WIRE, not delete: docs/architecture/configuration.md's behavioural-literals
inventory lists the "Memory safety scanner -- compiled prompt-injection and
sensitive-data patterns with fixed warn/block consequences" as current
behaviour, and internal/memory.Manager.HandleToolCall already refuses a write
whose content scans as ThreatBlock. The consumer existed; the producer never
called SetScanner, so Manager.ScanContent short-circuited to ThreatNone and
the gate was a permanent no-op.
setupMemory now installs memory.DefaultScanner. Consequences stay at the
documented defaults -- scanReject is false, so a prompt-injection match is
downgraded to a warn and logged rather than refusing the operator's write.
Red-then-green: TestSetupMemoryInstallsAThreatScanner asserts the composed
manager actually scans, not that a field was assigned; it failed with
"ScanContent = ThreatNone for a prompt-injection payload" before the change.
Mutation-verified by removing only the SetScanner call (API intact) and
watching the same assertion fail.