Add [forge] intake = "poll" (default) | "webhook" | "both", and a forge
webhook receiver (internal/forge/webhook) that verifies a GitHub webhook's
HMAC signature, decodes the "issues" event, and publishes a matched issue
through the same path the poller uses -- so a labelled or assigned issue
starts a task the moment it happens instead of waiting up to poll_interval
(bead archie-core-7d5u.4).
The dispatch predicate (workintake.MatchesDispatch/RequiresLabel) is now a
single shared definition consumed by both the poller and the webhook
receiver, so the two cannot drift -- including the empty-label guard from
63d0446 (an empty label must never match every open issue). Assignee
matching is case-insensitive to agree with AssignedIssues' server-side
GitHub filter; label matching stays case-sensitive, since GitHub labels
are case-distinct.
daemon.publishTask is exported as PublishTask, the single enqueue path
now shared by the poller and the webhook intake.
Two failure modes fixed during adversarial self-review before this landed:
a webhook secret that fails to resolve at runtime now degrades (logs and
skips the receiver) instead of aborting the whole daemon -- under
intake="both" the poll exists specifically as a backstop for this exact
misconfiguration, so crashing boot over it defeated its own purpose;
multi-identity deployments ([[identities]]) are explicitly unsupported for
now (webhook intake refuses to start, logs why, and leaves each identity's
own poll loop unaffected) rather than silently matching issues against the
wrong identity's dispatch rules.
Wire github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 into production startup so a
single-process deployment gets reaction delivery and task distribution
over an in-process server rather than a separate one
(docs/prds/embedded-nats.md).
Meaning change: [nats].url empty used to mean "no NATS, use the SQLite
ClaimNext flow"; it now means "start an embedded NATS server". The old
behaviour is the explicit opt-out [nats].mode = "off". mode resolves from
url when unset (url set -> external, url empty -> embedded), and
agent.mode="nats" / [containers] now require mode="external" (an embedded
loopback server cannot be reached by agent workers or containers).
The daemon owns the embedded server's lifecycle: StartEmbedded before
dialing the client, Shutdown after the client closes (LIFO cleanups). The
embedded server binds loopback on a random port, enables JetStream in a
store dir under the data directory, and leaves its logger nil so a startup
failure surfaces as a Connect error rather than an os.Exit.
Retention becomes a nats.Config field (default WorkQueuePolicy) so a future
reaction stream can fan out under LimitsPolicy instead of the hardcoded
competing-consumer policy that starves a second consumer on overlapping
subjects.
Adds POST /webhooks/capture/{source}: an unauthenticated endpoint (mounted
alongside /healthz, bypassing dashboard token auth by design) that persists
any inbound webhook archie has no binding for yet, so it can be inspected
and mapped later (t2db.2/t2db.3).
docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md decides SQLite over NATS JetStream for
storage: NATS is not unconditionally available until 7d5u.2 ships embedded
support, and capture's single-writer/single-reader access pattern doesn't
need JetStream's fan-out/replay machinery anyway.
internal/store/captures.go adds a captured_events table with prune-on-write
(retention age + row-count cap, both configurable). The HTTP handler applies
webhookguard redaction before persisting, and enforces two more independent
disk-bound mechanics before that: a per-request body-size cap and a
per-remote-address rate limit. New [capture] config section with documented
defaults; all fields optional, capture is on by default.
Adversarial review (manual, after the usual fresh-subagent pass hit a
session API limit mid-run) caught and fixed three real defects before this
landed, each with a regression test confirmed to fail against the pre-fix
code:
- the body-size cap silently no-op'd when CaptureMaxBodyBytes was left
unset, the one bound that limits a single payload's size rather than row
count or write rate
- the rate limiter was keyed by the request's own source path segment --
unregistered and attacker-chosen by design for this endpoint, violating
webhookguard.RateLimiter's documented bounded-key-space assumption and
letting a sender bypass the limit by rotating the segment; rekeyed to
remote address
- the retention prune compared time.RFC3339Nano strings, whose trimmed
variable-width fractional seconds break lexicographic ordering within the
same second; switched to fixed-width RFC3339
Closes archie-core-t2db.1.
show_tool_calls gated Telegram's tool-activity narration only; the
web dashboard's SSE chat stream narrated every completed tool call
unconditionally with no way to turn it off, leaking tool names and
parameter shapes to anyone with dashboard access even when an
operator had already opted out for Telegram.
Moved ShowToolCalls from TelegramConfig to ChatConfig so it is one
setting for every channel, and wired the webui stream to it:
chatStreamSink now carries a showToolCalls flag (snapshotted once per
turn, mirroring how Telegram's liveReply snapshots it) and ToolCall
no-ops when it's off.
BREAKING: an existing [chat.telegram] show_tool_calls = true in
config.toml now parses as an unrecognized key under [chat.telegram]
and is silently ignored (TOML decoding is non-strict) rather than
erroring -- move it to the top-level [chat] table.
