archie-core-t2db.5 -- decides the five non-negotiables its description named before capture (t2db.1) or the intake family (7d5u.3) exist to build against it: per-source HMAC auth reusing internal/channels/webhook's existing scheme, a draft/pending_approval/armed binding state machine modeled on telegram's dangerous-command approval flow, per-source rate limiting (precedent: pairing.MaxPendingPerPlatform) that rejects rather than silently drops, blast-radius bounding via the same gate/diff-cap/sandbox every task already gets rather than a new relaxation, and 7-day retention with best-effort redaction reusing gateway/stream.go's sensitiveParameterKey heuristic. The bead stays open: its code-level acceptance criteria constrain beads that haven't landed yet and cannot be satisfied by a document alone.
5.2 KiB
Webhook intake security -- decision
Status: Decided, not yet implemented
Date: 2026-08-22
Beads issue: archie-core-t2db.5, blocks archie-core-t2db.4
Why this is decided ahead of the code it constrains
archie-core-t2db (no-code playbooks) and archie-core-7d5u (typed event
sources) both land a public intake surface whose eventual output is an agent
with tool access and a repo. Neither capture (t2db.1) nor the intake family
(7d5u.3) has shipped yet, so this decision exists to be a contract the two
epics build against, not a retrofit once the surface exists. A webhook URL
that can start an agent is remote code execution with extra steps if any of
the five points below is missing on day one.
1. Per-source authentication
Reuse the per-route HMAC-SHA256 scheme already in
internal/channels/webhook/webhook.go (validateHMAC), unchanged: a source
registers with a shared secret; the signature is checked against the raw
body. Do not invent a second scheme for intake.
Capture and triggering split at the signature, not at a separate flag. An event with a missing or invalid signature is still captured (visible in the inspector, marked unauthenticated) so an operator can diagnose a misconfigured sender -- but an unauthenticated event can never be matched against a binding. Authentication is what promotes an event from "something arrived" to "something that can run a workflow."
2. Human approval before a binding arms
A binding has three states: draft -> pending_approval -> armed. Only
armed bindings are evaluated against incoming events. Creating or editing a
binding's matcher, mapping, or target workflow always sets it to
pending_approval, including edits to an already-armed binding -- an edit is
not silently re-armed, or the approval gate is decorative. Approval requires
an authenticated dashboard session; there is no unattended approval path.
Model: internal/channels/telegram's dangerous-command approval flow
(dangerousAction / pendingApproval in dangerous.go / approval.go) is
the existing precedent for "a human decision gates code from running" in this
codebase -- follow its shape rather than designing a new approval primitive.
3. Rate and volume limits, per source
A token-bucket limiter keyed by source ID, not global -- one noisy or hostile
sender must not exhaust another source's capture budget. Precedent for
per-key volume capping: internal/pairing/store.go's MaxPendingPerPlatform.
On limit exceeded, the request is rejected (HTTP 429), not silently dropped.
A silently dropped event is indistinguishable from a sender that never fired
-- the same invisible-failure shape the update-verification work
(archie-core-522) exists to prevent. The rejection itself is observable in
the inspector as a distinct outcome from "not received."
4. Blast radius bounded by code, not by prompt wording
A playbook-triggered task runs through exactly the same enforcement as every
other task: the [[repos.gate]] quality gate, diff_cap_lines, the
sandboxed per-task container (internal/container), worktree isolation, and
"the model never runs git." No new relaxation is introduced for
playbook-triggered work, and none is needed -- the existing constraints are
the control.
Mapped payload fields are treated as ordinary user-controlled text inside an
agent prompt, exactly like an inbound chat message today, never as trusted
instructions. "The agent should ignore instructions in the payload" is not a
control and must not appear as one anywhere in this feature -- per
ARCHITECTURE.md's environmental-enforcement-over-prompt-rules principle,
the boundary is the gate and the sandbox, not a sentence in the system
prompt.
5. Retention and redaction of captured payloads
Retention: captured events (bound or not) are purged after 7 days, configurable per deployment. Unbound events exist to be mapped against; nothing justifies keeping them indefinitely once that window has passed, and an unbounded capture store is the same disk-exhaustion risk item 3 addresses at the request-rate level.
Redaction: before a captured payload is persisted, apply the same
key-name heuristic internal/gateway/stream.go's sensitiveParameterKey
already uses for tool-call parameters (matches token, secret, password,
passwd, api_key, apikey, authorization, credential, cookie,
private_key against normalized JSON keys) and replace matching values with
the same [redacted] marker. This is best-effort, not a guarantee -- a
sender that names a secret field something the heuristic misses will still
have it captured. Document that limitation where captured payloads are
displayed, rather than implying the redaction is complete.
Visibility: captured payloads, redacted or not, are visible only to an authenticated dashboard operator -- the same authorization boundary as every other webui surface, not a separate or lower bar.
What this does not decide
The intake family's registration interface (7d5u.3), the capture storage
mechanism (7d5u.2, embedded NATS), and the binding data model's persistence
and versioning (t2db.4) are separate decisions. This document constrains
all three: whatever they build must satisfy points 1-5 above.