Proposed by the maintainer on 2026-11-16, from the #2026 review: a package is accepted once by the instance (archipelago ships it, like a GitHub App's definition); an installation of it is configured at a scope, instance-wide, organisation-wide or personal, and consumed by whatever binds to it. The same model applies to more than connectors. Spec: ARCHITECTURE.md 2.11, SPEC.md principle 9 and R47.
Today they are one row: accepting a connector writes its settings, egress and credentials into a single instance-level table, the binary is single-organisation, and the Extensions page shows one flat list.
Work, in order:
Split the package from the installation. A package row is name, contract, digest/version and the settings it declares; an installation row is a package plus settings, egress, env, credentials and enabled, owned by a scope. connectors.accepted becomes two tables; existing rows migrate as instance-scoped installations.
Scope ownership and resolution: scope is instance, organisation or person; resolution is person, then organisation, then instance; an explicit name wins; a scope can disable an inherited installation below it; the resolved installation and its scope are recorded on every decision, approval and action.
Apply the same split to credentials, MCP servers, sources, guards, secret engines, policies, controls, procedures and settings, one module at a time, starting with credentials and sources.
Authority: instance admin for packages and instance installations; organisation owner for that organisation's; a person for their own. Cross-scope use needs an explicit grant.
The dashboard shows the package catalogue separately from installations, with the scope visible on every installation and on whatever binds to it.
Open questions for the maintainer: whether a person may install a package the instance has not accepted (assumption: no, package acceptance stays instance-only), and whether an organisation owner may see another organisation's installations (assumption: no).
Done when: two organisations on one instance each run a different installation of the same connector, neither can see the other's settings or credentials, a personal installation is usable only by its person, and the decision trail names the installation and scope that acted.
Proposed by the maintainer on 2026-11-16, from the #2026 review: a package is accepted once by the instance (archipelago ships it, like a GitHub App's definition); an installation of it is configured at a scope, instance-wide, organisation-wide or personal, and consumed by whatever binds to it. The same model applies to more than connectors. Spec: ARCHITECTURE.md 2.11, SPEC.md principle 9 and R47.
Today they are one row: accepting a connector writes its settings, egress and credentials into a single instance-level table, the binary is single-organisation, and the Extensions page shows one flat list.
Work, in order:
1. Split the package from the installation. A package row is name, contract, digest/version and the settings it declares; an installation row is a package plus settings, egress, env, credentials and enabled, owned by a scope. `connectors.accepted` becomes two tables; existing rows migrate as instance-scoped installations.
2. Scope ownership and resolution: scope is instance, organisation or person; resolution is person, then organisation, then instance; an explicit name wins; a scope can disable an inherited installation below it; the resolved installation and its scope are recorded on every decision, approval and action.
3. Apply the same split to credentials, MCP servers, sources, guards, secret engines, policies, controls, procedures and settings, one module at a time, starting with credentials and sources.
4. Authority: instance admin for packages and instance installations; organisation owner for that organisation's; a person for their own. Cross-scope use needs an explicit grant.
5. The dashboard shows the package catalogue separately from installations, with the scope visible on every installation and on whatever binds to it.
Open questions for the maintainer: whether a person may install a package the instance has not accepted (assumption: no, package acceptance stays instance-only), and whether an organisation owner may see another organisation's installations (assumption: no).
Done when: two organisations on one instance each run a different installation of the same connector, neither can see the other's settings or credentials, a personal installation is usable only by its person, and the decision trail names the installation and scope that acted.
Two maintainer decisions from the move map review, 2026-11-16:
MCP servers are not packages. An MCP server is plain JSON configuration (stdio command or URL, credentials, egress, the tool allow-list), edited in the same section as extensions. Drop them from step 3's list.
The connectors module's accepted packages don't cover what packages need. Build this on the existing store packages (internal/domain/storepkg, internal/infrastructure/storepkg, internal/infrastructure/signedoci), moved rather than rewritten: the signed OCI catalogue, declared settings with secret references, contributions projected into the organisation and withdrawn on removal (workflows, prompts, profiles, MCP server configs, defaults), digest-pinned dependencies with required-by protection, authority accepted against the digest and possibly narrower, manual or automatic updates, approval for an update that widens authority, and rollback. The old Installed record is already per organisation, which is the scope split this issue asks for.
Two maintainer decisions from the move map review, 2026-11-16:
- MCP servers are not packages. An MCP server is plain JSON configuration (stdio command or URL, credentials, egress, the tool allow-list), edited in the same section as extensions. Drop them from step 3's list.
- The connectors module's accepted packages don't cover what packages need. Build this on the existing store packages (`internal/domain/storepkg`, `internal/infrastructure/storepkg`, `internal/infrastructure/signedoci`), moved rather than rewritten: the signed OCI catalogue, declared settings with secret references, contributions projected into the organisation and withdrawn on removal (workflows, prompts, profiles, MCP server configs, defaults), digest-pinned dependencies with required-by protection, authority accepted against the digest and possibly narrower, manual or automatic updates, approval for an update that widens authority, and rollback. The old `Installed` record is already per organisation, which is the scope split this issue asks for.
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Proposed by the maintainer on 2026-11-16, from the #2026 review: a package is accepted once by the instance (archipelago ships it, like a GitHub App's definition); an installation of it is configured at a scope, instance-wide, organisation-wide or personal, and consumed by whatever binds to it. The same model applies to more than connectors. Spec: ARCHITECTURE.md 2.11, SPEC.md principle 9 and R47.
Today they are one row: accepting a connector writes its settings, egress and credentials into a single instance-level table, the binary is single-organisation, and the Extensions page shows one flat list.
Work, in order:
connectors.acceptedbecomes two tables; existing rows migrate as instance-scoped installations.Open questions for the maintainer: whether a person may install a package the instance has not accepted (assumption: no, package acceptance stays instance-only), and whether an organisation owner may see another organisation's installations (assumption: no).
Done when: two organisations on one instance each run a different installation of the same connector, neither can see the other's settings or credentials, a personal installation is usable only by its person, and the decision trail names the installation and scope that acted.
Two maintainer decisions from the move map review, 2026-11-16:
internal/domain/storepkg,internal/infrastructure/storepkg,internal/infrastructure/signedoci), moved rather than rewritten: the signed OCI catalogue, declared settings with secret references, contributions projected into the organisation and withdrawn on removal (workflows, prompts, profiles, MCP server configs, defaults), digest-pinned dependencies with required-by protection, authority accepted against the digest and possibly narrower, manual or automatic updates, approval for an update that widens authority, and rollback. The oldInstalledrecord is already per organisation, which is the scope split this issue asks for.