Agent identities run without config.toml entries #300

Closed
opened 2026-10-27 13:35:46 +00:00 by sam · 0 comments
Owner

A dashboard-created execution identity must be usable by a workflow without a configuration-file entry or restart. Resolve active database bot/service-account identities through State Store contracts, verify organisation assignment and invocation/execution authorisation, and retain the requesting actor separately. New identities must never implicitly inherit root forge tokens or container credential grants. Forge authentication belongs to organisation-owned connections, not execution identity records.

Design

Approved direction: database-backed execution identities are authoritative, scoped to their assigned organisation. Forge authentication belongs to organisation-owned connections referenced by repositories, separately authorised for execution identities; never attach forge secrets to agents. Implement live identity resolution first, preserving lifecycle and invocation authorisation and refusing implicit root credentials or grants. Then finish connections and migrate obsolete configuration paths.

Acceptance criteria

A dashboard-created agent runs a repository-free workflow; suspended, retired, human and cross-organisation identities are refused; no root credential fallback; retries recheck authority. Repository operations use separately authorised organisation connections when available.

Notes

Handoff: claimed and investigated only; no application code edited or tests run. Current daemon builds IdentityRunner only from cfg.Identities in bootstrap.go. WorkflowSettings already offers database identity IDs. workflow_identity.go declaredIdentity and daemon.go identityMayAct resolve only startup runners. configFor, forgeFor, treesFor and repoFor fall back to root resources; changing declaredIdentity alone would expose root credentials. registerTaskRPCServers registers startup identity-scoped NATS handlers. Complete all consumers, lifecycle checks and scoped RPC routing before claiming identity execution works.
Live verification exposed an existing prerequisite defect: archied.openAccessChain asserts access.PolicySource.Policies, but the RPC client implements PolicyStore.ListPolicies. The chain was absent and buildDaemon only wired principals inside that branch. Fix the policy reader contract, wire principals independently, and use a pending deny-by-default live chain during policy outages as part of identity authorisation.
Implemented in 5d6d24c1. Database agents resolve live by durable ID; lifecycle, assignment and organisation checks precede execution. Unknown agents receive no root forge/repository/container grants. Policy loading now consumes the RPC policy store and starts denied while unavailable. Run-credential routing and identity-start audit resolve the pinned execution identity, preserving the recorded task requester. Real browser regression verifies named selection, rename and suspension. Isolated real TLS services and a real SELinux-confined container completed a repository-free workflow after creating the agent while the daemon was already running; audit principal and recorded requester were verified separately. Exact integrated commit passed task check in an isolated worktree. Existing ingress attribution bug is separately tracked in 3z4fd.10; repository connection consumption remains in oygqd.

Close reason

Dashboard-created execution identity ran a repository-free workflow without restart; lifecycle, org separation, credential isolation, canonical routing and audit separation verified. Integrated as 5d6d24c1 with exact-commit gate and browser/runtime evidence.


Imported from beads archie-core-kgxw.13 · GitHub #1316 · type feature · priority P2 · created 2026-10-05 · closed 2026-10-16

A dashboard-created execution identity must be usable by a workflow without a configuration-file entry or restart. Resolve active database bot/service-account identities through State Store contracts, verify organisation assignment and invocation/execution authorisation, and retain the requesting actor separately. New identities must never implicitly inherit root forge tokens or container credential grants. Forge authentication belongs to organisation-owned connections, not execution identity records. ### Design Approved direction: database-backed execution identities are authoritative, scoped to their assigned organisation. Forge authentication belongs to organisation-owned connections referenced by repositories, separately authorised for execution identities; never attach forge secrets to agents. Implement live identity resolution first, preserving lifecycle and invocation authorisation and refusing implicit root credentials or grants. Then finish connections and migrate obsolete configuration paths. ### Acceptance criteria A dashboard-created agent runs a repository-free workflow; suspended, retired, human and cross-organisation identities are refused; no root credential fallback; retries recheck authority. Repository operations use separately authorised organisation connections when available. ### Notes Handoff: claimed and investigated only; no application code edited or tests run. Current daemon builds IdentityRunner only from cfg.Identities in bootstrap.go. WorkflowSettings already offers database identity IDs. workflow_identity.go declaredIdentity and daemon.go identityMayAct resolve only startup runners. configFor, forgeFor, treesFor and repoFor fall back to root resources; changing declaredIdentity alone would expose root credentials. registerTaskRPCServers registers startup identity-scoped NATS handlers. Complete all consumers, lifecycle checks and scoped RPC routing before claiming identity execution works. Live verification exposed an existing prerequisite defect: archied.openAccessChain asserts access.PolicySource.Policies, but the RPC client implements PolicyStore.ListPolicies. The chain was absent and buildDaemon only wired principals inside that branch. Fix the policy reader contract, wire principals independently, and use a pending deny-by-default live chain during policy outages as part of identity authorisation. Implemented in 5d6d24c1. Database agents resolve live by durable ID; lifecycle, assignment and organisation checks precede execution. Unknown agents receive no root forge/repository/container grants. Policy loading now consumes the RPC policy store and starts denied while unavailable. Run-credential routing and identity-start audit resolve the pinned execution identity, preserving the recorded task requester. Real browser regression verifies named selection, rename and suspension. Isolated real TLS services and a real SELinux-confined container completed a repository-free workflow after creating the agent while the daemon was already running; audit principal and recorded requester were verified separately. Exact integrated commit passed task check in an isolated worktree. Existing ingress attribution bug is separately tracked in 3z4fd.10; repository connection consumption remains in oygqd. ### Close reason Dashboard-created execution identity ran a repository-free workflow without restart; lifecycle, org separation, credential isolation, canonical routing and audit separation verified. Integrated as 5d6d24c1 with exact-commit gate and browser/runtime evidence. --- _Imported from beads `archie-core-kgxw.13` · GitHub #1316 · type feature · priority P2 · created 2026-10-05 · closed 2026-10-16_
sam added the mediumfeature labels 2026-10-27 13:35:46 +00:00
sam self-assigned this 2026-10-27 13:35:46 +00:00
sam closed this issue 2026-10-27 13:35:46 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-10-27 13:41:59 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-10-27 13:42:22 +00:00
Sign in to join this conversation.
1 Participants
Notifications
Due Date
No due date set.
Reference: sam/archie#300