- ui-service-boundary.md: the /api/captures|/mappings|/bindings row is resolved by the cutover; archie-ui composes the store contracts and mounts the captureintake receiver. - event-capture-storage.md HTTP surface: the receiver mounts on the one process serving the dashboard; work intake stays with the daemon. - config.example.toml: [web].listen is the archie-ui process's bind address; [capture] is projected by archie-ui. - deployments: document running archie-ui alongside the other services and add its systemd unit; capabilities comments updated for the single-serving composition.
7.4 KiB
Event capture storage -- decision
Status: Implemented
Date: 2026-08-22
Beads issue: archie-core-t2db.1
webhook-intake-security.md decided points 1-5 (auth split, approval gate,
rate limits, blast radius, retention/redaction) and explicitly left the
storage mechanism open, forward-pointing at "7d5u.2, embedded NATS." That
pointer predates 7d5u.3's 2026-08-22 narrowing, which assigned capture
storage to this bead by name and told it to decide NATS-vs-SQLite itself
rather than inherit an answer. This document is that decision.
Decision: SQLite, not NATS JetStream
Captured events are stored in archied's existing SQLite database, in a new
captured_events table following the same shape as internal/store/events.go
(internal/store, *Store, SQL migrations inline in Go). No JetStream
stream is introduced for capture.
Why
NATS availability does not make capture a broker concern. NATS is now
unconditional for autonomous workflow handoff, including embedded mode, but
capture is also used by deployments with no repository workflow configured.
SQLite is already guaranteed present because it backs daemon state, and keeps
capture inspection independent of broker retention and consumer lifecycle.
The original version of this decision cited optional NATS as an additional
reason; that premise was superseded by archie-core-q15y, while the storage
fit and independence arguments remain.
Capture's access pattern doesn't need what JetStream is for. JetStream
earns its complexity for reaction delivery (7d5u.2) because multiple
independent consumers need fan-out, at-least-once redelivery, and Ack/Nak
semantics -- exactly the trap CLAUDE.md documents about WorkQueuePolicy
and overlapping consumers. Capture has exactly one writer (the HTTP handler)
and one reader (a human via the dashboard inspector, t2db.2). There is no
competing-consumer problem to solve and no redelivery semantics to get right,
so JetStream's core value proposition doesn't apply here. A bounded SQL
table is a better fit on the merits, not merely as a fallback.
Reusing 7d5u.2's stream, once it exists, would still be wrong. That
stream is provisioned for fan-out reaction delivery with its own retention
policy decision. Capture's retention need -- age- and count-bounded, prune
on write, no replay -- is a different shape. Building a second stream just
for capture, gated on an unrelated bead landing first, would trade a small
amount of duplication now for a hard dependency on 7d5u.2's timeline that
this bead's own acceptance criteria say not to accrue by accident.
This does not foreclose NATS later. If cross-daemon capture sharing or durable replay becomes a real requirement, that is a new decision made against a real need, not now against a speculative one.
Storage shape
captured_events table (internal/store/captures.go, mirrors
internal/store/events.go's pattern):
| column | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INTEGER | primary key, autoincrement |
| received_at | TEXT | RFC3339Nano |
| source | TEXT | opaque path segment chosen by the sender's operator |
| remote_addr | TEXT | RemoteAddr at capture time |
| content_type | TEXT | Content-Type header |
| headers | TEXT | JSON, redacted |
| body | TEXT | JSON, redacted (webhookguard.RedactPayload) |
| authenticated | INTEGER | 0/1; always 0 until a source registers a secret (future: t2db.4) |
Indexed on (source, id) for per-source listing and pruning, and id alone
for the global cap.
Disk-bound mechanics
Three independent bounds, composed, per webhook-intake-security.md point 5
and this bead's own "capture cannot exhaust disk" criterion:
- Per-request size cap. The HTTP handler reads the body through
http.MaxBytesReader(256 KiB default, configurable). A single oversized POST is rejected (413) before redaction or storage sees it. - Per-remote-address rate limit.
webhookguard.RateLimiter, keyed by the request's remote address, applied before the body is even read. Not keyed by thesourcepath segment:RateLimiter's own doc comment states its bucket map assumes a bounded, operator-registered key space, never evicted.sourceis exactly the opposite here -- an unregistered, attacker-chosen URL segment, since capturing senders with no registration yet is this endpoint's entire purpose. Keying on it would let one sender bypass the limit by rotating the segment every request (a fresh key always starts with a full burst) and grow the bucket map without bound. Remote address is the bounded identity actually available pre-auth. Over-budget requests get 429, observable per point 3 of the security decision. - Retention prune-on-write. Every insert prunes, in the same
transaction: rows older than
retention_days(default 7, per the security decision) OR beyondmax_eventstotal rows (default 5000, this bead's own addition -- age alone doesn't bound disk under a sustained flood inside the retention window; a count cap does). No background sweep goroutine; the daemon doesn't need one for this.
Together these give a deterministic worst-case: max_events * max_body_bytes
regardless of sender behaviour, independent of whether the age-based or
count-based bound is what actually fires first.
HTTP surface
Mounted on the existing internal/webui dashboard server
(Server.Handler's top mux), not a new listener. POST /webhooks/capture/{source} bypasses requireToken the same way /healthz
already does -- capture must accept unauthenticated senders by design (that
is the entire point: you cannot HMAC-verify a source you haven't configured
a secret for yet). Reachability is therefore whatever already exposes the
dashboard in a given deployment; no new port/host config surface is added,
and no new claim about public reachability is made beyond what already
exists for the dashboard.
Amended 2026-09-10 by the UI cutover (archie-core-8cda.5.4): the one
process serving the dashboard is now the standalone archie-ui service, so
the receiver mounts there, composed from the UI process's own State Store
client. The binding-dispatch loop that turns captures into tasks stays in
the daemon, consuming the same store, so the HTTP front door moved without
moving work intake.
GET listing/inspection endpoints (t2db.2) stay behind requireToken like
every other /api/* route -- captured payloads are visible only to an
authenticated operator, per the security decision's point 5 visibility rule.
Config
New [capture] section in config.example.toml / internal/config:
[capture]
retention_days = 7
max_events = 5000
max_body_bytes = 262144
rate_per_second = 1.0
rate_burst = 5
All fields have defaults; an empty [capture] section (or its absence) is
valid and produces the defaults above -- capture is on by default, since an
unbound POST being captured rather than rejected is this bead's acceptance
criterion, not an opt-in.
What this does not decide
Binding a captured event to a workflow, the draft/pending_approval/armed
state machine, and per-source HMAC secret registration are t2db.3/t2db.4.
The dashboard inspector UI is t2db.2. This bead ships capture and storage
only.