Chat returned only the final answer, so a wrong tool choice, a
hallucinated action, or a footgun like `systemctl stop` against
`restart` was invisible from the conversation. Only text deltas were
threaded through the turn, and tool calls executed inside Generate with
nowhere to report.
Replace the delta callback with gateway.TurnStream, which carries text
fragments and completed tool calls on one ordered path from the model
loop to the channel. The sequence is the point: a tool line that
overtakes the sentence it interrupted describes a turn that never
happened. Text-only callers use gateway.DeltaFunc and are unaffected.
A tool is reported on its result, never on its call -- the call part
carries no outcome yet, so reporting both would list every tool twice,
once with nothing to say.
Telegram renders it behind [chat.telegram] show_tool_calls, off by
default: this is debugging visibility, and it narrates every internal
step to provide it. The dashboard always shows it, being the operator's
own observability surface; its tool lines are live-only and are not
persisted with the conversation.
The Telegram live reply changes mechanism, and with it what a frame
MEANS. It used to stream through sendMessageDraft: drafts are ephemeral
30-second previews, so a tool call longer than that outlived the
preview, and successive frames were observed concatenated with their
cursors intact. It now sends one real message and edits it. An update
used to be "the next preview of the answer"; it is now "the whole
answer as it currently stands, replacing what is there". The cursor is
appended at render time and never stored, so exactly one exists and
always at the end, and a frame too long for one message is cut to its
tail rather than rejected outright.
A stopped or failed turn now edits the cursor away instead of leaving
it blinking on a message nothing will finish. That cleanup runs on a
live context because turnCtx is already dead, and it runs on both
failure branches: ai-sdk raises an aborted stream as ErrAborted with
ctx.Err() formatted in rather than wrapped, so errors.Is cannot be
trusted to tell a /stop from a fault.
Closes#467
Clone normalized nil slices to empty non-nil (make([]T, 0)), so after a
dashboard PATCH the cloned published config carried [] where the file
decodes to nil -- a subsequent SIGHUP reload's diff-and-warn compared
old [] against fresh nil and reported 'Repos changed; requires a
restart' for a field that had not changed at all. The exact warning
fatigue the allowlist exists to prevent. cloneRepos/cloneIdentities/
cloneMCPServers/cloneStringSlices now return nil for nil input (the
append-based copies already preserved nilness).
Second adversarial pass findings, fixed:
BLOCKER -- PATCH silently dropped every dotted key. The UI sends
dotted keys ('budgets.max_steps') but ApplyOverlayValues fed them
straight to yaml.Unmarshal, which cannot decode a dotted key as a
struct field and silently ignored it: 200 OK, zero effect, and the row
still persisted (poisoning later reloads with an unvalidated value).
The reload path worked only because overlay.Snapshot nests first. Fix:
applyDottedOverlay nests dotted keys via overlay.Nest before decode --
the same nesting Snapshot performs -- and is pinned by
TestApplyDottedOverlayNestsBeforeDecode, which fails against the old
behaviour.
MAJOR -- shallow copies let overlay decode mutate the published
snapshot. Holder.Get and *doc are shallow; yaml decodes maps in place,
so a crafted nested update (or a failed boot overlay apply) mutated
shared maps of the published config before validation. Fix: config.Clone
deep-copies every reference field (Models, Providers, Repos, Identities,
Dispatch.Labels, Agent.Env, Chat/Telegram slices, Tools.MCPServers,
Memory.ProviderConfig, WebFetch.Enabled pointer, Extra), used by the
PATCH path (next := d.Cfg.Get().Clone()) and by Loader.ApplyOverlay,
which now never mutates its input (clones Config and the provenance
chain internally), so boot and reload pass the base document directly
and a failed apply leaves it exactly as it was. Pinned by
TestConfigCloneDeepCopiesReferenceFields.
MAJOR -- data races on captured main.go variables. bootOverlayErr and
currentProvenance were plain values written by the SIGHUP goroutine and
the PATCH/Reset handlers and read by every GET /api/config; -race passed
only because no test exercised the composition root concurrently. Both
are now atomic.Pointer; the LastReload closure and the provenance
dedup read them atomically.
MINOR -- MaxConcurrency removed from the reloadable allowlist. The
dispatchers re-read it but the startup-built container pool captures it
(container/pool.go:94,163), so 'every consumer re-reads it' is false and
a change only partially applies. It now warns requires-restart; the
criterion comment on reloadableFields documents the pool capture.
MINOR -- ResetConfig now resolves and validates the target state BEFORE
deleting the row, so a broken file cannot leave the store and the
running config disagreeing; the provenance chain no longer grows
unboundedly (the runtime-overlay origin replaces, not appends).
Also: holder.go no longer references a file watcher that does not exist.
