# External agent harnesses **Status:** Approved **Authority:** `docs/architecture/agent-system.md` (agent execution as a data boundary); settles the harness non-goal deferred by `docs/prds/service-decomposition.md`. **Compounds with:** `docs/prds/execution-tree-state-machine.md` (a harness run is one `agent` StepExecution), `docs/prds/binding-secret-encryption.md` (the at-rest envelope reused for harness credentials). ## Decision A workflow stage can run on an external coding-agent CLI instead of the built-in agent loop: Claude Code, Codex, Pi, OMP, GitHub Copilot CLI, or any other CLI packaged as a Docker Sandbox Kit v3. Each authenticates with an API key or the operator's subscription login, and can carry the operator's own skills, plugins, subagents and instructions. Two boundaries hold regardless of what the harness does: - **The real credential never enters the container.** The container sees sentinel values; archie's egress proxy substitutes the real credential on outbound requests and performs OAuth refresh on the host. - **Archie's workflow guarantees are enforced outside the harness.** Git, protected paths, read-only stages, gates and budgets are checked by archie around the process and against the worktree afterwards. ## Kits A harness is packaged as a Kit v3 image: an OCI image whose `vnd.docker.sandbox.kit.descriptor` manifest annotation declares what the harness needs. Archie reads descriptors with the published `github.com/docker/sandbox-kit-spec/v3/spec` package and does not maintain its own descriptor format. Published Kits run unmodified. Archie is a partial Kit runtime. It implements these capability types: | Type | Archie behaviour | | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `credential@1` | Proxy-managed only, described below. | | `network-policy@1` | Enforced by the egress proxy. | | `volume@1` | A Docker volume keyed by WorkflowExecution, deleted with it. | | `lifecycle@1` | Install and startup hooks run on container create. | | `agent-sessions@1` | The headless `prompt` and `resume` invocations for the stage. | | `agent-skills@1` | The operator's skills store (`skills_dir`), mounted read-only whatever the Kit asks. | | `agent-context@1` | The workload's profile file beside the workspace, indexing each Kit's guidance. | | `resources@1` | Container CPU and memory limits. | Every other type fails closed: a required entry refuses the launch, an optional one is skipped and recorded on the step. `credential@1` with `passthrough: true` and any credential for a forge service are refused. The operator's own setup (plugins, subagents, instructions, settings) is a mixin Kit, published with the harness Kit as a Kit set: the set merges their layers into one image. It is versioned image content, rewritten on every create, never state a run can modify. ## Contract A harness run is a second implementation of `agentexec.Runner`. It takes the same `Request` and returns the same `Result`, so workflows, the daemon and the State Store do not know which runner ran a stage. `agent-sessions@1` supplies the invocation. Archie supplies, per CLI, an output adapter that translates the CLI's JSON output stream into `ToolCallReporter` calls, `Usage` and a session ID. A CLI with no adapter can run stages with no capture tools, reporting no usage; its token budget falls back to wall clock. Workflow definition validation rejects, at load time, a stage whose needs the selected harness cannot meet: capture tools without an adapter, or a gate retry without a `resume` verb. ## Selection A harness is an agent profile. `docs/prds/event-automation.md` defines a profile as the execution environment a workflow selects; a harness profile names one Kit pinned by digest, a workload Kit or a published Kit set, in place of a container image. Archie runs that Kit's image and composes no Kits itself; a bare mixin is refused. Everything else about profiles holds: a workflow names its profile, a stage may name a different one, and a profile holds no secrets. `archie-agent` builds the stage's runner from the stage's profile: the ai-sdk agent loop for an image profile, the harness runner for a Kit profile. Image profiles, and every workflow already written against them, are unchanged. A Kit profile named by no workflow is a validation error. A stage naming a different profile than its workflow's is a separate run, not a mid-container runner switch: a Kit task runs in one container provisioned for one profile (Container layout), so a stage that needs a different one is its own callee, started the way `workflow.call` already starts one (`docs/prds/event-automation.md` "Workflows call workflows"), with its own agent profile resolved off its own task row. This needs no mechanism beyond `workflow.call` plus per-task profile resolution (`daemon.pinTaskProfile`), both of which already treat every task's profile independently of any caller's -- see `TestWorkflowCallerConformance` (staterpc) for the callee's independent `Workflow` field and `TestWorkflowCallGivesACalleeItsOwnProfile` (daemon) for the Kit-vs-image runner selection that independence produces. Profiles are org resources in the