Domain fields ParkClass/RemediationRounds landed in d6f61c2c; this is
the wire and daemon half. Task gains park_class (32) and
remediation_rounds (33) and maps both directions; the classified park
write crosses the wire as ParkTask on a narrow TaskParker contract
(TaskLifecycle stays under the 8-method cap), with conformance
coverage local + grpc including the stale-guard sentinel and
needs_human normalization. Every daemon park site now states its
class: terminal for a repo that left config and a retired identity,
transient for the environmental parks (worktree, storage, grants,
taskrun), and identityMayAct returns the class beside its reason.
The F2+F3 schema wave from the auto-fix/resume investigation, sequenced
together as one migration. Every failure funneled to one parked status
with free-text ParkReason, and Task.RetryCount doubled as the
operator-retry budget and the review-remediation round budget -- so N
operator retries ate the remediation budget, a repo-level round cap
could re-park a task an operator had just legally retried, and no
surface could answer what a park needed from an operator.
Park class (F2): a producer-recorded vocabulary in taskstate --
needs_human (the default, so an unclassified park always reads as
operator-actionable), transient (environmental; a requeue can succeed),
terminal (retrying is pointless). Recorded at the park site, never
inferred from reason text; NormalizeParkClass makes unknown values
persist as needs_human. Transition-to-parked defaults the class, so
every existing unclassified park site reads correctly with no call-site
churn; the classified ParkTask write follows for parks that know
better. Requeue, RetryTask and BeginRemediation clear the class back to
the default with the reason.
Split budgets (F3): Task.RemediationRounds is the remediation's own
budget; RetryCount stays the operator's. The round-cap stage counts and
caps rounds; operator retry keeps counting RetryCount and can drive a
task to dead without touching rounds. remediation_rounds is a
presence-gated migrator column written through Update.
Known state: proto fields, the ParkTask RPC, the staterpc mapping and
the daemon-side park-site classification follow in the wire half of
this wave (the proto parity test is intentionally red until then).
Sequencing steps 6 and 7 of pr-review-remediation.md: the consumer
landed in 052e350b, and these are the two sources that feed it.
Webhook (decision 2, low latency): the GitHub receiver decodes
pull_request_review and pull_request_review_comment events behind the
existing HMAC verification and publishes the same typed reaction the
poller produces, keyed source-independently so PublishUnique collapses
the two sources. Only submitted/created carry a verdict to remediate;
edited and dismissed are acknowledged. Reaction deliveries are
rate-limited per source (decision 6's 'add when the receiver gains a
second event family'), and the reaction path carries no dispatch
predicate -- eligibility is the consumer's owned-PR lookup.
Poll (both forges, the no-webhook backstop): one shared scan over all
pr_open tasks, each with the forge client its own identity owns
(reconcilePRs's shape), listing reviews and comments since per-task
persisted high-water marks and skipping the owning identity's bot user
(decision 5's own-comment exclusion, which the poll is positioned to
make identity-correct).
The cursors are two, not one: review IDs and comment IDs are independent
forge sequences, and a combined high-water mark would silently skip
reviews once a larger comment ID landed. watch_comment_id -- dead since
the comment-watch design it was created for never shipped -- carries the
comment cursor; review_cursor is a new presence-gated migrator column,
and SetReviewCursors is its guarded RPC (pr_open only, so cursors never
move under a run that owns the task). forge.ReviewComment gains ReviewID
so a comment is collectable into its review's unit (decision 5) on both
forges, and forge.Review gains Body so poll-delivered reviews carry
their summary.
Note: the store/proto/facade half of this work landed early in a65eae24
under a release session's message -- a shared-checkout collision, kept
rather than rewritten; that commit carries the review_cursor migration
and the SetReviewCursors contract, this one carries the producers.
Beads sync to a Dolt remote, so anything written into one is published.
Two beads filed earlier today named an operator host, its internal
address and its filesystem paths -- the tracker was treated as a private
store, which it is not.
The rule is stated where the tracker is described, next to the existing
one about .beads/ never reaching a commit, because it is the same class:
the tracker is not a private store. Host-specific facts belong in the
operator's memos instance, which a bead may point at.
The remediate workflow was registered but had no trigger: the reaction
stream was provisioned, the envelope, resolver and owned-PR lookup all
landed, yet nothing consumed the stream (pr-review-remediation.md's
sequencing left the consumer for this step). The daemon now drains the
reaction stream each cycle, before the task drain, so a reaction can be
claimed in the same pass that carried it.
Per decision 3, the store's owned-PR lookup is the authorization
boundary: an unmatched, merged or closed PR drops with a counter, and a
public reaction can never start an agent against a foreign repository.
Per decision 5, a review is the unit of remediation -- its comment
events are appended to the unit while it is queued and dropped once the
run is claimed (the round cap bounds the exchange); a standalone comment
is its own unit of one; approved reviews never remediate; and archie's
own comments, matched on the owning identity's bot user, are excluded so
its replies cannot retrigger it.
The guarded BeginRemediation/UpdateReviewPayload store methods are the
dedup: the pr_open -> queued transition carries the review unit in the
same write, so re-delivered reactions fail the status guard instead of
starting a second round. Both are new StateStoreService RPCs following
the Requeue shape, covered by the local/grpc conformance battery.
Implements docs/prds/artifact-sender.md (Approved). archie-core now sends
generated artifacts to the offloaded.dev collaborative editor, whose
POST /api/artifacts route, bearer service token, PocketBase-backed
versions and idempotency semantics are the receiving contract.
- [artifacts] config section: base_url + token SecretRef with a
token_env fallback naming WORKSPACE_INGEST_TOKEN. An empty base_url
disables the sender entirely; a base_url with an unresolvable token
disables it with a warning, because a missing credential disables a
capability rather than stopping the daemon.
- internal/infrastructure/artifactsync: one-method Publish seam in the
Courier posture, full source per publish (versions of record are
snapshots), 503 retried three times with backoff, 401/400 surfaced
immediately with the field reason, deterministic request ids
(artifact:pr-review:<owner>/<repo>#<n>).
- ReviewReport gains a pure markdown renderer in internal/domain/workflow:
summary, one subsection per finding with the failure scenario and
disposition when present, verified properties as a checked-clean list.
- The daemon's PR reviewer publishes after a completed review when the
sender is configured, records the editor deep link on the result, and
degrades a failed publish to a log line -- publishing never fails the
producing work.
