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User authorization boundaries

Archie separates authentication (which person or service is calling) from permission to act on a resource. This inventory follows the OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet and Authorization Cheat Sheet, including its guidance on attributes and relationships. It describes concrete enforcement points and their regression tests; it is not a compliance certification.

Transport and authority

The browser uses HTTP/JSON and SSE to the UI service. The UI service calls State Store, Gateway, Messaging and the daemon through their gRPC contracts. Only the State Store opens the task/control-plane/account database; Gateway owns conversation storage. Browser HTTP handlers never open either database.

Instance service credentials are administrative authority. They are not user sessions and must never reach a browser, model, or agent container. A service forwarding a principal preserves attribution and tenant scope; forwarding alone does not mean every internal RPC evaluates Cedar. Most internal RPCs trust the authenticated service and enforce their own resource scope. The public HTTP boundary evaluates Cedar before invoking them. Task credentials have a separate, explicit RPC allowlist and cannot call account or identity administration.

Local service listeners are trusted process boundaries. Loopback is not a substitute for authentication on a remotely reachable listener. OIDC credentials, local browser sessions, personal API tokens, service credentials, and task grants must remain distinct.

Policy and relationship model

internal/domain/access defines actions, resources, principals and memberships. internal/infrastructure/access assembles Cedar entities and evaluates the instance → organization → workspace → object chain. A forbid wins; each applicable level must permit the operation. Missing or invalid policy chains fail closed.

The default policies grant actions through scoped roles. Policies can also restrict a named identity, workspace environment, owner, state, source address, signature, run or step. HTTP task decisions now include the stored initiating identity and task state; binding decisions include the stored binding state. The HTTP source address is the actual connection peer, not an unverified forwarded header. Membership and resource attributes must come from stored records or authenticated context, never a request's assertion about itself.

Cedar permission is not ownership of another person's private data. Conversation history, passkeys, recovery codes and personal tokens are bound to the person. An organization or instance admin role does not override those relationships. Account creation uses manage_members policy rather than a hard-coded admin role. Authenticating through OIDC does not automatically grant membership, link accounts by unverified email, or create an administrator.

