archied, archie-ui and the tool gateway re-read the stored policies on a 30s
ticker, so a forbid written seconds earlier did not stop a run. One
instance-wide revision now moves inside the transaction of every policy write,
and a decision reads it first and rebuilds the engine only when it moved.
A version read that fails, or a policy list that fails after a bump, refuses
with ErrChainUnavailable instead of standing on the last chain, so three call
sites now treat unavailable as availability rather than denial: dispatch leaves
the capture for the next cycle, a task start parks transient, and the tool
gateway reports the tool as unavailable.
A test run used to suppress only forge and push writes, which named one
destination among many. Deliveries now have one seam: TaskContext.Deliveries
records each as "would ..." and performs none, and a recording egress
session does the same for a Kit run's HTTP writes and central tool calls,
answering them synthetically. Provider hosts stay live, since model traffic
is how a test run reads. Native containers have no proxy (archie-core-n8d3).
The classify result required a workflow, and the capture tool rejects an empty
required string on the agent's single allowed call. A task needing no code
change has no workflow to name, so the classification failed instead of
closing the task -- the non-code path could never complete.
Require only what every classification has: whether a change is needed and the
reasons. Name the workflow required-when-true in its description, guard the
handoff on needs_code_change rather than relying on the finish step having
ended the run first, and comment the reasons before closing so the reporter
sees why nothing was built.
The State Store wire described a provider's class, base URL and key variable
but never where its key lives, so every provider reached the daemon
credential-less. A task then built its runtime with no key: the egress session
had nothing to bind and the agent parked on 'APIKey is required'.
Carry api_key_engine and api_key_key alongside the provider. They are a
reference, not a secret; the key is still resolved daemon-side and never
travels to a container.
A container task parked when a provider carried an api_key_env but no
credential binding named after it, even though the task's models never
reached that provider. Egress pre-bound every provider the instance
configures and ignored api_key_ref, so the credentials an operator stores in
provider-settings were never used.
A task's config now carries only the providers its model aliases resolve to,
each with the variable its credential is read from: the operator's
api_key_env, or a name derived from the provider when its credential is a
secret reference. modelEgress resolves that reference once for the session
and the proxy substitutes the session's key for the sentinel, so the
container still holds no key. A provider that only declares an env var keeps
resolving through its org credential binding.