Verified: task check clean; -race clean on cmd/archied, webui, daemon,
config; new findings from the second adversarial pass are closed.
Three gaps closed, all in the 'your change didn't take effect and
nothing told you' family:
1. MaxRetries joins the reloadable allowlist, and the criterion is
fixed on reloadableFields: a field is reloadable when EVERY
consumer re-reads it. MaxRetries is the worked example -- its only
consumer is the webui maxRetriesFor handler, which re-reads per
request (api_tasks.go:380,383); nothing in the daemon reads it, so
warning 'requires restart' was spurious. Chat.Telegram.TokenEnv is
documented as the counter-example (webui reads it per request but a
startup-built telegram bot consumes it, so it is not reloadable).
Pinned by TestChangedNonReloadableFields alongside the comment.
2. Boot-time overlay degradation is now surfaced. config.ReloadStatus
gains OverlayUnavailable; main.go records the reason when the
overlay store cannot be opened or its values fail validation, and
/api/config carries it (merged into LastReload). Cleared by a
successful dashboard write or reset. The settings page renders a
warning banner, so a daemon running on file config alone says so
where the operator is looking, not only in logs.
3. Overlay-shadowed file edits are visible and recoverable.
ConfigView.Overridden lists the dotted keys the runtime overlay
currently sets, so the UI marks those rows (their file value is
shadowed until reset). POST /api/config/reset exposes the
store's Delete as a per-row reset: it deletes the row and
republishes file + remaining overlay, which is also the answer to
'my file edit isn't taking effect'. The dashboard can now remove
every override it can create.
Verified: task check clean; -race clean on cmd/archied, webui,
infrastructure/configuration; new handler tests cover the reset
200/400/503 paths and the overridden list.
The daemon can now re-read its configuration on SIGHUP (or on a
future in-process trigger) and republish it through the Holder,
closing the first half of issue #348: 'config can change at runtime,
safely, and can't brick the daemon.'
Reload path:
- cmd/archied/reload.go: ReloadController re-runs loader.Resolve on
the same paths main.go passed at startup (Resolve is pure -- no
reload state added to the loader). apply is called only with a
Document that passed validation; a failed reload records the error
and its timestamp and leaves the running config untouched. That
Set-not-called-on-error property is the safety core and is pinned
by TestReloadValidationFailureDoesNotApply.
- SIGHUP listener in main.go runs reloadLoop(ctx, ch, controller, log);
the loop is extracted as a testable seam (syscall.SIGHUP is Unix-only,
fine given the Linux target).
PollInterval is genuinely reloadable now, not just re-read:
the three ticker sites (Run, per-identity goroutine, shared
maintenance loop) re-read the interval each tick and Reset the ticker
on change. A reloaded poll_interval takes effect on the next cycle.
Diff-and-warn so an operator never has to read the source to know
whether an edit took effect: changedNonReloadableFields compares the
old and new snapshots against an allowlist of re-read fields
(PollInterval, Repos, DiffCapLines, Budgets, Dispatch, and the
Containers sub-fields VolumeTTL + MaxConcurrency). Anything else that
changed logs Warn 'requires a restart'; a fully-applied reload logs
Info. The allowlist is deliberate: a field added to Config later
defaults to requires-restart, the safe direction.
NATS split-brain closed: containerEnv now hands containers the
endpoint the daemon's own client connected with at startup
(Daemon.ConnectedNATS, captured at construction) instead of the live
config, so a reloaded nats.url cannot point new containers at a
server the daemon is not publishing on. A nats change is therefore
classified requires-restart, and CLAUDE.md's 'hands its own nats.url
verbatim' note is updated to the meaning it now has (same today,
deliberately different after a reload).
Validation guard: poll_interval <= 0 is rejected in validate.go
beside the VolumeTTL guard. applyDefaults fills zero with 60s, so
this fires on an explicit negative -- which would panic
time.NewTicker/Reset at boot and, after the per-iteration reset,
on a SIGHUP mid-run.
Observability: config.ReloadStatus (last_error, last_error_at,
last_reload_at) is recorded by the controller and surfaced in
/api/config via Server.LastReload, so a stale running config is
visible in the dashboard, not just the logs. Rendering waits for the
UI step.
Recovery hatch: --no-config-overlay flag plus ARCHIE_SKIP_CONFIG_OVERLAY=1
(configuration.SkipOverlay), logged at startup. No overlay source
exists yet; the flag is the documented escape hatch the DB overlay
(step 3 of #348) will consult.
webui.Server.ConfigProvenance becomes atomic.Pointer so a reload can
swap it via SetProvenance independently of Cfg; the accepted skew
(new config alongside old provenance) is documented on the field.
Verified: task check clean; -race on daemon, webui, cmd/archied,
config, infrastructure/configuration.