Lane A. EventsSince no longer relies on events.id being monotonic: it
orders by (at, id), where at is written in a fixed-width layout so
lexicographic order is chronological order, and id is only a
deterministic tie-break. The cursor crosses the wire as an opaque string
and rides the SSE id: field, so EventSource's own Last-Event-ID resume
keeps working untouched. A malformed or legacy cursor degrades to
"from the beginning" rather than failing the feed.
events.id keeps its int64 type and row-identity meaning; no
push/subscribe RPC is added.
EventsSince no longer depends on events.id being monotonic. The feed now
pages a total order over (at, id): at is a fixed-width, lexicographically
sortable UTC timestamp (storecontract.EventCursorLayout) and id is only a
deterministic tie-break for rows sharing one timestamp. The cursor is an
opaque string on the wire (EventsSinceRequest.cursor), carried verbatim as
the SSE id: field and echoed back via Last-Event-ID, so EventSource resume
needs no client change.
A new idempotent migration normalises pre-existing RFC3339Nano at values to
the fixed-width layout before finishTaskMigration, and idx_events_at backs
the new query. Legacy integer and garbage cursors degrade to "from the
beginning", preserving the old failed-ParseInt-yields-0 behaviour.
Amends the "Dashboard live event delivery" decision's cursor-cannot-skip
justification, which previously rested on commit-order id assignment.
tools/cron ANDs the two day fields where Vixie cron ORs them, so
0 0 1 * 1 means Monday the 1st, not the 1st or any Monday. State the
deviation in the ScheduleCron comment and pin it with a test.
The event-capture tables (captures, mappings, bindings, binding_dispatches,
playbook_dispatches) now live in PocketBase-owned collections and their ids
are opaque record ids rather than autoincrement integers. The task lifecycle
stays on SQLite: tasks/transitions/events carry FIFO claim ordering, id-cursor
pagination and the task-grant map, none of which gain anything from being
hand-editable. binding_dispatches.task_id is the single seam and stays an
integer addressing that store.
BREAKING: CapturedEvent.Id, Mapping.Id, Binding.Id and Binding.MappingId are
strings on the wire, as are the ids in the capture/mapping/binding requests.
RecordDispatchRequest.task_id is deliberately unchanged.
What the collections buy, beyond storage: a payload nobody has modelled yet is
inspectable, a mapping is editable at runtime, and a binding's relation to its
mapping is enforced. The old schema declared no FOREIGN KEY on that link, so a
dangling mapping_id was previously possible and is now refused.
Behaviour preserved deliberately, each recovered from the SQLite version
rather than reimplemented from memory:
- draft -> pending_approval -> armed, with approval only from
pending_approval and an edit always returning a binding for re-approval
- one binding per source, guarded on insert, update and approve
- an empty secret on update keeps the stored one, so an edit form that does
not echo it back cannot silently disarm a binding
- ErrMappingNotFound / ErrBindingNotFound on a missing delete target
- sentinels are re-exported from storecontract, never redefined: staterpc
matches on exact canonical message to rehydrate them, so a second
definition would break errors.Is across the wire invisibly
Two implementation notes worth keeping:
- at-most-once dispatch is now a unique index rather than INSERT OR IGNORE.
Only the unique-violation maps to ErrAlreadyDispatched; any other save
error is returned, because treating them all as "already recorded" would
turn the ledger into a silent at-least-once dispatcher.
- captures store received_at themselves at nanosecond precision in a
fixed-width layout. PocketBase autodates are millisecond and record ids
are random, so same-millisecond captures would otherwise order
arbitrarily; the old store got insertion order free from autoincrement.
- ListUndispatchedCaptures is raw SQL: the anti-join is a subquery and
PocketBase's filter DSL is not SQL. A read fires no hooks either way.
Adds tool_calls, which had no persistence at all: tool calls only ever reached
the on-disk task log, readable as text but never queryable or watchable.
Nothing writes it yet.
The binding secret cipher moves with the bindings it protects.
The schedules feature no longer runs on it: jobs live in the state store
as the schedules control-plane document, read and written through the
control-plane client (scheduleResourceStore), and the legacy jobs.json
migration into that document has run its course. What remained of
internal/infrastructure/cronstore was 1,600 lines of file store, OS-level
cross-process locking and schema-versioned JSON envelope -- plus the
schedule vocabulary held hostage inside it.
The vocabulary moves to internal/domain/scheduling, which is where
migration-decisions already said a schedules vocabulary belongs: a domain
vocabulary package must not import infrastructure. JobSpec, Target,
Payload, the kind constants, Schedule and Duration move unchanged -- same
wire shape, same JSON tags -- with the two sentinel errors callers
matched outside the package (ErrJobNotFound, ErrScheduleUnsupported) and
ErrInvalidSpec, which the schedule arithmetic itself raises. The store's
own sentinels die with the store.
The legacy migration path (migrateLegacySchedules, readLegacyJobs) goes
with it: its only dependency was cronstore.Open, and its work is done.
crondelivery keeps its consumer-owned contracts; the compile-time
assertions that pinned *cronstore.Store move to the production
implementation, scheduleResourceStore, in internal/app/archied. The
package's fixtures swap the real file store for an in-memory one with
the same Get/MarkRun/Due semantics, so the run-recording acceptance test
still asserts against real schedule arithmetic.
A future storage backend (PocketBase) implements the same vocabulary.
A tool call rendered as a label line plus a ```text fence. Telegram draws a
fenced block as a full code widget (language header bar, copy button, panel),
and the block parser inserts a spacer paragraph before every block, so one
call cost four rendered elements. Three calls filled the screen to show three
word counts.
Every toolPreview path already summarises to a single line, so the fence was
never wrapping more than one. Drop it and put the preview on the header line.
Tool lines now join with a hard break rather than a bare newline: a soft
break would space-join them into one run-on paragraph, and a blank line would
put the spacer back. Three calls are now three consecutive blocks.
Two hardcoded values go with it. The status word is printed only when the
outcome is not success, since every line otherwise read "done" and
distinguished nothing. The icon is no longer a literal in the renderer: each
builtin declares its own on tools.Tool (not on Schema, which is the model's
contract), the provider carries it into ToolEntry, and the turn snapshots the
registry's icons alongside its tool set. A tool that declares none renders
without one rather than borrowing a generic wrench.
Carries a dependency upgrade (go.mod, go.sum, tools/go.mod, tools/go.sum).
