168 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
168 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
package webui
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/subtle"
|
|
"encoding/base64"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"path/filepath"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// tokenCookie carries the dashboard token once it has been exchanged from the
|
|
// URL, so the token is not left sitting in browser history or referrers.
|
|
const tokenCookie = "archie_ui"
|
|
|
|
// IsLoopback reports whether a listen address is reachable only from this
|
|
// machine.
|
|
//
|
|
// Loopback binds need no token. Archie's agent already runs shell, write and
|
|
// edit tools on the host, so anyone with local access has the capability
|
|
// regardless; a lock here would only obstruct the operator. What a token
|
|
// protects is *exposure* -- an instance reachable from a network -- so that is
|
|
// the only case where one is required.
|
|
func IsLoopback(listen string) bool {
|
|
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimSpace(listen))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
host = strings.TrimSpace(listen)
|
|
}
|
|
switch host {
|
|
case "", "localhost":
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
|
|
return ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DashboardURL renders a listen address as a URL a human can actually open.
|
|
//
|
|
// A wildcard bind ("0.0.0.0:8484", ":8484", "[::]:8484") is a valid thing to
|
|
// listen on but not a valid thing to visit, and printing it verbatim gives the
|
|
// operator a link that goes nowhere. The host is substituted for localhost,
|
|
// which is correct for the machine reading the log.
|
|
func DashboardURL(listen, token string) string {
|
|
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimSpace(listen))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
host, port = "", strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(listen), ":")
|
|
}
|
|
switch host {
|
|
case "", "0.0.0.0", "::", "[::]":
|
|
host = "localhost"
|
|
}
|
|
url := "http://" + net.JoinHostPort(host, port) + "/"
|
|
if token != "" {
|
|
url += "?t=" + token
|
|
}
|
|
return url
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoadOrCreateToken returns the dashboard token, generating and persisting one
|
|
// on first use. The token is created rather than configured so a non-loopback
|
|
// bind cannot be brought up unprotected by omission: there is no setup step to
|
|
// forget.
|
|
func LoadOrCreateToken(path string) (string, error) {
|
|
if b, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
|
|
if tok := strings.TrimSpace(string(b)); tok != "" {
|
|
return tok, nil
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("webui: read token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := make([]byte, 32)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("webui: generate token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
tok := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
|
|
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("webui: token dir: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tok+"\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("webui: write token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return tok, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// requireToken wraps h with token authentication. A zero token disables the
|
|
// check entirely, which is how loopback binds stay frictionless.
|
|
//
|
|
// The token may arrive as ?t=... once; it is then moved into a
|
|
// SameSite=Strict, HttpOnly cookie and the caller redirected to the clean URL.
|
|
// One click on the URL archied logs is the whole setup.
|
|
// The token is read per request rather than captured when the handler is
|
|
// built, so a Server whose Token is set after Handler() is still protected.
|
|
func (s *Server) requireToken(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if s.Token == "" {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if tok := r.URL.Query().Get("t"); tok != "" {
|
|
if !tokenEqual(tok, s.Token) {
|
|
http.Error(w, "unauthorised", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
|
|
Name: tokenCookie,
|
|
Value: tok,
|
|
Path: "/",
|
|
HttpOnly: true,
|
|
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
|
|
Secure: r.TLS != nil,
|
|
})
|
|
clean := *r.URL
|
|
q := clean.Query()
|
|
q.Del("t")
|
|
clean.RawQuery = q.Encode()
|
|
http.Redirect(w, r, sameOriginPath(clean.Path, clean.RawQuery), http.StatusSeeOther)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c, err := r.Cookie(tokenCookie); err == nil && tokenEqual(c.Value, s.Token) {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if hdr := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(hdr, "Bearer ") &&
|
|
tokenEqual(strings.TrimPrefix(hdr, "Bearer "), s.Token) {
|
|
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
|
|
http.Error(w, "unauthorised: open the dashboard URL archied logged at startup", http.StatusUnauthorized)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sameOriginPath rebuilds a redirect target from a request path and raw
|
|
// query, collapsing any leading "//" down to a single slash first.
|
|
//
|
|
// A path of "//evil.example/x" is a valid http.Redirect Location that
|
|
// browsers treat as protocol-relative, sending the client off-host. Since
|
|
// this path is echoed back from the incoming request URL, an attacker can
|
|
// choose it, so it must never reach http.Redirect verbatim.
|
|
func sameOriginPath(path, rawQuery string) string {
|
|
// URL.Path has already been decoded by net/http. Treat backslashes as
|
|
// separators before checking for a protocol-relative path, because browsers
|
|
// do the same when interpreting a redirect Location.
|
|
path = strings.ReplaceAll(path, "\\", "/")
|
|
for strings.HasPrefix(path, "//") {
|
|
path = path[1:]
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") {
|
|
path = "/" + path
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-encoding through URL.Path preserves decoded path characters such as
|
|
// '%', '?' and '#' as path data instead of reparsing them as URL syntax.
|
|
return (&url.URL{Path: path, RawQuery: rawQuery}).RequestURI()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func tokenEqual(got, want string) bool {
|
|
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(want)) == 1
|
|
}
|