# Playbook bindings: model and threat model **Status:** Approved foundation (documents shipped code: `archie-core-t2db.1` through `.5`, `.7`, `.9`-`.15`) **Date:** 2026-09-03 This document covers the binding model and the intake threat model portion of `archie-core-t2db.6`. It does not cover the `ARCHITECTURE.md` task-lifecycle addendum or the operator walkthrough -- those remain separate, open pieces of the same ticket. ## What a binding is A `binding` (`internal/domain/binding.Binding`) ties four things together: a **matcher** (which captured events it applies to), a **mapping** (`internal/domain/mapping.Mapping`, how fields are pulled out of a payload), a **workflow** (which registered workflow runs on a match), and a **state machine** governing whether it is live. ```go type Binding struct { ID, Name // identity Matcher // { Source string } -- the webhook path segment, e.g. "sentry" MappingID // which Mapping resolves payload fields Workflow // registered workflow name to dispatch to Version // bumped on every edit Status // draft | pending_approval | armed Secret // HMAC-SHA256 shared secret, encrypted at rest, never returned by GET } ``` Bindings live in the store (SQLite), not `config.toml` -- operators author them from the dashboard while the daemon runs, without a restart. ### Matching `Matcher.Source` is the only predicate today: the path segment a sender POSTs to (e.g. a webhook hitting `.../sentry` matches bindings with `Matcher.Source == "sentry"`). The storage column is plain `TEXT`, so adding predicates later is non-breaking -- extend `Matcher`, don't invent a second matcher shape. ### Mapping `mapping.Resolve(fields, payload)` walks a captured JSON payload against a list of typed `Field`s (name, JSON path, expected type), returning resolved values plus a `[]Failure` for anything that didn't parse or type-match. This is schema-by-example in practice: a mapping is authored by pointing at a real captured payload in the dashboard, not by guessing a schema in advance. ### Versioning `Version` increments on every `UpdateBinding` call. This exists so an editor's later change can never silently rewrite the historical provenance of a task that already fired -- a dispatched task's binding reference is pinned to the version that was armed when it fired, not "whatever the binding currently says." ### State machine ``` draft ---> pending_approval ---> armed ^ ^ | | | | +--------------+-----------------+ (any edit to an armed binding drops it back to pending_approval) ``` Modeled directly on Telegram's existing `dangerousAction`/`pendingApproval` flow (`internal/channels/telegram/dangerous.go`, `approval.go`) -- not a new approval mechanism invented for this feature. **Only `armed` evaluates against incoming events** (`binding.Matches`, `internal/domain/binding/ binding.go`); `draft` and `pending_approval` bindings are inert. An edit to an already-armed binding cannot bypass approval by silent mutation -- it drops back to `pending_approval` and requires an explicit `Approve` call to re-arm. ## The threat model This is a public, unauthenticated-by-default intake surface whose output is an agent with a repo, a worktree, and tool access. The design brief (`archie-core-t2db.5`, `docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md`) named five non-negotiables; each is verified below against the actual shipped code, not the design intent. ### 1. Per-source authentication Reuses `internal/channels/webhook`'s existing HMAC-SHA256 scheme -- capture accepts unsigned events (visible in the dashboard, marked unauthenticated), but **only authenticated events can ever match a binding**. `binding.Matches`' doc comment states this plainly: "an unauthenticated event can never trigger a binding, no matter how well it would otherwise match." Enforced structurally at two points, not just convention: - `captured_events.authenticated` is a real column (`internal/store/ captures.go`), set at capture time. - `dispatchBindings` (`internal/daemon/daemon.go:479`) walks **authenticated captures whose source has at least one armed binding** -- an unauthenticated capture is never even considered for dispatch. ### 2. Human approval before a binding goes live Covered by the state machine above. Nothing self-arms: `pending_approval -> armed` requires an explicit `Approve` call, and any edit to an armed binding reverts it. ### 3. Rate and volume limits