Chat authorisation, identity and memory security #2066

Open
opened 2026-11-20 08:41:08 +00:00 by sam · 1 comment
Owner

Chat turns are enforced deterministically outside the model: a turn can only do what its person, the agent and the session all allow, and what may be disclosed to each audience and destination is decided separately from which tools may run.

Normative source: the revised RFC exported verbatim at transcripts/2026-11-20-chat-authorization-rfc-3fa43269.md in sam/archie-product (see the 2026-11-20 comment on this issue). It supersedes the original spec paste. Its amendments are normative for the existing platform, not just the chat frontend: roles grant business-action eligibility, not blanket tool or credential access; forbidden is distinguished from permitted-but-awaiting-confirmation, and a confirmation never converts the former into the latter; authorization is enforced on every entry point, not only the chat tool router.

Children track each gap:

  • #2067 the model is offered only the tools its person may use
  • #2068 session taint tightens controls, never grants authority
  • #2069 memory is scoped per class with independent access and purpose
  • #2070 connector bindings declare delegated, shared or sandbox under the RFC's eligibility rules
  • #2071 platform and identity admin actions are refused in chat
  • #2072 approvals bind an immutable pending action and re-check everyone at dispatch
  • #2073 chat markdown and the dashboard CSP treat every outbound path as a sink
  • #2074 turns have budgets, rate limits and cumulative-effect caps, failing closed
  • #2075 policy decisions are audited, revocable within a bounded stale window, with a kill switch
  • #2078 authorization is enforced on every entry point
  • #2079 chat-triggered workflows are classified by transitive effects under a declared execution contract
  • #2080 disclosures are authorized per audience and destination

Done when every child is closed.

Chat turns are enforced deterministically outside the model: a turn can only do what its person, the agent and the session all allow, and what may be disclosed to each audience and destination is decided separately from which tools may run. Normative source: the revised RFC exported verbatim at transcripts/2026-11-20-chat-authorization-rfc-3fa43269.md in sam/archie-product (see the 2026-11-20 comment on this issue). It supersedes the original spec paste. Its amendments are normative for the existing platform, not just the chat frontend: roles grant business-action eligibility, not blanket tool or credential access; forbidden is distinguished from permitted-but-awaiting-confirmation, and a confirmation never converts the former into the latter; authorization is enforced on every entry point, not only the chat tool router. Children track each gap: - #2067 the model is offered only the tools its person may use - #2068 session taint tightens controls, never grants authority - #2069 memory is scoped per class with independent access and purpose - #2070 connector bindings declare delegated, shared or sandbox under the RFC's eligibility rules - #2071 platform and identity admin actions are refused in chat - #2072 approvals bind an immutable pending action and re-check everyone at dispatch - #2073 chat markdown and the dashboard CSP treat every outbound path as a sink - #2074 turns have budgets, rate limits and cumulative-effect caps, failing closed - #2075 policy decisions are audited, revocable within a bounded stale window, with a kill switch - #2078 authorization is enforced on every entry point - #2079 chat-triggered workflows are classified by transitive effects under a declared execution contract - #2080 disclosures are authorized per audience and destination Done when every child is closed.
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:52:31 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:52:47 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:53:03 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:53:11 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:53:19 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:53:27 +00:00
sam added a new dependency 2026-11-20 08:53:48 +00:00
Author
Owner

Normative source update (2026-11-20): the maintainer approved the architectural direction but not the original spec as written. The revised RFC with the normative amendments is exported verbatim at transcripts/2026-11-20-chat-authorization-rfc-3fa43269.md in sam/archie-product.

Key amendments: disclosures must be authorized per audience and destination, not just tool calls, and a confirmation click never turns a forbidden operation into a permitted one; roles grant eligibility for business actions, not blanket access to tool implementations or credentials; authorization is enforced on every entry point, not only the chat tool router.

Children #2067-#2075 are being re-based onto the revised RFC, and new children are filed for the newly normative gaps (disclosure authorization, entry-point enforcement parity, chat-triggered workflow execution contracts).

Normative source update (2026-11-20): the maintainer approved the architectural direction but not the original spec as written. The revised RFC with the normative amendments is exported verbatim at transcripts/2026-11-20-chat-authorization-rfc-3fa43269.md in sam/archie-product. Key amendments: disclosures must be authorized per audience and destination, not just tool calls, and a confirmation click never turns a forbidden operation into a permitted one; roles grant eligibility for business actions, not blanket access to tool implementations or credentials; authorization is enforced on every entry point, not only the chat tool router. Children #2067-#2075 are being re-based onto the revised RFC, and new children are filed for the newly normative gaps (disclosure authorization, entry-point enforcement parity, chat-triggered workflow execution contracts).
Sign in to join this conversation.
1 Participants
Notifications
Due Date
No due date set.
Reference: sam/archie#2066