Phase 1 of dynamic curator definitions (archie-core-trnd.1):
- ToolBuilder implementation resolves declared tool names from the
daemon's process-wide tool registry, returning exactly the declared
set and failing closed on an unknown name.
- curatorLLMRunner now carries ChatRequest.Tools and MaxSteps into
core.GenerateOptions and widens ChatResult with the executed tool
calls so a pass can attribute its actions.
- One generic DefinitionEngine interprets a Definition (Manifest +
name/enabled/instructions): its pass composes instructions with the
built declared tool set, runs the model loop, and records an action
per tool invocation.
- [[curators]] config definitions carry the Manifest shape verbatim plus
name/enabled/instructions; a definition missing interval is refused,
never defaulted.
- Idle curators are observable: the runtime logs a debug line when Check
reports not-due.
Two loose ends from the sign-in work, both mine.
A browser that cannot authenticate now goes to the provider when this instance has
a sign-in flow, instead of being shown the shared-token paste page -- a page that
cannot help it, because the token it would paste is not what this instance accepts.
A refusal that signing in again cannot fix, a suspended identity, is still answered
rather than redirected: sending someone back to a provider that already authenticated
them would hide the reason they were refused.
ProviderSession.Expired is removed. Nothing called it, and it must not: expiry is
the verifier's check, and a second opinion about whether a token is still good is
exactly the sort of near-duplicate that drifts from the authority it copies. The
browser path re-runs the flow when verification refuses, which is one rule rather
than two.
Verified: task check exit 0 on this tree.
The last gap in the identity boundary: enabling a provider used to lock browsers
out, because nothing could turn a sign-in into the credential the dashboard already
verifies. Now a browser completes the authorization code flow with PKCE and the
identity reaching the request context is the person who signed in.
The audience is requested AT THE AUTHORIZATION ENDPOINT, not only at the token
endpoint. Infra measured that a provider asked otherwise returns the audience empty,
and this dashboard then refuses a perfectly valid token -- a failure that reads as a
signing fault and is actually a missing query parameter. A test asserts the
parameter is present, so it cannot quietly go missing.
The flow is the libraries': discovery, the code exchange, PKCE generation and the
challenge transformation are go-oidc and x/oauth2, so archie writes no protocol. The
token returned by the exchange is verified through the SAME Verifier a presented
token goes through, and the identity is then resolved through the same rule -- one
Resolve now shared by Authenticate and the callback, so a browser sign-in cannot be
accepted on terms a presented token would be refused on.
Archie still issues no session. The callback stores the PROVIDER's token in an
HttpOnly cookie and every later request re-verifies it, so what archie holds cannot
outlive the provider's own decision. The callback checks the state it issued, and
expires the state and PKCE verifier cookies on use.
The sign-in routes mount on the bypass mux because they are how a caller becomes
authenticated; gating them behind the credential they obtain would make signing in
impossible. The client secret is never a flag: -oidc-client-secret-env names the
environment variable holding it, so it cannot reach a process listing or a log line.
No client id means no sign-in route and token verification is unaffected, which is
what an agent-only deployment wants.
Evidence, produced by driv·ng the flow rather than the seam:
internal/webui/api_tasks_actor_test.go's TestBrowserSignInRecordsTheSignedInPerson
walks sign-in -> callback -> cookie -> action and asserts the recorded actor is the
signed-in person with human_approved. TestCallbackRefusesAMismatchedState asserts a
replayed state is refused before any credential is verified.
internal/infrastructure/oidc/flow_test.go runs the real flow against a test
provider's own authorize and token endpoints, asserting the audience parameter, the
PKCE challenge, a successful exchange, and a refused wrong verifier.
Verified: task check exit 0 on this tree.
The transport could carry an actor and nothing filled it. It does now, so a
dashboard approval is recorded as the person whose credential verified, and an
agent's token is recorded as the agent's action -- for an agent, agent_approved;
for a person, human_approved; and for a caller whose identity archie could not
verify, task_approved, which claims nothing about who did it.
The actor travels the path the action takes: webui reads it from the request
context the middleware resolved, carries it in the gateway request, the daemon
passes it through the in-process adapter, and the NATS request body carries it to
the service that records it. Scope stays separate from actor at every hop, because
scope is which task a caller may touch and the actor is who touched it.
A chat channel's bound identity is an actor too: a bot acting on its own channel's
task is recorded as an agent's action rather than a person's, via ActorFromScope,
whose empty kind is what keeps it out of human_approved. The agent-facing
task_action tool passes that identity and never input["identity"].
The UI process's credential check is now filled by endpoint references rather than
by configuration: -oidc-issuer and -oidc-audience on archie-ui, two URLs the
process already understands the shape of, with the verifier built in Run because
cmd/ parses flags and nothing else. The UI package still never reads config, and a
configured provider that cannot be reached fails boot rather than falling back to
the gate that names nobody.
Evidence for this change, stated as measured: go build ./... and go vet ./... are
clean, and every package this touches passes -- webui, domain/taskactions,
infrastructure/taskactions, infrastructure/gatewayrpc, gateway, app/archieui,
app/archied, domain/messaging, channels/telegram, cmd/archie-ui. task check could
not be run to completion: it fails in cmd/archie-messaging on an untracked
internal/buildinfo package another lane has in flight, which is not this change and
was left untouched. The end-to-end flip is covered in
internal/webui/api_tasks_actor_test.go: a person's credential produces a record
naming that person with human_approved, an agent's produces agent_approved, an
unverified request produces task_approved with no actor, and a request carrying
forged actor fields cannot name one.
The verifier was a library nothing called. A request now carries a credential or
is refused: webui.Server.Authenticate resolves a presented bearer token to the
identity that may act, and requireIdentity attaches it to the request context.
With a provider configured that check replaces the shared token, so every request
resolves to a named identity or is refused; with none, the shared-token gate stays
for a loopback instance.
Nothing about the caller is read from the request. The subject comes from the
credential the provider signed and the identity is the record that subject is bound
to, which is what makes attribution possible at all: a caller cannot assert who it
is, it can only present what the provider gave it. A test sends an
X-Archie-Identity header and an actor field in the body alongside a valid token and
asserts the resolved identity is still the credential's.
Refusals follow HTTP's own distinction: absent or unverifiable credentials are 401
and name the scheme, while a credential that verified for an identity that may not
act is 403. Each is covered, because a refusal path with no test is a path nobody
has watched refuse.