per source Capture writes are bounded independently of the approval gate, so a flood of unauthenticated traffic cannot exhaust disk or drown the inspector: `InsertCapture` (`internal/store/captures.go`) prunes by both **retention window** (`WHERE received_at < cutoff`) and **max event count** in the same insert transaction. ### 4. Blast radius bounded by the same code-level controls every task gets A playbook-originated task is dispatched into the **same** gate, diff-cap, sandboxed-container, worktree-isolation pipeline every task goes through regardless of origin. Verified precisely, not assumed: `dispatchOneBinding` calls `EnqueueBindingTask` (`internal/store/store.go`), which wraps `EnqueueChatTask` -- the same direct-to-`tasks`-table enqueue path chat-spawned tasks already use, then stamps `binding_id`/`binding_version` for provenance in a second statement. This is a **different** enqueue mechanism from forge-issue polling's `workintake.TaskEnvelope`/NATS path (`docs/prds/event-sources-and-reactions.md`) -- binding and forge-issue tasks arrive by different producers, but both become an ordinary `store.Task` row that `ClaimNext` picks up identically, so both get the same gate/worktree pipeline downstream regardless of which producer created the row. Payload content is ordinary untrusted prompt input; the sender's text is never treated as a trusted instruction (Archie's environmental-enforcement principle: "the agent should ignore instructions in the payload" is not itself a control, the surrounding sandbox is). ### 5. Captured payloads may contain secrets from the sending system Two independent protections, not one: - **Redaction before persistence**: `webhookguard.RedactPayload` walks the decoded JSON and redacts recognised sensitive keys before the row is written -- the raw, unredacted payload is never durably stored. - **Retention**: a configurable window (`InsertCapture`'s `retention` parameter) prunes old captures automatically; visibility of what remains is gated by the same dashboard authentication as every other webui surface, not a separate, weaker path. ### Secrets at rest `Binding.Secret` (the HMAC shared secret a sender signs with) is encrypted at rest via AES-GCM (`internal/store/binding_cipher.go`, `archie-core- t2db.7`) -- a leaked SQLite file does not leak sender-side shared secrets in plaintext. The envelope is versioned (`bindingEnvelopeVersion`) so a future cipher or KDF change can roll forward without breaking already-encrypted rows, and the AAD binds ciphertext to the binding-secret context so it cannot be relocated to another field/column and still authenticate. A `nil` cipher (no encryption key configured) leaves secrets as plaintext -- documented legacy behaviour, not silent degradation. ### At-most-once dispatch `dispatchBindings` enqueues at most one task per `(binding, capture)` pair, enforced by a real ledger, not best-effort application logic: `RecordDispatch` (`internal/store/bindings.go`) does `INSERT OR IGNORE` into `binding_dispatches`, unique on `(binding_id, capture_id)`; a duplicate insert returns the sentinel `ErrAlreadyDispatched`, which the dispatch loop treats as "another cycle raced us," not an error. This guarantee holds **across daemon restarts**, not just within one process's lifetime, because the ledger is a durable table, not in-memory state. This ledger is also the direct precedent for the still-open EDA playbook engine idempotency question (`archie-core-t2db.17`, `docs/prds/eda-playbook- engine.md`'s execution-time gap 2) -- the same `(owner, event)`-keyed `INSERT OR IGNORE` shape almost certainly generalizes to playbook-run idempotency rather than needing a new mechanism invented from scratch. ## What this document does not cover - The `ARCHITECTURE.md` task-lifecycle section noting that a playbook-originated task has different provenance from a forge-issue task -- open, part of `archie-core-t2db.6`. - An end-to-end operator walkthrough (point an external app at archie, build a first playbook) -- open, part of `archie-core-t2db.6`. - The playbook YAML / CEL / Module/Channel/Forge action-position work (`docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md`, `module-position.md`, `channel-forge-positions.md`) -- a different, newer mechanism than the binding model described here; the two are related but not the same system, and this document does not attempt to unify them.