Held out of archie-core-8szi by the maintainer's decision (B) on 2026-09-21. The gate half of the deleted .archie behaviour landed as gate.diff-rules; this is the .archie/stages/*.go equivalent, and it needs a trust decision before anyone builds it.
What it would be: a registered workflow step type (name unexplored, command.run is a placeholder) that runs operator-authored argv in the task worktree at its position in the stored workflow definition, non-zero exit parking the run unless the step is declared advisory (level: warn).
Why it is a decision and not a fix. The deleted .archie/stages/*.go was repository-authored Go executed in the task container. This would instead make the stored workflow-definitions resource - archie.db, admin token, editable through the dashboard - a command-execution surface on the agent host. That is a change of trust tier, and ARCHITECTURE.md#plugin-engine-rule-strict invariant 6 requires a trust boundary to be explicit rather than implied: "Integrations that are not trusted as daemon code run out of process through MCP or a versioned protocol and, when a confidentiality or integrity boundary is required, inside a real container sandbox. A subprocess boundary alone is not a security sandbox."
Today only config.toml's repo.gate commands and the agent's own tools execute commands; nothing stored in the control plane does.
Open questions the decision must answer: may stored, admin-token-writable settings execute argv at all, and under what trust tier; must it run inside a container sandbox rather than as the agent process; does the actor recorded in the audit trail bear on what may be executed; and does an advisory/warn level widen the surface further.
Consequence of not deciding: steps.go:215 still hard-errors on .archie/stages/*.go and tells the operator to migrate to a registered YAML workflow step, and there is still no step that expresses that behaviour. That error message is left untouched deliberately - it was not made true with a command step (see archie-core-8szi).
Close reason
Decision: accepted, premise corrected. The bead said nothing stored in the control plane executes argv. That is false at d5763a4e. repository-policies (config.Repo with Gate and Preflight argv lists) and tool-settings (mcp_servers stdio Command/Args, spawned by tools/mcp StdioTransport.spawnProcess) are live control-plane kinds in runtimeResourceKinds, writable with the admin token and re-applied without restart. Stored settings already drive argv execution, so a command step adds no new trust tier. Build it as a registered step reusing the repo.gate execution path (agentexec.Command), non-zero exit parks the run, level warn makes it advisory. Open item for the build bead: confirm which of those paths run inside the task container versus on the host, and keep the new step on the container path.
Imported from beads archie-core-ndm8 · GitHub #1047 · type decision · priority P1 · created 2026-09-21 · closed 2026-10-02
Held out of archie-core-8szi by the maintainer's decision (B) on 2026-09-21. The gate half of the deleted .archie behaviour landed as gate.diff-rules; this is the .archie/stages/*.go equivalent, and it needs a trust decision before anyone builds it.
What it would be: a registered workflow step type (name unexplored, command.run is a placeholder) that runs operator-authored argv in the task worktree at its position in the stored workflow definition, non-zero exit parking the run unless the step is declared advisory (level: warn).
Why it is a decision and not a fix. The deleted .archie/stages/*.go was repository-authored Go executed in the task container. This would instead make the stored workflow-definitions resource - archie.db, admin token, editable through the dashboard - a command-execution surface on the agent host. That is a change of trust tier, and ARCHITECTURE.md#plugin-engine-rule-strict invariant 6 requires a trust boundary to be explicit rather than implied: "Integrations that are not trusted as daemon code run out of process through MCP or a versioned protocol and, when a confidentiality or integrity boundary is required, inside a real container sandbox. A subprocess boundary alone is not a security sandbox."
Today only config.toml's repo.gate commands and the agent's own tools execute commands; nothing stored in the control plane does.
Open questions the decision must answer: may stored, admin-token-writable settings execute argv at all, and under what trust tier; must it run inside a container sandbox rather than as the agent process; does the actor recorded in the audit trail bear on what may be executed; and does an advisory/warn level widen the surface further.
Consequence of not deciding: steps.go:215 still hard-errors on .archie/stages/*.go and tells the operator to migrate to a registered YAML workflow step, and there is still no step that expresses that behaviour. That error message is left untouched deliberately - it was not made true with a command step (see archie-core-8szi).
### Close reason
Decision: accepted, premise corrected. The bead said nothing stored in the control plane executes argv. That is false at d5763a4e. repository-policies (config.Repo with Gate and Preflight argv lists) and tool-settings (mcp_servers stdio Command/Args, spawned by tools/mcp StdioTransport.spawnProcess) are live control-plane kinds in runtimeResourceKinds, writable with the admin token and re-applied without restart. Stored settings already drive argv execution, so a command step adds no new trust tier. Build it as a registered step reusing the repo.gate execution path (agentexec.Command), non-zero exit parks the run, level warn makes it advisory. Open item for the build bead: confirm which of those paths run inside the task container versus on the host, and keep the new step on the container path.
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_Imported from beads `archie-core-ndm8` · GitHub #1047 · type decision · priority P1 · created 2026-09-21 · closed 2026-10-02_
sam
added the highdecision labels 2026-10-27 13:40:31 +00:00
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Held out of archie-core-8szi by the maintainer's decision (B) on 2026-09-21. The gate half of the deleted .archie behaviour landed as gate.diff-rules; this is the .archie/stages/*.go equivalent, and it needs a trust decision before anyone builds it.
What it would be: a registered workflow step type (name unexplored, command.run is a placeholder) that runs operator-authored argv in the task worktree at its position in the stored workflow definition, non-zero exit parking the run unless the step is declared advisory (level: warn).
Why it is a decision and not a fix. The deleted .archie/stages/*.go was repository-authored Go executed in the task container. This would instead make the stored workflow-definitions resource - archie.db, admin token, editable through the dashboard - a command-execution surface on the agent host. That is a change of trust tier, and ARCHITECTURE.md#plugin-engine-rule-strict invariant 6 requires a trust boundary to be explicit rather than implied: "Integrations that are not trusted as daemon code run out of process through MCP or a versioned protocol and, when a confidentiality or integrity boundary is required, inside a real container sandbox. A subprocess boundary alone is not a security sandbox."
Today only config.toml's repo.gate commands and the agent's own tools execute commands; nothing stored in the control plane does.
Open questions the decision must answer: may stored, admin-token-writable settings execute argv at all, and under what trust tier; must it run inside a container sandbox rather than as the agent process; does the actor recorded in the audit trail bear on what may be executed; and does an advisory/warn level widen the surface further.
Consequence of not deciding: steps.go:215 still hard-errors on .archie/stages/*.go and tells the operator to migrate to a registered YAML workflow step, and there is still no step that expresses that behaviour. That error message is left untouched deliberately - it was not made true with a command step (see archie-core-8szi).
Close reason
Decision: accepted, premise corrected. The bead said nothing stored in the control plane executes argv. That is false at
d5763a4e. repository-policies (config.Repo with Gate and Preflight argv lists) and tool-settings (mcp_servers stdio Command/Args, spawned by tools/mcp StdioTransport.spawnProcess) are live control-plane kinds in runtimeResourceKinds, writable with the admin token and re-applied without restart. Stored settings already drive argv execution, so a command step adds no new trust tier. Build it as a registered step reusing the repo.gate execution path (agentexec.Command), non-zero exit parks the run, level warn makes it advisory. Open item for the build bead: confirm which of those paths run inside the task container versus on the host, and keep the new step on the container path.Imported from beads
archie-core-ndm8· GitHub #1047 · type decision · priority P1 · created 2026-09-21 · closed 2026-10-02