The two state-store RPCs the dashboard needs to resolve a subject exist:
ResolveIdentitySubject and BindIdentitySubject, with the client implementing
identity.SubjectBinding (a narrower contract than Repository, so the administrative
facade keeps its shape) and the server answering Unavailable rather than pretending
when a process has no binding store.
chat.proto carries the actor for the next step: actor_id, actor_kind and
principal_id on ApplyOperatorTaskActionRequest, regenerated here. The transport can
now carry an attribution and nothing fills it yet, which is why the dashboard still
records task_approved rather than a human attribution.
Not wired in production yet, and worth stating plainly: dep.Authenticate is a seam
nothing sets, because the dashboard is served only by the UI process and that
process is documented to take endpoint references only -- there is deliberately no
config.Config in it. OIDC settings must therefore arrive as flags there, which is an
existing design boundary I did not want to cross unilaterally. config.Oidc exists
so the daemon-side wiring has somewhere to read from.
Verified: task check exit 0 after this commit; focused webui run records the
resolution and all four refusals.
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action
records which identity acted and whose authority it used.
resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer
token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie
compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no
client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an
identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another
service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an
unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise.
identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it
refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that
did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a
verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act.
The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is
used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended
identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is
archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token.
The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects
keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a
different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim
one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower
than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole
identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not
need a new RPC to satisfy it.
attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting
identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added
through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced
by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an
agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved,
a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing
approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so
"approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted.
Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is
never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token
and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard.
That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is
not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals
are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording
nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard
to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs
(ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite:
the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second
implementation of it.
Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque
authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified
against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256
on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer
https://auth.catlow.cloud.
Pass 2 of archie-core-nx30. Pass 1 typed each prior action's result in
the CEL env; this pass wires that typing through the loader, module
schemas, and daemon, and removes the now-redundant id classifier.
Loader shape (D2): one playbook is exactly one workflow action
(unchanged) OR one or more module actions; the shapes never mix. Mixed,
unsupported, or zero actions fail the load naming the playbook.
playbook.Load now takes a KindSchemas source (a small interface this
package defines, satisfied by *module.ModuleRegistry) so playbook grows
no module import. Callers: bootstrap.loadEDAPlaybooks passes b.modules;
daemon and playbook tests pass module.New().
Per-playbook env (D3): each action's when and args values compile against
an env built from the PRIOR actions' ids typed by their kinds' Result
structs (expr.NewEnv(DeclaredResult{ID,Type})). event stays dyn. An
undeclared id, a forward reference, or a field the kind's Result lacks is
a compile-time undefined-field error.
Args schema (D4): an args key the kind's Args struct does not define
fails the load. An args VALUE whose compiled type mismatches the field
type is left as a named gap (not cheap without leaking cel-go type kinds
into playbook and handling dyn reads); a wrong-typed value still surfaces
at module invoke, not load.
D1: Store.Dispatch routes workflow playbooks only, so an action playbook
cannot hijack the definition pin. bootstrap.loadEDAPlaybooks logs a
visible Warn (not debug) for each loaded action playbook naming it and
stating it does not execute yet.
D5: ModuleRegistry.Invoke is deliberately schema-agnostic (the stored
invoker is type-erased and returns map[string]any). The map-to-Result
marshalling belongs in the coordinator named by the doc, which is the
t2db.31 run path and out of scope here.
Classifier enumeration (E) and verdict, all proven for a typed action
playbook via CEL (expr.NewEnv with a declared log.Result id):
unknown id CEL compile (undefined field) -> delete unknownActionReference
literal map index actions["x"] CEL compile (no _[_] overload) -> covered
computed index actions[key] CEL compile (undeclared 'key') -> covered
dynamic index actions[event.name] CEL compile (no _[_] overload) -> covered
"x" in actions CEL compile (no @in overload) -> covered
size(actions) CEL compile (no size overload) -> covered
actions.all(...) CEL compile (not a range) -> covered
actions == {} CEL compile (no _==_ overload) -> covered
bare actions compiles; KEPT classifier -> retained resolvable check
unknownActionReference is deleted; actionReferences/ActionReferences are
kept solely for the bare-actions spelling CEL does not reject.
Declare `actions` as a per-playbook object type with one field per
declared prior action id, each typed by that kind's Go Result struct
(multi-action-playbooks.md D3). A data-driven types.Provider exposes
lower-cased Result fields to the checker, so a result-field typo, an
undeclared id, or a dynamic actions read is a compile-time rejection.
Evaluation still reads an ordinary map value; no custom ref.Val adapter
is needed.
NewEnv now takes the declared results (an empty set is valid); `event`
stays dyn. The playbook loader keeps its current single-action boundary,
so its zero-declared-results env is unchanged and playbook.go needed no
call-site edit. Two playbook tests are updated to assert the new
compile-time rejection semantics.
archie-core-8cda.6.8's carrier. The service now records channel lifecycle and has
nowhere to put it: /api/channels answered with nothing because
webui.Server.Channels had no production source, and reload answered 501 for the
same reason. This adds the surface the register decided on, following the split
archie-core-ymut established for config snapshots -- a pair of administrative RPCs
whose writer is one process and whose reader is the UI -- and wires both ends.
Wire and store: PutChannelStatus / ListChannelStatus, with ChannelStatus carrying
id, name, state, detail, configured, reload_supported and observed_at. The store
holds one row per channel and replaces the reported set, so a channel the reporter
no longer mentions is deleted rather than left standing as a stale "running"; an
empty report clears the table, because hosting no channels is a fact worth
reporting. A row without an id is refused: it could never be replaced or removed
by a later report.
Writer: the service publishes on every lifecycle transition through a coalescing
signal -- a burst of transitions is one write, since a reader only wants the latest
state of every channel -- plus a start-up report and a final report after shutdown,
so a stopped service leaves the store honest. A failed write is logged and retried
on the next signal; the dashboard losing channel state is worth a warning and never
worth failing a channel start over.
Reader: webui.Server.Channels becomes a source rather than a concrete manager, and
webui.RemoteChannelStatus reads the store the way RemoteConfigView reads the config
snapshot. A store it cannot reach reports nothing rather than a stale "running",
and a state the reader does not recognise is carried through rather than dropped.
