# archie-core Architecture **archied** is a resident daemon that polls its configured forges — GitHub and Gitea — for issues assigned to its bot user, carrying its label, or either (`dispatch` mode, per identity), works each one in an isolated worktree through a routed workflow, and opens pull requests for human review. A single daemon can serve several identities across several forges, each with its own `bot_user`, label, and repository set. ## Package Map This lists the load-bearing packages, not all of them — `internal/` holds ~36. The domain migration is in progress (`internal/domain/`, `internal/infrastructure/`), so **the tree is authoritative over this table**. See `docs/architecture/organisation.md` for the target structure and `docs/architecture/migration-decisions.md` for the current position. | Package | Role | | ---------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `cmd/archied/` | Binary entry: config→forge→store→runtime→workflows→daemon | | `cmd/archie-agent/` | Binary entry: flags, environment, signals, and agentworker invocation | | `internal/app/agentworker/` | Agent worker composition, lifecycle, routing, and workflow execution | | `internal/infrastructure/agentboot/` | Worker boot-brief filesystem decoding | | `internal/infrastructure/agentgit/` | Worker git safe-directory setup | | `internal/infrastructure/agenttransport/nats/` | Worker core-NATS full-task handoff and RPC client construction | | `internal/config/` | Config types only — loading lives in `infrastructure/configuration` | | `internal/daemon/` | Resident loop: poll, enqueue, claim, route, process, reconcile | | `internal/domain/workflow/` | Engine: stage lists, routing, shared steps, workflow definitions | | `internal/domain/workintake/`| `TaskEnvelope`, routing `Kind`, label vocabulary, task subjects | | `internal/agentexec/` | Worker-local stage protocol and ai-sdk loop runner | | `internal/forge/` | Forge interface: GitHub and Gitea implementations | | `internal/worktree/` | Git operations: clone, branch, commit, push, diff, cleanup | | `internal/store/` | Task store interface and SQLite implementation; RPC clients proxy it | | `internal/events/` | In-process event bus: publish/subscribe for observability | | `internal/infrastructure/` | Config loading, eventbus transport, model catalog | | `internal/webui/` | SSE dashboard: live event stream, task status | | `internal/gateway/` (18.7k LOC) | Persistent-connection layer between archie and its users (Telegram, web UI, etc.); shared CommandRouter for dispatch | | `internal/tools/` (20.9k LOC) | Central tool subsystem: built-in tool implementations, approval, execution contract | | `internal/memory/` (7k LOC) | Pluggable memory provider architecture | | `internal/secret/` | Secret reference resolution across named engines (env, vault, etc.) | | `internal/plugin/` | Core plugin interface: Yaegi-interpreted `.go` plugins loaded from `~/.config/archie/plugins/` and registered with the daemon's extension registry | | `internal/skill/` | Parses and discovers agentskills.io `SKILL.md` files | | `ai-sdk/runtime` | External: provider-agnostic LLM runtime | | `ai-sdk/agentloop` | External: gated agent loop with budgets and tool jails | | `ai-sdk/core` | External: tool definitions, generate options | ## Task Lifecycle ``` queued → running(workflow:stage) → pr_open → merged | rejected ↓ waiting_human → (human approves) → queued(implement) ↓ parked ``` **Crash recovery:** tasks left in `running` are re-queued on startup. Parks are never silent, but they no longer comment on the forge issue: the reason is recorded on the task as `park_reason` (cleared on requeue) and surfaced by the dashboard and `/api/tasks`. Retries are an explicit operator action capped by `max_retries`, not a label a human removes. **PR reconciliation:** the daemon polls open PRs, checks GitHub state (`merged`/`closed`), transitions the task, and cleans up worktrees. ## Workflow Engine ### Core types (`workflow.go`) - `Workflow` = named list of `Stage`s - `Stage` = `Name` + `Run(ctx, *TaskContext) error` - `TaskContext` = mutable bag: Task, Repo, Config, Forge, Store, Agent runner, worktree dir/branch, scratch fields - `Outcome` = terminal decision (status + detail) -- ends the workflow immediately - `Registry` = `map[string]Workflow` ### Routing (`Route`) Label-driven, no LLM involved. Pre-assigned workflow wins; then labels decide: - `bug` → `tdd` - `feature` → `feasibility` - `bootstrap` → `bootstrap` (diagnostics, no