Enforcement inventory

Location Enforcement Regression evidence
Browser credential gate: webui/auth.go, accounts.go Account session or verified provider identity; shared dashboard token is not a person when accounts are enabled. No API data before authentication. TestAccountBoundary, TestAccountSessionFailureIsClosed
Browser policy gate: webui/authorize.go Resolve principal from stored identity; evaluate action against stored org/workspace and resource kind before handler. Missing chain refuses. TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed, TestAuthorizeRefusesWithoutAChain, TestAuthorizeRecord, TestTaskAuthorizationUsesStoredAttributes, TestAuthorizeCreateIn
Instance-only HTTP surfaces: webui/instance_only.go, server route registration Hide instance-owned configuration and diagnostics from another org; policy still applies first. TestInstanceOnlyHidesTheInstanceFromOtherOrgs, TestInstanceAdminOrgs
First setup: webui/accounts.go, postgres/accounts.go Initial organization, workspace, instance URL, admin identity and password commit together. Transaction lock closes bootstrap after first account; later requests require manage_members. Disposable PostgreSQL smoke verification for bootstrap race and rollback; account policy tests below
Account creation: webui/accounts.go, staterpc/accounts.go, postgres/accounts.go Cedar manage_members at HTTP and RPC; target org is authenticated context. New local accounts cannot request owner role. TestAccountManagementUsesPolicy, TestAccountBoundary
Local passwords and sessions: identity/password.go, postgres/accounts.go Argon2id, independent salts, length/common-password checks, generic login refusal, account throttling, session hashes and expiry, revocation on logout/password change/suspension. TestPasswordVerification, TestAccountBoundary; disposable PostgreSQL session verification
Transport and CSRF: webui/accounts.go, api_tasks.go Password/account mutations require HTTPS or localhost development, JSON, custom CSRF header and same-origin requests. Forwarded headers require explicit trusted-proxy configuration. TestAuthenticationTransport, existing mutation security tests
Personal account routes: webui/accounts.go Active signed-in person; principal supplied by server. Password change verifies current password. Sensitive authenticator changes require recent sign-in. No caller-supplied target identity. TestAccountBoundary
Recovery: postgres/account_security.go, webui/accounts.go Fresh authenticated owner generates a hashed, one-use recovery secret. Redemption replaces password and revokes all sessions atomically. No email-existence disclosure. Disposable PostgreSQL recovery verification
Passkeys: postgres/passkeys.go, webui/passkeys.go Configured RP origin, browser-bound one-use expiring challenge, verified credential signature and user verification. Enrollment/management belong to caller. Credential counters persist under a row lock. Disposable browser virtual-authenticator verification; task-grant denial tests
OIDC: infrastructure/oidc, archieui/account_oidc.go, webui/auth.go Discovery and signed ID token with issuer/client audience/expiry, PKCE, state and nonce. Verified subject resolves to active identity. Browser-local session cannot outlive provider token, and provider credential remains checked. TestBrowserFlowVerifiesIDToken, TestProviderOutageIsUnavailableThenRecovers, subject-claim tests; no external provider acceptance implied
OIDC settings: webui/accounts.go, postgres/authentication.go Instance ownership plus policy; recent sign-in for changes. Public URL cannot change while enrolled passkeys would be orphaned. TestAccountBoundary, TestAuthenticationSettingsRejectUntrustedOrigins
Org membership/workspaces/agent assignment: webui/api_orgs.go, staterpc/orgs.go, postgres/orgs.go Own org or instance-owner relationship, allowed role vocabulary, membership escalation/last-owner guards, tenant-scoped SQL. TestOrgRPCsActInTheCallersOrg, TestSetMembershipRefusesUnknownRole, org HTTP tests
Personal API tokens: webui/api_personal_tokens.go, staterpc/personal_tokens.go, postgres/personal_tokens.go Token owner comes from principal; store only token hash; revoke only caller's binding. TestPersonalTokensWithoutPerson, TestPersonalTokenOwner
gRPC caller attribution: rpcidentity/identity.go Authenticated service may forward a principal; State Store resolves memberships/org itself. Task grant metadata is stripped. TestCallerAttribution
Agent/task gRPC: staterpc/task_grants.go Durable task-scoped grant, explicit allowed RPC and target task, no definition-pin replacement, no account RPCs. TestTaskCredentialsCannotManageAccounts, TestTaskCredentialCannotReplaceItsPin, TestRecordUsageAuthority, TestWorkerPresenceAuthority
Chat HTTP: webui/api_chat.go Server stamps sender and person thread; lists/read/turns/cancel/persona verify session ownership. Browser cannot submit another sender identity. TestWebChatOwnership, TestWebChatSenderCannotBeSuppliedByBrowser; HTTP deny matrix
Chat history, slash commands and model session tools: gateway/session_store_postgres.go Store filters Get, List, GetByChannel; shared read/write guards check person ownership as well as org. A saved session cannot change its conversation source to claim another person's history. Service curation runs without a person principal. TestSessionVisibility; PostgreSQL smoke for history isolation
Chat questions/approvals: webui/api_chat_ask.go Waiting question is bound to the initiating person, in addition to its unguessable ID. TestChatQuestionBelongsToInitiatingPerson
Chat downloads: webui/api_chat_files.go Offered file token expires and is bound to the initiating person; requests cannot supply a filesystem path. TestChatFileDownload
Per-person memory: archiegateway/chat_identity.go, gateway memory tools, sessioncurator Verified web sender identity scopes reads/writes. Curator refuses unidentified or mixed participants instead of guessing a person. Gateway memory and session-curator tests
Workflow/task actions: webui/api_tasks.go, domain/taskactions, staterpc Policy and stored workspace before action; domain transition, authority and durable dispatch guards remain in force. HTTP deny matrix, task action/domain tests, task grant tests
Incoming webhooks: captureintake, access delivery engine Verify HMAC before parsing; derive source/org from stored source; evaluate source delivery policies and egress rules. No browser-user credential is inferred. Capture tests, TestAuthorizeDelivery
Control-plane configuration, secrets and extensions Browser policy and instance-only restrictions where registered; service contracts carry principal/org; task grants cannot invoke administrative RPCs. HTTP deny matrix, TestAdministrationRoutes, TestChannelReloadRoute
Audit feed: webui/api_audit.go, domain/audit read_audit on the audit resource; org scope and the instance-wide exception come from the authenticated principal, never the query string. Export carries the same grant, needs an explicit range of at most a year, and is rate-limited per identity, one at a time. Redaction runs in the State Store adapter before an entry crosses gRPC. TestReadAuditRoleBoundary, TestAuditRoutesFollowTheReadAuditRole, TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed, TestAuditErrorMapping, TestAuditCSVCellNeutralisesFormulas
Live HTTP/SSE and diagnostics Authenticated policy gate applies before stream creation; org-scoped event reads; instance logs require administrative visibility. HTTP deny matrix, instance-only tests, TestServiceLogsRequireInstanceCredential
Background schedules, dispatch, curation Service/agent authority, not an implicit browser user. Task-scoped grants and org scopes remain distinct from initiating operator attribution. Existing dispatch, grant, memory and org-scope tests

The policy HTTP matrix enumerates each registered protected route. It checks both anonymous refusal and refusal by an explicit Cedar forbid, using the real handler stack. Separate tests exercise allowed requests and personal ownership; a denied-request matrix alone is not proof that a workflow works end to end.

Public and personal routes

Public protocol entry points are GET /api/auth/status, POST /api/auth/setup, POST /api/auth/login, POST /api/auth/logout, POST /api/auth/recover, POST /api/auth/passkey/begin, POST /api/auth/passkey/finish, GET /oauth2/login, GET /oauth2/callback, health probes and signed webhook intake. Each has its own protocol checks. Static embedded app assets are public; they do not contain user data. /health/detailed remains protected.