The contract's own index gains the group in the same change that adds the RPCs --
a surface the grouped table does not list is one nobody finds -- and the count moves
to 51. The register records why the surface is the State Store rather than a
resource kind, and why reload gets its own surface rather than a field here: reading
status must not be able to retrigger an action, a transient request is not
distinguishable from state once anything polls it, and it would invert the
writer/reader relationship the precedent establishes.
Verified: task check exit 0. New coverage: the store's replace-the-set semantics
and its refusal of an id-less row, the reader's mapping including an unknown state,
and the publisher's start-up, transition and final reports.
Add the playbook_dispatches at-most-once ledger (docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md
gap 2) and the record-then-invoke coordinator helper, with the cross-process
plumbing the State Store boundary requires.
- proto: RecordPlaybookDispatch and DeletePlaybookDispatches RPCs (string keys)
- storecontract: PlaybookDispatcher interface (no *sql.Tx, reuses ErrAlreadyDispatched)
- store: playbook_dispatches table + INSERT OR IGNORE dedup + delete-by-playbook
- staterpc: client/server methods and Deps field; error sentinel survives the hop
- eda/playbook: InvokeOnce record-before-invoke helper, keyed on
(playbook, version, event, action) with a "1" action-position fallback
The ledger is administrative-only: task-scoped grants never reach it, matching
TaskGrants' Update/Transition/InsertEvent allowlist. Not wired into the daemon
workflow pin; the production call site arrives with the first side-effecting
position.
Replace the per-form actions select/index special-casing with one AST
visitor that counts actions identifier nodes and statically-resolvable
accesses. resolvable = (identCount == staticCount): any actions read not
consumed by a static access (non-literal index, in operator, size, bare
actions, equality) now fails playbook load instead of slipping through to
a runtime miss.
One Router serves every channel and named itself "web", so Source.Platform -- the
FIRST component of the session natural key, and the platform GetByChannel filters
on -- was a constant, true of no channel but the dashboard. Two consequences
followed: the per-user identity policy was real code that no production call site
reached with a real channel name, and a curator pass's write to agent-user memory
could not be read back by the turn that wrote it, because that turn resolved no
UserID.
The channel now travels with the message. Frontends name the channel they carry
(pb.Message.platform: telegram, email, webhook, web), and the Gateway stamps the
session from it, falling back to its own name when a sender names none -- which is
what every existing row holds and what a frontend that does not participate keeps
doing.
Identity resolution reads the platform off the inbound rather than closing over a
channel name, so carriesPersonIdentity finally decides something in production:
telegram and email resolve a person, the dashboard and a webhook resolve nothing,
and an unknown platform fails closed.
Deliberately NOT changed, because it is where this could quietly widen scope:
TurnRunnerConfig.Channel still keys tool availability, so no channel gains or
loses a tool here. Only session lookup and identity follow the message's platform.
Consequence the maintainer accepted: a chat whose active session came from /new or
/branch re-resolves once, since GetByChannel now filters on the channel's name. A
chat with no /new re-resolves onto the same deterministic session id and heals
silently.
Verified: gateway, archied, gatewayrpc, messaging, webui, channels and cmd suites,
go vet ./..., go build ./..., golangci-lint run ./... (0 issues), docs:check.
New contracts: TestResolveSessionKeyStampsTheMessagesPlatform, the per-platform
identity table, and the transport-context wire round trip.
A webhook set SenderID to its configured route path. The turn path reads that
field through a per-channel resolver which refuses webhook, but the session
curator derives its participant from the raw field with no channel filter, so a
webhook session with exactly one distinct sender and one extracted fact wrote
agent-user memory addressed to User: "/hooks/...". Nothing reads it, and every
pass added more, because the facts are identical strings with no dedup.
docs/prds/memory-engine-unification.md criterion 7 requires that a route path
never become a user identity.
Clear it at the producer rather than teaching every consumer which channels are
lying: a route path is a source, not a person, so it no longer enters SenderID.
It still keys the inbound rate limit, where it is the documented per-source
budget for webhooks (config.RateLimitConfig), so it travels in the new
transport-only Inbound.BudgetKey -- carried on the wire beside Page, never
persisted, and never read as an identity.
pb.Message gains budget_key (field 9) for the same reason page (field 7) exists:
transport context that rides with an inbound message and is deliberately absent
from storedProto's rendering of a canonical record.
The curator needs no change. An empty SenderID already fails closed as an
unidentified user message, which is the path a dashboard session takes, and
sessionParticipant's existing skip covers it; the test name now says so.
The settings and persona watches were launched once, at boot, and ended on the
first stream failure: the goroutine returned, so every later stored change for
that kind was silently never applied and the process recovered only by
restarting (archie-core-yrmr).
Both watches now run one keepWatch goroutine per kind, which re-establishes the
stream in place after a bounded backoff, resuming after the last version an
update carried and stopping on ctx cancellation -- which the loop watches for
itself, so a stream that never closes cannot hold up shutdown. A first open that
fails still fails the boot that asked for it.
The reconnect delay is decided by the attempt that just ended, and only by that
(attemptHealthy, retryDelay): an attempt is healthy iff it delivered an update
this watch had not handled, or it outlived a window that is a strict multiple of
the delay it would otherwise be charged. A healthy attempt returns the delay to
the minimum, a failed one doubles it up to the cap, and the window moves with
the ladder instead of sitting at its floor. The acceptance of a reopen is the
wrong unit: gRPC takes the stream before the handler reads anything, and
controlplane.Server.Watch answers a store it cannot read by ending the stream,
so during the outage this reconnect exists for every reopen is accepted and
every stream ends carrying nothing -- measured with the real server and client
over bufconn, 4.0 watch RPCs a second across 2s of store outage with retry_in
pinned at 250ms when that acceptance is read as health. A window fixed at the
minimum is the same defect for the likelier shape of outage: a store that has
stopped answering does not error at once, it stalls until its read times out,
and an attempt that takes longer to fail than the minimum outlives that window
on every attempt -- measured in the end-to-end outage test before the change, a
300ms stall left the ladder flat at 250ms/250ms/250ms/250ms while the store
never answered a read. Both shapes are charged now, and the outage test drives
three of them (an immediate error, a 300ms stall, and a stall as long as the
delay that rung would be charged) up four rungs of the ladder, each logged retry
held to the delay actually waited.