State Store, so a Kit profile belongs to one org, is granted to its workspaces like any profile, and applies without a restart. ## Organisations `docs/prds/orgs-and-access.md` is the boundary; a harness adds nothing that crosses it. - A Kit profile, its credential bindings and its OAuth tokens belong to one org. No record is shared between orgs. - A harness run is a run like any other: it acts as the workflow's identity, under the run credential issued at dispatch. - The egress proxy injects a credential only when the run credential carries the secret the binding names. A Kit that declares a service the identity is not granted gets no credential: a required one refuses the launch, an optional one is skipped. - A Kit's network policy is what the Kit asks for; the identity's network grants are what the org allows. The proxy enforces the intersection. - Concurrency slots are counted per binding within its org. ## Credentials A credential binding maps a Kit's `credential@1` `service` name to an org secret, which the org grants to identities like any secret. The secret holds one of: - **API key:** a value in the org's secret store. - **OAuth:** tokens captured by the setup terminal, stored in the State Store under the at-rest envelope of `binding-secret-encryption.md` with its own domain separator. The egress proxy resolves the binding for each request against the run credential. The container gets the Kit's sentinel in the named variable or credential file. OAuth refresh happens at the proxy, which intercepts the Kit's `tokenEndpoint`, so a refreshed token is written to the State Store and never returned to the container. Runs sharing an OAuth binding share its subscription's rate limit. `max_concurrent` on the binding (default 1) caps its simultaneous runs. A stage waiting for a slot is `pending`, not `running`. ## Setup terminal The dashboard opens a terminal (xterm.js over a WebSocket to a PTY) into an ephemeral container built from a Kit profile, on the same egress path. The member runs the CLI's own login. The proxy captures the tokens at the token endpoint into the org secret the binding names. The container is removed when the terminal closes. No worktree is mounted into it. Opening the terminal is the `update` action on the secret, decided by the Authorizer like any other; the shipped roles give it to org owners and admins. It is the only interactive path into a harness container. ## Egress Only Kit profiles run on the egress path. An image profile keeps the network access its identity is granted, because workflows such as a network investigator need raw DNS, ICMP and arbitrary TCP that no HTTP proxy carries. - **Sandbox network.** Each Kit run gets its own internal Docker bridge on which the host holds no address. Host services, including those listening on every interface, are unreachable from it by any address. - **Relay.** One relay container, `archie-agent relay`, sits on the sandbox networks under a fixed alias and on the host-reachable network. It forwards three fixed ports, to the proxy, NATS and the State Store, and can reach nothing else. It holds no secrets. - **Proxy.** The proxy runs inside `archied`, listening on the host gateway of the host-reachable network. It terminates TLS with a per-daemon CA installed into the container at create, identifies the container by a per-run proxy token, and applies that run's network policy and credential inject rules. Upstream dials refuse loopback, and refuse internal addresses unless the policy names the exact IP, so an allowed name cannot resolve back into the host. ## Container layout A Kit task runs in one container, from the Kit composition's image, on the task's sandbox network. The worker and every harness invocation share it; they are separated by user, not by container, so a run's cost scales with the run and not with how many agents it fans out to. - **Worker.** Archie mounts its own `archie-agent` binary read-only and runs it as the container's entrypoint, as root. It holds the task's NATS and State Store credentials in its own environment and in root-only files, runs the workflow, and serves `archie-agent mcp`. The Kit image's entrypoint is not PID 1. - **Harness.** Every invocation runs as the Kit's user (the image's `User`, default uid 1000) with an explicit environment: the Kit's variables, the proxy environment and the credential sentinels, and nothing inherited from the worker. That user cannot read the worker's environment or files, or trace it. Sibling invocations in one run share the user and the worktree. - **Hooks.** `lifecycle@1` install and startup hooks run as the user each declares, before the worker accepts work. - **Mounts.** The task worktree at the Kit's workspace directory, owned by the Kit's user, and the read-only skills store. Nothing else from the host. - **Network.** The relay forwards three fixed ports on the sandbox network: the egress proxy, NATS and the State Store. The worker reaches NATS and the State Store with its credentials; a harness can open those ports but holds no credential either accepts. - **Volumes.