LLM spend) - Default → `implement` ### Execution (`Run`) Stages execute sequentially. After each stage: - Task is persisted to SQLite - Error → park the task (comment on issue, keep worktree) - Outcome set → finish (transition task, update labels) - Neither → continue to next stage A workflow that ends without an outcome parks -- definition bugs must not vanish silently. ## Workflows ### Bootstrap (diagnostics, no LLM) ``` prepare → apply(marker file) → commit-push → diff-cap → open-pr ``` Proves the plumbing: clone, push, PR. Label any test issue `bootstrap` to verify end-to-end. ### Implement (default) ``` prepare → baseline-gate → plan(planner, read-only) → build(builder, gated) → commit-push → diff-cap → open-pr ``` - **baseline-gate:** runs the repo's gate at the base commit before anything is touched - **plan:** read-only agent explores codebase, produces implementation plan, posts it as a comment - **build:** full toolset agent implements against the plan behind the repo's quality gate - **diff-cap:** parks oversized changes (>400 lines default) - **open-pr:** builder's summary becomes the PR body ### TDD (bug label) ``` prepare → baseline-gate → analyse(planner) → repro-tests(builder, inverted gate) → capture-proof → commit-repro → fix(builder, normal gate, test files protected) → commit-push → diff-cap → open-pr + repro-evidence ``` - **repro-tests:** the quality gate is **inverted** -- the test command must FAIL. Proven failure is required. - **capture-proof:** runs the test command deterministically, captures the failing output - **commit-repro:** commits the failing tests as the first commit - **fix:** test files are **environmentally write-protected** (not prompt-ruled). The agent fixes code, not tests. - **open-pr + evidence:** posts both the PR and the captured failure proof ### Feasibility (feature label) ``` prepare → assess(planner, with decide tool) → [close_if_bad_fit | prd(planner)] → deliver → waiting_human ``` - **assess:** reads AGENT.md, ROADMAP.md, README. Calls a `decide` tool (structured output, not parsed prose). Bad fit → close with reasons. - **prd:** read-only agent writes a PRD: problem, solution, files affected, acceptance criteria, non-goals, diff estimate - **deliver:** posts PRD as issue comment + webhook notification (n8n → email). Sets state to `waiting_human`. - The daemon watches for human replies, judges them with a triage LLM (APPROVE/REJECT/UNCLEAR), requeues or closes. ## Forge Interface A thin abstraction over the forge. GitHub (`github.go`) and Gitea (`gitea.go`) both implement it, plus a no-op (`noop.go`) used when no credential resolves — see the degradation rule in `docs/architecture/configuration.md`. A multi-forge deployment is configured per identity; see `deployments/multi-forge-github-gitea.toml`. | Method | Purpose | | ------------------- | --------------------------------------- | | `AcceptInvitations` | Auto-accept repo invites | | `AssignedIssues` | Poll assigned issues (excluding PRs) | | `IssuesWithLabel` | Poll labelled issues | | `Comment` | Post issue/PR comment, return ID | | `RepliesAfter` | Find human replies after a comment ID | | `CreatePR` | Open pull request | | `PRState` | Check merged/open/closed | | `CloseIssue` | Close with final comment | | `React` | Emoji reaction (pickup acknowledgement) | | `SetStateLabel` | Replace old state label with new one | | `VerifyPush` | Confirm push permission at startup | State labels (`archie:queued`, `archie:working`, etc.) are created on demand, removed when transitioning. They report state; they do not drive it. Removing a label no longer retries a parked task -- retries are an explicit operator action from the dashboard or chat, capped by `max_retries`. ## Worktree Manager Every task gets a fresh clone -- no persistent state between runs. The model never runs git. ``` ~/.local/share/archie/work/-/issue-/ ``` Token auth via a generated `GIT_ASKPASS` helper script -- the token never appears in `.git/config` or process argv. ## Config Daemon-level TOML (`~/.config/archie/config.toml`): - `[forge]` -- type (github), host, token secret reference - `[dispatch]` -- trigger (assignee/label/either), labels, ack reaction - `[[repos]]` -- owner, name, base branch, gate commands, protected paths, ecosystem - `[models]` -- planner, builder, triage (provider/model refs) - `[providers]` -- LLM provider configs - `[nats]` -- embedded or external broker