Daemon.Cfg, webui.Server.Cfg, and telegramSetup.Cfg were all held by
value (or as a raw shared pointer in webui's case), so a future reload
path could not swap the running configuration -- the consumers held
frozen snapshots made at construction. This is the prerequisite for
issue #348.
Add config.Holder, a small RWMutex-backed snapshot holder:
- Get returns a value copy under RLock; the copy shares its
reference-type fields with the published snapshot, so a doc
comment pins the immutability invariant (a published Config is
immutable; reload constructs a fresh one).
- Set replaces the snapshot under WLock.
- Get is nil-safe; Set is not.
Convert every consumer to read through the accessor. The convention
'cfg := h.Get() once per logical operation' is documented on the
type so the next reader knows that inline d.Cfg.Get().Foo is a code
smell (a Set could land between two consecutive Gets).
Special cases:
- webui.Server.Cfg: was *config.Config, a raw shared pointer read
from handler goroutines. Convert to *config.Holder. The
pre-existing 'cfg := s.Cfg' aliasing bug at api_config.go:295
(which was *trying* to copy but only copied the pointer) now
becomes 'cfg := s.Cfg.Get()', which is the value copy the
read-only view always wanted.
- daemon_test.go: one test mutated d.Cfg.DiffCapLines in place,
which the Holder forbids. Replace with the documented
read-modify-write pattern (prev := d.Cfg.Get(); prev.X = Y;
d.Cfg.Set(prev)).
- telegramSetup.Cfg: matches the daemon's API for consistency
even though setup runs before the daemon is alive.
TaskContext.Cfg in internal/domain/workflow/workflow.go is
deliberately NOT converted -- a task that starts under one config
should finish under it, and a config changing between TDD and gate
stages is a bug, not a feature. Snapshotted at dispatch, as before.
Verified: go test ./... (61 packages), go vet, -race on
internal/daemon and internal/config.
- Reword docs and comments to drop vague "legacy" qualifiers where they no longer describe deprecation status
- Remove unused code: RecentEvents, MessageEvent.ToLegacy, index setState, stderr redaction tool, telegramOnlyCommands
- Delete or comment out tests covering removed or superseded behavior
Under systemd, journald held the only copy of archied's output, and
running it by hand left no record at all -- so "where are the logs?" had
no good answer, and the dashboard had no history to show from before it
connected. [log] adds a file destination alongside stderr, with
size-based rotation and retention done in-package rather than pulling in
a dependency for a few hundred lines.
A file that cannot be opened is reported and the daemon continues on
stderr: losing the durable copy is not worth refusing to start over.
reader.go owns the on-disk format so nothing else has to parse it, and
bounds every read -- tailing keeps the newest entries within a fixed
scan window, so pointing it at a large file cannot exhaust memory.
/stop could not reach a running turn, and the reason was worse than a
missing cancel. go-telegram/bot runs one update worker that calls
handlers synchronously (defaultWorkers = 1, never overridden), and the
chat turn ran on it. While a turn streamed -- or sat in a shell tool --
the worker was blocked and /stop sat unread in the update channel until
the turn it was meant to kill had already finished.
Add gateway.Turns: a per-session serial lane that turns are submitted to
and that the event loop never waits on. The worker is free again in
microseconds, so /stop is serviced immediately; ordering comes from the
lane being serial rather than from the loop being blocked.
- Bare /stop cancels the running turn and clears the backlog behind it,
with no approval step. Approval guards destructive commands, and
gating the brake behind a confirmation defeats it. /stop <name> keeps
the existing process-termination behaviour and its approval.
- Cancellation propagates through the turn context, so it reaches the
model stream and any tool underneath -- a shell command built with
exec.CommandContext dies with the turn.
- Queues are unbounded and never shed. A dropped message is a silent
failure that surfaces later as an agent that ignored something.
- Turns are recovered per-lane: the channel's panic middleware wraps the
event-loop goroutine, which no longer runs the turn.
Also raise the chat step budget. It was hardcoded at 8 -- roughly one
read, one grep and two edits -- so turns hit the cap and stopped
mid-task with no indication they had been cut off. It is now
chat.max_steps, defaulting to 100. Interruption is /stop's job.
The chat agent had two tools -- memory_edit and skill_activate -- so it
could not read a file, search a tree or run a command. ai-sdk's runtime
already drives a tool loop for it (MaxSteps 8, toolExecute wired as the
executor), so the loop was never the missing piece: the registry was empty
of anything useful.
Lifted from tau internal/agent/tools at commit f5289ea, per the recorded
copy-and-mutate strategy: every file carries a provenance header naming its
tau source path, the commit, and the mutations made, so refreshing from
upstream is a diff rather than archaeology.
internal/tools/builtin/ the lifted tools, ~3.1k lines
internal/tools/provider/builtin/ the adapter to tools.ToolEntry
Six tools: read, write, edit, shell, grep, find. Tau's own tests came with
them and pass unmodified, which is the evidence that the lift is faithful.