** `volume@1` paths persist for the life of the WorkflowExecution, which covers session resume across gate iterations and retries. They are not shared between executions. ## Archie tools inside the harness Capture tools, which are how a stage returns structured results, are served by `archie-agent mcp`, a stdio MCP server registered through the Kit's MCP configuration or the adapter's flags. It serves the stage's `CaptureTools` and the central tools the agent profile's `AllowTools` permits, never the `workspace` toolset. The runner's `ToolLimits` bound its results; the harness's own built-in tools are outside archie's limits. ## Enforcement around the harness | Property | Enforcement | | -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Model never runs git | No forge credential can be bound. Archie records `HEAD` and every ref before the run; any change fails the step (`failed`, policy class). The workflow commits the stage's changes. | | Protected paths | A diff touching a `Protection` path fails the step. | | Read-only stage | Any worktree diff fails the step. | | Gate | Archie runs the stage's gate after the harness exits. On failure it resumes the session with the gate output, up to the stage's iteration budget. | | Budget | Archie kills the process on wall-clock timeout, or when streamed usage passes the token budget. | | Cancellation | Cancelling the step kills the process group, then the container. | | Egress | Only the proxy is reachable; the Kit's network policy decides the rest. | Harness settings that deny git or protected paths are added where the CLI supports them, to save wasted turns. They are never the enforcement. ## Execution tree A harness run is one `agent` StepExecution. Subagents the harness spawns internally are not recorded as children. Their usage is included in the step's `tokens_used` when the adapter reports it. ## Agents never hold a harness An Agent reaches a harness only by invoking a Workflow whose stage names it. No Agent tool, chat tool or capability exposes a harness, its setup terminal or its credential. The stage boundary is what carries the container, the git and path checks, the gate and the budget; a harness outside a stage has none of them. ## Out of scope - Chat through a harness. The gateway chat loop stays on the built-in runtime. - `network-policy@2` HTTP method and path rules; a Kit requiring it is refused. - Recording the harness's internal subagents as StepExecutions. - Cost in currency. - Choosing a harness automatically per task. ## Plan 1. Descriptor resolution with the Kit spec package; capability support table and fail-closed refusal. 2. Egress proxy: internal network, per-daemon CA, per-container token, `network-policy@1`. 3. `credential@1`: API-key bindings, sentinel rendering, inject rules. 4. Harness `Runner`: container create with worktree, volumes, lifecycle hooks and the mounted `archie-agent`; `agent-sessions@1` invocation; worktree checks for git, protected paths and read-only; budget and cancellation. 5. Claude Code output adapter; `archie-agent mcp`; gate-and-resume loop. 6. Kit profiles, runner selection from the stage's profile, and definition validation. 7. OAuth bindings as org secrets: token-endpoint interception, encrypted storage, per-binding concurrency; dashboard setup terminal. 8. Output adapters for Codex, Pi, OMP and GitHub Copilot CLI. ## Verification - The same workflow definition completes on `builtin` and on the Claude Code Kit with the same `Result` shape and captures. - After `/login` in the setup terminal, the container's credential file holds only sentinels, the State Store holds the encrypted token, and a task run authenticates. - A real API key or OAuth token never appears in the container environment, filesystem, worktree, task log or event stream. - A request to a host outside the Kit's runtime allow list fails, including a direct connection that bypasses the proxy settings. - A harness instructed to `git commit` fails its step, and the task branch is unchanged. - A harness edit to a protected test file fails the step in a TDD fix stage. - A read-only feasibility stage that writes a file fails. - A file a run writes into a Kit-managed path such as the CLI's settings file is gone on the next execution. - A Kit requiring an unsupported capability is refused at launch with the capability named. - A stage with a failing gate resumes the same session with the gate output, then succeeds or exhausts its iterations. - Two tasks sharing an OAuth binding with `max_concurrent = 1` run one at a time; the second waits as `pending`. - Stopping a run kills the harness process and removes the container. - A harness invocation cannot read the worker's NATS or State Store credential from its environment, its files or `/proc`. - A run fanning out to many agent invocations uses one container. - A Kit profile in org A cannot be selected, and its binding cannot be resolved, by a workflow in org B. - A harness run whose identity is not granted a Kit's required credential is refused at launch; the proxy never injects a secret outside the run credential. - The firewall investigation example runs unchanged on an image profile with direct network access.