deployment - `[containers]` -- managed `archie-agent` image, limits, storage, and network - `[budgets]` -- max steps, max tokens, wall clock, gate max failures - `[web]` -- dashboard listen address - `[notify]` -- webhook URL for notifications Secrets (forge token, provider API keys, channel tokens) are not embedded in config files. `internal/secret` defines a pluggable `Engine` interface (`Name`, `Version`, `Resolve(key) (string, error)`) resolved through a `Registry`; the built-in `env` engine reads an environment variable by name and the built-in `bws` engine caches the accessible Bitwarden project at startup. Custom engines (sops, Vault/OpenBao) are Yaegi-interpreted `.go` plugins loaded from a directory, following the same convention as `internal/plugin`'s daemon plugins. Config fields reference a secret as `{engine, key}` (`secret.SecretRef`), e.g. `token = { engine = "env", key = "ARCHIE_GITHUB_TOKEN" }`. As of this writing `Forge.Token` and `Provider.APIKey` use `SecretRef`; resolved provider values are exported under private, identity-scoped environment names because the SDK and container boundary consume credential names rather than plaintext wire fields. The older `Provider.APIKeyEnv`, `NATSConfig.TokenEnv`, and `TelegramConfig.TokenEnv` field names remain supported. Per-repo gates are command lists: `[[repos.gate]] = ["go", "vet", "./..."]`. The last command is the test runner (by convention -- TDD inverts it). ## Observability Every lifecycle event flows through an internal event bus: - SQLite event log (every event stamped with a row ID) - Live dashboard via SSE (server-sent events) - Bounded subscriber buffers -- slow consumers drop events, never block the daemon ## Plugin engine rule (strict) “Engine” is reserved for a typed, lifecycle-managed capability family. It is not a synonym for a generic plugin hook. Every new plugin engine must satisfy all of these invariants: 1. **Typed domain contract.** The engine interface exposes real capability-specific operations in addition to identity metadata. Examples are resolving a secret, delivering a message, or running an agent. A plugin that only exposes `Name` and `Version` is metadata, not an engine. 2. **Owning family manager.** The capability package owns a `Registry` or `Manager` that controls provider registration and discovery, initialization, or access. Providers do not register arbitrary callbacks directly on the daemon. 3. **Lifecycle and health.** When an implementation owns resources or background work, its typed family contract must expose start, health, and stop semantics. The owning manager invokes them and defines failure isolation and shutdown ordering. Stateless providers may make these operations explicit no-ops. 4. **Narrow host access.** Plugins receive the typed family registrar and only the host services their declared capability requires. They never receive `*daemon.Daemon`, a service locator, or an untyped hook map. 5. **Metadata-only generic plugin contract.** `plugin.Plugin` remains limited to `Name()` and `Version()`. Domain hooks belong on typed engine interfaces; adding capability methods to the generic interface is forbidden. 6. **Trust boundary stays explicit.** Explicitly trusted, operator-installed plugins—including third-party secret-engine plugins the operator chooses to trust—may run in-process and have daemon privileges. Repository-supplied code runs in the task container. Integrations that are not trusted as daemon code run out of process through MCP or a versioned protocol and, when a confidentiality or integrity boundary is required, inside a real container sandbox. A subprocess boundary alone is not a security sandbox, and calling Yaegi-loaded code a plugin does not isolate it. `internal/plugin/architecture_test.go` enforces the mechanically testable parts of this rule: the generic plugin method set, the shared agent-instruction source, and the requirement that engine interfaces have domain behavior plus an owning registry or manager. ### Memory engine family The current memory implementation is an engine family, not a collection of independent memory tools. `internal/memory.MemoryProvider` is the typed contract for built-in and external providers. It requires a provider name and availability check, session initialization, and tool-schema export. Optional capability contracts add system-prompt contributions, prefetch, conversation-turn sync, tool-call handling, and shutdown. Lifecycle