f8
Quality / check (push) Successful in 3m37s
deploy / gate (push) Successful in 4m45s
deploy / archied-image (push) Successful in 2m53s
deploy / agent-image (push) Successful in 10s
deploy / dist-zip (push) Skipped
fix(access): forbid clause scopes the canary grant against its developer role (#1727)
Service accounts created through the identities API are assigned the
developer role in the request's org, whose shipped policy permits read and
write across the org -- the permit alone did not scope the canary. Install a
matching org-canary-grant-forbid policy (access.CanaryGrantForbidPolicy) that
negates exactly the permit's surface for the canary identity; a forbid wins
within the level, so the role can no longer widen access. Engine tests pin
the surface with the principal carrying the developer role, and the
rehearsal now proves it live: the scoped token gets 403 on /api/access/policies
and 200 on /api/chat/update, and the full canary loop runs on it.

task check passes; task canary:rehearse green (REHEARSE_EXIT=0).
2026-11-02 06:23:38 +11:00
..