Files
archie/internal/webui/api_tasks.go
T
sam 72fcab3a13 feat(taskactions): one approval path answers the review gate from every surface
Decision 1 of docs/prds/pr-review-operator-response.md: the dashboard's
POST /api/tasks/{id}/action is the authoritative surface, chat's /approve
is a shortcut that posts every offered finding, and both reach the same
Service.Apply so one operator intent cannot be recorded as two decisions.

The action body now carries instructions (required by rereview) and the
finding keys an approve posts. taskactions.Service answers an offer
through the guarded RespondReviewGate write: approve records the
selection on the offer, rereview records the instructions, increments the
round and clears the offer, and a rereview with no instructions, with no
offer, or at the cap is refused as a conflict with nothing written. Chat
reaches the same service: chatTaskControllerAdapter.ApproveChatTask
delegates to b.taskActions() instead of its own requeue, which is what
removed the handler's hardcoded implement handoff -- feasibility's deliver
stage now names implement on the task before it waits, the invariant the
handler needs.

The payload crosses every hop it must: the NATS action request, the
gateway.v1 gRPC contract (regenerated), the LocalChatAdapter, and the
webui handler, which answers 400 for a rereview without instructions and
409 for the cap. A rereview event kind names its actor the way the
approval and rejection trios do.

taskactions.Task gains review_gate and rereview_rounds, and the two
surfaces' tests assert they agree.
2026-10-02 02:27:59 +10:00