The wait is injected (wait, production passes waitFor), because the ladder was
only ever asserted through the retry_in attribute: a loop that logged one delay
and waited another would have reported a growing ladder and reopened on a
schedule of its own. TestKeepWatchWaitsTheDelayItCharged reads the delays back
as values and asserts the ladder, and the outage test's gaps catch a wait that
returns without waiting. The retargeted reset test is joined by
TestKeepWatchChargesAReopenTheStoreMerelyAccepted: a delay reset by the
acceptance of a reopen charges every attempt of the outage from the minimum, and
nothing pinned that before.
The watch returns on cancellation without draining what the producer left for
it, so controlplane.Client's producers stop on the same context instead of
parking on a send no reader will ever take -- reproduced 40/40 times as a
goroutine still blocked on an undelivered send after keepWatch returned, one
goroutine and one channel leaked per kind at every exit. That cross-package
coupling is load-bearing in both directions and is stated as such; the two
producers now share the one stream reader that carries it.
A Recv failure is the store being unreachable, not a document this process
refused, and docs/prds/control-plane-apply-status.md ("What can be reported, and
what cannot") is what forbids reporting it as a failure of the process it
affected. The record is now written only for an update that carries a version,
which is what controlplane.Client emits for a document that would not validate
and never for a transport failure. Reporting the transport failure would also
overwrite the text of a standing refusal, replacing the one message that says
what to fix with "control-plane unavailable". The record is not un-clearable of
itself -- Report overwrites it on the next applied version -- but a store that
never changes again leaves the one stamp standing, and the process must not
write it at all. That emission is the whole of the failure path and now has the
test it lacked, from the producer's side:
TestWatchClientsDeliverARecvFailureAsAVersionlessUpdate pins that a Recv failure
is handed over carrying the mapped error and no version, and that a stream the
server closed and one that ended with the watch's context are not updates at all.
The refused version is deliberately not re-offered: the resume point moves past
it, so an edit only a newer build can decode cannot become a hot loop. Both ends
of that contract are pinned now: the watch stub filters its scripted stream by
AfterVersion as the server does, and controlplane.Server.Watch's own filter has
a test for the first time. The apply-status reporter's 30s re-stamp is unchanged
(TestRestampKeepsAReportedFailure).
A loaded playbook now decides a real task's workflow. The wiring point is the
daemon's definition pin (Daemon.resolveWorkflowID, consumed by
pinWorkflowFromCollection), not pollNATS/publishTask as the design doc
assumed: routing moved out of the agent process when workflow definitions
became database rows pinned before dispatch, so the pin is the one place a
task's workflow is chosen.
Precedence: an explicit Task.Workflow (the waiting_human -> approved requeue)
still wins, then a matching playbook, then workflow.ResolveWorkflowID's
existing label/kind bindings. A playbook naming an undefined workflow is a
reported failure that parks the task rather than a silent fall-through to the
binding's choice -- the operator bound that trigger deliberately.
Store.Dispatch returns the selected workflow name plus the matching playbook's
id and version, instead of a compiled workflow.Workflow: the production caller
decides against the active definition collection, and the id/version are the
first two components of the resolved gap-2 idempotency key. The playbook
package no longer imports internal/domain/workflow.
The shipped example's `when` read event.priority, a field no intake supplies,
so it could never have fired once wired. Both examples now read the event
surface playbookInput really builds, and label-trigger.yaml documents the axis
an instance defines for itself: trigger.kind is the closed workintake
vocabulary because a kind addresses a NATS subject, while trigger.labels is
free-form and binds an operator's own taxonomy to a workflow.
Module/Channel/Forge positions stay rejected at load; they need the
playbook_dispatches ledger first (archie-core-t2db.24).
Closes archie-core-t2db.23
The step's contract said it diffs "the worktree". It does not: Trees.Diff
reports the merge base against HEAD, so only committed work is visible.
A stored definition that placed gate.diff-rules before the step that
commits therefore ran every rule against an empty diff, found nothing and
returned nil, letting the run proceed -- the "load and check nothing"
failure the same file's settings validation exists to prevent, and
indistinguishable in the run's events from a change that passed.
The rules now read the committed change, and a run that read no committed
change while the worktree still holds uncommitted work fails on the spot,
naming the step it must follow. The count of added lines read is logged on
every run, so "checked nothing" is visible rather than silent.
Telling those two apart needs a fact Trees does not carry, so it arrives as
the same shape of optional capability changeStatsReader is: an unexported
interface in the domain, implemented where git is actually read
(worktree.Manager.HasUncommittedChanges, which excludes ignored files the
way CommitAll's own status check does) and forwarded by hybridTrees, the
Trees every production run uses. A Trees implementation that cannot answer
is refused rather than assumed clean: for a gate, silence about the change
is a failure, not a pass.
The four remaining review findings are recorded, not fixed, in
archie-core-ze7y (the escalated .archie/stages/*.go decision, P1, which now
blocks archie-core-8szi), archie-core-4kbg (discoverability),
archie-core-s1jz (hunk-header and threshold hardening) and archie-core-vof9
(retry keeps the pinned definition, so a rule cannot be unblocked by
editing it).
Part of archie-core-8szi. Restores the deleted .archie/gate.go Check() behaviour
as a registered, declarative workflow step type: RE2 rules matched against the
committed diff, per-rule level (error parks with findings in Detail, warn logs),
file:line preserved, registered through the workflowsteps provider set. The
.archie/stages equivalent (an argv-running step) is deliberately not landed and
is held for the maintainer's trust-boundary decision.
steps.go's StageYaegiGate tells the operator to migrate the deleted
.archie/gate.go hook to a registered YAML workflow step, and
BuiltinStepRegistry() exposed only the six shipped workflows' own stages,
so there was nothing to migrate to. What that hook did, from 02720c8e
which deleted it: it read the worktree's repository-authored Go,
exporting Check(GateContext{Diff, ChangedFiles, Dir, BaseRef, Repo})
[]Finding, where each Finding carried a level ("error" blocked the run,
"warn" was advisory) and an optional file and line, and it inspected the
committed diff.
gate.diff-rules is that behaviour as a typed step: operator-written rules
in a stored definition -- per-rule level, RE2 pattern, optional path and
exclude_path scope, message -- matched against the ADDED lines of the
diff against the base branch, reported with their new-file line numbers.
An error-level finding parks the run with the findings in the park
reason; a warn-level finding is logged and nothing else. Unlike the hook
it replaces, no code is read out of the repository being worked on, and
the rules are versioned and audited with the definition they live in.