Deliberately not lifted:
- agent.go (1214 lines): subagent spawning, and the only real coupling in
the package -- 10 tau packages including chat, sessions, store and
registry. Nothing the chat agent needs to do work.
- skill.go: depends on tau's skills package; archie has internal/skill and
already exposes skill_activate.
- docs.go: serves tau's own embedded documentation via tau/docs.
Not lifting the coordinator either. It is tau's agent loop (6.4k lines over
ten packages) and archie already has one in the ai-sdk runtime; porting it
would leave two loops competing. Its cancellation and tool events are worth
having, but they are a few hundred lines built against the existing path
rather than six thousand lifted onto a second one.
The adapter bridges two shape differences: archie hands handlers decoded
arguments where tau's executor takes raw JSON, and tau reports tool-level
failure in Result.IsError rather than as an error -- surfaced as a real
error so the runtime and the guardrail engine both see it. Tools are
classified idempotent or mutating for guardrails and budgets; that is
categorisation, not a jail.
chat.workspace roots the tools and defaults to empty, which registers none
of them. They read, write and execute, so the directory has to be a
deliberate choice rather than whatever the daemon started in -- in the
container that is /.
Verified: go build, go vet, gofmt clean; full suite passes.
Three defects found from a real Telegram transcript.
1. The operator's name was compiled into the prompt.
internal/gateway/persona.go and prompt.go both hardcoded "Sam's" into the
default persona and the fallback prompt. The persona renders first into
every system prompt, so a personal name was sent to the model provider on
every turn, and any other deployment got an assistant that believed it
worked for someone else. There was nowhere to put it: Repo.Owner is a repo
owner and config.Config had no operator concept.
ChatConfig.Operator now carries it, rendered in the prompt's <env> block as
runtime metadata and omitted entirely when unset. config.example.toml
documents that setting it sends the name to the model provider.
2. /new claimed to clear history that it had not cleared.
The chat responder keyed history by channel id through a local sessionKey
helper, while the session commands operate on tracked session ids.
sessionTracker.resolve mints deterministic ids so the two agree -- until
/new, /branch or /resume assigns a generated id, after which they address
different histories permanently. /new reported "Conversation history has
been cleared" while the next turn still saw everything, and /undo,
/compress, /resume and /sessions acted on a namespace the conversation
never read.
gateway.Router.ResolveSessionKey already existed for this, and
session_commands.go:104 said outright that main.go should call it instead of
its inline helper. It never got wired. The responder now resolves through
the router and the dead helper is deleted so it cannot come back.
buildTelegramRouter constructs the router before the responder so the
dependency is visible rather than captured by reference.
3. Prompt rules for two behaviours the transcript showed.
The agent offered to accept shell access it has no tool to use, which is
both unhonourable and a request for the user's secrets. It also opened
mid-conversation replies with a greeting, and described its own manner
("no fluff") in stock phrasing. Added core rule 7 and three communication
rules covering greetings, self-description and register.
Note the memory claim in that transcript was NOT a fabrication: the
memory_edit tool's own description names MEMORY.md and USER.md, and tool
descriptions are part of the prompt.
Also added chat-turn logging (session id, channel, thread, history depth).
Chat turns were entirely unlogged, so a report of lost context had no
evidence to check: 76 log lines covered two days and none of them was a
conversation. A separate report of mid-conversation amnesia remains
undiagnosed -- single process, 43h uptime, compression untriggered at three
messages -- and this is what makes it diagnosable next time.
Regression tests: prompt renders/omits the operator and carries no personal
name; the responder resolves via ResolveSessionKey and defines no local
session key helper.
Verified: go build, go vet, gofmt clean; full suite passes.
internal/config both defined the types every package imports and performed
the file I/O to produce them. Importing a settings struct therefore pulled
in a TOML decoder and a YAML decoder, and the shared model owned discovery,
decoding, overlays, defaulting and validation all at once. See
docs/architecture/configuration.md, which requires loading to move out and
internal/config to be dissolved.
internal/config is now types only -- no os, no filepath, no toml. The new
package owns loading, one concern per file:
features.go the closed set of recognised feature files
discovery.go directory scan and classification
decode.go TOML/YAML decoding, format dispatch
defaults.go filling absent values, no errors
validate.go judging supplied values, no mutation
provenance.go which file contributed what
loader.go Loader wiring the above; File/Overlay/Dir
Beyond relocating, this fixes what the old code conflated:
- Defaulting and validation were interleaved. applyAgentDefaults and
applyDispatchDefaults returned validation errors; validateContainers and
validateSingleIdentity quietly mutated the config. There was no point at
which you could see what the operator actually supplied. They are now
separate passes: applyDefaults never fails, validate never writes.
- Errors were fmt.Errorf strings prefixed "config: ", so a caller could not
distinguish operator-fixable input from an unreadable file without
matching message text. Five sentinels now carry that distinction.
