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archie/docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md
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sam 0c8ba2a047 docs: delete ARCHITECTURE.md, move its normative content into docs/architecture
ARCHITECTURE.md duplicated the docs/architecture tree and had drifted badly
against it: "internal/ holds ~36" against 112 packages, two of the seven
binaries listed, a Forge table listing `RepliesAfter` (deleted from the tree),
and a stated invariant ("No daemon-internal cron") contradicted by the
scheduling engine that internal/app/archied/scheduling.go composes and
main.go starts.

It was also the sole home of three pieces of still-authoritative content, so
those move rather than disappear:

- plugin engine rule (strict), the memory engine family, and the
  internal/plugin/architecture_test.go enforcement note ->
  docs/architecture/plugins-and-extensions.md
- intake provenance: forge poll/webhook dedup through
  TaskEnvelope.IdempotencyKey, binding-stamped chat/playbook enqueue, and the
  single-identity webhook-intake rejection ->
  docs/architecture/messaging-and-work-intake.md

Live references are repointed from CLAUDE.md (AGENTS.md is a symlink to it),
docs/architecture, docs/guides, seven PRDs, and four .agents skills. The
heading "## Plugin engine rule (strict)" is preserved in its new home so the
existing #plugin-engine-rule-strict citations keep resolving. Generated docs
artifacts regenerated.
2026-09-22 23:49:53 +10:00

5.2 KiB

Webhook intake security -- decision

Status: Approved Date: 2026-08-22 Beads issue: archie-core-t2db.5, blocks archie-core-t2db.4

Why this is decided ahead of the code it constrains

archie-core-t2db (no-code playbooks) and archie-core-7d5u (typed event sources) both land a public intake surface whose eventual output is an agent with tool access and a repo. Neither capture (t2db.1) nor the intake family (7d5u.3) has shipped yet, so this decision exists to be a contract the two epics build against, not a retrofit once the surface exists. A webhook URL that can start an agent is remote code execution with extra steps if any of the five points below is missing on day one.

1. Per-source authentication

Reuse the per-route HMAC-SHA256 scheme already in internal/channels/webhook/webhook.go (validateHMAC), unchanged: a source registers with a shared secret; the signature is checked against the raw body. Do not invent a second scheme for intake.

Capture and triggering split at the signature, not at a separate flag. An event with a missing or invalid signature is still captured (visible in the inspector, marked unauthenticated) so an operator can diagnose a misconfigured sender -- but an unauthenticated event can never be matched against a binding. Authentication is what promotes an event from "something arrived" to "something that can run a workflow."

2. Human approval before a binding arms

A binding has three states: draft -> pending_approval -> armed. Only armed bindings are evaluated against incoming events. Creating or editing a binding's matcher, mapping, or target workflow always sets it to pending_approval, including edits to an already-armed binding -- an edit is not silently re-armed, or the approval gate is decorative. Approval requires an authenticated dashboard session; there is no unattended approval path.

Model: internal/channels/telegram's dangerous-command approval flow (dangerousAction / pendingApproval in dangerous.go / approval.go) is the existing precedent for "a human decision gates code from running" in this codebase -- follow its shape rather than designing a new approval primitive.

3. Rate and volume limits, per source

A token-bucket limiter keyed by source ID, not global -- one noisy or hostile sender must not exhaust another source's capture budget. Precedent for per-key volume capping: internal/pairing/store.go's MaxPendingPerPlatform.

On limit exceeded, the request is rejected (HTTP 429), not silently dropped. A silently dropped event is indistinguishable from a sender that never fired -- the same invisible-failure shape the update-verification work (archie-core-522) exists to prevent. The rejection itself is observable in the inspector as a distinct outcome from "not received."

4. Blast radius bounded by code, not by prompt wording

A playbook-triggered task runs through exactly the same enforcement as every other task: the [[repos.gate]] quality gate, diff_cap_lines, the sandboxed per-task container (internal/container), worktree isolation, and "the model never runs git." No new relaxation is introduced for playbook-triggered work, and none is needed -- the existing constraints are the control.

Mapped payload fields are treated as ordinary user-controlled text inside an agent prompt, exactly like an inbound chat message never as trusted instructions. "The agent should ignore instructions in the payload" is not a control and must not appear as one anywhere in this feature -- per the environmental-enforcement principle (docs/architecture/agent-system.md, "Existing invariants to preserve"), the boundary is the gate and the sandbox, not a sentence in the system prompt.

5. Retention and redaction of captured payloads

Retention: captured events (bound or not) are purged after 7 days, configurable per deployment. Unbound events exist to be mapped against; nothing justifies keeping them indefinitely once that window has passed, and an unbounded capture store is the same disk-exhaustion risk item 3 addresses at the request-rate level.

Redaction: before a captured payload is persisted, apply the same key-name heuristic internal/gateway/stream.go's sensitiveParameterKey already uses for tool-call parameters (matches token, secret, password, passwd, api_key, apikey, authorization, credential, cookie, private_key against normalized JSON keys) and replace matching values with the same [redacted] marker. This is best-effort, not a guarantee -- a sender that names a secret field something the heuristic misses will still have it captured. Document that limitation where captured payloads are displayed, rather than implying the redaction is complete.

Visibility: captured payloads, redacted or not, are visible only to an authenticated dashboard operator -- the same authorization boundary as every other webui surface, not a separate or lower bar.

What this does not decide

The intake family's registration interface (7d5u.3), the capture storage mechanism (7d5u.2, embedded NATS), and the binding data model's persistence and versioning (t2db.4) are separate decisions. This document constrains all three: whatever they build must satisfy points 1-5 above.