The settings are validated at the factory, which runs where a definition
is validated and again where it is compiled: a missing level, pattern or
message, an unknown level or settings key, and an expression that is not
a RE2 all refuse the definition rather than load and check nothing.
It arrives through the extension point archie-core-fwmp landed: a
repo-hooks provider in internal/infrastructure/workflowsteps, so both
roots that resolve a step type (the State Store's validating side and the
daemon's workflow-definitions client) register it at once.
Deliberately not landed: a step type for .archie/stages/*.go, whose
faithful equivalent is running a configured command. That would make the
stored workflow-definitions resource a command-execution surface on the
agent host, which is a maintainer's trust decision, not this lane's; it
is escalated, so steps.go's repo-stages error stays as it is.
Third review pass on the step-vocabulary shape, one fix per finding.
P1, roots unpinned. The agreement test built its own manager and injected it, so
it pinned the resolution sites and not the roots that decide the provider set; a
root regressed to workflow.NewManager() (no shipped stages) left go test green.
archied now resolves through one unit, stepVocabulary (step_vocabulary.go), and
agentworker's productionWorkerDependencies is exercised directly:
internal/app/agentworker/step_vocabulary_test.go and
internal/app/archied/step_vocabulary_test.go assert each root's manager resolves
the shared provider set's shipped stages and accepts a provider registered
through it. RunStateStore and openStateStoreAdapter own a SQLite file and a gRPC
dial, so their calls are pinned by source position, the way
composition_order_test.go pins the memory-engine ordering.
P2-B, dead vocabulary. archie-messaging registered a step vocabulary it never
resolved (its only control-plane call is RuntimeChatConfig) and could fail
startup on it before the State Store target guard. The workflow-definitions
surface is now its own type, controlplane.WorkflowDefinitionsClient, so the
vocabulary is a constructor dependency of the one surface that resolves step
types and of nothing else. The messaging root no longer imports workflowsteps.
P2-C, nil manager. A nil *workflow.Manager dereferenced on every resolution path.
stepRegistry and CompilePinnedWorkflow now refuse with an error naming the wiring
mistake; TestNilStepVocabularyFailsClosedAtEveryResolutionSite pins the refusal.
Claim-vs-code corrections: agreement is stated as within one build (vocabulary.go,
stepRegistry, openStateStoreControlPlane, openStateStoreAdapter); the Yaegi claim
now says no bridge to StepFactory has been built and cites
internal/secret/secretextract; the provider set names its three roots;
Manager.Register's ordering is documented as a constraint with its consequence,
and the shape rule no longer claims to reserve shipped stage names; the
shipped-stage test compares against the builtin factory's own stage.
archie-core-fwmp. Every call site hardcoded workflow.BuiltinStepRegistry(), so
the step vocabulary a workflow definition may name was closed to the six shipped
workflows and archie-agent could compile only what the control plane happened to
validate against the same literal.
internal/domain/workflow.Manager is the family owner (ARCHITECTURE.md#plugin-
engine-rule-strict invariant 2): a constructed, injected value with no
package-level registry and no init()-time registration. Register validates at
the producer and atomically -- nil or unnamed provider, malformed provider or
step-type identifier, a step type with no factory, a duplicate claim, a provider
declaring one type twice, and a contribution shadowing a shipped stage are each
refused, and a refused contribution applies nothing. Registry() hands back a
copy, so the closed set is a property of the manager rather than a convention.
internal/infrastructure/workflowsteps is the one package both composition roots
import: it holds the compiled-in provider set and builds the manager. archied
registers it in RunStateStore (the validating side) and in openStateStoreAdapter
(the daemon's client), archie-agent in productionWorkerDependencies (the
executing side), and archie-messaging at its own root, each before the first
resolution.
The five hardcoded sites now resolve the injected manager instead: the State
Store's workflow-definitions validate closure and encodeWorkflowDefinitions, the
control-plane client's read and write paths, and CompilePinnedWorkflow's shipped
-definition and pinned compiles (one resolution per package).
step_vocabulary_agreement_test.go registers a provider through the production
Manager and drives all three sides with it; breaking any one of the six
resolution points back to the builtin registry fails that side's assertion.
Every process that layers database-owned settings now publishes the version it
applied, and re-stamps it every 30 seconds so the report time doubles as a
liveness signal. A record older than 90 seconds belongs to a process that has
stopped, which is the only way this surface can tell a live process from one
that applied a version and then died.
RuntimeConfig returned the merged config and discarded the versions it read,
so no caller could report what it had applied. It now returns them, and
archied and archie-gateway report each kind through boot.runtimeConfig at boot
and on SIGHUP. A validation failure reports every kind with the error, because
the layering is all-or-nothing, and leaves the recorded version alone so a
rejected edit does not erase the fact that an older one is live. The daemon
also reports workflow execution settings as the watch applies them, and
archie-messaging reports channel settings at startup.
Reporting is best-effort by construction: the configuration a report describes
has already been applied, so a failed write is logged and never returned. That
keeps it off the reload's error path, where it would have raised a banner
saying a reload failed when its config took effect.
applystatus.New refuses a process name Processes() does not list. The reader
renders known names, so an invented one would be invisible rather than wrong,
which is the same thing the page means by a process that never started.
Relates to archie-core-pskb.
Adds PutApplyStatus/ListApplyStatus so each process can report which version
of a control-plane resource it is running, and the UI can read it back.
docs/prds/control-plane-apply-status.md is the approved design.
It goes on the State Store contract rather than the control plane, whose
service is for editing a resource: a status report is not an edit. The
config-snapshot pair is the precedent, and the deny-by-default arm of
authorizesTaskScopedCall already refuses both new RPCs to a task grant, which
TestOnlyAdminReportsApplyStatus pins.
The row is keyed on (process, kind) and replaced in place, because a process
re-stamps on an interval and nothing reads a history of re-stamps. An error
leaves applied_version alone, so a rejected edit never erases the fact that an
older version is live. The read is a list and an empty one is not an error,
unlike the config snapshot's found=false singleton.
Contract PRD inventory and RPC count follow in the same series.
Relates to archie-core-pskb.
internal/webui hardcoded the control-plane actor as "operator:web", so every
audit row a dashboard edit wrote to resource_history named a constant rather
than an identity the repository can resolve. The identity API next door already
had the answer: the dashboard authenticates with one shared token and carries
no per-user session, so the actor is the System identity.