Personal routes under /api/account/ require an active signed-in person and server-derived ownership: password change, recovery-secret generation, passkey begin/finish/list/delete. They do not require an organization administrator role. POST /api/accounts and /api/authentication are administrative policy routes.

HTTP route inventory

The following routes are covered by TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed in internal/webui/authorization_surfaces_test.go. authorize.go maps each to its action/resource; the handler may impose a stricter record or instance boundary.

Method Route example
DELETE /api/access/policies
DELETE /api/bindings/7
DELETE /api/event-types/7
DELETE /api/extensions/sample
DELETE /api/mappings/7
DELETE /api/orgs/7/members/sample
DELETE /api/sources/sample
DELETE /api/tokens/7
GET /api/access/policies
GET /api/alerts
GET /api/audit
GET /api/audit/export
GET /api/authentication
GET /api/bindings
GET /api/bindings/7
GET /api/bindings/7/dispatches
GET /api/capabilities
GET /api/captures
GET /api/captures/7/dispatches
GET /api/channels
GET /api/chat/file/sample
GET /api/chat/sessions
GET /api/chat/sessions/7/messages
GET /api/chat/sessions/7/turns
GET /api/chat/update
GET /api/config
GET /api/control-plane/apply-status
GET /api/control-plane/catalog
GET /api/control-plane/resources/sample
GET /api/control-plane/resources/sample/history
GET /api/curators
GET /api/event-types
GET /api/extensions
GET /api/extensions/catalogue
GET /api/identities
GET /api/logs
GET /api/mappings
GET /api/mappings/7
GET /api/orgs
GET /api/orgs/7
GET /api/orgs/7/members
GET /api/orgs/7/workspaces
GET /api/secret-engines
GET /api/services
GET /api/setup
GET /api/skills
GET /api/sources
GET /api/stream
GET /api/summary
GET /api/task-meta
GET /api/tasks
GET /api/tasks/7
GET /api/tasks/7/attempts
GET /api/tasks/7/changes
GET /api/tasks/7/debug
GET /api/tasks/7/dispatches
GET /api/tasks/7/logs
GET /api/tasks/7/logs/download
GET /api/tasks/7/sandbox
GET /api/tokens
GET /api/version
GET /api/workflows
PATCH /api/bindings/7
PATCH /api/mappings/7
POST /api/accounts
POST /api/alerts/7/dismiss
POST /api/bindings
POST /api/bindings/7/approve
POST /api/bindings/7/pause
POST /api/bindings/7/resume
POST /api/channels/7/reload
POST /api/chat/answer
POST /api/chat/cancel
POST /api/chat/message
POST /api/chat/persona
POST /api/chat/stream
POST /api/chat/update/defer
POST /api/chat/update/install
POST /api/control-plane/resources/sample/commands/sample
POST /api/event-types
POST /api/extensions
POST /api/extensions/catalogue/sample/install
POST /api/extensions/sample/accept
POST /api/extensions/sample/approve-update
POST /api/extensions/sample/rollback
POST /api/extensions/sample/update
POST /api/identities
POST /api/identities/7/sample
POST /api/mappings
POST /api/mappings/preview
POST /api/orgs
POST /api/orgs/7/members
POST /api/orgs/7/workspaces
POST /api/secret-references/check
POST /api/sources
POST /api/sources/sample/approve-unsigned
POST /api/sources/sample/secret
POST /api/sources/sample/signing
POST /api/tasks/7/action
POST /api/tokens
POST /api/work-requests
PUT /api/access/policies
PUT /api/authentication
PUT /api/event-types/7
PUT /api/extensions/sample/enabled
PUT /api/extensions/sample/update-policy
PUT /api/orgs/7/agents/sample
PUT /api/orgs/7/members/sample
PUT /api/sources/sample/delivery-header
PUT /api/sources/sample/name
PUT /api/workflows/7/enabled

Verification limits

A synthetic browser authenticator verifies protocol behavior, not a physical security key or every operating system. An OIDC unit test is not acceptance against a deployed provider. Disposable PostgreSQL smoke checks verify real SQL without putting database-dependent tests in the fast unit suite.

Existing anonymous conversations are retained but are not silently assigned to a new person. Existing service credentials remain privileged; this inventory does not claim that all internal gRPC methods have independent Cedar gates.

When changing a user-facing operation, update its inventory entry and its allow/deny behavior cases. Include another user in the same organization, a caller in another organization, a missing principal, unavailable policy storage, and the applicable owner/workspace/instance restrictions.

Bootstrap is unauthenticated until the first administrator is created. Complete setup before exposing a new installation to untrusted users. Last-active-owner protection for identity suspension/retirement is tracked separately as archie-core-d7avc; membership-policy guards are not that lifecycle guard.