404 lines
14 KiB
Go

package webui
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/storecontract"
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/taskactions"
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/domain/workflow/task"
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/events"
"github.com/samcharles93/archie-core/internal/taskstate"
)
func (s *Server) handleSummary(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
statuses, err := s.Store.StatusCounts(ctx)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
workflows, err := s.Store.WorkflowStats(ctx)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
stages, err := s.Store.StageStats(ctx)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
days, err := s.Store.TokensByDay(ctx, 14)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"statuses": statuses, "workflows": workflows,
"stages": stages, "tokens_by_day": days,
})
}
func (s *Server) handleTasks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
tasks, err := s.Store.Tasks(r.Context(), 100)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
forge := s.resolveForge(r.Context())
views := make([]taskView, len(tasks))
for i := range tasks {
repoURL, issueURL, prURL := taskURLs(tasks[i], forge(tasks[i]))
views[i] = taskView{Task: tasks[i], Actions: taskstate.Actions(tasks[i].Status), RepoURL: repoURL, IssueURL: issueURL, PRURL: prURL}
}
writeJSON(w, views)
}
type taskView struct {
task.Task
Actions []taskstate.Action `json:"actions"`
RepoURL string `json:"repo_url,omitempty"`
IssueURL string `json:"issue_url,omitempty"`
PRURL string `json:"pr_url,omitempty"`
}
// forgeCoordinates locate a repository on its forge: the base URL, and the
// forge type that decides the pull-request path segment.
type forgeCoordinates struct {
host string
forgeType string
}
// resolveForge reads the forge layout once for a request and returns each
// task's coordinates from it.
//
// The projection publishes per-identity forges (ConfigView.Identities), so a
// multi-identity deployment links each task to the forge that owns it. The
// matching rules are the ones recovered from the pre-cutover resolver
// (forgeConfigForTask, 57d9be5): an exact identity name first, then repository
// ownership, and an ambiguous repository -- two identities claiming the same
// owner/name -- falling back to the default forge rather than pointing at
// either. Without this, every row in such a deployment renders unlinked.
func (s *Server) resolveForge(ctx context.Context) func(task.Task) forgeCoordinates {
unlinked := func(task.Task) forgeCoordinates { return forgeCoordinates{} }
view, ok, err := s.configSource()(ctx)
if err != nil || !ok {
return unlinked
}
if len(view.Identities) == 0 {
// Nothing per-identity was published. A single-identity deployment's
// one forge is the whole answer. A document that reports identities
// but carries none is one an older daemon published, and there is
// nothing to attribute a task to -- so the links are withheld rather
// than pointed at the wrong forge.
if view.MultiIdentity {
return unlinked
}
published := forgeCoordinates{host: view.Identity.ForgeHost, forgeType: view.Identity.ForgeType}
return func(task.Task) forgeCoordinates { return published }
}
return forgeLocator(view)
}
// ownedRepo identifies a repository within an identity's repo list.
type ownedRepo struct{ owner, name string }
// forgeLocator indexes a published projection's per-identity forges once per
// request and resolves each task against them: exact identity name, then repo
// ownership, with an ambiguous repo falling back to the default forge.
func forgeLocator(view ConfigView) func(task.Task) forgeCoordinates {
fallback := forgeCoordinates{host: view.Identity.ForgeHost, forgeType: view.Identity.ForgeType}
byName := make(map[string]forgeCoordinates, len(view.Identities))
byRepo := make(map[ownedRepo]forgeCoordinates)
// ambiguous records a repo two identities both claim, which ownership
// cannot decide -- it is answered by the default forge instead.
ambiguous := make(map[ownedRepo]bool)
for _, identity := range view.Identities {
coords := forgeCoordinates{host: identity.ForgeHost, forgeType: identity.ForgeType}
// First definition of a name wins, as the recovered resolver's
// forward scan did (and as daemon.identityFor still does), so the two
// agree even if a config ever names one identity twice.
if _, seen := byName[identity.Name]; !seen {
byName[identity.Name] = coords
}
for _, repo := range identity.Repos {
key := ownedRepo{owner: repo.Owner, name: repo.Name}
if _, seen := byRepo[key]; seen {
ambiguous[key] = true
continue
}
byRepo[key] = coords
}
}
return func(t task.Task) forgeCoordinates {
if t.Identity != "" {
if coords, ok := byName[t.Identity]; ok {
return coords
}
}
key := ownedRepo{owner: t.Owner, name: t.Repo}
if ambiguous[key] {
return fallback
}
if coords, ok := byRepo[key]; ok {
return coords
}
return fallback
}
}
func taskURLs(task task.Task, forge forgeCoordinates) (repoURL, issueURL, prURL string) {
if forge.host == "" || task.Owner == "" || task.Repo == "" {
return "", "", ""
}
repoURL = strings.TrimRight(forge.host, "/") + "/" + url.PathEscape(task.Owner) + "/" + url.PathEscape(task.Repo)
if task.IsForgeBacked() && task.IssueNumber > 0 {
issueURL = repoURL + "/issues/" + strconv.Itoa(task.IssueNumber)
}
if task.PRNumber > 0 {
segment := "pull"
if forge.forgeType == "gitea" {
segment = "pulls"
}
prURL = repoURL + "/" + segment + "/" + strconv.Itoa(task.PRNumber)
}
return repoURL, issueURL, prURL
}
func (s *Server) handleTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "bad id", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
evs, err := s.Store.TaskEvents(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
writeJSON(w, evs)
}
type taskActionRequest struct {
Action string `json:"action"`
// Instructions is the re-review's focus, required by the rereview action
// and ignored by every other one (docs/prds/pr-review-operator-
// response.md, Decision 1). The dashboard is the authoritative surface
// that carries operators' instructions; chat is a shortcut with no
// instruction syntax.
Instructions string `json:"instructions"`
// Findings are the keys of the offered findings an approve posts; an
// absent selection means all of them. It is ignored by every other
// action.
Findings []string `json:"findings"`
}
func (s *Server) handleTaskAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.authorizeTaskMutation(w, r) {
return
}
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.PathValue("id"), 10, 64)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "bad id", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
action, res, ok := decodeTaskAction(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if err := s.applyOperatorTaskAction(r.Context(), id, action, res); err != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, taskactions.ErrNotFound):
http.Error(w, "task not found", http.StatusNotFound)