hooks in `internal/memory/lifecycle.go` cover turn start, session end and switching, pre-compression, memory writes, and delegation. `internal/memory.Manager` is the owning family manager and the only entry point that agent lifecycle code should use. It owns the built-in provider and, in the current implementation, permits at most one external provider. It merges schemas from available providers, indexes tool ownership, routes calls, validates provider configuration through provider-owned schemas, and serializes background write synchronization. Providers do not register callbacks or tools directly on the daemon. The manager defines the lifecycle and failure-isolation contract: - construction starts the bounded background synchronization worker; - initialization attempts every active provider and returns the first error only after all providers have been attempted; - lifecycle hooks are dispatched asynchronously, with provider errors and panics recovered so a failing hook cannot interrupt the agent loop; - shutdown stops accepting new synchronization work, drains until the caller's context deadline, records abandoned work after a timeout, and shuts providers down in reverse registration order while still attempting every provider; - provider availability is checked before schemas and tool ownership are exposed, so an unavailable provider is isolated from normal dispatch rather than taking down the family. A memory backend is not trusted merely because it implements `MemoryProvider`. The built-in file-backed provider runs in the daemon's trusted process. A third-party backend may run in-process only when the operator has explicitly trusted it with daemon privileges. An untrusted or out-of-process backend must cross a versioned, scoped protocol owned by the memory manager; if confidentiality or integrity depends on process isolation, it must run in a real container sandbox. A subprocess boundary alone is not a security boundary, and the backend must never receive `*daemon.Daemon`, a service locator, unrestricted host files, or credentials by virtue of being a memory provider. These are the current `internal/memory` contracts and wiring. They do not close the OPEN placement, authoritative-record, retrieval, access-enforcement, or provenance decisions listed in [`docs/architecture/migration-decisions.md`](docs/architecture/migration-decisions.md#5-memory-placement-and-storage), nor do they change the four required scopes documented in [`docs/architecture/agent-system.md`](docs/architecture/agent-system.md#memory-scopes). ## Key Design Decisions 1. **Environmental constraints over prompt rules.** The gate, test-file protection, and diff cap are code enforcement -- not "please don't do that" in the system prompt. 2. **The model never runs git.** Worktree operations are deterministic steps, not agent tools. 3. **Tokens as cost, not features.** Token usage is tracked per task and emitted in observability events but never budgeted beyond the agent loop's own limits. 4. **Label-driven routing.** Workflow selection is a switch statement, not an LLM call. A triage LLM is used only for the human reply judgment in waiting_human. 5. **Shared code.** `ai-sdk/agentloop` and `ai-sdk/toolkit` provide the common agent loop and tool set. 6. **No daemon-internal cron.** Polling is a ticker loop, not cron. The feasibility PRD notification uses an external webhook (n8n). 7. **Fresh worktree per task.** No persistent state between runs. Crash recovery just re-queues. 8. **Agent execution is a data boundary.** Autonomous stages receive a versioned request and return a fenced result; SQLite, forge operations, git, workflow sequencing, and outcome handling stay daemon-owned. ## What's Implemented vs Planned **Implemented:** - Daemon poll loop, enqueue, claim, process - Bootstrap, implement, TDD, feasibility workflows - GitHub forge (issues, PRs, labels, comments, reactions) - Worktree isolation (clone, branch, commit, push, diff, cleanup) - SQLite store with transition audit - Config with ecosystem support (go, python, node, rust) - Agent stages with gates, budgets, preflight, protected paths - Observability (event bus, SQLite log, SSE dashboard) - Crash recovery (re-queue stale running tasks) - Human reply judgment (triage LLM for waiting_human) **Planned:** - Gitea forge implementation - More ecosystems - Notification integrations beyond n8n webhook - Skills (SKILL.md support -- see `.archie/skills/`)