- dataHome() read XDG_DATA_HOME directly and discarded the error from
os.UserHomeDir, so defaulting could not be tested without the
environment. It is injectable on Loader and no longer swallows the error.
- Nothing recorded where a value came from. With overlays, feature files
and conf.d/ all able to set the same field, "which file set this?" was
answerable only by re-deriving precedence by hand. Provenance records it.
- Feature files were applied in map iteration order, making load order and
any resulting error arbitrary. Discovery now returns them sorted.
- loadMainConfig reported "no config.yaml or config.toml found in %s" with
an empty string: the directory was lost when it was extracted from
loadDirInto, so the error named no directory.
- Unreadable or malformed conf.d/ extras were skipped silently, which
presents as a setting the operator wrote simply not taking effect.
- Decode errors from the main config were returned bare, without naming
the file that failed to parse.
The 40 loader tests moved with the code and their assertions are unchanged,
so the defaulting and validation rewrite is behaviour-preserving.
Document.Config is the temporary seam: still internal/config.Config, named
as a field so the compromise is visible at each use site, with its deletion
condition recorded in doc.go. Building typed per-domain sections now, while
every consumer still reads config.Config, would mean two shapes kept in sync
by hand with no consumer for the new one; that belongs with the dissolution
work, not ahead of it.
No consumer outside cmd/archied changed.
Verified: go build, go vet, gofmt clean; go test ./internal/config/... and
./internal/infrastructure/configuration/... pass. Pre-existing gateway and
telegram failures are unchanged.
The event bus was inspecting forge issue labels ("bug", "feature",
"bootstrap") to pick a subject. That put a forge vocabulary inside
infrastructure and duplicated the label table already owned by
workflow.Route -- adding a label meant remembering both places, and
nothing would have caught it if you forgot.
The label table now lives once, in internal/workflow, which already owns
label semantics:
- workflow.Kind names the routing category, with labelKinds as the
single label vocabulary and kindWorkflows mapping kind to registry
entry. Route consumes the ordered kind list so a "bug,feature" task
still falls through to feasibility when no tdd workflow is
registered, exactly as the switch did.
- nats.TaskKind is a closed, validated set of subject tokens.
PublishTask rejects an unknown kind rather than silently delivering
it to the default queue; the zero kind means default, so messages
queued before this field decode unchanged.
- The daemon classifies at the publish site and sets TaskEnvelope.Kind.
Also fixes two defects this exposed:
- drainNATS never reached its SQLite fallback. Replacing the old
(nil, nil) no-message signal with ErrNoMessage in 492ca20 made that
case continue at the top of the loop, but no-message is precisely
when the fallback must run -- requeued tasks (waiting_human approval,
retry-parked) never go through a NATS publish, so nothing would ever
arrive to trigger them. go vet caught it as unreachable code.
- config.classifyFeatureFile silently overwrote duplicate feature
files, so config.gateway.yaml and conf.d/gateway.yaml together
applied one at random. Its own doc comment recorded the bug
("or "" on success/duplicate"). The known-feature list in the error
message is now derived from knownFeatureNames instead of being
spelled out a second time beside it.
A test also called t.Fatalf from a non-test goroutine, where it does not
stop the test.
Verified: go build, go vet, gofmt clean. Pre-existing gateway (18) and
telegram (1) failures are unchanged in count -- they are lost routing
wiring from the parallel telegram merges, tracked separately.
Follow-up to c924281, which introduced two defects of its own.
1. indexing.Config was a private config island: index paths existed nowhere
in internal/config or config.example.toml, so they were undiscoverable
and unsettable by anyone reading the real configuration.
Now [indexing] in config.toml, defined in its own internal/config/
indexer.go rather than appended to the 21-struct config.go, and its
defaulting lives with it as IndexingConfig.withDefaults so finalize
delegates instead of growing. Paths default off work_dir, keeping the
two archied instances on one host from sharing an index. Documented in
config.example.toml.
internal/indexing keeps its own plain Config and does NOT import
internal/config, so it stays a straight diff against its tau original.
2. A failed index build was invisible. refreshAsync wrote the reason to a
database column with no reader and degraded to unindexed search in
silence — the failure mode that costs hours precisely because nothing
appears to be wrong. Every give-up path now logs, and a successful
build logs once.
The logger is resolved at the point of use, not in the constructor: a
Manager can be built as a struct literal (the ported tests do), and
constructor-only defaulting panicked on the build goroutine, where a panic
takes the daemon with it. Regression test covers the zero and nil Manager.
Allowlist (16.33). telegram.New was called with a nil allowlist and
isChatAllowed returned true whenever the list was empty, so any Telegram
user who found the bot could talk to it; AllowedChatIDs was not plumbed
into config, so there was no way to close it. Chat tools run with the
daemon's own authority, so this had to be fixed before wiring any real
tools to the chat agent.