Both dashboard paths now derive attribution from one webAudit helper, which
also stops swallowing the request ID error that would otherwise write an empty
idempotency key.
Messaging said the same thing but only checked the sender string was non-empty
before passing it through as the actor. Its set and replace paths now resolve
the sender to an identity and record its ID, on the same resolver the identity
subcommand uses, so a sender that does not resolve cannot change settings.
The Web UI and messaging channels now read and write Archie's runtime
settings through one versioned, audited control-plane API hosted on the
State Store's existing gRPC server: catalog, query, command, watch. Each
feature owns its resource, validation and commands; storage only writes
versions and audit records.
Workflows move with it. Definitions become portable YAML compiled through
a closed, typed step registry and stored as a control-plane resource, so
the yaegi interpretation paths (internal/gate, wfeval, wfextract,
gateeval, gateextract, skillbuild) are deleted rather than carried.
The UI process reads definitions as data: the JSON projection lives in
internal/domain/workflow/task so a dashboard decodes the stored
collection without linking the workflow engine, which cmd/archie-ui's
deletion gate forbids. Shipped definitions ride the catalog descriptor
rather than a bespoke REST route, keeping the API to its four operations.
archie-messaging gains -state-store-target/-state-store-token and reads
channel settings from the database, failing closed when the State Store
is unreachable: the database is authoritative for those settings.
The generated symbol tables carried 25 hand-added nil guards across three
packages, re-applied by hand after every regeneration because `yaegi extract`
does not emit them. Regeneration silently dropped them, and three package docs
instructed the next agent to put them back.
The guards also answered the wrong way. A nil WResolve returned ("", nil), so a
malformed secret engine served an empty secret and reported success; a nil
WStop reported a clean shutdown for a module that never ran one.
Reject the wrapper where it enters the daemon instead. Yaegi type-checks
"var X Iface = impl{}" and refuses an incomplete impl on its own, but the
wrapper type is exported into the symbol table, so interpreted code can build
one directly and struct-literal semantics leave the omitted method nil.
Resolve now names the missing method and skips the plugin.
Generated tables are used verbatim again. Also names the wanted type on a
failed assertion, which formatted as "want <nil>" for every interface target.
* fix: address the Greptile findings on the merged PRs
Four valid review findings from PRs #892, #893, #898 and #899, which were
merged without the comments being read.
- Config.Clone left the new diff-cap pointers aliased (#899, mine). Clone
deep-copies every reference field, including the *bool beside it, so a
clone could write the cap through to the published snapshot. Both the
top-level field and the identity overrides are copied, with the clone test
extended to cover them.
- providerOutcomeRecorder.record could report an older call as the latest
(#892). The completion time is taken before the lock, so two concurrent
calls can reach the lock in the opposite order to their completion and the
unconditional store overwrote the newer outcome. It now keeps the newer,
via a recordAt seam that makes the reordering testable.
- Curator model calls bypassed the recorder (#892). curatorLLMRunner calls
the runtime directly, so a daemon whose only recent model traffic was
curator work reported "no calls attempted yet" while the provider was
demonstrably reachable. It records at its own adapter, and sendChatTurn's
"single choke point" comment is corrected to say there are two.
- A provider error reached /status raw (#892), unlike channel details, so a
multiline or oversized error broke the one-line-per-fact layout. Both now
share one bounded formatter.
Found while fixing the curator path: agentexec.NewRuntime returns nil when no
provider is configured, and a nil *runtime.Runtime panics on its first method
call, so a curator asking for a completion took the daemon down. It now
returns an error, and records nothing -- a local misconfiguration is not a
provider call.
Not fixed, filed instead: the shared lastPollAt masking a stuck identity, the
container max-uptime callback resurrecting teardown bookkeeping, the
dashboard dropping a served-only status filter on cold load, and the route
registry test's line-by-line parser.
* fix(build): drop goimports from the gate's formatter set
`task check` spent 136 of its 167 seconds in `task fmt`, and 134 of those
136 in one formatter: goimports alone over the tree.
golangci-lint's goimports formatter calls imports.Process once per file,
which builds a fresh x/tools ProcessEnv each time, so
internal/imports.getFixesWithSource re-reads modindex.Read($GOMODCACHE) per
file. On this machine that index is 62.7 MiB / 2,081,070 lines (an 11 GiB
module cache), and modindex's in-process memo does not take effect: 3 files
read 187.9 MiB back, 15 files open the payload 15 times. That is ~53 GiB of
I/O and CSV parsing per run, and it is linear at ~155 ms per file (122 files
-> 18.8s, 864 -> 133.8s). Pointing the index cache elsewhere drops the same
command to 3.9s.
The same analyzer runs under `golangci-lint run`, so a cold cache pays it
again: 169s cold with goimports, 31s without -- which is what CI and archied's
own PR gate see, since only `fmt` never caches locally.
Removing it costs no enforcement. gofumpt and gci remain, `task lint` still
reports formatter drift as an issue, and the whole-tree fmt is now 2.2s with
the tree byte-identical. What is given up is goimports' convenience of
adding and removing import lines, which compile errors already cover.
The examples/secret-engines exclusion stays: gofumpt and gci leave those
Yaegi programs alone today, but the exclusion is the stated invariant that a
formatter must not rewrite the imports of files it cannot type-check, and
TestFormattersExcludeInterpretedSecretEngines holds it. Its comment no longer
pins the reason to the formatter that was dropped.
* fix(gateway): stop /status promising and mis-reporting health it cannot see
Two findings from the cloud review of #892.
Title generation no longer records chat-model health. It runs detached after
a first turn under its own 30s bound and its error is swallowed by the
caller, but it shared the process-wide outcome recorder, so a title that
merely timed out overwrote the health line with "failed" -- reporting a
broken provider on the strength of a call no user was waiting for.
The /status command description no longer claims "workers" and "channels".
Neither can render: newStatusHealth reads the container pool and the poll
loop from boot, but the only production router.Health assignment is in
setupGatewayChat, which runs solely in the archie-gateway process, where
neither exists; channels is nil since the Messaging Service took the
front-ends. Only the broker and chat-model lines actually appear, so that is
what the help text now says.
The underlying split -- daemon owns the facts, Gateway owns the Router -- is
filed rather than patched here: it needs either a cross-process health
contract or a ratified two-section /status, not a quick wire-up.