case errors.Is(err, taskactions.ErrConflict), errors.Is(err, storecontract.ErrStaleTransition),
errors.Is(err, storecontract.ErrRereviewCapReached):
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusConflict)
case errors.Is(err, taskactions.ErrUnavailable):
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
default:
s.logf("task action failed", "task", id, "err", err)
http.Error(w, "task action failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"ok": true, "action": action, "task_id": id})
}
func decodeTaskAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (taskstate.Action, taskactions.ReviewResponse, bool) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)
var req taskActionRequest
decoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)
decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := decoder.Decode(&req); err != nil {
if _, ok := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); ok {
http.Error(w, "action body too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return "", taskactions.ReviewResponse{}, false
}
http.Error(w, "invalid action", http.StatusBadRequest)
return "", taskactions.ReviewResponse{}, false
}
if err := decoder.Decode(&struct{}{}); !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
http.Error(w, "invalid action", http.StatusBadRequest)
return "", taskactions.ReviewResponse{}, false
}
action := taskstate.Action(req.Action)
if !taskMutation(action) {
http.Error(w, "unknown action", http.StatusBadRequest)
return "", taskactions.ReviewResponse{}, false
}
// A re-review without instructions is not a request the gate can honour,
// and refusing it here keeps the refusal the operator's to read rather
// than a round trip's conflict. The service re-checks it for the surfaces
// that do not pass through this handler.
if action == taskstate.ActionRereview && strings.TrimSpace(req.Instructions) == "" {
http.Error(w, "a re-review needs instructions", http.StatusBadRequest)
return "", taskactions.ReviewResponse{}, false
}
return action, taskactions.ReviewResponse{Instructions: req.Instructions, Findings: req.Findings}, true
}
func taskMutation(action taskstate.Action) bool {
switch action {
case taskstate.ActionCancel, taskstate.ActionStop, taskstate.ActionApprove,
taskstate.ActionReject, taskstate.ActionRereview, taskstate.ActionRetry,
taskstate.ActionAbandon, taskstate.ActionArchive:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// authorizeTaskMutation applies the browser mutation contract at the handler
// boundary: JSON only, a non-simple custom header, and a matching Origin when
// the browser supplies one. The custom header forces cross-origin callers
// through a CORS preflight, which this server never permits.
//
// Origin comparison previously validated against the daemon's own direct network
// connection (r.TLS). It now validates against the effective external scheme
// and host, deriving them from X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host only when
// explicit proxy header trust is enabled (Web.TrustForwardedHeaders). When trust
// is disabled (the default), forwarded headers are ignored to prevent untrusted
// clients from forging Origin scheme checks on exposed daemons.
func (s *Server) authorizeTaskMutation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
if r.Header.Get("X-Archie-CSRF") != "1" {
http.Error(w, "missing CSRF header", http.StatusForbidden)
return false
}
mediaType, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
if err != nil || mediaType != "application/json" {
http.Error(w, "Content-Type must be application/json", http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
return false
}
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
if origin == "" {
return true
}
u, err := url.Parse(origin)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "cross-origin mutation refused", http.StatusForbidden)
return false
}
wantScheme, wantHost := s.expectedOrigin(r)
if !validOrigin(u, wantScheme, wantHost) {
http.Error(w, "cross-origin mutation refused", http.StatusForbidden)
return false
}
return true
}
func (s *Server) expectedOrigin(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {
scheme = "http"
if r.TLS != nil {
scheme = "https"
}
host = r.Host
if s == nil || !s.trustForwardedHeaders() {
return scheme, host
}
if proto := firstForwardedValue(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")); proto != "" {
scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
}
if fHost := firstForwardedValue(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host")); fHost != "" {
host = fHost
}
return scheme, host
}
func firstForwardedValue(raw string) string {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return ""
}
if first, _, ok := strings.Cut(raw, ","); ok {
raw = first
}
return strings.TrimSpace(raw)
}
func validOrigin(u *url.URL, wantScheme, wantHost string) bool {
if u == nil || u.User != nil || u.Path != "" || u.RawQuery != "" || u.Fragment != "" {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, wantScheme) && strings.EqualFold(u.Host, wantHost)
}
// applyOperatorTaskAction sends the action to whoever owns task execution.
// The dashboard operator is authenticated and acts across identities, which
// the Gateway contract carries as its own method (archie-core-8cda.5.4).
//
// The UI process cannot run this itself: retry limits come from the daemon's
// configuration, closing the forge issue needs its forge client, the
// timeline needs its event bus, and stopping running work needs the
// goroutine or container that is executing it. Composing a local service
// over the task store alone would silently drop all four.
func (s *Server) applyOperatorTaskAction(ctx context.Context, id int64, action taskstate.Action, res taskactions.ReviewResponse) error {
if s.Chat == nil || s.Chat.Contract == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: no gateway contract is wired", taskactions.ErrUnavailable)
}
// The actor comes from the credential the middleware resolved and never from
// the request, so a caller cannot claim to be someone it did not authenticate
// as. An unauthenticated request (the shared-token gate) carries no identity,
// and the action is then recorded unattributed rather than as a human's.
actor := taskactions.Actor{}
if value, ok := ActingIdentity(ctx); ok {
actor = taskactions.ActorFor(value)
}
_, err := s.Chat.Contract.ApplyOperatorTaskAction(ctx, actor, id, action, res)
return err
}
// emit publishes an operator action so it reaches the task timeline and the
// live activity stream. A nil publisher is not an error: the action is still
// recorded in the store.
func (s *Server) emit(ctx context.Context, e events.Event) {
if e.Kind == "" {
return
}
if e.ID == 0 {
id, err := s.Store.InsertEvent(ctx, e)
if err != nil {
s.logf("operator activity persistence failed", "kind", e.Kind, "task", e.TaskID, "err", err)
} else {
e.ID = id
}
}
if s.Events != nil {
s.Events.Publish(e)
}
}
func (s *Server) logf(msg string, args ...any) {
if s.Log == nil {
return
}
s.Log.Warn(msg, args...)
}