Now chat.telegram.allowed_user_ids configures it and an empty list denies
everyone: a bot handle is public, so failing open is not a safe default.
The check matches the sender (from.id) rather than the chat, so adding
the bot to a group cannot be used to inherit access. Rejections log the
sender id and answer once, so a legitimate user missing from the list can
tell the bot is misconfigured rather than dead. Startup warns when the
gateway is enabled with an empty list.
The previous TestIsChatAllowed asserted 'empty allowlist allows all' --
it encoded the vulnerability -- and is replaced by fail-closed tests.
Command menu (16.34). SetMyCommands was never called, so Telegram showed
no menu and the commands Router implements were undiscoverable; asked
about /commands the LLM confidently answered it had none. The published
list mirrors what Router actually handles. Failure is logged, not fatal:
it costs discoverability, not function.
archied's container-mode agent tasks were all failing with "nats: no
responders available for request" in production. Root cause: pool.go's
selfNetwork() auto-detects the daemon's own Docker network by looking up
a container named after os.Hostname(), then joins spawned agent
containers to that same network so they can resolve "nats" by name.
On carina this detection was silently failing (wrong/stale hostname vs.
actual container ID) and returning "", so every per-task agent container
landed on the default bridge network instead — unable to resolve "nats",
never subscribing, hence "no responders" on every request.
selfNetwork() swallowed every failure silently (only logged on success),
so this had no diagnostic trail.
Fix: added Containers.Network config field (containers.network in
config.toml) so deployments can name the network explicitly instead of
relying on fragile self-detection; selfNetwork() remains as a fallback
but now logs a warning on every failure path so this doesn't silently
recur. Wired through container.Config and cmd/archied/main.go.
Both archied production containers (archie-core-archied-1 and -winter-1)
were crash-looping on carina with "forge token (engine \"env\", key
\"ARCHIE_GITHUB_TOKEN\") is required" despite being configured for gitea.
Root cause: the secrets-engine migration replaced [forge]'s flat
token_env string field with a {engine, key} struct (Forge.Token), but
dropped the old field entirely instead of keeping it as a deprecated
fallback like NATSConfig and TelegramConfig already do. TOML silently
ignores unknown keys, so deployed configs still using token_env had
their token config dropped without any warning, and finalize()
defaulted to demanding ARCHIE_GITHUB_TOKEN.
Fix: re-added Forge.TokenEnv and honor it in finalize() when the new
Token struct is unset, matching the existing NATS/Telegram pattern.
New-style [forge.token] still wins if both are present. Added
regression tests for both cases.
Operationally also fixed the two live configs on carina
(~/.config/archie/config.toml, winter.toml) to the new schema, and
added missing work_dir/db_path to winter.toml (its container had no
config-overlay, so it was defaulting to /root/.local/share/archie
instead of the mounted volume). Both containers verified healthy and
processing real issues after restart.
Adds internal/secret: a pluggable Engine interface (Name/Version/Resolve)
resolved through a Registry, so secrets backends (sops, Bitwarden Secrets
Manager, Vault/OpenBao) aren't hard-coded into the binary. Only the "env"
engine is compiled in; custom engines are Yaegi-interpreted .go plugins
loaded via Registry.LoadDir, mirroring internal/plugin's conventions
(secretextract provides the generated, nil-guarded symbol table for the
Yaegi/Go interface boundary).
config.Forge.TokenEnv is replaced end-to-end with config.Forge.Token
(secret.SecretRef{Engine, Key}) -- finalize() defaulting, forge token
resolution in cmd/archied/main.go, and per-identity validation that now
requires an explicit token instead of silently resolving to "". No
backwards-compat shim.
Provider.APIKeyEnv, NATSConfig.TokenEnv, and TelegramConfig.TokenEnv are
deliberately not migrated here -- they're forwarded by name to
ai-sdk/runtime and subprocess workers rather than resolved centrally,
which needs its own eager-resolve-then-inject design pass
(archie-core-xec.4). The three shipped engine plugins (sops, bws,
vault/openbao) are tracked separately as archie-core-xec.1-3.
Adversarially reviewed by a fresh agent with no implementation context;
fixed the two findings that survived (missing per-identity token
validation, underdocumented nil-wrapper Resolve edge case).
internal/secret package:
- Engine interface (Name, Version, Resolve) for pluggable secret backends
- SecretRef type replacing TokenEnv/APIKeyEnv string fields
- ResolveOrEnv for backward-compatible env-var fallback
- Built-in env engine registered by default
- Registry with Register/Get/Resolve/LoadDir (yaegi-based)
- DefaultRegistry() singleton for one-off resolution
- 12 tests, race-clean
Scoped to foundation only. Provider/NATS/Telegram migration deferred
to xec.4 (separate bead — those call sites forward env var names to
subprocesses/runtimes and need eager-resolve-then-inject, not a simple
field rename).
40/40 packages pass with -race.
Fix go vet/test failures by adding LinkBranch methods to stubForge, prCapturingForge, testForge, and fakeForge. Update test data from 'sam/archie' to 'acme/widget' and state label defaults from 'archie:*' to 'agent:*'. Add Taskfile.yml for project build automation. Implement container self-network detection so spawned agents join the daemon's Docker network.
- Introduce `-config-overlay` flag and `config.LoadOverlay()` to merge a base config with an overlay file, only overriding fields the overlay sets. This enables docker-compose to mount the base config from the host and apply only deployment-specific overrides.
- Create `internal/natsrpc` package with reusable NATS request/reply primitives (Envelope, Client, Call, RegisterAll, Respond). Migrate storerpc, worktreerpc, and forgerpc to use it, eliminating duplicated marshal/unmarshal and error handling.
- Create `internal/yaegiutil` package with shared interpreter construction (stdlib + extra symbols), generic export resolution (Resolve), and panic recovery (Safe). Migrate all Yaegi-based surfaces (gate scripts, daemon plugins, skill plugins, workflow stages, skill scripts) to use it, reducing boilerplate and centralizing panic safety.
- Simplify `config.docker.toml` to contain only overlay fields (paths, container config) and remove the duplicated repos list – the base config is now the single source of truth.
- Update docker-compose.yml to pass both -config and -config-overlay flags and mount the base config from the host.
- Add tests for LoadOverlay, DockerConfigOverlaysExampleConfig, Envelope, and yaegiutil utilities.
Add [containers].volume_ttl (default 72h). Persistent-storage repos get a
per-repo bare Git cache (--reference-if-able --dissociate) so task
worktrees clone fast without repeated full network clones, while staying
fully independent of the cache's lifecycle — cache expiry can never
corrupt an active or parked task's worktree. Docker repo volumes are
labeled as Archie-owned and swept non-forced (a volume still attached to a
running container survives and retries next cycle); the repo cache
directory is swept by mtime. Both cleanups run at daemon startup and each
poll cycle.
Filed archie-core-756 (repo-wide golangci-lint baseline) and archie-core-340
(intermittent JetStream TempDir teardown flake) as separate follow-ups
rather than scope-creeping them into this change.
Add internal/taskrun (Request/Response wire types) and
cmd/archie-agent/taskrun.go: runTask builds a workflow.Registry from the
container's own bind-mounted worktree, routes and runs the task's entire
workflow via workflow.Route/workflow.Run, using storerpc.Client/
forgerpc.Client for Store/Forge and a new hybridTrees that splits
Prepare/Push (proxied over worktreerpc — network ops needing the daemon's
credential) from CommitAll/Diff/ChangedFiles/ChangedLines (local git
against the mount).
Add config.TaskConfig.ToConfig() to rebuild a usable Config from the
curated payload, and storage.WorktreeMountDir (/data/worktree) — critical
fix: hybridTrees.Prepare discards the RPC response's host-side directory
and returns the container's fixed local mount path instead, since archied
and archie-agent see the same files at different paths.
Wired a queue-grouped core-NATS subscription on archie.taskrun.> in
cmd/archie-agent/main.go alongside the existing per-stage consumer, so
this is reachable in the running binary. End-to-end test drives the real
"bootstrap" workflow (no LLM) through real storerpc/forgerpc/worktreerpc
servers and a real local git remote — registry build, route, prepare,
commit, push, PR creation, and confirms the authoritative task state
lands in archied's store via RPC, not just in-memory.
archie-core-5zh.8 (daemon.go handoff) is unblocked.
Add config.TaskConfig/TaskForge and Config.ForTask(): a non-secret,
explicit-allowlist snapshot (Models, Budgets, Dispatch, DiffCapLines,
Notify, Forge.Host) of the fields workflow stages read from tc.Cfg.
Forge.TokenEnv is excluded even though it's just a var name, not a secret.
Maps are deep-copied to avoid aliasing the daemon's live config. Duration
gains JSON marshaling (string form, matching TOML); config.Repo gets full
json tags.
Groundwork for archie-core-5zh — not yet wired into workflow.TaskContext.
Add config.Repo.AllowConcurrent (allow_concurrent toml key). Repos opted in
skip the daemon's default FIFO same-repo task serialization while still
respecting [containers].max_concurrency globally. Worktrees are already keyed
per issue number, so opted-in repos don't collide on disk.
Daemon previously processed one task at a time. Add bounded concurrent
dispatch for SQLite and NATS agent modes, reusing [containers].max_concurrency
(0 = unlimited). Same-repository tasks stay FIFO-serialized to avoid worktree
conflicts; different repositories now run concurrently.
Unblocks archie-core-l1q (NATS transport) and archie-core-g1l
(per-repo allow_concurrent override).